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ABSTRACT 
A theoretical framework for exploring the feasibility and fairness of 
using mediation to address bullying and harassment in UK workplaces.  
Ria Deakin. Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Manchester, 2014 
Positioning itself within policy debates on the best way to deal with disputes in UK 
workplaces and the (potential) resultant increased interest in mediation, this thesis draws 
on literature from law, philosophy, psychology and management to add to the growing, 
but largely theoretically-underdeveloped research on workplace mediation. In this 
research, mediation refers to a voluntary and confidential process where parties to dispute 
seek a mutually agreed outcome. This process is facilitated by an impartial third-party 
mediator. The research offers an empirically-informed theoretical framework exploring the 
extent to which the use of mediation to deal with bullying and harassment is appropriate. 
In asking whether mediation is appropriate, it argues that it is necessary to consider 
whether its use is not only feasible but also fair. 
Using Rawls’s (2001) theory of justice as fairness to structure the discussion and focusing 
on cases involving sex, race and sexual orientation it constructs an argument for the use 
of fairness as a guiding concern for an understanding of mediation grounded in an 
appreciation of public values and notions of social cooperation. It explores tensions 
between the nature of mediation and of bullying and harassment to question the extent to 
which an emphasis on cost/efficiency and empowerment in mediation rhetoric may 
obscure questions of the privatisation and individualisation of systemic and structural 
problems. Within this discussion theoretical and practical questions are identified and are 
then explored through the use of a mixed method research design comprised of a small-
scale questionnaire (N=108), interviews (N=20) and focus groups (Four groups, N=16). 
Samples were purposively recruited and consisted of those over 18 years old with six 
month’s work experience in a UK workplace (questionnaire/focus groups) and external 
workplace mediators (interviews).  
Answers to the questions are offered in the form of a framework comprised of a 
theoretical model and a practically-orientated schematic. It is argued that the 
reconciliation of potential conflicts between mediation and bullying and harassment are 
found in a greater understanding of the way mediation operates in practice. This 
understanding is guided by an appreciation that different standards of reasonableness 
apply to different behaviours and that individuals, organisations and the courts have 
differing levels of responsibility for setting and upholding these standards. In meeting this 
responsibility it is important an organisation is seen as a party to the mediation process 
since a threat to fairness arises not from privatisation per se but from a personalisation of 
problems of organisational and/or societal significance. Rather than reject the use of 
mediation in such situations it suggests the notion of ‘tailored privatisation’ offering a 
compromise between the concerns of privatisation and the purported benefits of 
mediation.  
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LAY ABSTRACT 
Workplace mediation, bullying and harassment: A fair fit?  
Ria Deakin. Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Manchester, 2014 
Despite its presence on the peripheries of the policy agenda for a number of years, the 
use of workplace mediation to deal with disputes in the UK has been relatively low. 
However recent changes to the law relating to the bringing of Employment Tribunal claims 
may potentially provide the momentum for an increase in the use of workplace mediation 
that has thus far failed to materialise. In this research, mediation refers to a voluntary and 
confidential process where parties to dispute seek a mutually agreed outcome. This 
process is facilitated by an impartial third-party mediator. If organisational interest in the 
use of mediation grows, so too should knowledge and understanding about the ways it is, 
and should be, used. This knowledge and understanding in the academic field is currently 
sparse since there is a limited (but growing) body of research to draw on. 
As bullying and harassment are often said to be particularly suitable for mediation, this 
research takes such cases as its focus and explores the reasons why this may be the case. 
In so doing it addresses the question of the extent to which mediation is an appropriate 
way of addressing workplace bullying and harassment. Here appropriate is taken to mean 
that its use is not only feasible but also fair. It focuses on cases involving sex/gender, 
race and sexual orientation to explore whether bullying and harassment should be treated 
differently from other workplace disputes and indeed from each other. It does so on the 
basis that there are historical and social reasons for making such distinctions and 
considers these reasons in light of the rhetoric surrounding mediation and its focus on 
cost and efficiency and individual empowerment.  
A questionnaire and focus groups with those over 18 years old with at least six months’ 
work experience in a UK workplace and interviews with external workplace mediators 
were conducted to explore understandings of bullying and harassment and gather views 
on how it should be dealt with. The findings were explored and constructed into a 
framework which seeks to incorporate theoretical understandings and perceptions of 
fairness and justice into practical understandings and operation of workplace mediation.  
The research concludes that bullying and harassment should be treated differently to 
other disputes and should not be seen as individual, personal problems but rather as 
organisational (and potentially societal) ones and therefore an organisation should not 
shift responsibility for bullying and harassment onto the individuals involved. This shifting 
may be the case if mediation is used inappropriately and was seen as particularly 
concerning where the behaviour is symptomatic of organisational culture and/or societal 
prejudices and stereotypes. Therefore it argues that an organisation must be considered 
as a party to the mediation process but that confidentiality can be operated through 
‘tailored privatisation’ which preserves aspects of individual empowerment whilst 
potentially helping to challenge and possibly change organisational practice as well as 
personal opinion. The skill and integrity of the mediator were seen as crucial to ensuring 
appropriate use.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In November 2011 the UK government announced the results of its ‘Resolving Workplace Disputes’ 
consultation, setting out its plans for changing the way disputes are dealt with in the workplace. 
The aim of the consultation was to divert claims away from the Employment Tribunal (ET) system 
and encourage an early resolution of disputes. The consultation concluded that: ‘Taken together, 
the measures that we intend to take will support the work the Government is doing to deliver a 
flexible, effective and fair labour market, where employers and workers are informed and 
empowered and able to sit down and discuss issues with each other’ (BIS, 2011a:5). Those 
measures included an endorsement of workplace mediation through the piloting of regional 
mediation networks for SMEs and were accompanied by a statement that lack of understanding of 
mediation was seen as the biggest barrier to its use (BIS, 2011a:13). This research speaks to that 
endorsement and lack of understanding. The definition of mediation will be considered in greater 
detail in chapter 5, but for present purposes, mediation should be understood as referring to a 
voluntary and confidential process where parties to dispute seek a mutually agreed outcome. The 
process is facilitated by an impartial third-party mediator. 
The 2011 consultation marked the latest in a number of attempts by successive governments to 
deal with the expanding number of ET claims. Although it was anticipated that the previous 
consultation’s endorsement of mediation (Gibbons, 2007; Sanders, 2009) would lead to an increase 
in its use in the workplace, the most recent figures available indicate only 7% of workplaces had 
experience of workplace mediation in the last twelve months (Van Wanrooy, Bewley, Bryson, Forth, 
Freeth, Stokes and Wood, 2013). Whilst the current steps taken in relation to mediation are 
arguably limited (Saundry, Latreille, Dickens, Irvine, Teague, Urwin and Wibberley, 2014), other 
changes introduced since 2013 have the potential to stem the flow of ET claims. The most notable 
change is the introduction of ET fees in July 2013 which led to a 59% drop in single claims in 
January-March 2014 compared with the same period in 2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2014:8). 
Although there is currently no way of telling whether the drop in claims has been accompanied by 
an increase in the use of workplace mediation, it is not unfeasible and thus if there is the potential 
for an increased use of workplace mediation, there is an increased need to understand when it 
should be used and when it should not. This is the overarching concern of this research.  
This PhD focuses specifically on the appropriateness of using mediation to address workplace 
bullying and harassment since these have been identified as being potentially suitable for 
mediation (BIS, 2011a:12; Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) and Chartered 
Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD), 2013:12). This suitability however is questioned by 
those such as Keashly and Nowell (2003; 2011) in the bullying literature who argue there is a 
fundamental tension between the nature of mediation and the nature of bullying. This tension will 
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be explored in relation to the extent to which mediation can indeed be seen as an appropriate way 
of dealing with workplace bullying and harassment.  
The existence of workplace mediation on the peripheries of policy debates has been matched by 
only a limited amount of academic output on its operation in the UK. This output has however 
increased over the past few years and this PhD seeks to add to the growing contributions on the 
use of mediation in UK workplaces. This research however takes a different approach to much of 
the workplace mediation research produced over the past few years which has predominantly 
focused on exploring the prevalence and use of mediation (for example see Latreille, 2010) and/or 
concerns over the barriers to its increased use (e.g. Harris, Tuckman and Snook, 2012). The 
positioning of mediation against the policy background has led to an arguable polarisation of focus 
towards its cost and efficiency benefits and a strong empirical focus. This has left the concept of 
workplace mediation largely under-theorised with only one theoretical framework having been 
offered (by Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011). This research seeks to combine the two approaches by 
offering an empirically-informed theoretical framework to help facilitate understanding and 
discussion on the extent to which workplace mediation may be seen as an appropriate way of 
dealing with workplace bullying and harassment.  
In so doing it aims to broaden the focus beyond cost and efficiency to explore how bullying and 
harassment are perceived and constructed on an individual and societal level and how this may 
influence what is seen as an appropriate response. This aim is achieved by drawing on literature 
both from the academic disciplines of law, organisational psychology and management, and from 
practical materials such as policy and practitioner literature. By including a diverse range of sources 
it aims to offer a pluralistic and nuanced framework demonstrating how practice can be informed 
and strengthened by theoretical and abstract ideas and visa versa. Indeed it argues that it is only 
through a greater understanding of how mediation operates in practice that one can understand a 
number of conceptual issues, such as the compatibility of confidentiality in mediation with the 
change in culture promised in the policy endorsement. It is hoped the resultant framework can be 
used to facilitate discussion on and explore the question of the extent to which workplace 
mediation is appropriate for addressing workplace bullying and harassment in UK workplaces.   
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The construction of the framework is guided by a number of research questions. The overarching 
research question is what is referred to throughout this thesis as “the appropriateness question”:  
To what extent is workplace mediation appropriate for dealing with workplace bullying and 
harassment?  
It is argued that appropriateness should be considered as having two elements, feasibility and 
fairness. Feasibility relates to the extent to which mediation is appropriate in the sense it is a 
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feasible choice (for example practically possible). Fairness relates to whether the use of mediation 
is appropriate in the sense it is not only feasible but that its use would also be fair.  
In order to address the overarching question and explore these elements, a number of further 
questions were identified:  
1. What factors influence whether a situation is perceived as bullying and/or harassment?  
2. What factors influence whether mediation is perceived as appropriate? 
3. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining perceptions of bullying 
and/or harassment? 
4. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining whether mediation is 
perceived as appropriate? 
5. How do the factors associated with perceptions of bullying and/or harassment and those 
associated with the appropriateness of mediation relate to each other? 
 
Given the strong analytical and theoretical focus of this research, the research questions were 
treated as being as theoretically relevant as they were empirically important and thus guided the 
research design and argument presented throughout. Therefore, both the extant literature and the 
primary data collected here have been integrated to develop the framework offered in chapter 10.  
1.3 THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis seeks to offer a coherent and integrated argument throughout and its structure is 
designed to reflect that.  
The literature from the different disciplines (i.e. law, psychology, philosophy and management) is 
therefore not considered separately but is rather presented and compared throughout (i.e. 
according to theme, rather than discipline). The literature review is presented across four chapters 
which aim to incrementally develop the argument advanced in pursuit of answering the research 
questions.  This is then further developed through an outline of the methodology adopted and a 
presentation of the research findings. The final chapter brings all the various elements together to 
offer responses to the research questions and demonstrate how they can be consolidated into a 
new framework to help facilitate discussion on the extent to which mediation can be seen as an 
appropriate-both feasible and fair-way of dealing with bullying and harassment in UK workplaces.  
Chapter 2 begins by justifying the need for a new framework and outlining how the various 
literatures drawn on can inform the argument offered here. It rejects the possibility of developing a 
framework offering a universally correct and singular ordering of factors and instead accepts the 
need to embrace complexity and pluralism. In light of this, it begins to make a number of the 
assumptions adopted in this research explicit, including the assumption that the argument 
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advanced will (necessarily) not be accepted by all. It establishes the analogy of a map for helping 
to structure the discussion which follows.  
Chapter 3 uses Rawls’s thought experiment from his Theory of Justice as Fairness (1958; 2001) to 
lay the foundations for the thesis that fairness should be considered as an overarching aim when 
addressing “the appropriateness question”. In doing so it questions what the rules for social 
cooperation in a fair society should be. It introduces the importance of the idea of the government, 
the courts and organisations as institutions of society who are responsible for setting and 
upholding standards of behaviour considered collectively as appropriate. It rejects Rawls’s 
separation of an individual’s public and private identity in favour of Nagel’s (1991) accommodation 
of personal (private) and impersonal (public) stances and argues that where there is a conflict 
between the two this should be resolved in favour of the latter in accordance with societally 
determined standards of reasonableness. It identifies the possible tension between this and the 
empowering and confidential nature of mediation. Fairness is distinguished from justice. Different 
forms of justice are distinguished from one another and their potential relevance for workplace 
mediation is explored. The chapter concludes that whilst justice may be a relevant factor, it will not 
always be the case and that fairness in accordance with public standards of reason should be seen 
as the destination the map in the analogy leads to.  
Chapter 4 continues with Rawls’s thought experiment to consider the extent to which bullying and 
harassment may be considered as worthy of prohibition in a fair society and argues that dignity 
may be seen as a unified justification for this. In so doing, it draws on arguments of equality 
grounded in historical and social justifications for the protection of certain characteristics through 
the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation and considers how far these can be applied to 
bullying. It distinguishes harassment and bullying on the ground that the former may involve a 
protected characteristic whilst the latter will not. The differing levels of institutional protection for 
the two are considered and the fact harassment is explicitly prohibited by law whilst bullying is not 
is used to argue for the need to view organisations as social institutions responsible for upholding 
reasonable standards of behaviour. It is acknowledged, however, that this view may be 
problematic, particularly where systemic problems of bullying exist. The idea of a spectrum of 
reasonable behaviour is introduced and the opportunity for mediation to be seen as more 
appropriate at certain levels than others is offered. Bullying and harassment and the differing levels 
of protection are therefore offered as potentially different routes on the map. 
Chapter 5 moves on to explicitly consider how the emphasis on cost and efficiency and individual 
empowerment in mediation can be seen as consistent with a social order that prioritises collective 
and publically determined standards and mechanisms above personal perception of the 
appropriateness of the reasonableness of behaviour and confidential processes.  It explores the 
characteristics of mediation and the mediator role and limits the discussion to facilitative mediation 
and how this approach may be reconciled with the nature of bullying and harassment. It argues 
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that the answer to this reconciliation lies in a greater understanding of the way mediation operates 
in practice. This is particularly the case in relation to the management of power imbalances and of 
confidentiality. The apparent disconnect between the confidential nature of mediation and claims of 
cultural transformation are explored against legal concerns over the privatisation of justice through 
an increased use of pre-litigation resolution methods, such as arbitration and mediation, classified 
as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). In light of the spectrum of behaviour and potential 
barriers identified in the previous chapter it questions the extent to which courts and the legal 
arguments of privatisation are relevant and concludes that through the positioning of organisations 
as social institutions responsible for upholding socially-valued standards, the privatisation 
arguments can be adapted to an organisational context. Thus through a consideration of the 
characteristics of mediation, those of bullying and harassment and an identification of potential 
barriers and convergences, the ways in which mediation may be appropriately used to “signpost” 
directions along the routes set out in the previous chapter towards the destination of fairness are 
suggested.  
Having sought to navigate between and relate the purely philosophical or conceptual to questions 
of practical relevance to present the argument offered in chapters 2-5, the thesis then moves to 
consider how these may explored through data collection.  
Moving to research methodology, chapter 6 begins by justifying the critical realist approach 
adopted by outlining how the characteristics of critical realism relate to the topic, for example, the 
importance of shared understanding and construction of knowledge and through the recognition of 
the importance of context, the need to accept pluralism and reject an objectively correct ordering 
of factors accepted in chapter 2. In so doing, it accepts the aim of the research is to identify the 
factors which may be of relevance and the contextual factors which may determine the extent to 
which they are relevant in a given situation. It sets out a mixed method research design and 
argues for the need to see all three stages (questionnaire, interviews and focus groups) as 
sequentially contributing to the overall framework developed in chapter 10. It therefore argues that 
the quality of the contributions of the research should be evaluated on the strength of the 
theoretical framework and the way this has been justified by reference to both the existing 
literature set out in chapters 2-5 and the findings presented in chapters 7-9.  
Chapters 7-9 present the findings from each data collection stage in sequence. Though presented 
in this linear way, these chapters do not simply present the findings but rather begin to offer a 
discussion on how they do or do not conform to the arguments presented in chapters 2-5 and how 
the results converge or diverge across the stages. Intention and perception, power and the need 
for shared understanding between the parties emerge as common themes and factors which 
strongly influence both whether a situation may be perceived as bullying and/or harassment and 
whether mediation may be appropriate. Notions of fairness and dignity are presented as possible 
explanations as to why the various factors may be considered as influential. The importance of 
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contextual factors such as the relationship dynamic between the parties involved, with the 
organisation and in society, are evident as possible determinates of the ways in which the various 
factors may relate to each other. There was a disagreement between the mediator interviews and 
the focus group participants as to the appropriate balance between individual (personal) and 
collective (impersonal) judgements in assessing the reasonableness of behaviour and resolution 
choice but this disagreement is arguably mitigated by an acceptance in both stages of the need for 
organisations to play an active role in any process.  
Finally chapter 10 seeks to bring all the previous chapters together to answer the research 
questions. It concludes that there are circumstances where mediation may be seen as appropriate 
for dealing with bullying and harassment in the sense it is both feasible and fair but that this is 
contingent on a number of factors, including a greater recognition of different forms of bullying 
and harassment and the different institutional protections and responsibilities these attract, the skill 
and integrity of a mediator and the need for an organisation to be seen a party to mediation. The 
findings confirmed that a greater understanding of the way mediation operates in practice helped 
to unlock a number of the conceptual problems. For example, distinguishing between the stages of 
mediation and understanding it as a non-linear process is important for appreciating how power 
dynamics can be mitigated. In relation to privatisation arguments, understanding that 
confidentiality is not an absolute and may be tailored between the parties, the mediator and the 
organisation provides a potential compromise to the objection raised here over the individualisation 
of disputes where this would circumvent the standards determined to be reasonable in a fair 
society. The chapter thus offers a framework consisting of two elements: a theoretical model 
where disputes can be positioned in relation to understandings of fairness and responsibility and a 
schematic chart for facilitating discussions on how a dispute may be appropriately mapped onto 
the model. Limitations, future research and key contributions are also identified.  
Briefly however before turning to the review of the literatures, it is important to note at the outset 
that the scope and presentation of this research have been influenced by my own history and 
experience.  
1.4 THE AUTHOR 
I studied law for my undergraduate degree where I gained an interest in equality law and 
completed a dissertation on the importance yet (in)adequacy of the use of law to tackle social 
inequalities.  
Through a number of legal and non-legal jobs in a variety of workplaces I became fascinated by 
workplace dynamics and relationships which led me to do an MSc in Human Resource Management 
and Industrial Relations. This introduced me to a broader range of disciplines and literature 
including organisational psychology. Following a talk on Acas pre-conciliation I became interested 
in alternative dispute resolution generally and in workplace mediation more specifically, both at an 
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academic and a policy level. This led to my undertaking the MSc research dissertation on internal 
mediation.  
These varying influences led to me to seek commonalities and differences across the various 
literatures and identify the ways they could be integrated to broaden and facilitate understanding 
on the extent to which mediation could be seen as appropriate when dealing with cases which 
potentially engage with legal and moral issues, such as racial or sexual harassment.  
The structure of the thesis reflects this history since it is driven by analytical, often abstract, critical 
argument which is informed but not determined by the empirical components. This will become 
apparent as the thesis progresses.  
Having now set out the aim and structure of the thesis, attention will now turn to expanding its 
substance.  
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CHAPTER 2.  MAPPING A FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Stating that an aim is to develop a framework is arguably like joining the story half way through. 
To simply begin with the formulation of the framework without first exploring the underlying 
assumptions presents the risk of producing a piece of work ‘that is implicit and unconsidered’ (Fox, 
1971: v).  In agreement with Fox (1971), it is accepted here that a framework should possess ‘the 
virtue of being explicit and thus susceptible to conscious thought and challenge’ (v). This chapter 
will briefly establish the need to adopt a pluralistic approach and to develop a new framework.  
2.2 RESOLVING CONFLICT: ONE WAY OR MANY? 
At the heart of the debate for this framework is conflict and the need to seek to reconcile values, 
concepts and arguments that may be seen as conflicting. Broadly speaking, the debates may be 
seen in dyadic terms: economy and efficiency versus social justice; procedural justice versus 
substantive justice; alternative dispute resolution versus litigation; individual versus collective; 
equal opportunities versus managing diversity. Presented in this way they can be understood as 
standing in competition with each other. If one accepts this presentation, the question then 
becomes whether one can seek to reconcile them or if one must accept that they are indeed 
mutually exclusive; a favoured side must be chosen. 
The dyadic presentation is, however, overly simplistic; as is any attempt to argue that the “pairs” 
are themselves discrete from one another. It will be argued that the components are best 
understood as a mesh: interrelated in numerous complex ways. How then does one begin to 
unpick the mesh? For Bush (1988-1989) the first step is to decide whether or not it is possible to 
identify a single priority order. Such an order should not be determined by preference but rather 
must be objectively correct. Here the result would be a prescriptive framework. From such a stance 
there is no need to pick a side since there is only one correct side. In the alternative one may 
accept that there may be a multitude of ways in which the various competing elements may be 
prioritised. This priority will vary with any given number of factors and therefore one can only talk 
in terms of preferences. This therefore necessitates picking a side whilst accepting that others may 
not agree. These respectively represent the stance of unitarists and pluralists. The approach 
adopted in the current research is that of pluralism.  
For unitarists, decisions as to the ordering of priorities are taken using objective criteria and in 
doing so one is able to offer a greater degree of clarity and certainty (Bush, 1988-1989). Arguing 
for such certainty is a pleasing goal but when one adopts an interdisciplinary and multiparty 
approach it becomes difficult to see how such an assertion can be accepted. The difficulty lies in 
accepting an objectively correct and prescriptive reconciliation of competing claims that can be 
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applied regardless of context. One may argue that, according to their views and assumptions, 
there should only be a single ordering of factors, ranked according to their importance. It is difficult 
to take the leap to accept that there can be and is only one order since this involves an 
epistemological shift that, it is argued, it is not possible to make (see chapter 6). A clear example 
of this will be the discussion on equality/social justice below (see chapter 4). One may argue that 
given the various circumstances certain things should be prioritised, and indeed that is the position 
adopted here. However, it is accepted that this is a reflection of one viewpoint, which from the 
perspective assumed here is considered to be favourable. It is important to acknowledge that in a 
pluralistic world this will not be supported by everyone since people have different views and 
different assumptions. It will be seen that even where priorities are determined by law there is still 
the potential for disagreement and ambiguity. The law does, however, act as an important 
influence on the way personal and organisational priorities may be exercised (and constrained) in 
practice.  
The necessary consequence of this acceptance of difference is therefore the rejection of a unitarist 
view in favour of pluralism. In accepting this one also accepts the inevitability that no single 
framework can be truly comprehensive. The framework developed in this research therefore seeks 
to offer a way of facilitating discussion about the ways in which certain factors may be ordered and 
prioritised and how these are context dependent (see chapters 6 and 10). 
At the very centre of the discussion that follows is the assumption that different people will react to 
and assess different situations in different ways and that if mediation is to be considered 
appropriate one must explore the ways in which these may reconciled.  To take such a stance is to 
accept the inevitability of ambiguity. Rather than see this as a weakness, this ambiguity is fertile 
ground for discussion and disagreement, which is arguably so vital if the need for further 
knowledge is to be satisfied.  
The accommodation of ambiguity and therefore the susceptibility to criticism necessitates an even 
greater attention to detail in the examination of assumptions and use of concepts.  In defence of 
the framework one must be able to offer reasoned responses to criticisms. It is argued that having 
an empirically grounded framework may offer an important defence (Latreille, Buscha and Conte, 
2012; Seargeant, 2005:5).  
In pursuit of clarity it is vital that the reasoning underlying the purpose and choice of content of 
the framework is made explicit (Fox, 1971). If one rejects the universal prescription of the 
framework, the purpose of both the conceptual and empirical exploration is to identify whether, 
even with complex and varied priorities, it is possible to identify patterns and common ground 
which will help facilitate discussion in decision making and help fuel the debate on the 
appropriateness of the use of workplace mediation in the UK.  
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2.3 THE NEED FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK 
It is exactly in the pursuit of clarity of purpose that the argument for developing a new framework 
can be found. To put it bluntly there is no existing framework which adequately addresses the 
issues under consideration here. That is not to say that there are not a number of frameworks 
which are influential in shaping the new framework; but rather to acknowledge that each 
framework has its own purpose and focus. If one seeks to accommodate different voices (both in 
terms of discipline and individual/group position), it is also necessary to offer a framework which 
reflects multiple voices which few currently do (see Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011 regarding the 
unitary management perspective in mediation; Jenkins, Zapf, Winefield and Sarris, 2012 on the 
focus on the target in bullying research).  This has implications for recognising an important 
assumption in the proposed framework and that is the need to accommodate the priorities and 
concerns both of the people who are ultimately responsible for deciding whether mediation is 
appropriate and of those who may be influencing that decision.  Further, even where it is difficult 
to identify an existing framework there is a wealth of work and insights on important concepts 
which have also informed the content and the structure of the new framework. These are 
considered in chapters 3-5.  
Academic work on ADR (and mediation specifically) in the UK context is growing but is relatively 
sparse (Latreille, 2011). The work which does exist provides a useful insight into the way mediation 
operates and to barriers to its greater use. In terms of frameworks however, perhaps the best (and 
only) example is provided by Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011).  
They acknowledge that ‘the decision as to which type of ADR may be utilised can depend on the 
type of dispute, the stage of the dispute and crucially what type of resolution is being sought’ 
(:109). They draw attention to the assumption in ADR that there is a possibility of aligning social 
and economic interests (:108): an assumption which is also accepted here. Their focus is on 
addressing how mediation (and other ADR techniques) links to and challenges direct democracy. 
Their framework is ultimately underpinned ‘by the question of how power should be used and 
distributed’ (:115) and they concentrate on participation and its importance for autonomy and 
justice. The significance of power is undeniably important and plays an important role in the new 
framework. Ridley-Duff and Bennett’s framework offers some interesting insights but they 
themselves may arguably acknowledge that their framework is not fit for the desired purpose of 
the framework under construction here (:119). Further, their framework is only theoretical in 
nature. It has, however, been subsequently explored and partially confirmed by Bennett (2013) 
through a number (60) of interviews with (largely internal) mediators, trade union officials and 
HRM professionals in the North West. Bennett identified a key deficiency as the framework failed to 
adequately account for the role of organisational gatekeepers. Thus the role of the organisation in 
relation to the appropriateness of mediation is given a great deal of attention in this thesis.  
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The matter of reconciling the nature of bullying and harassment with the use of mediation has 
been given some (limited and predominantly non-empirical) attention in non-UK academic work, 
for example Keashly and Nowell (2011), Jenkins (2011) and Saam (2010). There has also been 
little exploration of how this reconciliation varies with the presence of a racist, sexist or 
homophobic element and indeed one of the most notable concerns driving the argument behind 
the need for a new framework is the marginalisation or absence of equality and diversity debates 
in ADR literature (Baker, 2002). This is particularly concerning as mediation is said to be 
particularly suitable in bullying and harassment cases (BIS, 2011b). The new framework seeks to 
make equality and diversity, and the reasons behaviour related to certain protected characteristics 
is prohibited by the Equality Act 2010 an explicit part of the appropriateness question. Some 
attempts to explore equality and ADR are evident in the US literature (Bond, 1996-1997; 
Hippensteele, 2006-2007) but again, it is argued that, given differences in support and legislative 
structures, one needs to be cautious in relying too heavily on such work for a UK context (Baker, 
2002). In seeking to accommodate equality and diversity within mediation discourses the 
discussion needs to draw on multiple disciplines (here law and management). The aim is to explore 
whether there are parallels or at least compatible elements in mediation, diversity and equality 
discourses. Whilst it will be argued that equality arguments should be given priority since these 
represent societal values, it is a further assumption of the framework that this sense of priority will 
not be shared by all. This will be explored in chapter 4. 
2.4  CONCLUSION: VISUALISING THE FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTING A MAP 
The preceding discussion aimed to briefly outline the worth in pursuing the development of a new 
framework to help explore how workplace bullying and harassment is perceived and to position this 
alongside equality and diversity in order to help understand how different individuals (and society) 
prioritises competing factors to determine whether or not mediation is appropriate. In short, the 
quest is to try and develop an understanding of the ways in which the various assumptions (and 
counter arguments) can be utilised to develop a more comprehensive picture of the realities of 
addressing the appropriateness question in cases of bullying and harassment. It is argued 
therefore that whilst the endeavour is no doubt messy, and is necessarily complex, it is needed.  
In helping to describe the process of determining possible content for the framework (which is 
what the next few chapters will do) and in navigating the line between pursuing simplicity and 
embracing complexity, Riskin (2003) offers a pleasing analogy. He suggests visualising the 
framework as a map. Where one strives only for simplicity, a framework ‘resembles a map that 
shows only major highways and large cities’ (:33). If one begins to embrace complexity however, 
the map becomes more helpful: ‘On such a map, additional information such as smaller towns, 
smaller roads, rivers, airports, recreation areas and ball parks, topography and weather-could 
inform and remind travellers of choices and decisions that can enrich their journeys. People 
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concerned about mediation…could benefit from maps of mediation that highlight particular issues’ 
(2003:33).  
This is an analogy which is embraced here and it is therefore to detailing the map which the 
discussion will now turn. The chapters that follow will draw on existing theory and empirical 
findings to offer an integrated exploration of the issues associated with the research questions. The 
next chapter will begin by considering the extent to which fairness may be used as a foundation for 
structuring discussions over the identification, and relative importance and value of possible 
influential factors resulting in a perception of bullying/harassment and a conclusion that mediation 
is appropriate.  
The discussion presented across chapters 3-5 seeks to engage with the complexity involved in 
exploring a theoretical basis for determining the appropriateness of using workplace mediation to 
address bullying and harassment. The argument is developed and presented in an incremental way 
and, as such, arguments may be briefly mentioned or referred to, but not discussed until a later 
point. Each stage of the argument seeks to build on the preceding stage and therefore subsequent 
chapters should be viewed as extending or refining understanding of the concepts previously 
presented. As a consequence of this approach, concepts cannot be considered discretely, but 
rather should be understood as interrelated. This treatment of the concepts and arguments as 
interrelated will be crystallised in the framework presented in chapter 10. For the purposes of 
chapters 3-5 however, the relationship between the concepts and themes discussed is shown in 
figure 1.  
Fairness is presented in chapter 3 as the foundation for the discussion and the ideas considered in 
relation to fairness are returned to in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 also introduces the relationship 
between fairness and justice and the extent to which the two may be seen as separate constructs. 
The need to see fairness and justice as separate, though related, is explored further in chapter 5 in 
the context of the scope of mediation. In chapters 4 and 5, fairness is discussed and related to 
arguments as to why bullying and harassment are objectionable, and to how this objectionable 
status dictates the need for a certain response. Therefore fairness is considered both in relation to 
the determination of behaviour and in relation to the action required in response to that behaviour. 
In respect of the former, the concept of dignity is offered as a way of approaching bullying and 
harassment, and is related to notions of justice and fairness. In so doing, it seeks to further 
demonstrate the need for the accommodation of a substantive element to fairness. Having 
established the relevance of dignity to fairness, chapter 5 moves on to explore the extent to which 
mediation may be seen as an appropriate response. Appropriate is considered by reference to not 
only feasibility, but also to fairness.  
Crucial to the question of what may be considered as fair in relation to both the determination of 
behaviour and in relation to the appropriate response, is the balancing of objective, collective 
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standards and views, with subjective and individual determinations. This balancing is a key theme 
throughout this research and influences many of the arguments presented. The mechanism for 
balancing the potentially competing determinations is set out in chapter 3 and is further developed 
and applied against the concept of dignity and determining what behaviour amounts to bullying 
and/or harassment in chapter 4. Chapter 5 takes this application further by considering the role 
mediation could play in facilitating and/or prohibiting a fair balancing of the objective and 
subjective arguments. Mediation as a process is positioned against the role of courts and of 
organisations as social institutions. The role of social institutions is initially presented conceptually 
in chapter 3 in relation to establishing a fair society and is developed further on an operational 
level in chapter 5.   
        
Figure 1. Overview of theoretical relationships.  
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CHAPTER 3.  ADR AND FAIRNESS AS THE DESTINATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first major features to plot on the map are those relating to mediation as a form of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) in relation to other resolution options. Though space does not permit an 
exploration of all the various mechanisms falling under the ADR umbrella (for example 
arbitration/conciliation (Roberts and Palmer, 2005)) it is vital to remember that mediation does not 
operate in a vacuum and nor is it (or should it be) the only option available to parties in 
employment disputes.  
The chapter will then move on to adopt (and adapt) Rawls’s Theory of Justice (2001) to 
demonstrate why fairness should be seen as a guiding concern and as something which is different 
(though related) to justice. It will argue that personal perceptions of fairness and justice should 
always be considered in the light of impersonal, objective standards of reasonableness, although it 
is accepted that determining how these should be balanced is not easy.  
3.2 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
In the quest for clarity, before one can discuss the definition(s) of mediation, one must first 
consider what is meant by ADR. Debates to this end may mistakenly be dismissed as a matter of 
mere semantics but if one is seeking to understand nuances, to make that mistake would be 
dangerous. The ‘dispute resolution’ aspect of ADR is relatively uncontroversial-in the ADR literature 
at least-and has been explored in a multitude of contexts (family, environment, organisational, 
commercial). The greatest amount of debate has arguably focused on the operation of ‘alternative’ 
and that is the element which has the most relevance here.  
The key question is, unsurprisingly, alternative to what? Again, the options can be characterised in 
dichotomous terms. In much of the legally-grounded ADR literature, the presentation is of ADR as 
an ‘alternative’ to the courts, to litigation (Lieberman and Henry, 1986). Here the role of ADR is 
often a docket-clearing one, concerned with reducing burdens on courts and the costs associated 
with litigation (Edwards, 1986; BIS, 2011a; 2011b). In literature which is more 
management/organisationally focused, ADR is argued for in the alternative to formal options like 
grievance and disciplinary procedures (Blancero and Dyer, 1996; Jameson, 1999; Lipsky and Avgar, 
2008-2009). These aims again return the debate to the idea of conflict. ‘Alternative’ conjures up 
the idea of either/or: parties either choose mediation, for example, or they choose 
litigation/grievance. In practice however this is not the case. Rather than either/or, it is probably 
more appropriate to consider the options as alternative stages in a resolution process (Gibbons, 
2007). Kruse (2004-2005) suggests the ‘A’ should refer to ‘Appropriate’ and given the aim of this 
research, this is a more useful way of framing the debates.  
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It is also perhaps inaccurate to present the legal and management discourses in a similar yet 
parallel way. Indeed to do so would be to undermine the arguments in favour of 
comprehensiveness offered by the interdisciplinary approach. Although the focus and forum may 
change, many of the key pros and cons of using ADR are measured against the same criteria. 
Some of the criteria were set out in the preceding chapter and typically focus around the demands 
of efficiency and justice (Genn, 2010). These debates however arguably take place against the 
backdrop of fairness. It is accepted here, that whilst the concept of ‘fairness’ may be enduring and 
exist in an ontologically objective sense, its meaning is necessarily subjective and that there is, and 
can be, no all-encompassing formula for determining fairness. It is argued that the pursuit of 
fairness should be considered as a, if not the, guiding principle in decision making and therefore in 
answering the appropriateness question.  
Before turning to that question however, it is useful to provide a brief definition of the facilitative 
mediation referred to throughout this research. The reasons for and consequences of this choice 
will be considered in chapter 5 but until then the following definition should serve as a sufficient 
point of reference: ‘Mediation is a confidential and voluntary process in which a neutral person 
helps people in a dispute to explore and understand their differences so that they can find their 
own solution’ (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011:123). 
3.3 FAIRNESS AS THE DESTINATION  
In embracing the centrality of fairness, one arguably finds a unifying concept on which to build the 
framework and begins to build links between the concepts of mediation, equality and diversity and 
bullying and harassment. In so doing however there is an unavoidable assumption that ‘fairness’ is 
important to all. The extent to which this may be universally true is doubted and it may therefore 
be more accurate to say that there is an assumption that seeking fairness should be important to 
all. This recognition however does not render the proposed guiding force of fairness unusable. 
There is evidence across the literature that it does play an important role (Blancero and Dyer, 1996 
in an organisational context; Genn, 2010 in relation to civil court claimants). It is also (purportedly) 
given a central role in determining policy (BIS, 2011a). It is argued the accepted subjectivity of the 
meaning of fairness provides a sufficiently flexible yet stable arena to help understand resolution 
decisions. 
For the purposes of the framework, the differing ways of achieving what one may consider fair are 
determined by the weighting and prioritisation of the various factors in decision making (sought by 
the first two research questions). To continue with Riskin’s map analogy therefore, one may 
suggest that fairness is the destination all are (or should be) trying to reach. To reflect the variance 
in what different individuals may see as being fair, one may suggest that fairness is, for example a 
very large park, meaning that all may end up in the same broad space but not necessarily in the 
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same location within that park. Further, they may have taken different routes to arrive there and it 
is to those which the discussion will now turn.  
3.4 FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE: THE SAME BUT DIFFERENT? THE RELEVANCE OF 
RAWLS 
A fundamental battle ground for determining fairness is the issue of justice. Of particular concern 
here is the extent to which fairness and justice may be considered as separate (although not 
necessarily) discrete concepts, rather than as interchangeable labels for the same thing. 
Both the proposed necessity and the challenges of seeking an integrated interdisciplinary 
framework are brought to the fore here as one is faced with the need to seek to reconcile 
constructions of concepts which are not consistent which one another. The pluralist perspective 
does however provide sufficient flexibility to at least acknowledge these differences and at best 
offer a way of accommodating (if not entirely reconciling) this by appreciating that they are 
different, yet intertwined routes, people may take.  
It would certainly be easier to simply adopt the approach of Reb, Goldman, Kray and Cropanzano 
(2006) in the organisational justice literature where fairness and justice appear to be used 
interchangeably. However, for present purposes, this is, unfortunately, not sufficient. Before 
moving on to explore the complex notion of justice it is vital to establish why here it is argued that 
fairness and justice should be considered as separate, yet related concepts and not simply as 
synonyms. John Rawls is particularly helpful in this regard. Whilst much of the substance of Rawls’s 
theory of ‘Justice as fairness’ is not necessarily of relevance here, his approach is nevertheless 
invaluable in helping to structure the way the remaining discussion will proceed.  
Rawls's theory of 'Justice as Fairness' is thus used throughout this thesis as a way of both 
informing, and structuring, the discussion presented. It does so by offering a way to distinguish 
fairness from justice in way which allows for the consideration of both individual and societal 
concerns (chapter 3). Further, it provides a way of positioning bullying and harassment as societal 
problems (chapter 4) and facilitates discussion as to the role played by institutions in society for 
addressing such problems (chapter 5). Finally, Rawls’s emphasis on public standards and collective 
knowledge of those standards, and the role of societal institutions in these public processes, 
provides a way of considering the potential benefits and limits of the individualised and confidential 
process of workplace mediation (chapter 5).  
Rawls: A (loose) blueprint for fairness 
In ‘Justice as Fairness’, Rawls’s argued that ‘the notion of fairness could be used as a framework, 
to assemble and to look at [concepts of justice] in a new way’ (Rawls, 1958:164). As will be seen, 
there are many points of departure between the assumptions made and conclusions drawn by 
28 
 
Rawls
1
 and those assumed and sought here. However, these differences notwithstanding, the 
underlying view that fairness ‘is in some sense ‘prior’ to the development of the principles of 
justice’ (Sen, 2009:54) is whole-heartedly embraced and it is taken as the starting point for the 
justification as to the choice of fairness as the destination. In agreement with Stulberg (1998), it is 
agreed that fairness must have both a procedural and a substantive element. It is also accepted in 
this research that when considering the relationship between fairness and mediation ‘one must 
crystallise a sufficiently rich conception of fairness in order to assess how particular statutory 
features advance or undermine its principles’ (Stulberg, 1998:910). He was concerned with drafting 
statutory provisions for the fair use of mediation in a variety of contexts but one may substitute 
‘features of a framework’ for ‘statutory features’ and his point stands.  
For Rawls, fairness ‘relates to right dealing between persons who are cooperating with or 
competing against one another…The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no 
authority over one another, are engaging in joint activity and amongst themselves settling or 
acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits 
and burdens’ (Rawls, 1958:178). In the context of Rawls’s enquiry, this is arguably an 
uncontroversial definition; although of itself it is insufficient for present purposes, not least in 
respect of the assumptions about authority. It does, nevertheless provide a useful point of 
reference for the discussion of Rawls here.  
Perhaps of greater direct relevance is Sen’s (2009) description of a broader notion of the fairness 
endorsed by Rawls: ‘So what is fairness? This foundational idea can be given shape in various ways 
but central to it must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and 
concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our respective 
vested interests, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices’ (:54). Understanding 
what may bias evaluations, in what ways and how these may be balanced or mitigated is what this 
research is concerned with.  
To construct his theory of justice, Rawls sought to present a thought experiment where, via the 
careful consideration and balancing of competing claims to principles of justice, representatives of 
free and equal, reasonable and rational citizens reach a consensus on those principles of justice 
necessary ‘to specify the terms of social co-operation’ (Rawls, 2001:7). According to Rawls, free 
and equal citizens possess two moral powers: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for 
the conception of the good (2001, 18-19). Here, that conception of the good is contained in a list 
of primary goods which are to be allocated according to the principles of justice (2001, 57-59). 
                                                          
1
 Rawls’s theory underwent a number of changes (Rawls, 1958; 1985; 1993; 2001) and since it is the most refined version, 
the discussion in this research will focus on the final formulation (‘Justice as Fairness: A Restatement’, 2001).  
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The representatives have to determine the social and political institutions of society which are 
needed to form the basic structure of a society that operates in accordance with the principles of 
justice (Rawls, 2001:7-9). Through the institutions, the principles of justice operate to regulate the 
behaviour of citizens (Rawls, 2001:6). Because of this regulative function, the institutions must be 
supported by all within a society and this support is grounded in the ‘idea of reciprocity or 
mutuality’ (Rawls, 2001:6). This support is crucial for the stability and legitimacy of the basic 
structure and these features are realised and sustained through publically known and agreed upon 
standards (Rawls, 2001:6, 92).  
These statements seek to concisely introduce the key features of Rawls’s theory of relevance to the 
current discussion. 
Before exploring some of these features in greater detail (in this and subsequent chapters), it is 
important to address the qualification about the use of Rawls’s theory given at the end of the 
previous section.  
Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is a complex and multifaceted theory. In the interests of expediency in 
and clarity of argument for the present research, however, the discussion will predominantly focus 
on the worth of the mechanisms of Rawls’s original position, rather than his substantive 
conclusions.  
The reasons for doing so are rooted in a number of fundamental differences between the 
underlying assumptions and explicit purposes here and those of Rawls. The first relates to 
distinguishing purpose. Although Rawls recognises a difference between justice and fairness, he is 
ultimately concerned with advancing a theory of justice. The concern here is with fairness and the 
extent to which it may (or may not) be realised through a pursuit of justice, with justice being one 
category of potential principles. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is argued that whilst a 
concern for justice should always be present, this will not necessarily be the case and therefore 
one cannot define fairness solely in terms of justice (Ake, 1975). Further, it is perhaps 
disingenuous to talk about ‘justice’ to the extent it implies a single conceptualisation and purpose. 
For Rawls, this singularity is precisely what he sought (2001:32). He was concerned with 
distributive justice and the allocation of disadvantage related to income and wealth (Rawls, 
2001:65). As will be seen shortly, such singularity is rejected here.  
In order to facilitate this he devised two (sequential) principles of justice (these would be chosen in 
his thought experiment). These are: ‘Each person has the same indefensible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all’ (The first principle) and ‘Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions and 
fair equality of opportunity’ (Equality of Opportunity principle) and ‘second they are to be to the 
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greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the Difference principle)’ (Rawls, 
2001:43). 
A body of debate has grown up around the principles and particularly around the second principle 
(see for example, Cohen, 2008; Shelby, 2004; Shiffrin, 2004; Stulberg, 1998). For present 
purposes however the focus will be on the first and adapting the discussion to the context of this 
research.  
Rawls’s focus on disadvantage associated with income and wealth has led some to criticise him for 
failing to adequately account for the relationship between such disadvantages and characteristics 
such as race (Allen, 2004; Foster, 2004; Shelby, 2004; Shiffrin, 2004) and gender (Okin, 1987). 
The focus on income and wealth, together with the questionable adequacy of Rawls’s ability to 
accommodate understandings of historical and structural disadvantage further limit the applicability 
of the substance of justice as fairness for this research. It will be argued that bullying and 
harassment cannot be seen solely in terms of distribution and that any consideration of the guiding 
principles for society should account for the reasons for the existence of certain disadvantages. 
This is not only important for determining why there is a need for the principles but also for 
understanding how they manifest in practice and therefore how they should be dealt with. Rawls 
alone does not provide sufficient mechanisms or answers to do this: he does, nevertheless, provide 
insight and it is to that insight the discussion will now turn.  
   The importance of social institutions 
The first insight is the role of the principles in the design and role of institutions forming the basic 
structure of a fair society. For present purposes, the most relevant institutions are law/the courts
2
 
(Alejandro, 1996; Dworkin, 2004, 2006; Wertheimer, 1988) and potentially the employment 
relationship (Lindblom, 2011). The workplace is not a context Rawls himself devoted much 
attention to (little beyond a brief consideration in Restatement, 2001:178). There has, however, 
been some (limited) application of justice as fairness to the workplace, of most relevance to the 
matter in hand its consideration of affirmative action (Allen, 2004; Shriffrin, 2004). Understanding 
the role of the organisation in standard setting and enforcement is necessary for present purposes, 
not least because the focus is on workplace bullying and harassment. A consideration of the 
relationship between individuals, employers and other social institutions (especially the courts) is 
arguably unavoidable when one considers the debates over the use of ADR. Rawls’s approach also 
potentially provides a way of assessing whether mediation can be accommodated within existing 
institutions.  
Great attention is to be paid to ensuring the institutions of the basic structure are just since there 
is an assumption that if the institutions themselves are just, anything which flows from their 
                                                          
2
 In this research ‘courts’ should be read as including Employment Tribunals 
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operation will also be just. This is what Rawls refers to as ‘background procedural justice’ (Rawls, 
2001:50). This is an interesting idea and one may potentially draw parallels between the 
arguments made in favour of the relationship between the structure of mediation and its 
outcomes.  
The focus on the design of just institutions required for a fair society has led Sen (2009) to criticise 
Rawls and argue that the better enquiry is to ask ‘how would justice be advanced?’ (:9). He rejects 
the ‘transcendental’ and ‘ideal’ nature of Rawls’s theory (2009:15-17), arguing instead that a 
theory of justice should be concerned with the realisation of justice and should help to guide ‘the 
actual behaviour of people’ (:69). Whilst Sen accepts institutions can play an important role in 
helping the realisation of justice, for him, an alternative approach focusing ‘on information on 
individual disadvantage judged in terms of opportunities rather than a specific ‘design’ for how 
society should be organised’ is to be favoured (:232). He therefore advocates the capabilities 
approach. This approach is concerned with the capabilities of individuals and the extent to which 
they can realise these in pursuit of their own wellbeing and agency (Sen, 2008).  
Sen’s formulation of the capabilities approach is not without merit and for present purposes the 
rejection of an ‘ideal’ answer and the recognition of the plurality of interests and influences in the 
lives of individuals (Sen, 2009) is particularly attractive. Beyond this however it offers little 
assistance above justice as fairness, not least because, whilst it accepts the difference (Sen, 
2009:4), it does not advance understanding of distinguishing between fairness and justice. Further, 
though the role of social structures and norms is acknowledged in respect of the extent to which 
they may constrain realisation of capabilities (Robeyns, 2005), Sen’s approach also fails to 
acknowledge the reasons for the existence (and of great relevance here, persistence) of certain 
social structures (e.g. gender discrimination).  
Nussbaum (2003) takes greater steps within the capabilities approach towards an appreciation of 
the need to address underlying rationales for supporting the exercise of certain capabilities and of 
addressing social barriers (in particular those associated with gender). She argues for the centrality 
of a respect for human dignity. In chapter 4 it is argued that dignity should indeed play a pivotal 
role in the appropriateness question.  Nussbaum sets out ten ‘Central Human Capabilities’ 
(2003:41-42). Of those, two are potentially of relevance here. The first is ‘Affliation’: ‘having the 
social bases of respect and nonhumilation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose 
worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin’ (Nussbaum, 2003:41-42). The 
second, ‘control over one’s environment’, has a dimension which resonates with protection against 
workplace bullying and possibly even justifying a role for mediation: ‘In work, being able to work 
as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual 
recognition with other workers’ (:42).  
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This approach has more to commend it for present purposes than Sen’s formulation but it 
nevertheless still suffers from a number of deficiencies. The first is again a failure to adequately 
address and conceptualise the role of social structures and institutions. A focus on ‘what people are 
actually able to do and to be’ (Nussbaum, 2003:39) arguably again obscures an exploration of the 
reasons why social structures exist in a particular form which therefore leads them to operate to 
constrain (or facilitate) the realisation of certain capabilities and do so in different ways for 
different people (e.g. for men and women).  
Nussbaum also fails to provide any guidance on how conflict between the ten Central Capabilities 
should be resolved. Her purpose is, she argues, to provide general principles and out of respect for 
pluralism across nations, questions of implementation and more precise specification are left to 
individual states (Nussbaum, 2003:42). This is an insufficient conclusion for current purposes since 
one of the aims of the proposed framework is to consider how various competing interests are 
weighed and balanced. As it is argued that an appreciation of the history behind the development 
of various social structures and institutions is a key element in this evaluation, failing to provide 
any guidance in this regard also fails to adequately address arguments as to how the balance is to 
be struck between individual and collective interests. This connection between the individual and 
society leads back to Rawls and his pursuit of fairness through social institutions.  
Social cooperation and expanding Rawls from political citizens to private individuals 
A further function of the desired basic structure identified above is related to the terms of social 
cooperation. This focus on pursuing social cooperation as the aim is important since it expresses 
fairness and justice in terms of a collective (public) rather than individual (private) interest. Rawls 
limited his theory to the former. He was not concerned with what he called ‘local justice’ which 
applies to the conduct of relations between individuals in their private associations (Rawls, 
2001:11; Lindblom, 2011). Over time, Rawls came to characterise justice as fairness as a political 
theory and not a metaphysical or moral one (1985; 1993; 2001). The political character is derived 
not only through the role of state intervention (through the basic political institutions) but also in 
respect of the political power of citizens as a ‘collective body…regularly imposed on citizens as 
individuals some of whom may not accept the reasons widely believed to justify the general 
structure of political authority’ (Rawls, 2001:182). In making this clarification he constrained the 
theory to interactions between citizens rather than individuals in their day-to-day lives.  
In making the distinction between the influence of justice as fairness over people in their political 
capacity and in their associational capacity (Rawls, 2001:182) he thus makes a distinction between 
the public and private (moral) identity of a person (2001:22). Rawls is concerned only with the 
former. Whilst justice as fairness is not directly concerned with regulating the conduct between 
individuals in the associations they form with others (e.g. through religion), these associations exist 
within the basic structure and are therefore subject to the principles of justice (2001:50-54). 
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However, to the extent their actions and private identity do not contradict justice as fairness, 
individuals are free to act in accordance with their private identity as they wish (2001:50).  
This separation between citizens and individuals is attractive since it potentially recognises the 
scope for the reasons why different individuals or associational groups may argue for different 
values, standards and principles (e.g. for religious reasons). However, such a clear separation of 
the public and private identity is arguably untenable (Cohen, 2008; Murphy, 1998; Nagel, 1973; 
Titelbaum, 2008; Wilkins, 1997). That is not to reject the distinction between a public and private 
assessment of values and priorities; quite the contrary. In fact it is accepted that given the plurality 
of identities such a distinction is inevitable and indeed necessary.  
Nagel: Accommodating personal and impersonal standpoints for social cooperation 
A preferable argument is advanced by Nagel (1973; 1991) who suggests each individual possesses 
a personal and impersonal standpoint (1991:3). The personal ‘gives rise to individualistic motives 
and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and realisation of such [personal] ideals’ 
whilst the impersonal ‘represents the claims of the collectivity and gives them their force for each 
individual’ (Nagel, 1991:3). These are not treated as separate or motivated by different values as 
in justice as fairness: rather conflict between the standpoints is resolved (or at least addressed) via 
an individual evaluation exercise. In making this distinction, Nagel rejects a purely personal 
(private) approach, arguing that the personal view alone is insufficient as one must recognise the 
importance of the lives of others and the impact that has on our own lives: ‘suppression of the full 
force of the impersonal standpoint is a denial of our full humanity and of the basis for a full 
recognition of the value of our own lives’ (1991:19-20). Of course, for Rawls, it was not a 
suppression of the impersonal but rather a suppression of the personal which led to his division of 
identities. In agreement with Nagel, it is accepted here that it is only through a consideration of 
both one can begin to answer the question: ‘How should we live together in society?’ (1991:6).  
A recognition of both the personal and the impersonal is important to not only determine what the 
guiding principles of society should be in the first place, why they are important (e.g. for reasons 
of dignity) and what institutions are needed to support them but also how these structures are 
then interpreted and manifest in an individual’s life. Accepting this two stage approach means 
accepting that the relative prioritisation of one of the standpoints over the other will not always be 
the same. Nagel suggests that in respect of the acceptance of general principles, the emphasis will 
likely fall on the impersonal, however, in respect of ‘choices about how to lead their lives and what 
to do on particular occasions’, personal motivations will come to the fore (1991:85). When 
discussing bullying and harassment this is particularly important as it speaks not only to the 
reasons why one may object in principle, but also to the substance or boundaries of the concepts. 
Crucially, it may allow for an explanation of why individuals may apply different personal standards 
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in situations of varying impersonal significance (e.g. thinking something is acceptable with friends 
but not at work).  
Having sought to position the relevance and preference for Rawls-albeit with some adaptation, the 
discussion will now use Rawls’s thought experiment as a device to demonstrate how guiding 
principles may be identified, how these relate to institutions and how the balance between 
individual and social interests could (or rather arguably should) be resolved.  
The (Unideal) Original Position, reasonable pluralism and the pursuit of an overlapping 
consensus  
For Rawls the enquiry begins from the ‘Original Position’ (OP) (1958). This is a hypothetical 
thought exercise used to facilitate the discussion on the design of the basic structure. Although this 
research necessarily rejects any claims to an ‘ideal’ theory where such a theory purports to offer a 
single, complete conception of justice, the nature of the OP provides a useful starting point to 
compare how the idealised basic institutions fare against their operation in “reality”.  
It is from within this OP that the representatives of free and equal, reasonable and rational citizens 
make their deliberations. Their determinations are dealt with in a sequential manner (Rawls, 
2001:48): (1) principles of justice are adopted, (2) constitutional essentials are decided, delineating 
the rules for the ‘acquisition and exercise of political power’, (3) the degree of legislative 
intervention permitted and required by the previous two stages is considered and finally (4) the 
decisions taken in (1-3) are ‘applied by administrators and followed by citizens generally and the 
constitution and laws are interpreted by members of the judiciary’. This chapter will concentrate on 
the initial stage, with discussions on the other stages being deferred for consideration in later 
chapters.  
At the first stage, representatives are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (1958; 2001). This is the 
device which seeks to ensure that fairness is necessarily built into all decisions. Behind this veil, 
representatives are to proceed on the basis they are unaware of their position in society and 
therefore, denied their knowledge of privilege and bias, they will be motivated to make decisions 
that seek to benefit the most disadvantaged in society (Rawls, 1958). As all citizens are considered 
as free and equal, no person is given priority over another and therefore all must unanimously 
agree on the principles (2001:31-32). This has a pleasing simplicity but is the stage at which the 
fallacy of a thought experiment is most glaring and again returns the discussion to the point about 
the extent to which there is a need to acknowledge not only the fact that there is disadvantage but 
also the reasons for the existence and the persistence of that disadvantage (Okin, 1987). Cynically 
this acknowledgement is also inherently intertwined with possible objections to the assumption that 
citizens can be free and equal and indeed that they are both reasonable and rational. However 
cynical, this objection may be a little premature, since the veil of ignorance is only the first stage. 
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Of greater concern however is the requirement for unanimity among the representatives (Rawls, 
2001:86). In order to facilitate acceptance by all in what Rawls acknowledges as a diverse world 
(in terms of beliefs and values, expressed through association with and within comprehensive 
doctrines), he allows the representatives to see what he describes as ‘reasonable pluralism’ 
(2001:34-37). This is the notion that there is an inevitable difficulty in seeking agreement in the 
presence of a diversity of opinions but the qualification of ‘reasonable’ dictates only certain views 
should be taken into account (Rawls, 2001:35). ‘Reasonable pluralism’ offers a useful idea for 
seeking to argue why certain views and principles should be prioritised above others. The 
‘reasonable’ element in particular is an indispensable component of the framework sought here. It 
is necessary however to consider the criteria on which reasonableness is to be determined and also 
who, when moving beyond the representatives (i.e. moving from theory to practice), is to decide 
what is reasonable: should it be the courts, or perhaps organisations? This is a question the 
discussion will return to shortly and will be considered at greater length in chapter 5 in the context 
of mediation and the privatisation of justice.   
In the OP the representatives are to agree on principles which no one could reject as 
unreasonable. For Rawls, the reasonableness his citizens possess refers to their readiness ‘to 
propose certain principles (as specifying terms of cooperation) as well as to comply with those 
principles even at the expense of their own interests as circumstances require when others are 
moved to do likewise’ (2001:191). He distinguishes between public reason and non-public reason. 
The former is concerned with justifying the imposition of rules by citizens as a corporate body and 
the latter with those rules applicable to individuals and associations (2001:92). Again, this reflects 
the separation of public and private apparently necessitated by his focus on the political and 
therefore elevates the public over the private. Representatives can only choose from a list of 
principles which have been predetermined as (publically) reasonable (Rawls, 2001:83). Whilst the 
content of the predetermined list is not necessarily disagreeable per se, it is arguably necessary to 
take a step back and seek an understanding of why there is an assumption that all would find such 
things unreasonable. Such an assumption makes sense from within the idealism of the OP but 
more is needed if justice as fairness is to be of relevance for the world as it is.  
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls relies on achieving a ‘reasonable overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls, 2001:12). This is the idea that whilst it is unlikely agreement could be found on 
many political and social matters, it is possible to identify common areas of agreement, across the 
various doctrines, in the form of the principles of justice (Rawls, 2001:28).  One may query 
however how feasible it is to achieve any sort of unanimity without diluting principles to the lowest 
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common denominator and/or to be an “objective”3 statement of a concept whose subjective 
interpretation is so varied that the concept itself may be seen as little more than an empty shell.  
The objection here is not to the possibility of finding an “objective” concept which is reliant on 
subjective interpretation for its realisation but rather with the necessity for unanimity. In order to 
achieve a unanimous overlapping consensus Rawls requires the representatives in the OP to 
discard any principles based on ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (meaning those grounded in religion and 
philosophy) (Rawls, 2001:29). The need for unanimity is based on the argument that principles of 
justice must be general, universal and capable of generating their own public support (Rawls, 
2001:86). The possibility of achieving an overlapping consensus is therefore important for the 
stability of the basic structure of society (Rawls, 2001:183). The issues of stability and sustaining 
public support potentially reflect the consequences associated with the privatisation of justice. 
This partition of comprehensive doctrines returns the discussion to a number of the (arguably 
interrelated) limitations of justice as fairness introduced above. The first relates to the distinction 
between public and private identities and the second concerns an assessment of the need for 
unanimity, favouring instead the acceptance of an “objective” impartial reasonableness based not 
on unanimity but on political agreement or modus vivendi if that is the only viable option (Nagel, 
1991:169).  
To recap, Rawls is concerned only with the public, or to use Nagel’s terms the impersonal, element 
of an individual’s identity since, for him, this is the one which is required to participate in society 
and uphold the basic institutions. The principles of justice in justice as fairness are therefore 
necessarily public principles and once the institutions are set up in accordance with them, 
individuals are free to live their life as they wish.  Individuals are therefore expected to live within 
the structure of the society and support the basic institutions but are not required to explicitly 
factor the principles of justice in every decision.  
When one considers the necessary relationship between “objective” principles and their subjective 
realisation it arguably becomes both theoretically and practically difficult to support making the 
public/private distinction made by Rawls. It is nevertheless very important to consider and 
understand the relationship between the two (i.e. how a consideration of the public guides the 
private behaviour and visa-versa) and the relevance of the basic institutions in a society potentially 
play a very important role in this. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where one individual 
thinks they are acting in line with the public principles but another disagrees (e.g. “it’s just 
banter”). Rawls’s focus on the need for agreement on public reason and shared understandings 
(2001:114-115) is therefore pivotal in arguing for a prioritisation of reasonableness driven by 
collective notions, rather than individual perceptions.  
                                                          
3
 The framing of objective here as “objective” is an apologetically crude way of distinguishing between objective in an 
ontological sense and “objective” in the epistemologically subjective sense outlined (see chapter 6). 
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Reasonableness: a collective determination, not an individual perception 
Here it is accepted therefore that the need for unanimity over the importance of a principle is 
unnecessary and unrealistic, even with the dilution the overlapping consensus allows (Alejandro, 
1996). The approach taken by Nagel however offers a more workable solution. He argues that 
whilst one may seek ‘reasonable unanimity’, sometimes it is necessary to settle for less (Nagel, 
1991:45). Here Nagel accepts the possibility expressly rejected by Rawls of accepting a ‘merely 
political solution’ (1991:45; Rawls, 2001:89 n10). For reasons of stability and legitimacy, unanimity 
is beneficial (or for Rawls essential) but it is accepted here that there may be (many) instances 
where accepting less is necessary (Titelbaum, 2008:320). This is of particular importance when one 
moves to consider the substantive meaning of a principle (or construct) i.e. the behaviour people 
would associate with it.   
It is important to note at this point that the personal and the impersonal exist as dimensions of an 
individual’s standpoint (Nagel, 1991:3). Each individual must make an evaluation for themselves as 
to how they are going to reconcile the two in any given situation. This evaluation starts from an 
appreciation of their own position but moves to a stage of abstraction which contemplates that 
things (for example desires and interests) ‘have impersonal value i.e. they do not simply matter to 
particular individuals or groups’ (Nagel, 1991:11).  For example, it may suit the personal standpoint 
of an individual to mediate in a situation of harassment which they perceive to be racist, as 
mediation may help preserve their career but they may also feel that there is an impersonal value 
in allowing a discussion on the potentially racist behaviour to take place in a more public way and 
therefore choose to prioritise this aspect and pursue a more formal route. In such a situation 
however, the individual in the example would be the only person making an evaluation and the 
conclusions of the others involved may conflict.  
When one is talking about seeking agreement on broad principles, the potential for these 
conflicting views is vastly multiplied. The question is then which areas of agreement are to be 
preferred and how is this to be determined. For Rawls this was the job of his principles of justice. 
Here, however, this falls to this recurring notion of reasonableness. At this point the argument 
presented perhaps risks becoming a little tautological: reasonable agreement is required on the 
principles and the way of determining what is to be considered reasonable is to be guided by the 
principles. Hopefully the discussion in the remainder of this (and the following chapters) will help to 
unpick this tautology.  
Although he assigns no substantive principles to reasonableness, Nagel accepts its use as a way of 
seeking to structure and justify the prioritisation of the personal over the impersonal (or visa versa) 
(Nagel, 1991:38). He argues ‘the reasonableness of a complaint depends on general standards for 
the accommodation of partiality [personal] and impartiality [impersonal]…in questioning 
reasonableness one may appeal to both an objective standard and a personal motive’ (1991:39). 
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This is important since it means reasonableness is not to be viewed solely as an individualistic, 
personal perception. Reasonableness may therefore be read in substitute for the use of 
‘“objective”’ thus far.  
Nagel, however, argues that there is no automatic prioritisation of one over the other and both 
must be considered in any decision (Nagel, 1991:15). In this regard, this research takes a stronger 
position and argues that where there is an unresolvable conflict between impersonal and personal 
standpoints, the impersonal should be given priority. This should not however be deployed in an 
arbitrary way. The decision is to be taken and justified after a consideration of the arguments 
presented by the opposing viewpoints (Nagel, 1991) and again reasonableness should be the 
benchmark. The structure of institutions may have a key, if not determinative, role to play here: 
indeed reasonableness is enacted in the legal definition of harassment in the Equality Act 2010 (s 
26 (4)(c)) and is used throughout employment law (e.g. unfair dismissal) (Cabrelli, 2011). The 
potential conflicts and justifications for competing areas of agreement (on the principles, meaning 
of bullying/harassment and use of mediation) are, of course, what are being presented throughout 
this research. The process of comparison required by this evaluation of reasonableness has direct 
resonance with Rawls’s and Sen’s definitions of fairness adopted above. 
If it is accepted then that in the identification and realisation of the significance and relevance of 
guiding principles, there is scope to go beyond Rawls and accommodate consideration of both the 
personal and impersonal standpoints and that there is a mechanism for determining how to deal 
with conflict between the two, consideration returns to the question of the content of the rights 
and the role of institutions in the basic structure. Of particular interest is the matter of how a right 
against harassment and bullying may be formulated and how it should be protected (e.g. is it 
necessary for it to be enshrined in law at Rawls’s legislative stage). These issues will be discussed 
against the context of the current positions and prevailing approaches in the chapters which 
immediately follow.   
In pursuit of what Dworkin may refer to as ‘appropriation through interpretation’ (2004:1405) an 
amended version of justice as fairness has, and will continue to serve as a loose blueprint for the 
discussion offered here. Whilst the content may have been somewhat altered, the aim remains the 
same, i.e. to determine the rules for fair social cooperation.  
3.5 THE MANY ROADS OF JUSTICE 
Any argument that there can be a single form of justice was rejected above. Multiple formulations 
of justice are relevant for the current debate and again it is only by drawing on literature from 
across various disciplines that it is possible to understand how to position justice in the context of 
bullying and harassment. In the ADR literature the conceptualisation often focuses on informal and 
formal justice (Roberts and Palmer, 2005).  These are further bolstered by debates of procedural 
justice, (often, although not necessarily, versus) substantive, social justice (Edwards, 1986; Genn, 
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2010). Indeed, in the context of mediation, Welsh (2004) argues that the focus on resolution and 
self-determination has led to a regrettable side-lining of the importance of social justice to that of 
procedural justice. When one looks at bullying and harassment, particularly in respect of the 
attitudes of the mediation (and to some extent also the bullying/harassment) practitioner 
communities, there is a growing need to also add restorative justice to the mix (Ridley-Duff and 
Bennett, 2011).  Further, distributive justice which is a key pillar of equality arguments may also be 
relevant (Fredman, 2011: albeit with a slightly different focus to Rawls). Inevitably it will be argued 
that none of these can be considered as mutually exclusive but rather should be seen as often 
complementary, though sometimes competing, concepts. In agreement with Welsh (2004), this 
research accepts that any discussion as to the relevance of justice to mediation should be 
‘infuse[d]’ with arguments of both procedural and substance justice (:58-59). 
Formal justice typifies litigation and internal procedures (Roberts and Palmer, 2005). The essence 
is that a clear, transparent procedure is followed resulting in a consistent result. It involves a third 
party making a decision as to the outcome of a dispute and representatives (for examples lawyers) 
are often required, or at least recommended. The potential outcomes are often limited in number 
and prescribed by procedure/rules. Informal justice on the other hand emphasises flexibility in 
process and outcomes and places a much greater emphasis on the autonomy of the parties 
(Roberts and Palmer, 2005).  
Looking at the essence of formal and informal justice one can see the implications for procedural 
and substantive justice.  
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice is, unsurprisingly concerned with fairness in procedure. Key elements include 
‘the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to influence the decision maker, even-handedness of 
the decision-maker, and being treated with courtesy and respect’ (Genn, 2010:14). A procedurally 
just procedure should provide the opportunity for a decision to be made on the basis of all 
available evidence by applying clear rules/laws to those facts (Genn, 2010).    
Procedural justice is present in Rawls’s theory of justice. For him, ‘procedure is not a (more or less) 
reliable method for realising a fair outcome; rather the very fact that procedure has been followed 
is what makes the outcome fair’ (Lovett, 2011:61). The organisational justice literature also offers 
some illuminating insights into procedural justice (Goldman, Cropanzano, Stein, Shapiro, Thatcher 
and Ko, 2007; Reb et al, 2006). Here the focus is primarily limited to perceptions of justice of 
internal organisational procedures and decisions, rather than the use of external/legal procedures
4
.  
                                                          
4
 Although see Goldman, Cropanzano, Stein, Shapiro, Thatcher and Ko, 2007 
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Some organisational justice scholars however offer empirical evidence which may be used to 
demonstrate that certain aspects of what was described as procedural justice above may more 
suitably be attributed to something they refer to as ‘interactional justice’ (Bies and Moag, 1986 in 
Colquitt, 2001; Reb, Goldman, Kray and Cropanzano, 2006; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997). This ‘is the 
perceived fairness of the interpersonal treatment people receive as processes are enacted’ (Reb et 
al, 2006:32). Reb et al (2006:33) further state that ‘[i]nteractionally fair treatment is respectful, 
affirms one’s dignity and provides employees with relevant information’. This is an interesting 
contribution to the debate on organisational justice. A further contribution was made by Greenberg 
(1993), who suggested a four factor model where interactional justice was separated further into 
informational justice and interpersonal justice (Greenberg 1993b in Colquitt, 2001:386). 
Interpersonal justice is concerned with the ‘respect and sensitivity aspects of interactional justice’ 
whilst informational refers ‘to the explanation aspect’ (Colquitt, 2001:386). Although this model has 
not been adopted by all (see Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel and Rupp, 2001:181-183), Colquitt 
(2001) found support for the validity of the four factor model.  
The addition of interactional justice may have the potential to separate the characteristics of 
procedural justice which are seen as advantages of mediation (e.g. treated as equals and given the 
opportunity to present own point of view in a respectful environment) from those which are seen 
as lacking in mediation (e.g. low transparency and consistency in outcome). In such a case, the 
focus on procedural justice in mediation discourses could be diluted. Interactional justice certainly 
seems to resonate with the arguments of those who seek to promote mediation as a way to 
empower parties
5
: Nabatchi, Bingham and Good (2007) would arguably agree.  
Nabatchi et al (2007) highlighted the need for more enquiry around fairness and justice in 
mediation (fairness and justice here are synonyms) (:149). They sought to adapt Greenberg’s four 
factor model for a mediation context. One of the reasons they argue for a tailored model is the 
framing of disputes in organisational justice in bipartite terms, i.e. a matter between the individual 
and the organisation (or manager) (:153). In mediation, this dynamic is seen to be inappropriate 
and instead they consider perceptions of justice in two relationships: disputant-disputant (1) and 
disputant-mediator (2) (:153). Whilst this is an interesting and necessary amendment, the 
adequacy of this shift in focus will be considered shortly. 
In measuring perceptions of justice in mediation they argued that a six-factor model was more 
appropriate. Nabatchi et al (2007) divided procedural justice into two: a mediator component and a 
process component (:152). The latter is concerned with capturing information relating ‘to the 
process itself, quite literally the procedural aspects of the process’ (:152). The former is concerned 
with ‘the instrumental aspects of procedural justice as they relate to the mediator, and is an 
objective assessment of the mediator’s performance as a professional’ (:152). At face value this 
                                                          
5 See chapter 5, p72 
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distinction seems a subtle one. A reference to the items attached to the respective components 
help illustrate the difference. Participants
6
 were asked to rate their level of satisfaction on various 
aspects of their mediation experience. For process, these included: the amount of control over the 
mediation; the opportunity to present their side; the fairness of the mediation and their level of 
understanding of the mediation process (:158). Those for the mediator dimension concerned the 
amount of respect the mediator gave them; the mediator’s impartiality; the fairness of the 
mediator and the mediator’s overall performance (:158).  
In addition to this partition of procedural justice, they also divided interpersonal justice into the 
experiences between disputants during the mediation process (‘disputant-disputant interpersonal 
justice’) and those between each participant and the mediator (‘disputant-mediator’) (:153). Here 
the confusion or subtlety does not necessarily come from the split of interpersonal justice but 
rather by comparison with procedural justice, particularly in respect of the disputant-mediator 
relationship. One may argue that seeking agreement on perceptions of the extent to which a 
mediator helped them clarify their goals and/or choice; understand the other person’s viewpoint 
and help the other person to understand their point of view (Nabatchi et al, 2007:158) surely at 
least parallels (if not overlaps) with those items concerned with measuring the procedural aspects 
given above.  
The extent to which it may be possible to accommodate interactional justice (and/or Nabatchi et 
al’s additional factors) as distinct forms of justice within the legal discourses is, however, 
questionable. Whilst they may be statistically distinct (Colquitt, 2001; Nabatchi et al, 2007), 
conceptually (and possibly practically), given the qualitative interrelations and dependencies it 
perhaps seems like too subtle a separation to make and one would certainly argue for the need for 
qualitative enquiry.  It may be perceived as side stepping the issue but for present purposes, it is 
sufficient to accept that there are different views but ones which cannot yet (or perhaps ever) be 
integrated. It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that there may be this plurality of views as 
to perception of the requirements of justice a person may choose to prioritise in pursuit of what 
they consider to be fair.  
Substantive Justice 
A further potential component of fairness is substantive justice. In contrast to procedural justice 
where an unfair outcome may be accepted provided the parties felt the procedure was fair, 
substantive justice can be concisely summed up in the statement: not just an outcome but a just 
outcome (Genn, 2010). Here the concern is with the quality of an outcome. What is considered as 
a substantively just outcome will vary according a wide array of factors. Of particular relevance 
here as to whether or not an outcome is considered as a substantively just one is the emphasis 
                                                          
6 48, 024 Exit surveys were used for participants of US Postal Service REDRESS mediation scheme (2007:155) 
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one places on social outcomes (rather than simply individual ones) and the extent to which one 
may see state and organisational involvement as necessary.   
Restorative justice has its roots in the criminal justice system and prioritises the power and ability 
of the parties involved to achieve their own resolution (Menkel-Meadow, 2007). By empowering the 
parties to seek a resolution which speaks both to repairing the harm done to the victim and on 
rehabilitating perpetrator themselves, the role of the state (legal/court systems) is minimised 
(Acorn, 2004; Pavlich, 2005). In the context of the role of institutions and reasonableness in the 
sense described above, this form of justice provides an interesting contrast to other notions of 
justice (i.e. procedural) since it is positioned as a potentially conceptually and substantively 
different paradigm (Robinson, 2003; Zehr, 1985 in Johnstone, 2013:33). There is a striking 
convergence between the principles of restorative justice and the argued benefits of mediation 
(Bush and Folger, 1994 in Johnstone, 2013). Conversely there are potential similarities with the 
arguments of those who argue against mediation and the privatisation of justice (Acorn, 2004; 
Strang, 2002). These points will be considered in greater detail in chapter 5. 
Social justice is a central issue here. For Rawls, his concern with distribution starting with the veil 
of ignorance sought to achieve a society which could be deemed substantively fair by all (Lovett, 
2011: 28). As noted previously, there are echoes of Rawls’s social justice in the arguments offered 
in opposition to the privatisation of justice (and therefore the use of mediation). Although it is not 
labelled as social justice, Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger (2003) in their work on organisational 
justice recognised a form of ‘deontic justice’, that is where a person may be motivated to act not 
out of concern for self-interest but rather in accordance with some a priori moral standard (see 
also Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee, 2002). In respect of this form of justice, mediation 
has been found to be of use for restoring justice in ‘ideological’ cases, although this success is 
contingent on perceptions of the mediator (Goldman, Cropanzano, Stein, Shapiro, Thatcher and 
Ko, 2007).  
Deontic justice may perhaps be seen as social justice in a shallower sense since it arguably skims 
but does not really engage with the deeper arguments about the benefits for society. This 
limitation can also be applied to Folger’s ‘Fairness as Moral Virtue’ (1998). Folger explicitly engages 
with Rawls, recognising the importance of general principles being applied to all (:30-31) and 
argues for the importance of a respect for human dignity as the basis for individuals acting not out 
of self-interest but out of a sense that ‘[i]t’s the right thing to do’ (:25). Whilst the recognition of a 
role for dignity and broader values is to be welcomed, it does not really engage with the arguments 
as to why this is the case (Crawshaw, Cropanzano, Bell and Nadistic, 2013; Wade-Benzoni, 
Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, Gillespie and Bazerman, 2002) and crucially in respect of seeking to 
balance the impersonal with the personal, here, as with organisational justice work in general, the 
decisions and perceptions are grounded in personal, individual evaluations of what is needed to 
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rectify the injustice. This may be sufficient for individual reconciliation of the impersonal and 
personal but fails to provide a role for the reasonableness/impersonal component argued for here.  
What is interesting, especially if comparisons are made with restorative justice (Robinson, 
2003:387), is that perceptions are not only individual but driven by a desire to assign blame to and 
to punish or seek retribution against the wrongdoer (i.e. the organisation) (Truillo et al, 2002; 
Folger and Cropanzano, 2001; Folger, 1998). Indeed Folger and Cropanzano’s Fairness Theory 
‘presumes that the central topic of social justice is blame’ (2001:1). The role of blame and 
punishment in mediation and in bullying and harassment will be considered in later chapters. It is 
accepted here that assigning blame may be a consideration but it disputed it is the dominant or 
sole one (Genn, 1999:254).  
A further limitation returns the discussion to the delineation of the relationships involved in 
constructs of organisational justice. As noted above, the focus often falls on the dynamic between 
an individual and the organisation (or their manager). More specifically, the research is often 
concerned with individual perceptions of justice towards the organisation and rarely the other way 
round i.e. where an ‘organisation is deliberating on the actions of an individual’ (Folger and 
Cropanzano, 2001:17). In the context of determining the appropriateness of mediation this latter 
direction is arguably at least equally, if not more, important.  
In addition to Nabatchi et al (2007) and Goldman et al (2007), others, within organisational justice 
such as Keashly and Newberry (1995) have found that the presence and activity of a third party in 
interventions impacts on perceptions of justice. Whilst it is therefore accepted that one must 
consider the relationship between the disputing parties, and their respective relationship with the 
mediator (therefore agreeing with Nabatchi et al, 2007), these alone are not sufficient. It has been, 
(and will be) argued that one must also consider the broader societal (impersonal) relationships 
and in this regard one should not, and cannot exclude the role of the organisation in influencing 
and achieving fairness. Further, these relationships and the role of the organisation must be 
considered against the context of the broader institutional framework (e.g. the legal system) 
which, with limited exception (Wade-Benzoni et al, 2002), organisational justice work fails to do. 
Therefore whilst organisational justice does offer some extremely interesting insights, the semantic 
constraining of scope to the organisational context has some potentially substantive limitations.  
In seeking to offer an interdisciplinary approach however, there may be more potential to allocate 
and integrate arguments and understandings here than in respect of interactional justice. In both 
social justice and deontic justice the aim of fair distribution is again brought to the fore.  
Distributive justice may be expressed in many ways. Goldman et al (2007) describe it as ‘the 
perceived fairness of the outcomes received’ (:212). Whilst it is suited to their purpose 
(experimental design concerned with fair reward/punishment for organisational wrongdoing), this, 
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it will be seen shortly, is arguably too narrow a definition of distributive justice. Broadly speaking 
(and arguably inclusive of the narrower definition), distributive justice is concerned with the pursuit 
of a fair distribution of assets and opportunities (Fredman, 2011). There is a clear link back to 
Rawls here. Now however, Rawls can be used not to explain why bullying and harassment are 
unfair but rather to help structure the discussion as to whether or not mediation has the potential 
to operate in a fair way. Essentially, the use of Rawls provides a longwinded way of expressing a 
number of the underlying concerns about the fairness of using mediation generally and of using 
mediation for bullying and harassment specifically. These will be considered in greater detail in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
Distributive justice plays an important role in justifying the need for anti-discrimination legislation 
(and therefore state intervention) in seeking to tackle barriers and re-distribute opportunities to 
those who have been disadvantaged because of their membership to one/multiple protected 
group(s) (Fredman, 2011). This has important consequences for bargaining positions and in terms 
of access to justice and, as far as mediation is concerned, may operate to place those who have 
been disadvantaged in an even more vulnerable position. This again conjures the need to 
acknowledge that one must consider not only who is making a decision but also who/what is 
influencing that decision.  
3.6 CONCLUSION: VISUALISING FAIRNESS, ADR AND JUSTICE 
From the discussion in this chapter it is hoped that one can begin to see how the framework may 
take shape. If one accepts that fairness determined by impersonal standards of reasonableness is 
the overarching principle all should aim for, then one must move on to consider how this aim may 
be achieved. It was argued that Rawls’s justice as fairness could be used to this end. In a rejection 
of Rawls’s pursuit of a single justice, it was accepted that justice (in the various guises outlined 
above) play a fundamental role. To again return to the idea of visualising the framework as a map, 
the different types of justice act as the main roads along which one may travel towards their 
destination of fairness. The roads however do not necessarily run parallel to each other and will 
intersect at various points. There will also be multiple side roads and the routes available will be 
determined by the choice of resolution technique pursued. Further, for some individuals (or 
groups) certain routes will be blocked or may be rife with barriers.  
Before moving on to explicitly consider the role mediation may play in dictating and navigating 
these routes, it is important to turn to the question of the basic liberties and how one may justify 
the need for protection against harassment and bullying.    
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CHAPTER 4. BULLYING AND HARASSMENT: DIFFERENT ROUTES OR         
MERGED BY DIGNITY? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consider the role fairness plays in explaining and justifying why bullying and 
harassment should not be tolerated in a fair society. An argument will be presented for positioning 
dignity as an underlying and unifying concept for respecting and upholding fairness in respect of 
bullying and harassment. Bullying and harassment will be considered as a way of operationalising 
this respect for dignity. Here therefore one is concerned with a two-step justification.  
The first step revolves around using the idea of fairness to justify why dignity is important and 
worthy of protection. This step is aligned with Rawls’s theory of justice. The second step however 
moves away from Rawls and returns to the distinction between the personal and impersonal and 
the setting of standards which guide individual, as well as societal conduct. In each step one is 
concerned with how the idea of reasonableness introduced above may be realised. In order to 
explore the role of reasonableness, the discussion will consider what bullying and harassment are,  
where the lines between the two are drawn and the implications these have for their relative 
positions regarding the extent to which they are afforded legal and other institutional protection. 
On a theoretical level it will be argued that these differing positions should not necessarily alter the 
way reasonableness is applied to a situation but that in practice, however, it may make a 
significant difference. This difference therefore has an impact on the arguments one can make as 
to the appropriateness of the use of mediation in cases of workplace bullying and harassment. The 
role of mediation will be considered in the next chapter but for now a return to Rawls is required. 
Unless otherwise stated (for example in relation to the legal position), as the research seeks a 
unifying, underlying rationale for prohibiting bullying and harassment (i.e. dignity), the arguments 
in this, and subsequent chapters, should be read as applying equally to bullying and to 
harassment. 
4.2 INSUFFICIENCY OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES 
The principles of justice Rawls concluded his representatives in the original position would adopt 
were set out in the previous chapter
7
. The principles are arranged according to a ‘lexical priority’ 
(Rawls, 2001:43) meaning that the second principle can only operate to the extent that the first is 
respected i.e. so that any measures required by the equality of opportunity principle can only be 
justified to the extent they do not contravene the principle of a guarantee of basic rights and 
liberties for all free and equal citizens.  
                                                          
7
 By way of short hand they will be referred to as the liberty principle (1), the equality of opportunity principle (2a) and the 
difference principle (2b). 
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Having argued in the previous chapter that one cannot conflate justice and fairness and that 
Rawls’s conception of a single justice for his political society must be rejected; seeking to rely on 
his principles in this chapter potentially poses somewhat of a conceptual hurdle. These problems 
are in addition to the question of whether one agrees with the selected principles and their 
formulation.  
For the sake of brevity, it is argued that although the two principles are far from uncontroversial
8
, 
for present purposes, their utility is accepted. With some adaptation they serve to provide a useful 
(and somewhat novel) way of discussing workplace bullying and harassment and how institutions 
may be designed to help address it.  
Whilst concerns about the dilution required by Rawls’s original position were set out above, it is 
argued that sufficient consensus may be reached on the need for and priority of the liberty 
principle. In accepting this, one may also find the veil of ignorance required to identify the principle 
to be unproblematic since it is possible to accept that within the idea of reasonable pluralism, no 
one can reasonably reject the idea that ‘each person has the same indefensible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties 
for all’ (Rawls, 2001:43). However, without more the principle could merely be seen as an 
aspirational notion. It is when one moves to consider the choice of those liberties (their meaning 
and content) and the boundaries between them that the situation becomes more problematic.  
Accepting the second principle requires a greater degree of persuasion, particularly if one is to 
position it against the formal equality approaches which favour equal treatment. The second 
principle accepts the inevitability of the need to deal with social and economic inequalities and to 
do so by treating certain groups in unequal ways (Rawls, 2001:43). The second principle is of 
lesser relevance to this research than the first and therefore a discussion of its viability and 
appropriateness will be deferred (see p75). Before moving on to the matter of “fleshing out” the 
first principle, one must briefly return to the other potential barriers to the use of Rawls. 
Perhaps most problematic is the “fairness-not-justice” barrier. These are principles of justice and 
the previous chapter argued instead for fairness. Since there was no single conception of justice 
which can determine what may be considered a fair society, what is required are principles based 
on the broad notion of fairness (as defined). This is more than a semantic problem and is 
inextricably linked with the further barrier, that is, the rejection of a number of the underlying 
assumptions in justice as fairness. In addressing these problems one must again appeal to the 
purpose for which Rawls is being used here: to structure discussion. It may not be a sophisticated 
argument and undeniably does a disservice to the complexity and refinement of Rawls’s theory 
throughout the years. It is nevertheless argued here that the mechanics of Rawls’s justice as 
fairness-including the choice of principles-are invaluable for approaching the complex issues 
                                                          
8
 See previous chapter for references for Rawls’s critics, p29 
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involved in the current discussion, even if potentially drastic (yet arguably necessary) changes are 
made to the substance. It is to the question of the substance of the first principle to which the 
discussion will now turn.  
4.3 TAKING RAWLS’S LIBERTIES 
Again, the focus here will not be on the propriety of the choice of the basic liberties chosen by 
Rawls’s representatives but rather the extent to which these are sufficient to enable the arguments 
in this research to be made. In other words, are they sufficient to argue for the need to protect 
individuals (as well as citizens) from bullying and harassment on a constitutional (and possibly 
legislative) level? The answer to that question is probably not.  
The basic liberties deemed necessary to enable equal and free citizens to ‘develop and fully 
exercise their two moral powers to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good’ (Rawls, 
2001:57) include: freedom of thought, liberty of conscience, the guarantees of the rule of law and 
freedom of speech (Rawls, 2001:111-114). These may engage and overlap with some of the 
elements necessary for justifying protection from bullying and harassment, for example freedom of 
speech (Shiffrin, 2004; Lindblom, 2011), and with the ADR privatisation of justice arguments (i.e. 
with respect to the rule of law) but they are far from sufficient. Again, it is important to remember 
that Rawls is concerned with the basic liberties of free and equal citizens within a political theory. 
Just as the constraining of individuals to citizens was deemed insufficient above for decisions of 
reasonableness and standard setting, it fails to acknowledge that what is needed to argue for 
bullying and harassment is an appeal to individuals as human beings, not as political actors.  
Greater help is perhaps to be found not in Rawls’s basic liberties but in what he sees as the basic 
primary goods citizens may seek to pursue (Rawls, 2001:58-60). Rather confusingly, these include 
the basic liberties themselves, together with recognition of the ‘social bases of self-respect’ (Rawls, 
2001:59). Here the good is to be found in citizens being able to possess ‘a lively sense of their 
worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence’ (Rawls, 2001:59). This 
has more resonance with the arguments advanced here but returns the discussion to a 
consideration of whether or not bullying and harassment should be seen as damaging and/or 
threatening a person’s own perception of their self-respect or whether it is to be seen as a social 
problem. For Rawls it is the latter (2001:60) but arguably it is necessary to consider it as both (see 
for example Hoel, Faragher and Cooper, 2004 and Einarsen and Mikkelsen, 2003 on the impact of 
bullying on targets), and to approach it not solely as a political problem but also as a moral one. 
If one then rejects the adequacy of Rawls’s basic liberties, what then should be seen as a basic 
liberty worthy of constitutional (and possibly legislative) protection, sufficient to ground both 
bullying and harassment? In order to answer this, help can be gained from the arguments 
associated with the justification for anti-discrimination law and for an appreciation of diversity.  
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4.4 DISCRIMINATION, DISADVANTAGE, DIGNITY AND DIVERSITY 
Distinguishing and defining bullying and harassment: a brief overview 
Here one encounters the first potential implications of differing justifications for bullying and for 
harassment. Precisely where and how the lines may or may not be drawn will be considered in 
greater detail later in this chapter when the definitional aspects of the concepts are discussed. It is 
important at this point to seek to clarify the reason this research explores bullying and harassment 
where there may be an element of racism, sexism or homophobia.  
For present purposes it is useful to simply offer definitions of harassment and bullying as they are 
to be understood in the context of this discussion.  In the interest of pursuing the equality 
arguments, a critical consideration of these definitions is temporarily adjourned.  
Harassment here is defined by reference to s26 (1) of the Equality Act 2010: ‘A person (A) 
harasses another (B) if- (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected 
characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of- (i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B’. As there is 
no explicit legal provision prohibiting bullying in the workplace there is no equivalent legal 
definition of bullying. A definition of bullying is instead taken from the organisational psychology 
literature: ‘persistently insulting, malicious, intimidating, exclusionary or violent behaviour which 
adopts a particular pattern and dynamic with escalation of the problem over a time period’ (Beale 
and Hoel, 2010:101). Although a number of similarities are clear (e.g. negative behaviour), the 
distinction to be made between the two is the requirement for the presence of a protected 
characteristic in the former but not the latter.  
Using the involvement or potential involvement of certain protected characteristics to distinguish 
between harassment and bullying is not without precedent (see Branch, 2008 commentary); and 
though it potentially risks massively oversimplifying the meanings individuals assign to the labels 
bullying and harassment, it will suffice for now. This is chosen in preference to other forms of 
bullying, such as work-related bullying (Einarsen, Hoel and Noelaers, 2009) which do not allow for 
such a direct comparison with arguments of equality (in an anti-discrimination sense). These 
equality arguments are almost absent from UK debates on the use of mediation in bullying and 
harassment cases (limited reference in Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011) but are arguably central and 
essential to the debate on the appropriateness and fairness of its use.  
Discrimination: the centrality of disadvantage 
Drawing on anti-discrimination arguments provides a way of exploring and explaining why anti-
discrimination needs to be valued as a basic liberty. This enquiry is inherently related to a further 
issue, that of why only certain groups are protected.  
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In the context of Rawls, one may ask whether protection from discrimination is covered by the two 
principles (Shelby, 2004) or whether there is a need for an extra anti-discrimination principle 
(Shriffrin, 2004). A third option, and indeed the favoured option, is to consider the extent to which 
protection from discrimination can be accommodated as an additional right under the first 
principle. This third option is arguably the easiest way of reconciling the arguments advanced here 
with Rawls’s structure.   
The choice of rights and liberties can occur at the constitutional stage in the original position and, 
once the basic principles have been adopted, the veil of ignorance operating to obscure historical 
and social sources of disadvantage is partially lifted (Shelby, 2004:1707). This brings the argument 
advanced in support of this research into closer alignment with Rawls since he now allows his 
representatives access to ‘general, non-controversial knowledge’ which may include knowledge of 
historical inequalities (Rawls, 2001:93). The importance of recognising these was outlined above 
where it was argued that a sense of reasonableness should always be historically and socially 
defined. This reasonableness should apply not only when seeking to identify the broad concept 
(i.e. of prohibiting discriminatory treatment/attitudes) but also when the standards to be applied 
for it to be realised are being considered (e.g. what specific language or treatment is to be 
considered as amounting to discrimination). This latter endeavour is more complicated and involves 
a greater tension between the personal and impersonal standpoints since it potentially impacts on 
an individual’s day to day conduct. A consideration of this tension is not new in the equality 
literature and indeed is well established in the debates between equality approaches 
(predominantly equal opportunities) and managing diversity approaches.   
It is difficult to disentangle the reasons for prohibiting discrimination per se and those advanced for 
justifying protection by law, meaning arguments are conflated in a way which is not helpful when 
one is trying to argue for them in a sequential manner. Attempts will, nevertheless, be made to try 
and unpick the arguments.  
The first question then is why should discrimination, in principle not be permitted. This may be 
answered by reference to the identification of disadvantage arising from difference (Fredman, 
2011). This disadvantage is traditionally associated with structural and institutional barriers which 
have operated to exclude or subordinate certain groups from participating in society (Collins, 2003; 
Fredman, 2011) e.g. women from participating (and then later progressing) in the workforce.  
When it is understood in this way, one can see why debates around equality often centre round 
distributive goals (Collins, 2003; Rawls, 2001). There is much conflict-across disciplines-about how 
to best redress these imbalances. Here the decision is not necessarily (or at least not immediately) 
that of the most appropriate instrument or institution to use but rather the principle to guide it. 
These options guide the discussion back to a consideration of formal and substantive justice.  
50 
 
The choices are often presented in terms of a conflict between striving for (or imposing) equal 
treatment and allowing for some difference in treatment, either through seeking to equalise 
starting points or the equalisation of results (Fredman, 2011). These may be seen on a spectrum 
moving from the formal equal treatment principle towards the more substantive equal 
opportunities and equality of results (Hepple, 2010). There are clear shades of similarity with 
Rawls’s approach, especially with his second principle which acknowledges there are circumstances 
where different treatment is necessary.  
The equal treatment principle, that is, ‘treating likes alike’, is the approach which dominates the UK 
legal approach to anti-discrimination law (Fredman, 2011:8).  There are many, however, who 
argue this is not a sufficient approach and that more (for example positive action) is required 
(Barmes and Ashtiany, 2003; Collins, 2003; Dickens, 2007). In particular, there is a valid objection 
that equal treatment excuses ‘an equal opportunities harasser’ who treats all equally poorly 
(Clarke, 2006:161). Crucially, it also fails to recognise the persistence of certain disadvantages and 
prejudices (Hepple, 2008). This persistence of disadvantage argument is anchored in the limits of 
legal intervention (Hepple, 2008; Dickens, 1999; Healy, Kirton and Noon, 2011a; Fevre, Grainger 
and Brewer, 2011a) and plays an important role in the arguments about the role of mediation 
presented in chapter 5.  There is a great deal of interesting debate on this matter but for present 
purposes dwelling on the best approach would be an unnecessary diversion since firstly, none 
really offer an explicit explanation for why discrimination can be damaging or indeed are adequate 
to explain the need to protect against harassment which cannot be satisfied by appeals to 
distributive concerns alone. 
Unity through dignity 
Implicit in the various approaches is that there is some reason why the systematic oppression of 
certain groups is not acceptable. Fredman (2011) offers a need to respect dignity as that reason. 
Dignity, she argues, provides a more substantive grounding for equality (2011:19). Dignity is at the 
core of many international human rights instruments (e.g. Article 1 EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 2000) (Fredman, 2011:20), as well being included in the statutory definition of harassment. 
As seen in chapter 3, it is also acknowledged to be important by many organisational justice 
scholars.  
The concept of dignity is itself, not uncontroversial and not least because its meaning can be so 
indeterminate and open to interpretation (Hepple, 2008:11; Khaitan, 2012:3). If one is to accept 
this criticism one may as well accept that there is no use in any abstract concepts and abandon the 
pursuit for understandings of fairness and justice too. Clearly to do so would be to concede an 
unnecessary defeat. It is however, accepted that dignity alone cannot dictate how competing 
interests should be treated and it therefore should be considered as an addition to, and not a 
replacement for the equal opportunity and equal treatment approaches (Fredman, 2011; Hepple, 
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2008). The better course of action is therefore to try and seek clarity in the meaning of dignity in a 
given context and demonstrate an awareness of the factors which may influence the way it is 
interpreted and assigned meaning (for example see Khaitan, 2012).  
Dignity here is to be understood as ‘the value attached to individuals simply by virtue of their 
humanity’ meaning ‘that all are entitled to equal concern and respect’ (Fredman, 2011:20). Subject 
to the need to extend the justification to individuals as human beings and not citizens, this notion 
of equal concern and respect is arguably consistent with Rawls’s assumption of all as free and 
equal.  The idea that dignity allows for a recognition that all should be valued ‘not because of their 
merit, or their rationality…or membership of any particular group but because of their humanity’ 
(Fredman, 2011:28) is extremely appealing. The divorcing of disadvantage from an individual’s 
personal group membership is attractive since it potentially allows for a justification as to why 
someone who does not belong to a particular group may still have a genuine objection to racist or 
sexist treatment of others. Indeed in practice a person does not need to possess a specific 
characteristic to claim harassment on a protected ground (English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd [2008] 
(CA)). That one may possess such an objection was assumed in the previous chapter to be a, if not 
the, guiding force for the impersonal judgement necessary to ensure a fair society. That is not to 
say, however, that it is simple (or indeed correct) to assume that a person’s group characteristics 
are not important. The relationship between an individual’s interpretation and assignment of the 
personal importance of their characteristics to their identity and the relevance of group 
membership for assessing standards of behaviour is extremely complex and is something that will 
be considered shortly.  
A respect for dignity allows for other, non-structural or distributive disadvantages, to be addressed. 
This is a welcome broadening of anti-discrimination since it makes accommodating sexual (and 
other protected characteristics) harassment easier. These other disadvantages may take the form 
of stigmas, stereotypes or prejudice (Fredman, 2011:25; Solanke, 2011). An appreciation of the 
existence of these forms is important for justifying the need to protect dignity by prohibiting 
harassment, as well as in understanding the form harassment may take, how it may be interpreted 
and how it should be dealt with. However, this approach still ties the treatment to disadvantage 
(McColgan, 2007) and in the context of anti-discrimination law, operates to limit protection only to 
selected groups (ss4-12 Equality Act 2010). These, particularly the last element, provide a 
significant dividing line between acts which may be considered as harassment (at least according 
to the EA 2010 definition) and those which by default may fall to the description of bullying.  
The protected groups: a clear selection process?  
Unlike the discussion offered here, anti-discrimination protection did not develop from reasoned 
and systematic basic principles but rather ‘according to specific legal, historical and cultural factors’ 
(Fredman, 2011:143). The various protected groups have differing histories where the 
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disadvantage manifested in different ways and at different points in time (Fredman, 2011; Holvino, 
2010). This has led to the piecemeal and uneven protection of different groups (Hepple, 2008:22). 
An example of this was the limiting of protection for sexual orientation to the workplace 
(Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003). These differing histories, treatment 
and manifestations are the reason for choosing to focus this research on a number of 
characteristics: sex, race and sexual orientation. It is hoped that structuring discussions around 
characteristics that vary in their visibility and the length of protection, it is possible to access 
understandings of the extent to which the characteristics are treated as equally serious, or whether 
it is possible to identify a ‘hierarchy of characteristics’ with some (like sexual orientation) being 
treated as less serious than others (Acker, 2006:445; Colgan and Wright, 2011). 
The choice of characteristics afforded protected status is deemed, by some, to be too narrow 
(Barmes and Ashtiany, 2003; Desir, 2010). Attempts have been made to identify reasons for the 
selection of certain groups above others. Solanke (2011) argues that stigma itself can be used to 
decide between groups. She argues that ‘[s]tigmatisation is a social process’ by which there is a 
collective assignment of ‘a negative relationship which permits a collective public ‘doubting’ of a 
person’s worth’ (2011:351). Stigma as a guiding concept would therefore potentially allow for 
protection to be extended to other groups who suffer disadvantage, for example because of their 
weight or physical appearance (Solanke, 2011). If taunts or different treatment based on a non-
protected physical characteristic has the potential to harm the dignity of an individual, can one 
reasonably say that it is not worthy of protection?  
If protection for some, women for example, resulted from an organised campaign to challenge 
their treatment in society, is there a principle which would stop the extension of protection to other 
united groups, for example those who argue against ‘lookism’ (Desir, 2010; Davis, 2008), if they 
similarly organised? There is no easy answer to this question, although it is one which is certainly 
worthy of exploration. One argument may be to retain the link to demonstrating a disadvantaged 
or subordinated position in society (Hepple, 2008). Another may be made by an appeal to 
‘immutability or absence of choice’ (Fredman, 2011:131; Desir, 2010). This latter argument has an 
easy logic to it, i.e. someone cannot, and should not, be treated differently for a characteristic they 
did not choose and cannot change. It does, nevertheless, oversimplify the issues involved. For 
example, one may question the extent to which religion or pregnancy are a choice (Fredman, 
2011:134). A further answer to this question may found in the managing diversity literature.  
Diversity: avoiding the question?  
Managing diversity, is, unsurprisingly, given the label, rooted in managerial discourses and has, 
over time ‘overshadowed and marginalised’ the more ‘mainstream interest in equality’ (Oswick, 
2011:31). There is no agreed definition but in essence it is ‘an approach to fair treatment that 
encourages employers to harness a wide range of visible [and non-visible] differences in their 
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employees’ (Foster and Harris, 2005:5). In managing diversity the discussion returns to a number 
of potential conflicts and trade-offs identified in chapter 2.  
In the current context, what it serves to do is essentially avoid any questions or issues of equality 
tied to group membership or structural disadvantage and instead champions the worth and 
contribution of treating individuals as individuals (Healy et al, 2011a; Thomas, 1990). This 
emphasis reflects government policy which promotes individuality and rejects a ‘strand approach’ 
since ‘[p]utting people into different categories simply because they tick a box on a form ignores 
their needs as an individual’ (HM Government, 2010:7). In this view there is no need to address 
the question as to why some characteristics are to be treated differently to others since all 
characteristics are treated as equally relevant or irrelevant. The result of this would be to make 
race ‘as insignificant to a person’s aspirations as eye colour’ (Barmes and Ashtiany, 2003:291). This 
arguably serves to side-line, if not eradicate, any need to consider an impersonal, social standpoint 
since the personal, individual view is paramount. Given the emphasis placed on social cooperation 
and collective understandings, such a consequence is objectionable in itself but it is also 
disingenuous.  
The rhetoric implies that it is the choice of the individual to decide which characteristics are to be 
favoured, however, in managing diversity this is not the case. Managing diversity is to be 
understood as an alternative managerial approach to equal opportunities (equal treatment) which 
characterises equality discourses (Hoque and Noon, 2004; Liff and Cameron, 1997). The relevance 
of characteristics in diversity is assigned to the extent to which the possession of that characteristic 
(or combination of characteristics) can be used by an organisation to gain a competitive advantage 
(Foster and Harris, 2005). For example, a woman may be chosen as a shop assistant because she 
reflects the customer base. This leads the discussion to the primary objection of managing 
diversity: it makes equality contingent on a business case (Dickens, 1999; Noon, 2007).  
The need to balance claims to fairness and efficiency is not alien to or absent in anti-discrimination 
equality debates (Dickens, 2007), for example allowing justification for indirect discrimination (s19 
(2) (d) Equality Act 2010). The difference in such a case is that the equality arguments remain 
grounded in concerns for social justice and not ‘economic circumstance’, giving the former greater 
weight when considering the reasonableness of any balance (Dickens, 2007; Noon, 2007). 
Beyond offering an alternative option for the treatment of group characteristics (i.e. treat them as 
individual ones), there are some important potential lessons to be drawn from managing diversity. 
These can inform the argument presented here for the need to explicitly retain and consider 
arguments grounded in group disadvantages and collective, as well as individual notions of dignity, 
in weighing the fairness and appropriateness of using mediation in bullying and harassment cases. 
The priority afforded to efficiency in the debates surrounding the use of mediation in UK 
workplaces has the potential to obscure these other issues and it is a deficiency which should not 
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be overlooked. The research on the operation of managing diversity in practice can also provide an 
insight into the hesitance employers and managers may have over the use of mediation in cases 
which may engage with or potentially engage with employment law (Barmes and Ashtiany, 2003; 
Foster and Harris, 2005)
9
.  
An interesting mid-point between the matter of the relevance of group membership and 
individualism may be found in the concept of intersectionality.  
Intersectionality: a middle ground? 
The definition and boundaries of intersectionality are far from settled (Holvino, 2010; McCall, 2005; 
Tatli and Ozbilgin, 2012) but space and current purpose do not permit an exploration of the various 
different arguments. For present purposes, intersectionality can be accepted as the recognition of 
the fact ‘that a range of social identities can influence people’s workplace experiences’ (Hudson, 
2012:2). Intersectionality rejects the classification of individuals by a single characteristic and 
replaces it with an acknowledgement that identities may be determined by the ‘intersection’ of 
multiple characteristics (Hudson, 2012). This intersection is not to be understood in an additive 
sense but rather as a ‘simultaneity’ (Holvino, 2010) or ‘synergy’ (Solanke, 2011:340) between 
characteristics. Whilst Tatli and Ozbilgin (2012) argue for a rejection of the pre-determined groups, 
this formulation of intersectionality works with the boundaries of the existing protected groups. 
This option is to be favoured as it is most coherent with the argument being presented here, i.e. 
that fairness requires a collective understanding and appreciation of the need to prioritise certain 
groups and it is therefore important that known (and knowable) categorisations are drawn.  
An appreciation of intersectionality is therefore relevant for the present discussion not only because 
it may inform assessments of reasonableness from the impersonal standpoint but also because it 
recognises a further complexity in the interaction between the way in which an individual may 
personally experience, interpret and choose (or be able) to respond to a particular situation 
(Berdahl and Moore, 2006; Salin and Hoel, 2013). By way of illustration, there is a growing body of 
literature which demonstrates that BME woman experience a different type of harassment than 
white women (Healy, Bradley and Forson, 2011b; Fielden, Davidson, Woolnough and Hunt, 2010). 
Further, even talking in terms of BME as a group runs the risk of misinterpreting or oversimplifying 
the experiences of the various composite groups (Giga, Hoel and Lewis, 2008; Holvino, 2010).  
Fielden et al (2010) for example found that BME women operate within a culture which seriously 
constrains the way they may be able to respond to racialised sexual harassment at work. One 
should also be aware of grouping the experiences of gay men, lesbian women and bisexuals 
together as Hoel, Lewis and Einarsdottir (2014) found these can be qualitatively different. 
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The complexity embraced by intersectionality also has some important consequences for the 
interaction between the instruments and institutions utilised to ensure protection against 
harassment. Following failed attempts to reflect a form of (additive) intersectionality in the EA 2010 
(cl 14, dual discrimination)
10
 the current legal protection is not equipped to deal with multiple, 
intersecting characteristics (Bahl v The Law Society [2004]; Hudson, 2012). This has potential 
knock on effects for organisational recognition of and responsibilities toward intersectionality 
(Hudson, 2012). 
4.5 ACCOMMODATING DISCRIMINATION AND DIGNITY IN RAWLS’S THEORY  
Having now presented a number of different arguments, one must return to the initial matter of 
whether the inclusion of a right to protection from discrimination and harassment can be 
incorporated into Rawls’s first principle. It is suggested that discrimination alone is not enough but 
that an explicit right to dignity (rather than it simply being implied by the treatment of all as free 
and equal) should be included to help justify why both harassment and bullying should not be 
tolerated in a fair society.  
Whilst the precise meaning and content to be given to dignity will vary according to which of the 
above arguments are to be favoured, one would argue there is sufficient overlap and coherency 
within them to offer a reasonable overlapping consensus which would support the inclusion of 
dignity. Indeed, one may argue an appreciation of the different arguments offered by the 
interdisciplinary approach is necessary if appeals to consensus are to be made (Barmes and 
Ashtiany, 2003). Further it is argued that once one accepts dignity, one must also reasonably 
accept its value on a constitutional level. If this is the case, one must then seek to explore what 
institutional protection is required. Here the dividing line in the conceptualisation and operation of 
bullying and harassment rears its head.  
If one is arguing that a fair society necessitates respect for the dignity of all, it is difficult to argue 
harassment should be prohibited by law but not bullying. Indeed there is an interesting debate on 
whether legislative protection against bullying is necessary or effective (Lippel, 2010; Yamada, 
2003). These are two very different issues. Just as the prohibition of harassment and 
discrimination by law sends an important message that such conduct is not to be tolerated, it is 
difficult to see why such a message should not also be given in respect of bullying (Hepple, 
2008:13, for example argues for a general tort of harassment). Problems of legislating for a 
complex concept are certainly not unique to bullying (Hoel and Einarsen, 2010). Particularly if one 
is concerned with establishing public rules and guidance for acceptable social cooperation in a fair 
society, it is difficult to understand why bullying should not be prohibited by law.  
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This, however, is not the approach adopted by UK law and so whilst harassment (on a protected 
ground) is explicitly covered, legal protection for bullying has depended on an ‘imaginative use’ of 
available actions (Beale and Hoel, 2010:104) and through judicial interpretation (Walden and Hoel, 
2004). Legal redress for conduct that may otherwise be labelled as bullying must be sought 
through a number of paths, for example constructive dismissal through breach of implied duties of 
mutual trust and confidence and reasonable care for health and safety (Yamada, 2003; 2011). 
Rather confusingly (from a discrete concept perspective), claims may also be brought under the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (Majrowski v Guy’s & St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006]). Whilst 
bullying may therefore be objectionable on moral grounds, its legal position is ambiguous. How 
mediation may interact with these differing levels of protection will be considered in chapter 5.  
If then, one is able to argue for the need to protect dignity through prohibiting bullying and 
harassment (legally or otherwise), one must then move to consider how decisions as to what may 
be considered a breach of reasonable standards are to be taken. This again moves beyond Rawls’s 
original position (and pure theory) since it begins to deal with day-to-day and associational 
interactions. The focus in the remaining sections of this chapter will be on how the way bullying 
and harassment is understood has important consequences for the ways in which the reasonable 
standards (and their breach) can be determined.  
4.6 SETTING THE STANDARDS: DEFINING BULLYING AND HARASSMENT 
The complexity of bullying and harassment: unpicking the mess 
At the outset it is useful to quickly address a point which has perhaps been implicit throughout this 
and the preceding chapters and is wildly basic but nevertheless bears explicit acknowledgement: 
bullying and harassment are complex. There are instances which may unequivocally be considered 
to be bullying and/or harassment but this is not always the case. One may seek to establish or 
argue for rules which should govern decision making (as is the case here) but there are so many 
interrelated and competing factors and influences in any given situation there can be no absolutes.  
The individuals involved, their characteristics, the importance they attach to those characteristics, 
their sense of job security and their position in an organisation have all been shown to have an 
influence (Fevre, Lewis, Robinson and Jones, 2011b; Hitlan, Schneider and Walsh, 2006; Hodson, 
Roscigno and Lopez, 2006). The type, size, structure, culture and composition of their workplace 
will also potentially have a significant impact on the extent to which certain behaviour is deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable (Berdahl, 2007; Benavides-Espinoza and Cunningham, 2010; Cowie, 
Naylor, Rivers, Smith and Pereira, 2002; Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Huhn, Getfund and Magley, 1997; 
Hutchinson, 2012) and will, in turn have an influence on the ability of an individual to challenge 
bullying/harassing behaviour
11
. The existence of and effective (or ineffective) implementation of 
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any policies (Fevre et al, 2011b; Woodrow and Guest, 2014) or the presence of a trade union can 
also influence the options available (Hoel and Beale, 2006). The pursuit of a personal or impersonal 
sense of justice (in one or more of the forms) also adds a further level of complexity.  
Such is the messy complexity of dealing with conflict in the workplace. Attempts could be made to 
limit the focus or exclude factors but as this research is concerned with presenting a practically 
workable framework, one must find a way to try and accommodate and work with the complexity. 
It is argued here that in that way the concern with fairness and the balancing of competing claims 
is in accordance with an impersonally informed sense of reasonableness.  
The identification of antecedents to bullying behaviour, harassment and even conflict in general are 
well canvassed in the various literatures. A great deal of work has also been undertaken on the 
factors which may influence the choice of response and the success (perceived success) of that 
response
12
. The aim here is not to deny or ignore the existence of these multiple influences but 
rather to suggest a way in which the various and varied factors can be understood and prioritised. 
This ordering is, of course, not and cannot be the sole, true prioritisation but rather accords with 
the view advanced here that where there is a conflict between personal and impersonal (individual 
and societal values), that conflict should be resolved by favouring the latter, since this is what 
fairness requires.  What is important here is an acknowledgement that whilst a multitude of factors 
may influence how behaviour is perceived by individuals and dealt with (or not dealt with) by 
organisations, the individual characteristics and organisational climate do not necessarily determine 
the reasonableness of the behaviour. 
 The matter of who should be responsible for deciding where the balance should fall will be 
considered in chapter 5 as it is arguably determined by the interactions between employer 
approaches and responsibilities and legislation and policy but for now it is important to note that 
standards should be determined in accordance with these objectively reasonable arguments. With 
this acknowledged, there is perhaps a prior issue which needs to be addressed: how important is 
being able to label something as bullying and/or harassment before it is possible to say that a 
standard has been breached? 
Labels: what’s in a name?  
Having spent the best part of this chapter arguing for the need to protect against bullying and 
harassment to the extent it should be protected by legislation, it perhaps seems inappropriate to 
now address the need for such labels when one is determining standards of reasonable behaviour.  
The response to such an objection is that if one is relying on codified protection, for example 
through law and/or organisational policy, then assigning a label before arguing a standard had 
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been breached is important (and necessary). Rather the question refers to the trouble or 
complications involved in applying, or rather proving that the label is the appropriate one.  
This distinction between the application of the label and the requirement of proof is significant 
when one is considering what the appropriate remedy is to ensure fairness. Demonstrating or 
providing proof for bullying and/or harassment can be extremely difficult (Harrington, Rayner and 
Warren, 2012; Hoel and Einarsen, 2011) and is inherently linked with not only the nature of 
bullying and harassment but also of the consequences following from many of the organisational 
antecedents and priorities introduced above. Further, establishing a credible case of harassment is 
also difficult when (if) a case moves to a formal legal process, since institutional and other power 
imbalances (particularly in respect of access to legal advice and representation) operate to raise 
the bar (Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin, 2011).  These relate to the operation of the institutions and 
will be explored in chapter 5
13
.  
If establishing the appropriate application of the label(s) is so difficult but the behaviour led an 
individual to seek to label it bullying/harassment this has two implications. The first is the need to 
try and understand what it is about the behaviour that led to the person to use that label, and the 
second is the need to recognise that there may be a spectrum of standards, determined by severity 
and reasonableness. This latter element acknowledges that though behaviour may fall short of the 
standards protected by bullying and harassment, it may nevertheless be considered as 
inappropriate and should not be tolerated. It is in this nexus that mediation may be particularly 
useful.  
Possible labels for this behaviour short of bullying/harassment might be ill-treatment or 
unreasonable treatment (Fevre et al, 2011b) or misunderstanding or personality clash (Ferris, 
2004). Exploring the nuances in these different labels is an unnecessary endeavour for present 
purposes and not least because none adequately capture or reflect the underlying assumptions and 
argument presented here. Of particular concern however is the classification of behaviour as 
personality clashes or misunderstandings. Downplaying the severity or significance of behaviour 
labelled as bullying or harassment is not uncommon (Harrington et al, 2012; Saundry, Bennett and 
Wibberley, 2013) and runs the risk of at best obscuring and at worst avoiding addressing wider 
organisational and/or societal problems (e.g. the perpetuation and legitimatisation of stereotypes) 
(Acker, 2006; Jenkins et al, 2012; Leskinen, Cortina and Kabat, 2011; Samuels, 2004; Thornton, 
2002).  
That is not to say no dispute can ever be considered as a personality clash or a misunderstanding, 
but rather to argue that care should be taken in classifying behaviour labelled as bullying (correctly 
or incorrectly) without careful thought (and preferably not before conducting a fair investigation) 
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(Ferris, 2004). For reasons introduced above (and considered in greater detail below14), a tendency 
or rush to label behaviour as misunderstandings or downplay it is particularly concerning if 
organisational support systems are poor or non-existent (Firestone and Harris, 2003; Lewis and 
Rayner, 2003). For the sake of clarity, this level of behaviour will be referred to as inappropriate 
behaviour short of bullying and harassment. Rawls would perhaps see this lower category as a step 
closer to the regulation of individuals in their associational capacities and therefore beyond the 
reach of his theory. On the adapted version of Rawls argued for here however, this behaviour 
would still be governed by the protection for dignity and an organisation (as an institution) must 
act to uphold their employees’ dignity. An interesting dynamic in this is to understand how the 
alleged victim and the alleged target are treated and whose dignity is to be prioritised.  
Bullying and harassment: the necessity of power struggles? 
Much of the focus in the bullying literature has been on perceptions and harm/impact on the target 
and the reasons for this will be considered shortly. The dynamics of the bully-target relationship 
however can be complex and unstable (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf and Cooper, 2003) and therefore it is 
necessary to also include the perspective of the bully/harasser (Rayner and Hoel, 1997). This is 
particularly important in a fairness context.  
Some attention has been paid to the personalities of bullies or the conditions which may lead 
someone to bully another (Hauge, Skogstad and Einarsen, 2009; Sumajin Parkins, Fishbein and 
Ritchey, 2006) but a qualitative consideration of the way in which bullies and harassers (alleged or 
otherwise) justify and rationalise their behaviour would help to increase understanding of the way 
the labels of bullying (and therefore the associated types and standards of behaviour) are reasoned 
and applied in practice (Jenkins et al, 2012). Whilst there may be methodological issues associated 
with recruiting (alleged/actual) perpetrators, it is accepted there is a value in seeking to find a way 
to access their understanding or at least a proxy of understanding how bullying behaviour might be 
justified (for example through the use of vignettes or reflective interviews with others involved in 
the resolution process). This desire to include the voice and understandings of both parties reflects 
the approach adopted by mediation and therefore in the context of the current research would be 
a worthwhile endeavour. 
Understanding the dynamics of the accused bully-target relationship is inherently linked to, if not 
defined by, the characteristics of bullying. At this point it is useful to return to the definition of 
bullying provided above. The existence of a power imbalance is a relatively uncontroversial element 
of the bullying definition and is seen as one of the ways of distinguishing bullying from other forms 
of conflict (Einarsen et al, 2003; Einarsen et al, 2009; Keashly and Nowell, 2011). Key to this 
distinction is the ability of a target to defend or retaliate in response to the circumstances): where 
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parties are both able to “give as good as they get” this may be better classified as conflict rather 
than bullying (Keashly and Nowell, 2003). 
One should be careful however in jumping to this conclusion. Where the alleged target may have 
initially retaliated or responded, for example ‘ignoring the behaviour or making a joke of the 
incident’ (Firestone and Harris, 2003:50), such a response may not be indicative of compliance with 
or condoning the behaviour but rather might be the only or the best choice in the circumstances 
(Knapp, Faley, Ekeberg and Dubois, 1997): for example because they feel like their job would be at 
risk otherwise (Fielden et al, 2010; Healy et al, 2011b) or because that is what is expected of them 
in the culture of the organisation (Ferris, 2004; Jennifer, Cowie and Ananiadou, 2003).  The 
response may even reflect expectations of stereotypical gender and/or ethnic roles, for example 
men to be more confrontational than women (Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin, 2011; Salin and Hoel, 
2013:241). In the case of less visible characteristics, for example sexual orientation, an individual 
may feel that challenging the behaviour would require them to reveal their sexuality and so choose 
not to complain (Colgan and Wright, 2011).  
It may also be the case that the parties started out in equal positions and/or both willingly 
retaliating and responding. The initial behaviour may not have been unwanted or consist of 
‘negative acts’ but over time what may be have been considered a dispute or just a joke may 
escalate into something more serious. This process of escalation is another important characteristic 
of bullying (Einarsen et al, 2003) and, as will be seen in chapter 5, is of potentially great relevance 
when the appropriate timing for the use of mediation is considered
15
. Without looking further at 
the rationales for the response, there is a risk of ‘victim-blaming’ (Keashly and Nowell, 2011:440). 
Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin (2011) argue that the legal system may be guilty of penalising 
claimants since an analysis of ET sexual harassment judgments (1995-2005) revealed that failing 
to complain about the behaviour at an early stage can have a negative effect on the credibility of a 
woman’s harassment claim, particularly in respect of demonstrating the conduct was unwanted 
(see also Samuels, 2004).  
Focusing on the response and not the reason for the response may serve to obscure the existence 
and the significance of power imbalances in the relationship. In the UK bullying occurs most 
commonly in a vertical, downward relationship i.e. a person with managerial responsibility bullies a 
subordinate (Beale and Hoel, 2010). There is an inherent, formal power imbalance built into that 
relationship by virtue of the nature of the employment relationship and ‘managerial prerogative’ 
(Beale and Hoel, 2010; Liefooghe and McKenzie Davey, 2001). The existence of such a formal 
power imbalance does not however make bullying inevitable (Beale and Hoel, 2010:112). Where 
bullying does occur in this relationship however it may have important consequences for the 
assessment of what is to be considered as appropriate and reasonable behaviour and what would 
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be considered as a fair response. Managers, for example ‘have a commensurately greater degree 
of responsibility than those without managerial responsibility’ (Hoel, Einarsen, Keashly, Zapf and 
Cooper, 2003:416) and it follows from this that the standard of behaviour expected of managers is 
higher than that of co-workers. 
The predominance of downward bullying in the UK however, does not mean that other types, for 
example horizontal or upwards bullying does not occur. In addition to formal power imbalances, 
discrepancies in power may arise from other informal sources (Einarsen et al, 2003). These forms 
of power include greater experience or knowledge (Einarsen et al, 2003). Power imbalances may 
also arise from the draining of an individual’s resources resulting in a decrease in their ability to 
cope (Einarsen et al, 2009). Of particular relevance to the current focus are sources of power 
associated with sex, race and sexual orientation (Holvino, 2010; Leskinen et al, 2011; Tatli and 
Ozbilgin, 2012). Even where the behaviour itself does not explicitly involve a protected 
characteristic, for example a string of sexist jokes or comments, social power imbalances can play 
an important role in distorting power relations (Rotundo, Nguyen and Sackett, 2001) and response 
strategies
16
. Although power imbalance is not an explicit defining characteristic of harassment, at 
least where one is concerned with “status” harassment (as is the case here), for the reasons of 
dignity and disadvantage considered in the previous sections of this chapter, one may argue that a 
recognition of social power imbalance is an inherent characteristic (McDonald, 2012:12). Also, as 
with bullying which does not directly involve a protected characteristic, where harassment is 
concerned, any one (or more) of the additional power imbalances can be present.  
Because of the influence of these conflicting or possibly confounding imbalances, it follows that 
power in bullying and harassment may be dynamic and particularly so where there is a process of 
escalation (Jenkins et al, 2012). There may be points where it is not possible to clearly define the 
roles of perpetrator and target (Jenkins et al, 2012). This fluid nature adds to the complexity of the 
application of the label bullying and/or harassment. Positions may be fixed or assigned (at least 
initially) solely ‘on the basis of who makes a complaint first’ (Jenkins et al, 2012:499). Klein and 
Martin (2011) argue however that those dealing with the complaint need to be aware of the ways 
in which a bully may masquerade as a victim and seek to coerce them (HR for example) into 
‘colluding with the perpetrator against the victim’ (:19-24). This arguably also extends to a 
mediator. 
The existence of power imbalances, particularly formal ones, may also serve as reason for a target 
to not report or challenge the behaviour (Fox and Stallworth, 2004) and where a complaint is made 
to HR, organisational priorities and support for managers may lead to a hesitance to apply the label 
bullying and leads to the downplaying of the behaviour considered above (as found by Harrington 
et al, 2012).  
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The relationship between power and mediation is an interesting one and much of the objection to 
the use of mediation is based on an incompatibility of the assumption of power relationships in 
mediation as (necessarily) equal and those in bullying and harassment as (necessarily) unequal. 
The validity of this objection will be considered shortly
17
.  
In seeking an understanding of how people think about bullying and assign standards and 
behaviours, it is interesting to explore the relative significance placed on the different sources and 
dynamics of power and understand the extent to which these are seen as defining characteristics. 
It is also important to then understand how these power imbalances may influence what is deemed 
to be a fair way of addressing the situation.  
Against these power issues, it will also be interesting to see what impact the characteristics of the 
parties involved have on the assessments made. For example, does the assessment of fairness 
vary if the parties are of the same sex rather than different sexes? Using vignettes to explore the 
perceptions of 293 (Finnish) third parties, Salin (2011) indicated that it would and indeed that men 
and women prioritise different factors. Would perceptions (and the reasonableness) be different in 
a situation where a gay man was calling another gay man a queer? What if it was a lesbian woman 
calling a gay man a queer? One must arguably consider such questions in light of the persistence 
of stereotypes arising from and perpetuated by certain power imbalances.  
The relative importance of perception and intent 
In chapter 3 there was a great deal of discussion rejecting a sole reliance on personal, subjective 
perceptions and evaluations of a situation (as in organisational justice) in favour of a reasoned 
balance of these perceptions with an assessment which may objectively (collectively) be considered 
as reasonable. In the pursuit of fairness, it was argued that such an approach is necessary. 
Although used to different ends, a debate about the balancing of the objective with the subjective 
in respect of defining bullying is well established.  
Here a distinction must be made between the pursuit of objectivity in defining bullying as a 
scientific construct for the purposes of measuring bullying and the need to balance subjective and 
objective accounts in respect of managing and addressing bullying in the workplace (Einarsen et al, 
2003). In relation to the role and application of anti-bullying policies, however, the two are closely 
linked. Some of the complexity and implications of the difficulty in assigning the labels of bullying 
and harassment were considered above. The concern in respect of perception relates to the issue 
of who is responsible for assigning that label and whether there is a need for that label to be 
externally verified.  
Research into workplace bullying has been dominated by a positivistic, quantitative paradigm 
(Fevre, Robinson, Jones and Lewis, 2010). There has been a concern with developing scales to be 
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used to measure exposure to bullying, its impacts and with predicting the organisational conditions 
and personal characteristics which may lead to bullying or to a person being bullied (see for 
example Einarsen et al, 2009; Parzefall and Salin, 2010). Definitional issues within these have been 
concerned with whether or not to allow participants to self-label on the basis of a given definition 
or whether it is better to use a standardised descriptive list of behaviours (Einarsen et al, 2009; 
Fevre et al, 2010). In line with Nielsen, Notelaers and Einarsen (2011) it is accepted there is utility 
in both approaches, although the latter is not employed here.  
This research accepts that bullying is a pervasive and prevalent problem and is not concerned with 
measuring or predicting the existence of bullying behaviours: therefore the assumptions and 
purposes of the more positivistic research are inappropriate. Whilst it is interesting to look at the 
‘negative acts’ used to measure bullying in these instruments, for example ‘Being the subject of 
excessive teasing and sarcasm’ (Einarsen et al, 2009-NAQ-R), if one is to understand what 
substantive experiences and meanings are attributed to those statements, an exploration of 
subjective perceptions is needed (Fevre et al, 2010; Lewis, 2006). This is necessary if one is to 
understand the level at which individuals set their personal standards.  
Although the focus is often the perception of the alleged target, as accepted above, an 
appreciation of the perceptions of the personal standards of the alleged perpetrator is also 
important if one is to reach a reasoned conclusion on where the boundaries of reasonableness 
should fall. That is not to say that equal consideration should necessarily be given to the 
perceptions of both parties, or at least not in terms of the initial choice of response or resolution 
strategy but rather that fairness (and procedural justice) demands both be considered. It follows 
from this that if a consideration of both perspectives is required there is necessarily a role for an 
assessment of the objective (reasonableness) of those perceptions. This assessment may involve 
talking to bystanding colleagues (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf and Cooper, 2011). The factors which may 
influence this assessment have been introduced above and will be considered in greater in chapter 
5
18
. The requirement of some external validation is not only important from a social cooperation, 
collective perspective but also to try and address any cases brought by egregiously vexatious 
individuals (Goldman, Gutek, Stein and Lewis, 2006) or those whose reaction was unreasonable in 
the circumstances (e.g. over-sensitivity).   
The arguments on the relevance of perception are often paired with those asking what role, if any, 
should be given to the alleged perpetrator’s intention when defining bullying. This is more 
controversial than the inclusion of perception (Keashly and Jagatic, 2011; Parzefall and Salin, 
2010). There are two reasons why one may argue against the inclusion of intention, one practical 
and one conceptual (Einarsen et al, 2003:20). The first is related to concerns of evidence since ‘it 
can be very difficult to prove intent’ (Fevre et al, 2010). The latter resonates strongly with the 
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argument being advanced here and reflects the view that there is an inherent value in protecting 
people from bullying behaviour. Making a judgement of bullying contingent on the demonstration 
of the perpetrator’s intent arguably risks undermining the significance of the effect of the conduct 
on the individual target (Einarsen et al, 2003; similarly for harassment see Clarke, 2006; Hepple, 
2008) and ignoring the arguments that, regardless of intent, such behaviour may independently 
violate what can be considered as reasonable (Berdahl, 2007; Einarsen et al, 2003; Gutek, 1995; 
Hoel and Beale, 2006).  
It is accepted here that intention may not be entirely irrelevant when one turns to questions of 
providing an appropriate resolution (see for example pp158-159; 183-184; 222-223) but, in 
agreement with the argument in the previous paragraph, it is also accepted that in respect of the 
determination of whether standards have been breached, intention should not be a relevant factor.  
This reflects the position in s26 (1)(b) of the EA which accepts that conduct with either ‘the 
purpose or effect of’ violating the target’s identity or creating an environment as described in s26 
(1)(b)(ii) can amount to harassment.  
In arguing for a role of intention in resolution, it is helpful to clarify a distinction which may be 
made in the meaning of intention: the intention to do the objectionable act(s) and the intention to 
cause the harm which results from those act(s) (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf and Cooper, 2003). An 
example may be a male colleague making jokes about “bums” and “anal sex” to a male co-worker 
who is gay (but not out at work) who is offended by the jokes (Grimshaw v Griffin Signs Ltd & 
Others (2008) EAT).  Leaving aside the question of the (in)appropriateness of such behaviour and 
regardless of the recipient’s sexual orientation, one may argue that the telling of the jokes was 
intentional but that the resultant offence was not. It is perhaps in such a case that one can see the 
temptation to label the behaviour as a misunderstanding but to do so would be incorrect because 
the behaviour itself is not appropriate.  
Arguably a distinction should nevertheless be made between this and a situation where the joke 
teller was aware that the recipient was offended by his jokes but nevertheless continued to tell 
them with the intention of causing further harm. In the latter case perhaps the language of blame 
and retribution in organisational justice is more appropriate (Neuman and Baron, 2011). If 
intention is important for resolution, it will be interesting to explore whether any importance is 
attached to intention when considering the question of fairness and feasibility of mediation, 
especially if the concern is with challenging and possibly changing attitudes.  
The matter of labelling behaviour and determining whether standards have been breached is a 
difficult task. Although it is potentially messy, complex and risks imprecision, an open approach to 
defining bullying and harassment is to be favoured. Providing no prior definition of bullying or 
harassment is important for understanding how the labels bullying and harassment are assigned in 
practice (Liefooghe and MacKenzie Davey, 2001; Lewis, 2006) and for accessing information on the 
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ways divisions between harassment and bullying are drawn (if indeed they are).  For example it is 
interesting to further explore the role assigned to perception and intent in such decisions and 
whether intent - or at least the ‘malicious’ element in Hoel and Beale’s (2010) definition of bullying 
- is also seen as a component of harassment. This is particularly important given the wording of 
the statutory definition which states ‘purpose or effect’ and therefore does not require a malicious 
element. 
 It will be also be interesting to see how relevant the persistency (frequency and duration) of the 
negative acts is (and how this relates to escalation) since this potentially a further defining 
characteristic of bullying but not necessarily of harassment (Branch, 2008). That the behaviour 
should have been experienced on a reoccurring basis and over a certain period of time, and that 
there is a process of escalation, are necessary features for defining bullying in much of the 
psychology literature (Einarsen et al, 2009; Einarsen et al, 2011). The s26 Equality Act 2010 
definition of harassment, however, allows for a single act to be considered as harassment. In 
understanding how distinctions between bullying and harassment are made by individuals in 
practice it will be useful to see how far this distinction is relevant and thus how this relates to the 
speed at which a label of bullying and/or harassment may be applied.  
4.7 CONCLUSION: BULLYING AND HARASSMENT: THE NECESSITY OF DIFFERENT 
ROUTES 
This chapter has sought to argue that protection of dignity should be considered as a basic right in 
a fair society and that any decisions based on a reasonable balancing of the personal and 
impersonal standpoints should take respect for dignity into account. Bullying and harassment may 
be seen as ways of operationalising respect for dignity and any behaviour which amounts to 
bullying and harassment is to be seen as a breach of reasonable standards of appropriate conduct. 
Whilst dignity may be seen as a unifying concept, the different underlying rationales for and scope 
of bullying and harassment, coupled with (or leading to) their differing legal and institutional 
protections means they have to be considered as separate, yet overlapping concepts. The creation 
of a possible spectrum of behaviour (determined by differing levels of reasonableness) is a 
consequence that flows from this separation. The difficulties involved in balancing the personal and 
impersonal standpoints to assign labels to the behaviour were discussed and in light of these 
problems the potential for mediation to operate were noted.  
Determining where on the spectrum behaviour falls may influence (or dictate) the appropriate 
route one should take towards the pursuit of the analogised destination in the park of fairness. The 
role of institutions-namely the government, the courts and organisations in helping (or hindering) 
this determination was referred to at many points in the previous two chapters and the discussion 
will now turn to a consideration of how the arguments presented so far may play out in the 
structure of Rawls’s basic society (as amended).  
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CHAPTER 5.  SIGNPOSTING MEDIATION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This closing chapter of the literature review will bring together the arguments presented thus far 
and will consider the role mediation does, and could, play in either facilitating or mitigating the 
pursuit of fairness in addressing workplace bullying and harassment. Therefore, to return to the 
analogy of the map, the various characteristics may be seen as signposts, guiding the direction a 
party may take. 
Continuing with Rawls’s thought experiment it will consider the extent to which the courts and 
organisations should be seen as basic institutions. The assumption that the State should play an 
important role in structuring the institutions and in guiding interactions between individuals which 
is accepted here will be questioned. As this research is concerned not with ideal theory but rather 
with a practically feasible understanding of the realities of the workplace, a critical consideration of 
this assumption is unavoidable. This is important given the government’s approach to regulation 
and policy which seeks to minimise its interference in the employment relationship. In doing so it 
shifts responsibility away from the State and on to individuals (see also BIS, 2013a on coalition 
reforms to employment law; Dickens, 2012a). The government’s encouragement of the use of 
mediation typifies this attitude.  
In light of this (and the uneven legal protection for bullying and harassment), although the role of 
the courts will necessarily be considered, the emphasis will be on the organisation and the extent 
to which it can be seen as a feasible (and reliable) body to act in a fair way to uphold standards of 
reasonableness. Through an exploration of the characteristics of mediation, it will explore the 
objections to its use in dealing with bullying and harassment and address arguments as to how the 
two may be reconciled.  
In seeking to navigate the roles of the institutions and the balancing of personal perceptions of 
fairness and reasonableness with impersonal standards, it will discuss the potentially conflicting 
assumptions underlying mediation and those of the need for the public knowledge of and debate 
on standards argued for here. Such a consideration necessitates a return to the differing forms of 
justice considered above
19
 and the ways these may be served or excluded by the operation of 
workplace mediation. Finally it will conclude with a return to the acknowledgement there is no right 
way of ordering the competing factors and that whilst a particular view has been argued for here, 
the best that can be hoped for is to seek to offer a framework which serves to both broaden and 
inform mediation debates.  
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5.2 COURTS AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION: A PUBLIC GOOD? 
Having argued for the central importance of fairness in determining what is to be deemed to be 
reasonable conduct in a fair society, it is now time to explicitly return to the question of whose 
responsibility it is to ensure those standards are known and upheld. For Rawls this job falls to the 
social institutions and in particular to the courts with judicial interpretation of laws as the final 
stage in his thought experiment. Having decided on the need for justice (here fairness)
20
 and the 
broad idea of the two principles in the first stage then assigned content and meaning to them in 
the constitutional stage and chosen how to enshrine them in law in the legislative stage
21
, it is the 
job of the courts to deal with any problems or conflicts which arise.   
Beyond assigning this role to judges, Rawls actually says little about the role of the courts and of 
judges (Dworkin, 2004; 2006). Nevertheless, he argued that a coherent and consistent application 
of the law was important for protecting citizens (Dworkin, 2004:1395). In pursuit of this, judicial 
determinations are to be informed by and inform public reason (Dworkin, 2004; Rawls, 1997). 
Reflecting these sentiments, Genn (1999) acknowledges courts play an important role in ‘national 
consciousness’ as ‘a place in which ordinary citizens can enforce rights’ and as such they have a 
‘symbolic value’ (:226). Here the discussion will not dwell on the detail of the ways in which courts 
can or should be conceptualised or the rules by which judges should interpret the law since this 
would be an unnecessary diversion: not least because the focus here will be on organisational and 
individual decision making.  
For present purposes the most important characteristics of the legal system is the recognition of 
public adjudication as a social good and as a means of benchmarking accepted standards. These 
characteristics have great relevance and resonance with, and for, those who argue against the use 
of ADR on the basis it leads to a privatisation of justice which can be damaging to society and the 
pursuit of a collective social justice (for example Bush and Folger, 2012; Edwards, 1986;). Such 
arguments are longstanding in the wider ADR literature (Fiss, 1984 and Nader, 1979). However, 
although this has been given some attention in the UK in relation to the broader procedural 
changes in the legal system (Genn, 1999; 2010), the debates have generally been absent in the 
workplace context. The potential reasons for this will be considered shortly and are closely related 
to the way workplace mediation has been framed in practitioner and policy discourses. Before 
turning to consider the privatisation of justice arguments in the context of the current discussion, it 
is useful to first return to the matter of what mediation is.  
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5.3 CONCEPTUALISING MEDIATION 
Defining Mediation  
Mediation was defined above as ‘a confidential and voluntary process in which a neutral person 
helps people in a dispute to explore and understand their differences so that the can find their own 
solution’ (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011:123). This definition was chosen since it reflects the 
characteristics of facilitative mediation which is the form most commonly used in UK workplaces 
(Latreille, 2011). Selecting a definition of mediation however is not a simple task and there is a 
danger of assuming a common definition without explicitly asking whether everyone is talking 
about the same thing (Dickens, 2012b:31; Dolder, 2004). Unhelpfully, the BIS consultation, for 
example, called for views on the use of mediation with little attempt to provide a clear definition. 
Like bullying and harassment, the study of mediation may suffer from mediation having a lay 
meaning or indeed meanings. Unlike bullying and harassment, however, the ambiguity is arguably 
not helpful in understanding how mediation should be conceptualised and is, or could be, used in 
practice. Arguing in favour of embracing differing understandings of the former but not the latter 
may be considered inconsistent but it is nevertheless necessary. It was argued above that because 
of the complexity involved in delineating the boundaries between what may or may not be 
considered as bullying and/or harassment by any given individual or group of individuals, in order 
to further understanding of how to deal with bullying and harassment this ambiguity could not be 
avoided. Within this however, a role for clear definitions as a way of guiding conduct in terms of 
reasonableness was conceded and a similar argument can be made in respect of mediation: if the 
appropriateness of mediation is to be understood and determined in a practical context it is 
necessary to have a consistent idea of what mediation means. The alternative is to run the risk of 
talking at crossed purposes, for example mediation may be a structured process for one but may 
simply be a chat with two people to another (Latreille, 2011:12; Saundry and Wibberley, 2012:29).  
 To argue for greater clarity in definition is not to argue for a single, all-encompassing concept of 
mediation “proper” but rather to ask for better attention to detail in distinguishing between models 
of mediation. If one is to seek to address the appropriateness of and consequences arising from 
the use of mediation, it is necessary to understand the specific characteristics of the process 
employed since different forms and models of mediation offer different benefits and pose different 
problems.  
Seeking clarity will perhaps become increasingly difficult yet important as the supply of mediators 
grows and they seek to differentiate themselves through the development or rebranding of types 
of mediation. Such clarity is also necessary if one is to understand how private non-judicial 
mediation is to be distinguished from other forms of ADR, particularly Acas early conciliation and 
judicial mediation which are not considered here (see Roche and Teague, 2012).  
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Further, if one is to understand the relationship between mediation and the law it is potentially 
important to also explore the distinction between workplace mediation and employment mediation. 
Some providers make a distinction between the two with the latter being more closely aligned with 
the negotiation of legal rights than the former. It appears however that such a distinction is not yet 
evident in the academic literature on the use of mediation in the UK or indeed represented in 
policy. Understanding the relationship between mediation and employment law is necessary not 
only in terms of conceptualising mediation and determining its appropriateness but may also be an 
important piece of the puzzle when it comes to persuading organisations and individuals to try 
mediation
22
.  
The above plea for clarity comes with a caveat that, in any given mediation, a number of factors 
(including the experience and skill of the mediator), may operate to make clear distinctions 
between the different forms seem like an impracticable demand (Riskin, 2003). One may argue, 
however, that this recognition, whilst a practical necessity, does not detract from the need to first 
understand how the different forms of mediation may operate discretely. It is arguably only from 
this point one can begin to understand how combinations of the various models may operate. 
Having argued for the need to seek greater precision in expression, the discussion will now briefly 
consider the alternatives to facilitative mediation before returning to a consideration of how the 
characteristics of facilitative mediation can feed into the broader arguments of fairness relevant 
here.  
Distinguishing facilitative mediation 
The first area for confusion over the delineation of the different models arises from the influence of 
US literature on mediation. In the US the debate is characterised by seeking to understand the 
differences between evaluative, problem-solving (or facilitative) and transformative mediation 
(Lande, 2000).  The focus in distinguishing the approaches lies in identifying the purpose and 
therefore in the differing roles of the mediator (Bingham, 2004; Riskin, 2003).  
In evaluative mediation, the mediator ‘gives an expert opinion on the merits of the dispute’ 
(Bingham, 2004:156) whilst in facilitative, a mediator works with the parties towards an outcome 
that will settle the dispute (Riskin, 2003). In transformative mediation however, their role is far less 
defined with all control being given to the parties (Bingham, 2004). Transformative mediation 
allows parties to ‘develop a greater degree of both self-determination and responsiveness to 
others’ (:264) since participation in mediation is grounded not in the pursuit of solving a problem 
but in empowerment and recognition (Folger and Bush, 1996).   
According to Riskin (2003) the different approaches are not to be seen as discrete but rather as 
existing on a continuum potentially allowing the shift (or shifts) in mediator approach anticipated 
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above. It follows from this therefore that in seeking to establish the appropriateness of mediation, 
one must understand the purpose for which it is used, as well as the relationship between the 
parties involved and the mediator. This, and in particular the latter element, is reflective of the 
organisational justice approaches to mediation outlined in chapter 3. The significance of the role of 
the mediator cannot be underestimated (Saundry et al, 2013) as this potentially has very 
importance consequences for perceptions of fairness and justice.  
When the discussion returns to mediation in the UK, the labels shift. Here facilitative mediation is 
close to problem-solving whilst ‘directive mediation’ requires a greater level of intervention from 
the mediator (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011). The purpose of the facilitative mediator is ‘to orient 
disputants to the processual dimensions of interest-based negotiations, rather than focusing on the 
substance of the dispute’; in so doing ‘the mediator’s role is essentially passive and pacifying in 
nature’ (Dolder, 2004:332). The notion of transformation, in the sense participating in the 
mediation process can lead to personal and organisational transformation can, however, arguably 
be found in arguments of empowerment and shifts in conflict management culture annexed to the 
use of facilitative mediation. How far such claims of transformation and empowerment can be 
supported will be considered later
23
. 
It is perhaps interesting that the facilitative approach is the most prevalent, since this approach is 
somewhat polar to traditional adversarial approaches, not least because it is ‘non-judgmental and 
based on joint searches for ways forward’ (Purcell, 2010:19). In order to understand the reasons 
why facilitative mediation may be favoured it is useful to return to the policy motivations for 
recommending the use of mediation in workplace disputes.  
The twin pillars of the benefits of workplace mediation 
The introduction to this thesis opened with a brief consideration of the legal and policy landscape 
shaping current discussions on the resolution of workplace disputes. Like previous governments, 
the current coalition government is seeking to reduce the number of employment tribunal claims 
which are lodged each year (BIS, 2011b; Sanders, 2009) by making substantive changes to the 
law, as well as procedural changes to “encourage” a greater use of ADR. This ‘docket-clearing’ 
argument for the use of ADR was identified previously
24
 and is by no means unique to the UK 
(Goldberg and Shaw, 2010; Stipanowich, 2004 (US)). A focus on reducing litigation has arguably 
led to an emphasis on process, rather than a consideration of the quality of outcomes (Edwards, 
1986). Of particular relevance here is the positioning of the changes in the context of access to, 
and delivery of, justice and fairness.  
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This balancing is motivated by arguments of economic efficiency and a shifting of responsibility for 
resolving their own problems onto the people involved (employer and employee), rather than 
relying on third party decision makers and more specifically to the legal system to address them 
(BIS, 2011a; 2011b). These two elements may be considered as the “twin-pillars” of the arguments 
dominating discussions of the use of mediation in UK workplaces: cost and efficiency (1) and 
empowerment (2)
25
.  
Cost and Efficiency 
Unsurprisingly given the wider rhetoric and concern for economic growth, a great deal of attention 
has been paid to the cost and efficiency benefits of mediation (Dickens, 2012b). These are related 
to arguments that mediation is a cheaper alternative to formal and legal routes (Zack, 1997), with 
figures estimating the cost of (external) mediation to be £1,200-£2,000 (BIS, 2010:42) compared 
with costs of an  ET hearing which stood (pre-fees) at £6,200 (employer), £1,800 (claimant) and 
£3,200 (exchequer) (BIS, 2013:26)
26
. It is the potential for savings that leads the practitioner 
rhetoric.  
Many of these savings arise from the positioning of mediation as offering a faster resolution to 
problems (Roche and Teague, 2012). Issues are potentially dealt with in a matter of days rather 
than months or even years as may be the case with formal and legal procedures (BIS 2011b; 
Acas/CIPD, 2013). The faster resolution comes from the avoidance of the need for formal 
investigation procedures and a stemming of the disturbance and diversion of time and productivity 
spent dealing with conflict, both in respect of the parties directly involved, as well as those, such as 
HR involved in the process of dealing with the dispute (Acas/CIPD, 2013). A faster resolution also 
minimises the wider effect of conflict which impacts other individuals within a workplace and 
beyond, for example colleagues and family. Further, chances of a faster resolution are often linked 
with the positioning of mediation as an early intervention route (Gibbons, 2007). Although the 
positioning of mediation in respect of more formal procedures varies (Latreille, 2011:37), it is 
logical that a number of the benefits (particularly avoiding investigation) depend on mediation 
taking place prior to formal approaches since formal procedures may lead (or even force) parties to 
become further entrenched in their positions, making resolution less likely (Irvine, 2014). 
If one returns to the conflict and to the bullying literature this early approach seems sensible. 
Given the acknowledgement that conflict may escalate over time in to something damaging, even 
where it does not become bullying, it makes sense to try and stop this process of escalation 
(Jenkins, 2011: 29). Preventing this escalation thus serves to prevent all the costs (financial and 
time) that flow from it (Saundry and Wibberley, 2012:26).  
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Given the relatively low use of mediation by employers which was placed at 7% in the latest WERS  
figures (4% internal/3% external, Van Wanrooy et al, 2013:27) it is early days in terms of being 
able to say whether mediation delivers on these promises of cost and efficiency. There are also 
findings demonstrating that mediation may be seen as cheaper but it is not necessarily seen by 
employers (and particularly SMEs) as cheap, indicating that cost may be seen as a barrier to its 
increased use (CIPD, 2011:3; Latreille, Buscha and Conte, 2012). There are also indications that 
the size and sector of a workplace will have an important effect on the extent to which mediation 
may deliver on any such benefits (Bennett, 2013: higher education). 
It is also interesting to note that there is very little, if any, discussion on the cost savings 
associated with the use of mediation for employees (Colling, 2004). This is perhaps because it is 
envisioned that employers are likely to be the ones who pay for mediation (Acas, 2008: although 
the results from SETA 2008 paint a more complicated picture (BIS, 2010:42)) and therefore it 
makes sense for the rhetoric to target the savings available to them. This feature has implications 
for arguments of fairness and balances of power
27
. The focus for individuals has fallen to the 
second pillar: empowerment. This characteristic is the one which returns the discussion to the 
comment that the dominance of facilitative mediation is interesting. What is interesting is that 
participation in facilitative mediation potentially necessitates a significant recalibration of attitudes 
towards and responsibilities within a dispute processes. A failure to critically consider the feasibility 
and implications of this, especially in the context of bullying and harassment, is to shield the 
question of appropriateness from a number of potentially insidious and damaging consequences. 
This is particularly concerning where such questions are obscured by a blinkered discussion of cost 
and efficiency and organisational advantage (Saundry et al, 2014).  
Empowerment 
The idea of empowerment lies in the notion that individuals in a conflict situation should be given 
greater responsibility to jointly reach an outcome that is mutually satisfactory to them. Through 
this process individuals are able to regain control and learn new skills to better understand 
themselves and others (Irvine, 2014). These potential gains reflect the hopes of transformational 
mediation. The idea of regaining control is attractive but, as will be seen shortly, problematic in any 
relationship where power imbalances are present.  
The shifting of responsibility for reaching an outcome to the parties involved necessitates a 
reshaping of the dispute relationship away from adversarial processes where representatives or 
third parties seek to uncover and present facts and arguments to another (or the same) third party 
who is responsible for reaching a decision which is, on the balance of probabilities, the right one 
(Hoel and Einarsen, 2011). Here the parties’ involvement in the decision making process is 
extremely minimal, instead this responsibility is assigned to an investigator, employer, or, should it 
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get that far, to an ET. In mediation however there is a significant narrowing of the number of 
parties involved in the process of resolution.  
Although a mediator will be present and may, depending on the role they adopt, suggest 
outcomes, the decision making power lies with the parties themselves. As was mentioned above
28
 
in relation to Nabatchi et al’s (2007) framing of the mediation relationship, great attention needs to 
be paid to what happens to the role and responsibilities of the organisation in this narrowing 
(Keashly and Nowell, 2011:439). This point will be considered shortly but it is first necessary to 
note two further, related consequences of this reshaping which have implications for the balancing 
of personal and impersonal standards of reasonableness: individualisation and the (ir)relevance of 
evidence. 
Individualisation or personalisation of disputes 
The move towards empowerment is also characteristic of the individualisation of dispute resolution 
(Bush and Folger, 2012; Dolder, 2004). This reflects the drive towards individualisation in the 
context of managing diversity and in respect of group characteristics considered above
29
. It is 
important here to make a distinction between individualisation in the sense of the promotion of 
individual choice and empowerment on the one hand and the individual nature of enforcement 
mechanisms in much of employment law and organisational policy, on the other (Dickens, 2012c). 
Given the argument offered here for the need to stress the impersonal standpoint in respect of 
standards of reasonableness and accepted principles of dignity, acknowledging this distinction is 
crucial in navigating arguments of substantive justice and fairness in mediation.  
In respect of legal claims, whilst the actions and remedies may be individually-focused, they are 
defined and assessed by reference to impersonal objective and publically known rules and 
standards
30
. The individualisation characterising empowerment runs the risk of avoiding or 
circumventing these standards and replacing them with almost entirely personally determined 
standards and perceptions of fairness. Interviews with (25) participants to mediation suggest that 
treating the behaviour in this way (as a personal issue) made them feel as though agreeing to try 
mediation required them to potentially accept some blame for the situation (Saundry et al, 
2013:15). This seems to reflect Keashly and Nowell’s (2011) concerns over the risk of victim-
blaming. This also has a further potential consequence since it may serve to treat sexual (and 
arguably also other forms of) harassment ‘as a private shame’ serving to secure ‘its continuing 
status as a deeply personal and necessarily private injury’ rather than a social harm (Hippensteele, 
2006-2007:58).  
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In this one finds a further shift away from adversarial processes which are (in theory at least) 
designed to weigh the validity (reasonableness) of these personal elements with impersonal 
standards. These judgements rely on (admittedly imperfect) processes of investigation and 
evidence which are deemed inappropriate for mediation.  
This potential to circumvent the arguments underlying the need for legal protection again draws 
interesting parallels between conflict management discourses and the managing diversity approach 
discussed above
31
. Reflecting these similarities, recent case study findings indicate that the 
attempts to make conflict management a strategic issue may suffer the same contingency-based 
fate of equality in managing diversity (Saundry and Wibberley, 2014). Of greater relevance to the 
current discussion is the emerging similarity that organisations may be reluctant to try mediation 
where its relationship with their potential legal liability is uncertain (Harris et al, 2012). Employer 
reluctance or hesitance to use mediation is perhaps the favourable outcome where the alternative 
is for employers to seek to use mediation to potentially avoid responsibility or “sweep problems 
under the carpet” by making individuals responsible for resolving their own ‘misunderstandings’ 
where these are grounded in more systemic problems. The potential readiness to label situations of 
bullying, harassment and/or inappropriate behaviour short of bullying/harassment was considered 
above
32
 and is of particular concern. 
This same fear of litigation (coupled with an alleged tendency for employees to “claim first, think 
later” (Confederation of British Industry, 2013:6)) has motivated many of the changes to 
employment law (and the removal of regulation) made by the coalition government (Busby, 
McDermont, Rose and Sales, 2013; Hepple, 2013). There is, however, evidence to suggest such 
fear is not motivated by the actual impact of regulation but rather a misunderstanding about or 
perception of that burden (Hepple, 2013; Jordan, Thomas, Kitching and Blackburn, 2013). This 
strengthens the argument that any question of the appropriateness of mediation necessitates an 
understanding of the way mediation relates to employment law and other formal processes. In 
addition to the conceptual arguments related to the importance of prioritising the impersonal, there 
is also therefore a practical need to address individualisation. The criticisms of mediation rooted in 
concerns over the privatisation of justice resulting from an increased use of ADR provide a helpful 
(and relevant) way of discussing these issues.  
5.4 PRIVATISING JUSTICE 
In addition (and related to) the individualisation issue, privatisation also returns the discussion to a 
number of the reccurring themes, namely the positioning of courts in society and the role of 
justice. 
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The main arguments concerning the danger of privatising justice centre around the idea that a 
private settlement grounded in private interests rather than a public judgment, undermines the 
public right for disputes to be dealt with by those chosen to deliberate on and enforce social values 
(i.e. judges) (Fiss, 1984). The objections may therefore be considered in relation to the way in 
which private settlement deprives the legal system of developing precedents and of allowing those 
in positions of power (here employers) to escape being held to account for their actions.  
Mulcahy (2013) argues that precedent setting through the (appellate) courts is important as courts 
use ‘individual disputes to constitute and justify a particular view of how the social world we all live 
in is and ought to be’ (:60). Central to this therefore is the idea discussed in the previous chapter 
that there are reasons certain conduct has been seen as objectionable by society and therefore 
should not be tolerated or settled. Private settlement may also lead to an inconsistent application 
of the law (Dolder, 2004; Harkavy, 1999) or to the application of a ‘second class justice’ (Edwards, 
1986).  
The second argument, escaping accountability, potentially excuses poor or unfair employer 
behaviour and shields such actions from public scrutiny (Mahony and Klass, 2008; Ridley-Duff and 
Bennett, 2011). Given the inherent power imbalance in the employment relationship and the role 
assigned to organisations here as societal institutions, privatisation potentially allows employers to 
ignore or deny any systematic or endemic problems in their workplace and may serve to limit the 
powers of employees to expose or challenge this even further. This possibility for ensuring the 
‘disaggregation’ of collective complaints (Nader, 1979) is of particular concern in light of the 
arguments considered in the previous chapter
33
.  
These objections stem from the private and confidential nature of mediation (and other ADR 
procedures), a confidentiality which may operate to ensure only the parties to a mediation and the 
mediator are aware of what happens (CIPD, 2013:10; Acas, 2008).  
To return again to Rawls, the courts therefore have an important role to play in providing social 
justice. Societal values and the associated standards should be publically knowable which, it may 
be recalled, is important for the legitimacy and sustainability of public reason and consensus 
around what are to be considered as reasonable principles and standards in a fair society (Rawls, 
2001; 1997). It is important to note here that arguments of privatisation again serve to place 
justice, rather than fairness as a primary goal.     
At this point this positioning of justice is arguably not problematic. It has been argued that fairness 
and justice are different things and that the latter is not necessarily always considered as a 
prerequisite for the former. However, it is accepted that when it comes to public adjudication and 
determination of what is to be seen as reasonable in a given situation, justice in an objective sense 
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(i.e. determined by reference to collective, not personal perceptions of justice) should be treated 
as a necessary, although perhaps not sufficient component of fairness. This potentially subtle but 
nevertheless significant distinction should become more apparent as the discussion progresses.  
Given the assumptions and leanings of this research, the privatisation arguments are inherently 
attractive. What is not attractive however, is the prospect of demonstrating how the current legal 
system operates to deliver on the functions outlined above. In the context of workplace mediation, 
this demonstration requires the consideration of privatisation in two respects. The first is the more 
commonly considered i.e. mediation operating to remove actions from public scrutiny in a societal 
sense. The second concerns the extreme narrowing of confidentiality which potentially shields 
scrutiny from anyone other than the parties involved i.e. mediation used to deny scrutiny in an 
organisational sense. The latter is perhaps a necessary component of the first but is nevertheless 
worthy of consideration in its own regard, especially when one returns to the complexity involved 
in workplace bullying and harassment.  
Access to justice: Necessarily tied to law?  
The differing legal statuses assigned to bullying and harassment provide fertile ground for a 
consideration of the role mediation might play in the workplace and is the starting point for 
addressing the question as to whether the privatisation arguments can only be applied to the legal 
system. In short, the answer to this question is, as will be argued here, no. Whilst it is accepted 
that the law and the courts can indeed play a vital role in a fair society, in practice focussing only 
on the relationship between mediation and the courts is to be concerned only with the tip of the 
‘iceberg’ (Latreille, 2011:15).  
Despite claims of an unreasonable and unsustainable increase in the number of ET claims, as was 
seen in the previous chapter, individuals, for many reasons, may choose or not feel able to report 
or challenge the way they are treated, meaning ET statistics represent only an extremely small 
proportion of negative (and even potentially unlawful) treatment at work (Colling, 2004; Dickens, 
2012c; Twining, 1993).  
Even where individuals do report the behaviour, a number of potentially prohibitive barriers to 
access the legal system need to be overcome. Although it is not a point which will be pursued 
here, one may see access to justice (or at least access to equal resources) concerns in light of 
Rawls’s second principle (equality of opportunity) (Wertheimer, 1988). These barriers may be 
substantive and/or procedural.  
Substantive barriers may take the form of qualifying criteria, for example the need to be an 
employee with two years continuous employment for unfair dismissal. This will serve to leave many 
of those in atypical employment without protection (Dickens, 2004). A further example is the 
(non)existence of specific legal protection (which, as has been seen is not necessarily the case for 
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bullying). A prior substantive barrier may operate in the form of an individual’s lack of awareness 
of their rights and possible options (Dickens, 2012c; Perren, Roberts, Stafford and Hirsch, 2012a). 
This barrier may also be compounded by a lack of access to free or affordable legal advice (Busby 
and McDermont, 2012; Hudson, 2012).  
This latter barrier, together with the procedural aspects immediately takes the discussion back to 
the cost and efficiency arguments considered above. Accessing ETs is potentially expensive for 
both the employee and the employer. With the introduction of ET fees in July 2013 (with a view to 
‘encourage mediation and arbitration’34) the cost of lodging a claim for any of the jurisdictions 
which may cover bullying and/or harassment immediately adds £250 to the claimant’s costs to 
lodge a claim, with the potential of having to pay a further £950 should the claim proceed to a 
hearing (The Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013). 
Although the fees order did also establish a system for the remission of fees for those on lower 
incomes, it is complex (Schedule 3, ibid). These fees are in addition to any which may be incurred 
accessing legal advice and/or representation
35
.  
One need only to look at the disparity in the Ministry of Justice statistics between the number of 
claims submitted and those reaching a full hearing to see the tip of that publically knowable 
iceberg is even smaller than initially anticipated. Therefore, even where claims are lodged, they 
may be privately settled by conciliation or compromise (/settlement) agreements (Dickens, 2012b), 
meaning any public value in knowing about such cases is lost.  
Even where a claim does make it to a hearing, the barriers are not overcome. Whilst it is possible 
for parties in an ET claim to represent themselves (Morris, 2012), the need to frame the arguments 
in legal terms can be highly disadvantageous to those with no legal background and who cannot 
access any, or sufficient legal advice. The adversarial nature and need for one party to win and the 
other to lose also opens the gates for advantages to be gained by those parties who have greater 
resources (and experience) (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011). One may argue that such disparities 
operate to mitigate any fair operation of procedural justice and may therefore have an impact on 
the fairness or justice of any substantive outcome. Indeed it is the need for the disadvantaged 
‘have-nots’ to overcome such barriers that leads Green (2005) to strongly argue in favour of the 
use of mediation to tackle employment discrimination.   
Leaving aside the fairness of any such outcome for a moment, although in principle the outcome of 
a hearing is publically knowable, that does not mean that it will be publically known. This is 
particularly the case in first instance cases since full ET judgments are becoming increasingly rare 
and records are not easily available. For individuals who are not deliberately engaged with ET case 
law, they may only find out about the details and standard-setting through those cases deemed  
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newsworthy by the national (or perhaps local) press. The situation may be similar with employers. 
Unless an organisation is proactively concerned with staying informed, and has the resources to do 
so, awareness of the law (updated through the dissemination of the judgments) is likely to be 
limited (Perren, Roberts, Stafford and Hirsch, 2012b; 2012c).  
The accountability arguments can similarly be derailed by a consideration of the number of private 
settlements and by a return to the consideration of the individual nature of remedies in 
employment law. For example, even where a successful claim for sexual harassment is brought 
there is limited scope for the claim to trigger wider changes in organisational behaviour and 
attitudes (Dickens, 2012a:212). The coalition government would no doubt counter this with an 
assertion that specific legal remedies to this effect are not necessary since they would expect 
employers ‘at the sharp end of a tribunal finding’ to make changes anyway (Government Equalities 
Office, 2012:8). Although no evidence was offered to support this, this was their reasoning for the 
proposed repeal of the wider recommendations provision in the EA 2010 (s124 (3) (b); GEO, 
2012). There is something unsettling about relying on organisations deemed to have acted 
unlawfully to police their own behaviour but it is not surprising. Indeed, this attitude is not 
exclusive to this point but is rather endemic in arguments in favour of organisational conflict 
management and in the bullying and harassment literature i.e. the assumption employers are 
engaged, reflective and supportive. The reasons for distrusting this assumption were introduced in 
the previous chapter and will be explored in more detail below
36
.  
The purpose of highlighting these barriers is not to argue against the importance of recognising 
arguments of privatisation and to outline the limits of legal processes with a view to saying the 
concerns are overstated, far from it. The importance of law for demonstrating what is considered 
as a necessary value worthy of protection in a fair society was accepted above and is, as has been 
and will further be, argued invaluable in serving as a public point of reference for determining how 
standards of reasonableness should be set. What a consideration of the barriers does is to begin to 
highlight how the law and legal process alone is not sufficient. This is glaringly obvious in the 
simple acknowledgement of the persistence of stereotypical and structural barriers despite the 
existence of anti-discrimination legislation on the statute books for more than 40 years (Foster, 
2004; Fredman, 2011). One may also extend these arguments to the potential “empty shell” 
character of organisational policies (Hoque and Noon, 2004).  
The point then is not to argue for an abandonment or circumvention of the legal system but rather 
for a greater attention to the detail and implications of the relationship between the privatisation 
arguments and pre-legal measures. Even if one were to exclude harassment from the discussion, 
the precarious and complicated legal position relating to bullying justifies this extension.  
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The scope of privatisation: wider than law 
In addition to the insufficiency of law arguments, the need to broaden the focus is arguably 
necessitated by two further reasons. The first relates to the categorisation and aspirations of 
workplace mediation as an alternative to legal remedies, thus seeking to divorce the use of 
mediation from legal discourses. The second concerns the scope of mediation to address issues for 
which legal remedy is insufficient, unavailable (Latreille, Buscha and Conte, 2012:596) or extremely 
difficult to substantively pursue. The two are related and will therefore be dealt with together.  
If the pursuit of legal routes is rife with barriers and inflexibility, proponents of mediation would 
argue that mediation can potentially offer unmitigated flexibility, or rather flexibility in outcome.  
This distinction is necessary as despite its frequent label as an informal approach, the process can 
be quite structured (Latreille, 2011:6). Facilitative mediation is not concerned with providing proof 
or evidence or framing disputes in legal terms and therefore is not concerned with rights 
(Hippensteele, 2006-2007:62) and because of this, parties are free to talk about the underlying 
issues. This benefit over the ET system is concisely summed up in this quote by a (then) Industrial 
Tribunal chair: ‘People often have a generalised sense of injustice…They find it hard to appreciate 
that we are not concerned with a generalised sense of injustice…It may be important to the 
applicant but it is not important to us. We are in the business of applying the facts to the law’ 
(Genn, 1993:403) (see also Goldberg and Shaw, 2010:242). At the risk of oversimplifying the 
issue, this potentially offers an insight into the reasons why even those who are successful in an ET 
adversarial process are not necessarily satisfied (Clark, Contrpois and Jefferys, 2012:562). 
 A further benefit of mediation is therefore not only its flexibility in scope but also its flexibility in 
outcome. The hope is the two parties are able to reach a mutually agreed solution which is not 
constrained by those available through formal and legal routes (Lieberman and Henry, 1986). It 
thus allows parties to tailor the outcome to the specific circumstances of their dispute 
(Stipanowich, 2004:846).  
Satisfaction and success rates for mediation are routinely heralded as good (Bingham, 2004). The 
question however of what counts as success in mediation is again a potential minefield of 
ambiguity. A number of possible criteria may be considered and include: whether a resolution is 
reached (in writing or otherwise); whether parties are satisfied with the process and/or the 
outcome; whether the parties can continue to work together or perhaps whether the parties are 
‘transformed’ (Bingham, 2004; Boon, Urwin and Karuk, 2011; Latreille, 2011; Saundry et al, 
2013:7). Understanding how success is defined and whether it is defined uniformly by mediators, 
organisations and parties is therefore also an important part of understanding whether the use of 
mediation is fair.  
With these characteristics the discussion again returns to the question of personal perceptions and 
standards of reasonableness. It seems that a departure from established standards and remedies 
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shifts the balance between the personal and impersonal standpoints much further towards a 
prioritisation of former. Given the emphasis placed on the importance of the impersonal in this 
research, this shift is a little uncomfortable. The assumption of plurality and the dismissal of one 
“right” way to order priorities however necessitate a consideration of why this may be seen as 
beneficial.  
5.5 MEDIATION: A BENEFICIAL SHIFT TOWARDS THE PERSONAL? 
A rejection of labels and the importance of perception, intention and confidentiality 
Perhaps the most obvious benefit lies in the complexity involved in defining and labelling behaviour 
as bullying and/or harassment. The difficulties involved in this were considered in the previous 
chapter where it was seen that the need for evidence and objective determinations can be risky as 
it relies on the (not always fair) motives of third party decision makers.  
The value of using labels such as bullying and harassment is doubted in mediation (Irvine, 2014) 
and may again be related to the importance of understanding the appropriate timing for mediation. 
It is interesting to explore the difference labels can make where mediation is used at different 
points: for example, either early in a dispute or where it is used following or in conjunction with 
formal processes where one party may have already been vindicated either to confirm or deny the 
application the label of bully (Saundry et al, 2013:17). In mediation, instead of seeking to endorse 
the un/reasonableness of the attributed labels, the emphasis is on understanding the meanings 
attached to the experiences (Jenkins, 2011). In discussing this one must return to the significance 
of perceptions and intention in bullying and harassment.  
Mediation potentially provides a forum for parties to directly state their perceptions of the 
behaviour of the other party and of the intentions to the alleged perpetrator. The alleged 
perpetrator is then provided an equal opportunity to share their own perceptions and perhaps offer 
insight to their intention. Through a discussion (facilitated by the mediator) parties may then reach 
a joint understanding and can work towards an outcome that is mutually acceptable to them. 
Indeed, it is in a (rather ambiguous) distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘perceived’ bullying that one 
may find classifications drifting towards misunderstandings or personality clashes (Latreille, 
2011:25). The emphasis here is on seeking a way forward with a view to hopefully preserving a 
continuing relationship (Gibbons, 2007). In such discussions, one can see how the dynamics of 
empowerment may operate. One can also clearly see why mediation is seen as particularly 
appropriate for addressing a situation where it is not clear whether the behaviour amounts to 
bullying (Jenkins, 2011). Crucially for this research it enables the parties themselves to personally 
determine what they consider to be reasonable conduct and a fair resolution.  
There are also consequences which flow from participation or association with formal bullying and 
harassment processes. These include the stigma or reputational damage which potentially attaches 
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to the accused perpetrator and the alleged victim: a confidential and private process can operate 
to mitigate public knowledge of parties’ involvement (Hippensteele, 2006-2007; Harkavy, 1999). 
Another relates to the need to perhaps disclose private personal details in an effort to demonstrate 
the strength and credibility of a case. An example may be feeling like it is necessary to disclose 
sexual orientation to pursue a complaint about homophobic behaviour. The confidential nature is 
therefore ‘crucial…for parties to be willing to discuss matters openly’ (Latreille, 2011:35).  
Being able to discuss matters in an open and honest way is important for helping the parties to 
rebuild trust into their relationship (Lieberman and Henry, 1986:428). Further, even though it is not 
necessarily exclusive to mediation, a private resolution potentially prevents any consequences 
which arise beyond the end of a claim, for example an impact on job prospects (Drinkwater, 
Latreille and Knight, 2011). 
Outcome: A concern for fairness but not justice? 
From a fairness perspective these aspects seem consistent with the definitions of fairness provided 
in chapter 3. Similarly, from a procedural justice point of view (here procedural justice includes 
interactional justice) it is also attractive, not only from a subjective personal perspective but also in 
objective sense too. However, depending on the outcome, the extent to which it may be seen to 
be achieving substantive justice in an impersonal sense may be more difficult to reconcile. This 
may be particularly problematic where the outcome chosen is one which is less than that which 
would have been available through formal mechanisms.  
Here one must return to the distinction between fairness and justice and a situation in which an 
individual may be concerned with fairness but not justice, or at least not substantive justice. This is 
arguably tied up with the motivations in challenging the behaviour. For example, if one is 
concerned with assigning blame and punishment (as organisational justice is), an apology and a 
promise to not repeat the actions may not be seen as a just outcome since it does not meet the 
expectations of the individual. If, however, the aim is to get the behaviour to stop (Bond, 1996-
1997) then an outcome which achieves that may be seen to deliver some form of substantive 
justice. Such substantive justice however would not necessary conform to the collective values of 
social justice (through distributive justice for example). Green (2005) would not see this lack of 
conformity as particularly problematic since justice in mediation depends on the subjective views of 
the parties involved. Green argues that mediation can be used to deliver social justice in the 
context of equality (employment discrimination), but that social justice should only be of relevance 
where it is a concern for the parties involved and required for their self-actualisation (2005:351). 
For him, public and societal concerns will still be addressed because ‘there will be enough disputes 
that parties cannot resolve in mediation’ (2005:351).    
This conclusion again begs the question of what the purpose of mediation is. To answer this one 
must recall the statement above that facilitative mediation strives to be something entirely different 
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in nature and purpose to adversarial processes. Acknowledging this further begs the question of 
whether justice (or least anything beyond procedural justice) is the appropriate criteria to apply to 
mediation (Bennett, 2013:204; Bingham, Hallberlin, Walker and Chung, 2009; Saundry et al, 
2013:20).  
Certainly in respect of the privatisation of justice arguments one may accept that the objection 
arises not because ADR (and mediation specifically) was designed to be an exact substitute for the 
court process but because mediation is intended as an alternative, and therefore different 
approach
37
. It may then be not that justice per se is inappropriate or irrelevant but rather forms 
which are traditionally associated with adversarial procedures. This is perhaps illustrated by the 
clear parallels in arguments over the benefits and disadvantages in the use of restorative justice 
methods and those in ADR more broadly, for example a concern over privatisation and the 
acceptance of outcomes lesser than those imposed by law (for example see Menkel-Meadow, 2007 
for a good overview of restorative justice).  
However, one may make an interesting distinction between restorative justice methods and the use 
of mediation in the circumstances envisioned above over the role of blame and punishment. In 
restorative justice the perpetrator (offender) admits fault and there is a punitive component and a 
concern with both blame and forgiveness (Bradfield and Aquino, 1999) whereas this is not 
necessarily the case in workplace mediation. Mediation is at least not concerned with blame and 
punishment and at worst actively rejects its language (Keashly and Nowell, 2011; Saam, 2010:55). 
The comparison between restorative justice and mediation is therefore not perfect but it does 
nevertheless support the need to acknowledge the existence of multiple forms of justice argued for 
in chapter 3.   
The unclear role of justice notwithstanding, the question still remains as to whether or not an 
argument can be made for accepting a resolution or outcome as fair on the basis that the parties 
involved perceive it as fair, even if such outcome falls short of what may objectively be considered 
fair.  
The answer perhaps lies in a deeper understanding of the nature and process dynamics of 
mediation and in the relationship between workplace mediation, formal procedures and the 
influence of employment law. Although it may seem inconsistent with arguments that mediation is 
to be seen as something different and not concerned with rights, it is arguably a practical necessity 
that it be retained since it provides the boundaries within which organisations should operate. This 
is both a conceptual and a practical compromise. It is a position which is supported (albeit usually 
without the explicit collective and societal element) by many who argue for multi-pronged 
approaches to dealing with workplace conflict.  
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The need for organisations to adopt multiple approaches is reflected across disciplines, for example 
see Lipsky and Avgar (2008-2009) and Bendersky (2007) (organisational conflict management), 
Saam, (2010) and Hunt, Davidson, Fielden and Hoel (2010) (bullying and harassment). In 
accepting this it is also important to acknowledge a characteristic of mediation which has the 
potential to dampen objections to the use of mediation (or at least workplace mediation), the 
voluntary, non-binding nature means that mediation is not an either/or alternative since attempting 
mediation does not bar the pursuit of other options (Bennett, 2013). 
Having reached this point, the remainder of the chapter will now turn to address the need to gain a 
greater understanding of the mechanics of mediation. It will be argued that it is only through 
increasing knowledge of the use of mediation in practice that one can begin to better understand 
how to answer the question as to whether mediation is to be seen as both feasible and fair for 
bullying and harassment. Finally, it will return to the arguments of privatisation and the idea of 
transformation and consider how this may feed into arguments of the need to more explicitly 
consider the operation and impact of privatising dispute resolution at the organisational level.  
5.6 MEDIATION IN PRACTICE 
A voluntary process? 
At present the decision to try mediation is a voluntary one. Unlike Gibbons (who rejected the 
need), the 2011 BIS consultation did not consider the question of mandatory mediation, focusing 
instead on early conciliation.  
This voluntary nature of workplace mediation provides a hurdle for arguing about any unfairness 
arising from a prioritisation of personal perceptions. For example, if a person is willing to try 
mediation if it will offer the opportunity of a quicker resolution and the chance to keep their job, it 
is perhaps difficult to reasonably criticise or challenge this decision. This stands even where they 
may otherwise have had a legitimate formal complaint. Where that individual has genuinely chosen 
to try mediation, it may be difficult to object on grounds other than the fact one may not agree 
with their choice. Indeed this is the premise upon which Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011) and 
Bennett (2013) argue for the radical potential of mediation. 
For them, individual choice frees parties from having to conform to ‘pre-agreed’ standards which 
are set by ‘an unchallenged elite’ (Bennett, 2013:193-194). This is grounded in a participatory 
sense of democracy rather than the representative sense underpinning Rawls. Their approach 
therefore takes a very different starting point to the argument advanced here and is another 
reason why an alternative framework is necessary.  
Ridley-Duff and Bennett’s stance notwithstanding, a reasonable objection from within the argument 
advanced here may arise in the form of questioning how voluntary the decision to try mediation 
really is (Saundry et al, 2013). Figures from Acas found that whilst 75% of participants in Acas 
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delivered mediations (2011-2012) had felt their decision to participate was voluntary (in the sense 
they could have declined to participate), 19% had felt they could not say no and a further 6% 
were given no choice (Acas, 2012:4). In this one must again consider the factors which may 
influence an individual’s decision.  
Many of these influences have been considered in the preceding chapters and may be related to 
personal choices and options, for example a sense of job insecurity. They may also come from 
other pressures such as organisational endorsement (through a formal policy or otherwise) of 
mediation (Latreille, 2011:33; Saundry and Wibberley, 2012:31). Understanding these pressures 
and influences and how they are realised through the way in which mediation is promoted and 
deployed in practice is necessary for assessing feasibility and fairness.  
It follows from this that a further, related point, is the matter of whose decision it is to proceed to 
mediation. In answering this question one may actually find support for the need to have an 
evaluation not solely based on individual choice and perception. In internal schemes, for example, 
this function may be served by a gatekeeper who initially decides whether a case is suitable to 
proceed to mediation (Bennett, 2013). Such a decision may be made after it has been determined 
no legal duty of care issue is involved (Latreille, 2011; Saundry et al, 2013). It is therefore again 
necessary to consider the role an organisation plays in the mediation process. If organisations are 
acting as gatekeepers, it is important to ensure they have a greater understanding of when 
mediation is appropriate and when it is not. It is to be hoped that an ultimate gatekeeping role will 
be performed by the selected mediator but much in this hope is pinned on the skill and integrity of 
the mediator. Given the lack of regulation, one may question the extent to which mediators are 
sufficiently trained to make such decisions, especially where they involve an assessment of the 
parties’ capacity to participate (Crawford, Dabney, Filner and Maida, 2003; Goldberg and Shaw, 
2010). 
Allowing a party to proceed to mediation without understanding the pressures that individuals may 
be under should be a concern of all involved in the mediation process and may be of particular 
concern where a party is in a vulnerable position. Accounting for the vulnerability of parties is of 
great concern in situations of bullying and harassment.  
(Un)problematic power imbalances? 
A number of the arguments in favour of the use of mediation for bullying and harassment were 
considered above, e.g. mediation allowing parties to assign their own meaning to the complex 
experiences. In so doing it passes the control to the parties involved. Harkavy (1999) argues that 
in cases of sexual harassment this is mediation’s biggest advantage since ‘for victims of sexual 
harassment, the prospect of controlling a situation instead of being controlled by it may be critical 
to recovering self-esteem, continuing employment and stabilising personal situations’ (:160-161). 
This is an approach also favoured by Gazeley (1997) who argued that the flexibility permitted by 
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mediation can result in ‘cathartic and creative solutions’ which are more ‘meaningful’ to the victim 
than those available through other processes (:634). 
The arguments against the use of mediation, however, frame the situation in a far less positive 
light. Instead of seeing mediation as an opportunity for empowerment and shared understanding 
and development, it may be seen as a potentially dangerous process which can serve to further 
disadvantage or harm a vulnerable person (Keashly and Nowell, 2003). Here the objection focuses 
around the apparent inconsistency between the power imbalances in bullying and the assumptions 
of equal power in mediation (Dolder, 2004).  
According to Keashly and Nowell (2011), the problem arises because victims of bullying and 
harassment ‘are often diminished and disempowered as a result of the experience, undermining 
their abilities to be assertive in dealing directly with the actor’ (:438). This view contrasts quite 
starkly with that expressed by Harkavy above. One can certainly see the logic (and indeed danger) 
in Keashly and Nowell’s point, and failure to acknowledge and account for power imbalances may 
have implications for the extent to which mediation may be seen as fair in any sense. This is a 
(related) addition to privatisation arguments.  
Here one must return to the different sources of power considered in Chapter 4, e.g. vertical 
relationships and social sources of power. Although the research in the UK has not advanced to 
consider the matter (or at least not in the workplace), there is an indication from other countries 
that mediation may operate to the disadvantage of minority groups (Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee 
and Hubbert, 1985; Rack, 1996) and women (Charkoudian and Wayne, 2010; Grillo, 1991). When 
one recalls the stereotypes (and cultural influences) associated with certain characteristics and 
response strategies in the previous chapter, this is perhaps not surprising. Additional sources of 
power imbalance may arise from a discrepancy in communication or language skills (Bush and 
Folger, 2012).  
Whereas there is potential for this to be mitigated in formal procedures by the use of 
representatives, the attitude towards (and prevalence of) the use of representatives in mediation is 
not really consistent on the information available: for example see Saundry et al, 2013:23 which 
indicates it is not the norm and may actually be considered a negative contrasted with Unwin et al 
(2011) who found the presence of representatives to be high, albeit in the context of judicial 
mediation. That the use of representatives in mediation would not necessarily be encouraged is not 
surprising as their presence would potentially provide a source of tension in arguments over the 
importance of individual control, empowerment and self-determination (Latreille, 2011:2).  
Acknowledging the importance of power therefore requires attention to be paid to the 
characteristics and the relative positions of the parties in a dispute (Wiseman and Poitras, 2002). 
In particular, given the dominance of downwards bullying in the UK, understanding the dynamics 
surrounding the balancing of power in mediation and how this is then transposed back into the 
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workplace is an unavoidable enquiry if one is to address the question of the feasibility and fairness 
of using mediation. This is important given the fact a mediator is unable to ‘change the 
fundamental power relationship that exists between parties’ (Sherman, 2003:46); and especially 
since figures from Acas indicate that ‘70% of mediations involved a dispute where one party had 
authority over the counterparty’ (Acas, 2012:1). Whilst the motivations and solutions for 
addressing power imbalance differ, this research is in agreement with Ridley-Duff and Bennett 
(2011) over the importance of accounting for the inherent nature of the employment relationship in 
any discussion of the appropriateness of mediation.  
Having accepted the central importance of power imbalance, one must return to the nature of the 
mediation process and what it holds for dealing with such imbalances.  
Mediator Role: Balancing power imbalances 
Those who argue for the use of mediation in bullying and harassment counter these arguments by 
reference to the safeguards built in to the mediation process and this is arguably where an 
unhelpful gap between academic arguments and practitioner practice (and rhetoric) exists. Broad 
appeals are made to the meaning of impartiality and the significance of the mediator role in 
“levelling the playing field” (Van Gramberg, 2006). This is, however, perhaps more easily said than 
done and one may question how realistic it is for a mediator to be genuinely neutral (Sherman, 
2003) and how compatible balancing power in neutral facilitative mediation is (Dolder, 2004; 
Lande, 2000).  Techniques used by mediators in pursuit of this neutrality-and crucially the way 
they are perceived by the parties-are an important part of judging whether mediation is fair (and 
possibly also just)
38
.  
Although mediators in his research were confident mediation could sufficiently deal with power 
imbalance, Bennett (2013) gives little insight into how. Possible mediator techniques were 
identified in a practice noted by Jenkins (2011) who argues mediators must support both parties, 
ensure they are familiar with the mediation process, reality test options and hold individual 
sessions (:32). She also states a mediator should ensure ‘both parties are aware of their rights’ 
(:32). This is particularly interesting considering the assumption above that facilitative mediation is 
not about rights. The singling out of individual meetings is also potentially important as there is 
arguably a tendency (adhered to thus far here) to talk about mediation as a process without 
distinguishing between the stages of that process or considering the potentially differing roles 
individual and joint meetings can play in allowing a mediator to control the process and manage 
the parties (Acas/CIPD, 2013).  
A greater presence of mediator voice and experience in UK work would therefore be very 
beneficial. It is argued that the key to an increased understanding of the arguments for the 
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repeated call of the appropriateness of mediation for bullying lies in a greater practical 
understanding of the techniques used by mediators in practice.  
Mediator Influence and Power 
In accepting the importance of the role of the mediator, one must therefore also ensure attention 
is paid to the power and the influence of the mediator in the mediation process (Bush and Folger, 
2012; Dolder, 2004; Honoroff and Opotow, 2007). Coben (2001; 2004) is particularly sceptical of 
the techniques used by mediators to influence the parties and the mediation process. He argues 
that the rhetoric of empowerment (self-determination) and of mediator neutrality, together with 
the lack of transparency, provides scope for inevitable ‘mediator manipulation and deception’ 
(Coben, 2004:66). The different roles a mediator may adopt were outlined above
39
 but if one is to 
acknowledge the significance of the role of the mediator in the process it is necessary to adopt a 
critical approach.  
An important element of this critical approach is to understand the relationship between mediator 
and the organisation (Jenkins, 2011). Indeed, in addition (but related) to the need for 
organisations to retain their responsibility for upholding standards, this is a further reason to reject 
Nabatchi et al’s (2007) limiting of the relationships in mediation to the parties and the mediator. It 
also begs the question as to the extent to which mediators are aware of the influence they may 
have over the parties and, where they are aware, what they do to try and manage that influence 
(a question asked but not answered by Herrman, Hollett, Eaker and Gale, 2003). Indeed, Coben 
(2001) views mediator self-regulation and self-restraint ‘a fragile safety net’, especially when faced 
with pressure to reach a resolution (:6). 
One may argue that, given the cost and efficiency emphasis in mediation rhetoric and the crowded 
supply side of mediation providers, the motives of mediators may be perceived (perhaps correctly) 
as lying not with the interests of the parties but rather with those of the organisation or with 
themselves and a desire for repeat business (Dolder, 2004; Van Gramberg, 2006). If an employer 
pays for an external mediator their neutrality may be doubted (Dolder, 2004; Harris et al, 
2012:618). It would therefore be useful to understand not only how participants perceive 
mediators but also to learn more about the techniques used by mediators to demonstrate their 
impartiality to parties.  
A further concern in this is the need to return to the question of how success in mediation is 
determined and indeed whether the goal lies with short term solutions (to indicate value for 
money) or the pursuit of a sustainable outcome (Dickens, 2012b:32). Saundry et al (2013) found a 
number of participants ‘did not feel that the underlying issues were explored and that the mediator 
was directing the parties to a solution that was fundamentally unsustainable’ (2013:24). This was 
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also not helped by the short time period involved (sometimes only one or two days for both 
individual and joint meetings) which meant parties felt they did not have time to reflect during the 
process (Saundry et al, 2013:26). It was further felt that continued support through follow up 
contact with the mediator would have been beneficial (and aided sustainability of outcome) but 
where an external mediator was used this option was not provided (2013:37). These observations 
were related to the resources (read money) organisations were willing to commit to the process 
(2013:27) and demonstrate how the use of mediation may easily be seen as transactional, rather 
than transformational.  
This last statement leads the discussion onto its final points, a consideration of the 
transformational nature of mediation and the chances of this being realised in practice.  
The scope of impact and the incompatibility of confidential and transformation 
Just as there seemed to be an inherent incompatibility between the assumptions about power in 
bullying and those in mediation, there is an apparent inconsistency in seeing how cultural change 
and transformation can arise from a process which is, at its core, private and confidential. Here one 
must make a brief distinction between the transformational nature of mediation on an individual 
basis (i.e. a change in participant attitudes) and transformation in a wider sense (i.e. to drive 
organisational and cultural change). The two are related but arguably have rather different 
prospects of being realised.  
As was stated above, this transformation supposedly arises from the empowering nature of 
mediation and from equipping those who participate with a new way of approaching future conflict 
and of understanding others (Bush and Folger, 2012). Although there is limited evidence to 
demonstrate that this is an inevitable consequence of (party) engagement with the mediation 
process, such changes do occur (Saundry et al, 2013:28-29). Hoskins and Stolz (2003) argue 
however that the change may not be immediate but rather become apparent over time.  There are 
signs however that a greater impact is felt by those who receive mediation training (as part of an 
internal scheme) (Saundry and Wibberley, 2014).  
Where mediation is used to challenge behaviour grounded in or associated with protected 
characteristics, particularly if it arises from a stereotypical assumption or cultural misunderstanding, 
one may ask whether it is appropriate and sufficient to rely on changing attitudes one at a time in 
the hope the individuals in the parties involved then take that change forward. Even if one is 
satisfied the parties voluntarily chose and participated in mediation and that the mediation was 
conducted in a fair way, it is still perhaps difficult to accept transformation in this sense is 
sufficient.  
To justify this conclusion a return to understanding how an organisation can be understood to be 
and used as an institution of society, charged with ensuring standards of reasonableness are 
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upheld is necessary. To return to the idea of Rawls’s society being both reasonable and rational, 
one may argue that employers may see the use of mediation as rationally sound. This, however, 
does not mean it is also a reasonable decision and in a conflict between reason and rationality, the 
former should win (Rawls, 2001:82). Although it was argued all should support principles of 
dignity, here it is important to remember organisations (and managers) have different 
responsibilities to individuals in this regard, and, as has been argued, this should be reflected in 
mediation discourses. 
The key to accommodating this greater role in reconciling personal and impersonal standards of 
reasonableness and fairness may be found in a greater understanding of what confidentiality in 
mediation means and how it operates in practice. Crucially, Jenkins (2011) comments that 
‘confidentiality in mediation is never absolute’ (:33). There is currently little evidence available on 
what this means but brief insights into this non-absolute sense can be found from the Acas/CIPD 
(2013:10) who note it may be broken where a ‘potentially unlawful act’ is involved and also from 
Saundry et al (2013): ‘whether the outcome or details of the mediation are revealed to managers 
and colleagues is a matter for the parties’ (:6) (see also Latreille, 2011:365-37). Interestingly given 
the focus of this research, the participants in Bennett’s (2013) research indicated mediation was 
inappropriate when a public outcome is needed. Unfortunately, however, there is no expansion on 
this point.  
Throughout this chapter, a great emphasis has been placed on the private and confidential nature 
of mediation or perhaps a naïve conception of it. Cynically (or maybe realistically) some, such as 
Honeyman and McAdoo (2000) and Lande (2000) question how far it can be ensured that what is 
said in a mediation actually “stays in the room” and is not deliberately or inadvertently revealed or 
exposed to others. One may suggest that the answer to such a criticism again lies in learning more 
about the way confidentiality operates in practice.  
Leaving this criticism aside, one may reiterate that shifting of responsibility for disclosure towards 
individuals is insufficient and particularly worrying where the behaviour involved is indicative of 
wider organisational (and even societal) behaviour which breaches standards of reasonableness 
e.g. sexist or racist stereotypes. Again, the privatisation of justice arguments play an important role 
here.  
Whilst the possibility of changing attitudes on an incremental basis, at a ‘micro-level’ rather than 
‘macro-level’ (Bush and Folger, 2012:45) (i.e. one mediation at a time) is not to be dismissed, a 
private mediation process deprives other members of the organisation from assessing and 
understanding the permitted standards of behaviour. It also allows an organisation to potentially 
abdicate or avoid accountability for their role in the situation (Saam, 2010).  
The role organisational culture can play in perpetuating and sustaining negative behaviours was 
considered in the previous chapter. These consequences reflect the observations of Acker (2006) 
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who argued that by failing to visibly address inequalities, prejudices and stereotypes, these can be 
legitimised through the informal interactions of an organisation.  
Where this is the case it arguably becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to challenge the 
behaviour without recourse to formal or even legal procedures (see chapter 4). In such a 
circumstance, where confidential mediation is used, it becomes difficult to argue that individuals 
can have any trust in the organisation since witnesses ‘receive little or no information regarding the 
dispensation of the case [and] may contribute to their sense that the organisation tolerates these 
behaviours, a sense that would hence reduce their likelihood of reporting bullying’ (Keashly and 
Nowell, 2011:438).  
It is (optimistically) argued however that these consequences do not necessarily have to follow 
from the use of mediation in the workplace. Seeking to explore the ways in which confidentiality 
can be adapted in practice may provide ways of compromising between the individual choice and 
collective interests at stake in mediation. Ensuring that the organisational role and responsibility is 
not forgotten in this is absolutely crucial. Here however the argument finds itself having to deal 
with the familiar problem of the assumption that organisations are supportive environments, ready 
and willing to question and evaluate their own cultures and actions. Indeed, success of mediation 
may depend on “buy-in” from both senior management (Latreille, 2011:3) and line managers 
(Saundry and Wibberley, 2012) and on high levels of trust in the employment relationship (Saundry 
and Wibberley, 2014). The many reasons why this is not the case have been considered in this and 
the previous two chapters. It is on that rather pessimistic note that the discussion reaches its 
conclusion.  
5.7 CONCLUSION: FINISHING THE MAP 
Through the use of Rawls’s thought experiment, tailored by reference to Nagel and appropriated 
and adapted through an interdisciplinary lens, chapters 2-5 have sought to present a 
contextualised discussion of the factors which may influence perceptions of bullying and 
harassment and the appropriateness of mediation, why they may be considered important and how 
they may relate to one another. They sought to justify the need to consider and discuss questions 
about the appropriateness of the use of mediation to address workplace bullying and harassment 
against the backdrop of a concern for fairness.  
A distinction was drawn between fairness and justice. It was argued that whilst fairness should 
always be a concern, this is not the case with justice. Justice (in a number of forms) may often be 
a concern but this may not necessarily be true when one is talking about mediation.  
It was argued that in addressing the appropriateness question, one must carefully consider 
whether prominence should be given to personal perceptions of what is reasonable or to collective, 
objective (impersonal) standards of reasonableness. Where bullying and harassment are 
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concerned, it was argued that their grounding in dignity necessitated a prioritising of the 
impersonal. It was accepted however that this would not be universally supported and may even 
be somewhat incompatible with many views on mediation and its emphasis on individual choice 
and empowerment. In facilitating a potential compromise between the two positions, a greater role 
for organisations in mediation was suggested, although the feasibility of this was doubted.  
A call was made for the need to gain a greater understanding of the way in which individuals think 
about and understand bullying and harassment and for the need to seek insights into the way in 
which mediation operates in practice. In so doing, it is hoped that one may be better placed to 
understand the dynamics between bullying and harassment and workplace mediation.  
The review of the literature began by stating the need to be open and transparent about 
assumptions made and how these feed into the arguments presented. It has been accepted and 
argued throughout that the approach presenting this research represents one view which may be 
taken. To return to Riskin’s analogy, what these chapters have therefore sought to do ‘is to inform 
and remind travellers of choices and decisions that can enrich their journeys’ (2003:33).  
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CHAPTER 6.  METHODOLOGY  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous section the conceptual and theoretical arguments guiding this research were 
explored and the gaps for further inquiry were identified. This chapter will consider the 
methodological approach adopted by the research: critical realism. It will outline what critical 
realism is and how it has informed the preceding discussion before moving on to discuss how this 
has guided the research design deployed to explore the gaps identified in the previous chapters. A 
mixed method design comprising an initial qualitative case study pilot, followed by a questionnaire, 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups was undertaken. The reasons for adopting a mixed 
method approach will be discussed and the choice justified against the potential problems 
(particularly in respect of how to evaluate the quality of the research and choices for analysis). 
Although each stage of the research will then be discussed sequentially, it will be argued that the 
most appropriate way to evaluate the research is to consider it as a whole i.e. the integrated sum 
of the parts.  
Given the potentially novel methodological approach and research design, it is necessary to 
consider each aspect in a greater depth than would perhaps be the case had the approach adopted 
been more “typical”. The discussion in this chapter seeks to establish how the assumptions and 
arguments presented above and throughout are consistent with critical realism and the research 
design, lending an internal coherency to the thesis.  
First however it is useful to restate the research questions.  
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overarching question is: To what extent is workplace mediation appropriate for dealing with 
workplace bullying and harassment?  
In order to explore this question, a number of further questions are relevant.  
1. What factors influence whether a situation is perceived as bullying and/or harassment?  
2. What factors influence whether mediation is perceived as appropriate? 
3. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining perceptions of bullying 
and/or harassment? 
4. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining whether mediation is 
perceived as appropriate? 
5. How do the factors associated with perceptions of bullying and/or harassment and those 
associated with the appropriateness of mediation relate to each other? 
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6.3 THE INFLUENCE OF CRITICAL REALISM 
In the most basic of terms, critical realism accepts that there is a ‘mind-independent reality’ that 
‘exists independent of our concepts and knowledge of it’ (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and 
Karlsson, 2002:20) but that our knowledge of that reality is both socially defined and socially 
produced (Danermark et al, 2002:5). It therefore argues for an objective ontology but a subjective 
epistemology. For critical realists, reality is divided into three ontological domains: the real, the 
actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1978:56). Realists seek to understand the real through the 
empirical and actual (Danermark et al, 2002:21). Critical realism accepts that society is structured 
and that these structures (e.g. the employment relationship) guide and constrain individual actions 
(Sayer, 2000:11; Danermark et al, 2002:56). However, since these structures are not visible or 
directly observable one can only observe their effects (Sayer, 2000:11-12); further, merely 
observing an event can tell us little, if anything about what has caused the event or about its 
meaning (Bhaskar, 1998). So, in the current context for example, merely observing or recording an 
event of what may be described as bullying or harassments can tell us nothing about why those 
particular words or actions caused that particular person to react in a negative way and it provides 
no illumination as to why the whole situation may be considered as problematic at all.  
It is therefore important to acknowledge that there is a need to distinguish between an event or an 
experience and what caused it (Danermark et al, 2002:5). An important component in this is 
seeking to understand why, in those circumstances, an event manifested and was experienced in a 
particular way. In critical realism, causes behind an event are to be found in generative 
mechanisms which ‘combine to generate the flux of the phenomena that constitute the actual 
states and happenings of the world’ (Bhaskar, 1998:34). At any given time there are multiple 
generative mechanisms in existence, sometimes acting to ‘reinforce one another’ and sometimes to 
‘frustrate the manifestations of each other’ (Danermark et al, 2002:56). There are circumstances 
where generative mechanisms may be triggered by a particular action and others where that same 
action would trigger different mechanisms, or where the same mechanism would be triggered but 
would be outweighed or counteracted by another (Danermark et al, 2002:58). Because of this it is 
necessary to accept that society is an open system making ‘predicting social events and 
processes…problematic’ (Danermark et al, 2002:68). Further, it is therefore not possible to 
presuppose a single causal power or a single generative mechanism which would provide a 
definitive explanation for a particular social phenomenon (Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998:15).  
These characteristics have an important consequence which reflects the assumptions outlined in 
chapter 2 and centre around the acceptance that the aim of the research is not and cannot be to 
provide a single, prescriptive and predictive framework. Instead, it potentially provides a way of 
explaining how an individual, for example a woman, may experience and choose to respond to 
inappropriate and potentially sexist behaviour in a different way to a man. In such a case, the 
structures and generative mechanisms at play (those surrounding sexism, workplace structure, 
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fairness for example) interact and are triggered (or not triggered) in different ways to produce 
differing results. The causal explanation and meaning exists in the real and actual domains and can 
only be accessed through a context-dependent (Sayer, 1992:40) and subjective interpretation of 
the observed events which result from the triggering of certain mechanisms. The aim for the 
framework is therefore to try and uncover what mechanisms (factors) may be present and to 
understand the ways these may be triggered and may interact and in which circumstances.  
It is important to note that whilst individual choice as to the relative importance of different 
mechanisms in any given circumstance is a factor, it is not the sole determinant and operates 
within the broader societal structures and shared knowledge of what is considered as valuable and 
important to society. This is characterised in critical realism by arguing that reality is not only 
structured but it is also stratified (Bhaskar, 1978). The strata are hierarchically ordered and in 
higher strata, certain powers operate to create a ‘pseudo-closed system’ (Danermark et al, 
2002:68). Examples of pseudo-closed systems include the legal system and ‘the organisation of 
working life…[and] are the result of a conscious striving to make society…more controllable in 
relation to peoples’ different aims’ (Danermark et al, 2002:68). This attempt, however, is 
somewhat contrived since society is constantly changing, although change may be slow. An 
important (and relevant) example of this is the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation and 
persistence of racism. Despite a shift in societal attitudes and the introduction of specific 
interventions, change or transformation may be a gradual process due to the impact of past 
generations and residual generative mechanisms and structures (e.g. institutional racism) (Archer, 
1998:363-366). This again has important implications for the research under discussion. The first is 
that whilst it is accepted that there is no single predictive ordering or path to be sought, the 
structure offered by the pseudo-closed systems provides a means for prioritising and 
recommending certain explanations and preferred choices. The second is that it highlights the need 
to understand how individuals interpret and make sense of certain situations, as this is a way of 
accessing the generative mechanisms and structures which operate and are reproduced through 
individual and collective action. This second implication returns the discussion to the opening 
assertion that knowledge is socially defined and socially determined. A key component of this is 
accepting the worth in accessing “common sense” meanings assigned to concepts, at least as a 
starting point. It is through the ‘intersubjectivity’ of a shared language that concepts derive 
meaning (Danermark et al, 2002:29; Sayer, 1992:22). This intersubjectivity of meaning can form 
the basis upon which social science can begin to both understand and question societal 
construction of meaning (Sayer, 1992:39). For this reason focus groups are very appropriate for 
this research.  
The critical realist perspective is therefore embedded in the theoretical assumptions and arguments 
offered throughout this thesis and necessarily guided the construction of the research design.  
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6.4 JUSTIFYING MIXED METHODS   
Adopting an approach informed by critical realism does not automatically necessitate the use of a 
particular research design (Van der Ven, 2007:63). The complex and stratified nature of reality 
accepts that different methods and different disciplines can offer explanations of the same 
phenomena and in doing so it sees a value in multidisciplinary research (Sayer, 1992). In accepting 
our knowledge can only ever be partial, any information which may help provide an explanation is 
to be welcomed. Critical realism therefore acknowledges the value which can be offered by a mixed 
method design (Modell, 2009; Zachariadis, Scott and Barett, 2013). The mixed method approach 
adopted here seeks to combine quantitative methods with qualitative methods.  
Whilst it is possible to say that critical realism does not necessitate the use of a particular research 
design, there is an argument that, given its assumptions about the nature of society and the nature 
of knowledge-and indeed what it is important to know-qualitative methods offer a more 
comfortable “fit” than quantitative ones (Sayer, 1992; Danermark et al, 2002; Mingers, 2004). 
There is an ongoing debate about how to reconcile or at least accommodate quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a mixed design, much of which is focused around the (apparently) 
necessarily conflicting positions of positivism (quantitative) and interpretivism (qualitative) (Modell, 
2009; Bryman, 2007; Maxwell and Loomis, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). For present 
purposes this debate is largely unhelpful. 
 The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods here seeks to divorce the methods from their 
traditional paradigmatic associations but in contrast to the pragmatist approach favoured by some 
mixed method advocates (notably Tashakkori and Teddlie) it does not seek to divorce it from 
methodological considerations altogether (Danermark et al, 2002:152). 
Here the aim was to utilise quantitative and qualitative methods in a way which is consistent with a 
critical realist approach. In critical realism the guiding force is the objects of study (here bullying, 
harassment, mediation and fairness) with this driving force a ‘critical methodological pluralism’ is 
permitted (Danermark et al, 2002:152). The relationship between the different methods is dictated 
by the adopted methodology, research question(s) (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007; Zachariadis et 
al, 2013) and the purpose for which a mixed method approach is deployed (Bryman, 2006a; Howe, 
2012). Here the purpose for using mixed methods was to aid with the development of theory 
(Danermark et al, 2002:153). The different methods were chosen since they would provide a way 
of identifying and accessing the varying perspectives of the different actors and provide a way of 
navigating through the complexity of workplace bullying/harassment. Combining the findings from 
the different stages allows the research to offer an integrated framework to help explain and 
facilitate understanding of workplace bullying and harassment and mediation (Hammersley, 2008). 
It was therefore necessary to utilise a combination of methods to ‘achieve a kaleidoscopic or 
prismatic view’ since this offers a greater opportunity to capture the nuances and complexity of the 
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inquiry in a way that individual methods alone would not (Sandelwoski, 2003:329; Cowie et al, 
2002).  
The overall structure of the research design is given in figure 2. As each stage was designed to 
inform the next, the design was sequential (Creswell, Plano Clark and Garrett, 2008:69). Whilst 
there is a mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods (both within and between stages) and 
all have been integrated into the final framework, there is a greater number of qualitative methods 
and this is reflected in the emphasis placed on accessing a deeper understanding and on retaining 
context inherent in the critical realist design. This is not to say that the questionnaire stage and the 
quantitative data is being treated as inferior, rather whilst it is utilised in pursuit of the same 
question and is integrated in the final framework, the role of statistics here is limited to that of 
description, rather than prediction or explanation. This role is consistent with the positioning of 
statistics in critical realism (Ackroyd, 2004; Danermark et al, 2002; Mingers, 2004; Sayer, 1992) 
and therefore placing an equal emphasis on quantitative and qualitative data was not appropriate 
in the present design.  
 
Figure 2. Overview of mixed method research design 
This emphasis, together with the fact the stages were not designed or intended to serve as 
discrete, stand-alone empirical contributions, but to be used in a symbiotic way to aid the 
development of theory has important implications for assessing the quality of the research. 
Although options have been presented in the literature (for example Tashakkorri and Teddlie, 
2008; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006), there is no established or agreed approach as to how 
mixed methods research should be evaluated (Bryman, 2006b; Ihantola and Kihn, 2011). For 
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present purposes the dilemma is to find an approach which is consistent with critical realism, 
which, arguably the current frameworks are not. This is particularly difficult given the emphasis 
placed on context and complexity in critical realism and the implications this has for the way the 
use of quantitative data is characterised.  
Limiting the use of statistics to description makes conformity to many of the accepted validity and 
reliability criteria difficult or inappropriate (Danermark et al, 2002; Mingers, 2004; Modell, 2009). 
As critical realism values a divergence of results, internal validity criteria, for example, are difficult 
to reconcile in a coherent way (Modell, 2009). The centrality of context-dependency also makes 
the pursuit of generalisation somewhat misguided, since any appeals to generalisation (to the 
extent to this is possible in an open system) should be applied to the underlying qualitative 
mechanisms and structures and not ‘to a wider population of unobserved data’ (Mingers, 
2004:156; Sayer, 1992). Whilst it is accepted that certain standards and criteria for ensuring that 
the design of the instrument is of a sufficient quality are important and have thus been retained, 
the evaluation of the statistical results alone is to be guided by their purpose.  
The purpose of the questionnaire was to allow for the possibility of uncovering regularities in the 
identification of possible mechanisms and trigger factors which can help structure and focus further 
(qualitative) explanation (Zachariadis et al, 2013:878). The instrument and the resultant data were 
therefore not designed to measure and develop replicable scales and results that can be 
generalised. The quality of their contribution is to be considered in light of their use in the resultant 
analytic and theoretical conclusions (Modell, 2009).   
Similarly, whilst the interview and focus group stages were designed to conform with conventions 
for generating quality qualitative data (i.e. trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 1985)), the emphasis for evaluating 
the extent to which this translated into quality research is to be determined by reference to output 
i.e. the framework developed (Modell, 2009). This is arguably consistent with the purpose of 
theory development and with the process of retroduction in critical realism which seeks to allow for 
the offering of theory which, though being informed by the empirical findings is also informed by 
the theoretical abstraction of concepts (Mingers, 2004; Zachriadis et al, 2013). As Danermark et al 
state ‘[r]etroduction is about advancing from one thing (empirical observation of events) and 
arriving at something different (a conceptualisation of transfactual conditions)’ (2002:96). It is 
therefore argued that it is the quality and rigour of the transfactual conclusions embodied in the 
framework which are to be evaluated40.  
The aim here is therefore not to demonstrate that a complete and exhaustive theoretical 
framework has been produced, not least because this is inconsistent with the partial and fallible 
nature of knowledge inherent in critical realism. Claiming a mature theory on the basis of the 
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research conducted and without its debate and consideration by the academic (and possibly 
practitioner) communities would also be naïve (Modell, 2009: 215). The purpose throughout the 
thesis is to demonstrate that the framework has some utility and sufficient grounding in the 
empirical findings without being entirely constrained by them. This utility and grounding can, 
however, be strengthened by reference to the quality of the research process.  
In accordance with the criteria outlined by Leitch, Hill and Harrison (2010:75-76), the discussion 
and supporting documents presented in this thesis demonstrate how the process of the empirical 
research can be validated. Validation is provided in relation to the research design and data 
collection process by the explicit presentation of assumptions and methodology underpinning the 
research, for example see chapter 2 and section 6.3 above. It is also aided by providing a clear 
description of the research design process. This description is given in the remainder of this 
chapter and, where relevant, documents such as recruitment posters or invitations are provided to 
increase transparency. 
 Further validation is provided in respect of the analysis and interpretation of the findings. Here, 
transparency is vital and accordingly the coding frames for the qualitative analyses have been 
included in the Appendices. The continual relating of the findings to the literature in chapters 7-9 
helps to demonstrate how the conclusions presented in chapter 10 have been reached. Finally, the 
inclusion of the reflexive author’s statement in chapter 1 and the recognition of researcher 
proximity as a limitation of the research (see chapter 10) also help to justify and validate the steps 
taken and the conclusions made.  
Having discussed the methodological assumptions and reasons for using mixed methods, the 
discussion will now turn to the detail of the methods undertaken.  
6.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In accordance with figure 2 above, there were four, integrated stages of data collection: an 
exploratory pilot (Stage 1), followed by a questionnaire (Stage 2), semi-structured interviews 
(Stage 3) and finally focus groups (Stage 4).  
Sample 
Although the sample composition varied between the data collection stages, the overall strategy 
adopted was purposive. The rejection of the ability to generalise results, and an acceptance of the 
need to seek to accommodate multiple, potentially divergent views, meant the sampling strategy 
was not concerned with seeking representativeness. This desire for breadth but not 
representativeness meant non-probability, purposive sampling was appropriate. Theoretical 
sampling was used as this allowed for the targeting of groups who are potentially of theoretical 
relevance and importance (Bryman, 2008:415).  
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Given the positioning of public understandings of workplace bullying, harassment and resolution 
choices, a key group of theoretical relevance was any individual over the age of eighteen years old 
with at least six months work experience in a UK workplace. The decision to focus on individuals, 
rather than industries or organisational sectors, sought to allow for the potential identification of 
broad, cross-sectional factors. This sample group was used for both the questionnaire and the 
focus group stages. In addition to this, answering the question of the extent to which mediation 
can be seen as an appropriate way of addressing workplace mediation, it was important to access 
informed and specialist accounts. These accounts were collected through interviews with external 
workplace mediators. This specialist element was also incorporated - albeit it to a lesser extent - 
with the targeting of mediators and lawyers in the questionnaire sample. Further details of, and 
justification for, the sampling choices are offered below in relation to the individual data collection 
stages.  
Each data collection stage will now be considered in turn. Where a previous stage has informed the 
next or subsequent stages, these ‘points of interface’ (Guest, 2012) will be identified.  
6.5.1 STAGE 1: Exploratory pilot 
An initial qualitative exploratory pilot case study was conducted. Seven semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with those who were involved with the decision to introduce an internal mediation 
scheme at the University of Manchester and/or with its administration and operation.  The aim of 
the pilot was to identify the extent to which the potential mechanisms and causes identified from 
the extant literature were reflected in a practical arena. This helped to build a greater degree of 
clarity and focus into the research41.  
6.5.2 STAGE 2: Questionnaire 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to identify the extent to which certain mechanisms may be 
deemed to be present and relevant to understandings of bullying and harassment and response to 
them. The aim was not to explore the relationship between these various factors or to seek 
explanation but rather help to guide the way in which the later data collection stages and 
ultimately the framework are structured. Therefore the questionnaire was concerned only with 
research questions one and two.  
Pilot 
Given these aims a new instrument was designed and constructed in Qualtrics. The detail will be 
considered shortly but, briefly, it utilised vignettes to provide context and anchor participants’ 
responses in concrete examples, rather than abstract or de-contextualised statements. Other 
sections also asked about workplace experience of bullying/harassment and what would influence 
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 See Appendix 1 for Pilot Report. 
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respondents if they were in a bullying situation. There was also a final section on mediation for 
those who indicated they had experience of and/or training in workplace mediation.  
Prior to launching the questionnaire, a small pilot was conducted with twenty participants who 
qualified for the sample and who were speculatively contacted and asked to take part. Seventeen 
completed an online version and three completed pen and paper copies. The aim of the pilot was 
to confirm the questionnaire had face validity and was to try and address any issues that may 
cause method bias (MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012). Whilst the impact of method bias on the 
relationship among the variables was less of a concern (given the questionnaire was not seeking to 
uncover relationships), addressing possible bias was important to try and mitigate the chances of 
participants misunderstanding or misinterpreting the questions (MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012). 
Participants were asked at the end of the questionnaire to complete a short set of questions which 
asked them to provide feedback on a number of features e.g. length and clarity of questions. 
Participants were also asked to provide any other feedback.  
Following the pilot a number of changes were made to address feedback. The changes were 
primarily concerned with reducing the length of the questionnaire and in this respect a number of 
qualitative, open questions seeking explanation were removed. The number of vignettes was also 
reduced from four to three. In addition to this, changes were made to address concern expressed 
by a minority (two of the participants) over their capacity and knowledge. In response it was made 
clear in the initial introduction and at various other relevant points that there were no right or 
wrong answers and that the research was interested in what they thought and not in testing what 
they know. By providing such information it was hoped that the purpose of the research would be 
clear to respondents, as in the circumstances, there was no reason for this not to be explicit 
(DeVillis, 2003:57-58; MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012:550).  
Participants and procedure 
The sample size varied for the different sections and, unsurprisingly decreased towards the end of 
the questionnaire (Table 1).  
                                
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        Table 1.  Questionnaire sample sizes 
Section N 
Scenarios 135 
Decision making 108 
Demographic and Influence 108 
Bullying and harassment 102 
Mediation  55 
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The research sought to include a cross-sectional and heterogeneous sample to identify patterns 
that apply across the different and varied cases (Patton, 2002:234-235), which is important for 
identifying the existence, if not activation of relevant factors. The concern was therefore not with 
sample size but rather with sample composition. The overarching qualification was: eighteen years 
old or over with at least six months work experience in a UK workplace. Table 2 shows the sample 
demographics.  
GENDER Women 69% 
  Men 30% 
AGE 18-25 11% 
  26-34 19% 
  35-46 17% 
  47-54 29% 
  55-64 22% 
  65 or over 1% 
ETHNICITY White (British or 
Irish) 
79% 
  White (Other) 10% 
  Mixed 5% 
  Asian 5% 
SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION  
Heterosexual 85% 
  Gay/Lesbian 10% 
  Bisexual 3% 
TRADE UNION 
MEMBERSHIP 
Member (current 
or former) 
24% 
  Non-member 78% 
SECTOR Private 56% 
  Public 35% 
  Third 9% 
ET 
INVOLVEMENT 
Involvement 31% 
  No Involvement 69% 
EXPERIENCE 
OF 
BULLYING/    
HARASSMENT 
Yes 64% 
  No 36% 
MEDIATION 
EXPERIENCE 
AND/OR 
TRAINING 
Yes 56.2 
  No  43.8 
         Table 2. Questionnaire sample demographics 
An ‘unrestricted sample’ approach (Van Selm and Jankowski, 2006:440) was adopted, with a brief 
description of the research and a tinyurl link (tinyurl.com/wpbullying) to the questionnaire being 
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posted on Twitter and Facebook. This link was then subsequently retweeted or shared by others. 
Recruiting participants in this way has received little attention and whilst it is acknowledged that 
this may pose some problems (e.g. multiple responses) in this instance, these were outweighed by 
the potential benefits, not least in terms of accessing a geographically and otherwise diverse 
population (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava and John, 2004; Fox, Murray and Warm, 2003; Kapp and 
Peters, 2013). Although only those with access to a computer could complete the questionnaire, 
flyers advertising the questionnaire were also produced and distributed to try and reach a broader 
range of people (i.e. those who may not have, or not have seen it via social media) (Appendix 2).  
Within this broad scope, however, certain theoretically-driven groups were also targeted, namely, 
mediation providers, employment solicitors and trade unions. Lists of potential participants were 
identified through an internet search using terms such as “workplace mediators uk” and “solicitors 
bullying at work”. A speculative email invitation to complete the survey was then sent to those who 
qualified (Appendix 3).  
In order to try and include both those who had experienced bullying and harassment in the 
workplace and those who had not in the sample, participants were also recruited via certain online 
groups on LinkedIn (e.g. Workplace bullying, harassment, discrimination UK and Workplace 
bullying) (Fox and Warm, 2003; Van Selm and Jankowski, 2006).  
To encourage participation, participants were offered an incentive for completing the 
questionnaire: the chance to enter a prize draw to win a £100 Amazon voucher.  Although 
participants were aware of the prize draw in the introduction to the questionnaire, the incentive 
was offered as a ‘post-incentive’. Participants were asked if they would like to be entered into the 
draw only once they had completed the questionnaire (Sanchez-Fernadez, Munoz-Leiva, Montoro-
Rios and Ibanez-Zapata, 2010). The winner was selected at random.  
The use of an online, self-completion questionnaire provided a number of benefits, both in terms of 
cost and speed of administration (Fox et al, 2003) and in respect of the potential mitigation of 
social desirability bias afforded by the relative anonymity (MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012). The 
first aspect was particularly important given the intensification of time pressures involved in 
undertaking sequential mixed methods research (Creswell et al, 2008:80). Although the 
depersonalisation offered by the use of vignettes may have also helped (Schoenberg and Ravdal, 
2000) given the sensitive and potentially offensive nature of the research topic, the relative 
detachment of the participant from the research in online questionnaires is a beneficial 
characteristic (Ritter and Sue, 2007:8).  
Structure and measures 
The questionnaire was split into five sections (see Appendix 4 for a copy of the questionnaire). 
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Scenarios 
The first section contained three scenarios in the form of vignettes. Vignettes were used to help 
focus participant thinking: giving them concrete examples to consider rather than asking them to 
identify or consider complex issues in an abstract way (Schoenberg and Ravdal, 2000; MacKenzie 
and Podsakoff, 2012:545). The use of vignettes sits comfortably with critical realism in the sense it 
facilitates the identification of mechanisms and structures whilst retaining the importance of 
context.  
Although they were presented as hypothetical scenarios, the vignettes were composites of real life 
examples (Spalding and Phillips, 2007). Here the examples were drawn from existing UK case law. 
Choosing to base the scenarios on behaviour which had been deemed to be unlawful by the legal 
system provides an interesting foundation to discussions over striking the balance between 
individual standards and societal ones. Cases were selected on the basis of the criteria given in 
Table 3.   
Criteria Dimension 
Frequency One off 
Sporadic 
Persistent 
Unwanted Mutual  
Initially mutual 
Unwanted 
Protected characteristic Race 
Sex 
Sexual Orientation 
Perception Reasonable 
Too sensitive 
Vexatious/retaliatory 
Intent Joke/banter 
Misunderstanding 
Deliberate 
Relationships (Party) Vertical 
Horizontal 
Group to individual 
Power Equal 
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Changeable 
Unequal 
                                Table 3.  Case qualification criteria 
Twelve vignettes of 150-200 words were prepared (Appendix 5). From those twelve, four scenarios 
were initially chosen, with this being reduced to three following the pilot. The final selection was 
determined according to whether or not the scenario was plausible (Jenkins, Bloor, Fischer, Berney 
and Neale, 2010:187) and sufficiently nuanced and open to discussion but not ambiguous 
(Spalding and Phillips, 2007): for example one scenario was rejected due to potential ambiguity 
around the term “batty boy”. Although the qualitative explanation question was removed following 
the pilot, its initial inclusion provided confirmation that participants were able to identify the chosen 
variables (e.g. power relationship) in the given scenarios. The chosen scenarios are given in table 
4. 
Scenario 1: Sexual Orientation42  
Mike Nkumbwa is an electrician and general maintenance man at the Leopold Hotel, a family 
owned company with 45 members of staff. The owner of the hotel is John Fisher who is gay 
and his employees are aware of this. On two occasions John overheard Mike talking about him 
to his colleagues. On the first occasion he had referred to him as “that poof John” and 
commented that “if it were the 1960s he would be locked up”. On the second occasion Mike 
again referred to John as a “poof” and said that he didn’t want to go into his office “after the 
poofs had been in there” as it “would need a thorough clean first”. John is angry and upset. 
Mike doesn’t deny making the comments but says that he doesn’t consider “poof” to be a 
derogatory term as that's how everyone his age refers to gay men. He said if John had 
mentioned it at the time he would have apologised. 
Scenario 2: Sex43 
Katrina and Philip are both probation officers. They work together in an environment where 
there is a lot of banter which sometimes includes sexual innuendo. Both frequently participate 
in this. They were initially the same grade but Philip has since been promoted and is now 
Katrina’s line manager. Neither of them say this has affected the level of banter between them. 
Katrina gives examples of Philip tying her scarf around her face when she is typing, making 
comments about her appearance and, on at least three occasions having made remarks about 
her “being on the game”. Until recently Katrina had never complained about the behaviour 
to Philip or to anyone else.  She is now off work with stress and is saying she wants the 
behaviour to stop. Philip is shocked to hear that she has said she feels harassed and bullied as 
he thought she had happily participated. He doesn’t deny any of it but said the comments 
about her being a prostitute were in response to Katrina’s statement to her colleagues that “in 
an ideal world she would like to be the madam of a high class brothel”. Their colleagues are 
also surprised as they say Katrina is “no shrinking violet”.   
 
                                                          
42 Reeves v The Royal Hotel (12 July 2012) Case no. 1700573/2012 ET  
43 Loosley v Moulton and Another [2005] UKEAT/0468/04/DA EAT 
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Scenario 3: Race44 
Sarah and Charlie work together in a commercial kitchen. She is an Assistant Chef and he is 
her manager. She is black and he is white. They have worked together without any problems 
for almost three years. However, recently they were both working in the kitchen with their 
backs to each other, chatting as they worked. Because of the noise of the kitchen, they could 
not always hear what the other was saying. At some point however Sarah heard Charlie use 
the words “golliwog” and “golliwog jam” and became upset. Charlie said he was sorry she had 
got upset but that the words were not directed at her but rather that he had been talking 
about the change to the label of Robertson’s jam. At the time Sarah seemed to accept the 
apology but has brought the incident up weeks later after Charlie accused her of taking cakes 
from the kitchen. 
Table 4. Questionnaire vignettes 
After each scenario participants were asked a set of questions asking them to indicate how they 
would describe the scenario and how appropriate (on six-point scale: Very Inappropriate to Very 
Appropriate) they thought each of twelve potential options would be for dealing with the situation. 
As it was anticipated that many participants may not be familiar with the terminology, short 
descriptions of each of the options were provided to enable them to make more informed choices 
(MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012:545).  
Rather than indicate on a scale the degree to which they would agree (or disagree) that the 
behaviour could be described as bullying and harassment, participants were asked to choose a 
statement which made a judgement as to the appropriateness of the behaviour. The intention here 
was that the use of more concrete statements rather than abstract evaluations would help engage 
participants and more closely reflect the types of assessment they make in their day-to-day lives.  
No definitions of bullying or harassment were given. This was driven by a desire to identify the 
mechanisms/characteristics associated with the phenomena in everyday, common sense meanings. 
Participants then were asked to indicate on a six-point scale how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
with each of six statements which asked whether they would describe the scenario as an example 
of racism/homophobia/sexism and then whether they think “some people” would describe it as an 
example of racism/homophobia/sexism. Again, no definitions were given of racism, sexism or 
homophobia. This was intended to identify whether a participant thought that others would 
evaluate the situation in a different way and begin to explore the abstract ideas of the 
personal/impersonal. 
 
 
                                                          
44 London School of Economics and Political Science v Lindsay [2012] UKEAT/0440/11/JOJ EAT 
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Decision making factors 
The purpose of the second section was to clarify the influence of a number of variables (potential 
mechanisms and triggers) on the decisions participants had made in the previous section. This was 
divided into two: those considered when deciding whether or not the scenarios were bullying 
and/or harassment (25 Behaviour variables) and those considered when deciding how appropriate 
each of the resolution choices were (40 Resolution variables). These were identified through the 
discussion in chapters 2-5 and the exploratory pilot.   
Given the complexity of the research focus and the relatively exploratory purpose of the 
questionnaire, the number of variables is high. They included those related to or associated with 
formal definitions of bullying and harassment (e.g. “How many times the behaviour happened”), 
with the impact of bullying and harassment (e.g. “Impact on colleagues”), with the characteristics 
of mediation (e.g. “Opportunity for shared understanding”) and with fairness and dignity (“Violation 
of the alleged target’s dignity”). As outlined in the previous chapter there is potentially an overlap 
(i.e. the same factors influence both, although not necessarily in the same way) and therefore 
some variables were included in both lists. A glossary of potentially ambiguous or unfamiliar terms 
was provided to try and aid understanding and clarity (Podsakoff, MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 
2012:561-562). Participants were also asked to provide details of any other factors they had taken 
into account. This was important as the list provided was not (and cannot) be assumed to be 
exhaustive.  
Importance was measured on a six-point scale, ranging from Not at all important to Extremely 
Important. Due to the length of the respective lists, the response options were repeated at several 
points to remind participants of the scale. 
Demographic details and Personal Influence  
This section collected demographic details about the participants, together with details about their 
employment situation, trade union membership and experience (if any) of Employment Tribunals.  
In a shift from the hypothetical scenarios involving others in the first section, participants were 
asked to imagine that they were being bullied at work and asked to indicate on a four-point scale 
(“None” to A “Lot”) the influence each of nineteen different variables would have on the way they 
chose to deal with it. These were stated in brief and clear terms and included those related to their 
personal characteristics (e.g. “Your gender”), employment position (e.g. “Your chances of getting 
another job”), relationship with others (e.g. “Your family”); as well as to a resolution itself (e.g. 
“How quickly the situation could be resolved”). Together with two or three follow up questions 
(depending on their responses), this question provides a further way of accessing the various 
mechanisms that may be triggered in a situation of bullying and harassment. 
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Bullying and harassment 
Participants were asked to indicate whether they had ever experienced workplace bullying or 
harassment. Those who indicated they had were asked to answer two to four follow up questions 
(depending on their response) about their role and their response to the bullying.  
Participants were asked to define bullying and then to define harassment in their own words. To 
try and ensure responses were given in accordance with participant’s own definitions, the following 
reminder was included: “You are not necessarily expected to know a formal or “proper” definition 
of bullying. Please answer according to what you mean when you think about bullying”. Asking for 
qualitative responses provides a further insight into meaning assigned to the labels “bullying” and 
“harassment” since it allows for a comparison not only of the common language associated with 
them but also adds a further level of understanding in respect of the assessments made in the 
scenario stage.  
A series of eight items was then presented reflecting a number of the key themes of the 
questionnaire (e.g. “Bullying and harassment are different things”), as well as a number of those 
which were to be considered more explicitly in the later data collection stages (e.g. “Bullying and 
harassment is worse when it involves racism, sexism or homophobia”). Responses were presented 
on a six-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. No neutral option was offered 
to seek to mitigate satisficing by encouraging a cognitive effort (MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 
2012:55) and in doing so discourage ‘unwanted equivocation’ (DeVillis, 2003:77). 
Mediation 
All participants were asked if they knew what mediation was. Those who indicated they did not 
were directed to the end of the questionnaire. Those who selected “Yes” were asked how they 
would define mediation (in a similar format to the previous definition questions).  Participants were 
then asked to indicate whether they had any training and/or experience of workplace mediation. 
Those who had neither were directed to the end of the questionnaire.  
Participants who qualified for the final section were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with 37 items about the characteristics of mediation and its use both generally 
and in respect of bullying and harassment.  A six-point Likert scale was used ranging from Strongly 
disagree to Strongly agree. Although the number of items was large (at this stage perhaps 
necessarily so (DeVellis, 2003:65)), each item was kept as clear and short as possible and care was 
taken to ensure they were not double-barrelled (DeVellis, 2003:68).  
Analysis 
Given the sample size and the aims of the research and the purpose of the questionnaire, the use 
of analytical statistics such as regression and factor analysis was not seen as the right choice here 
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(Olsen and Morgan, 2005). The use of vignettes to focus the responses has many benefits but 
because of context-dependency, just because a variable was not considered as important in those 
particular circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that it will always be the case. It is argued 
therefore that the qualitative stages of the research design provide a greater degree of flexibility to 
explore the implications of context on the existence and influence of, and behaviour and 
relationships between factors, than statistical methods (Mingers, 2004). The quantitative data was 
therefore only analysed to produce frequencies and percentages. The qualitative responses 
provided were initially analysed using content analysis to count the frequency of the use of certain 
terms (Bryman, 2008:280-281)45. Following completion of the interviews and focus groups the 
definitions were additionally integrated and coded into the template used for analysing the later 
stages.  
6.5.3 STAGE 3: Interviews 
The aim of the interview stage was to confirm/further address the “what” questions (research 
questions 1 and 2) and begin uncover explanation for and assign meaning to the questionnaire 
results (and therefore also address the remaining research questions). Given the integrated 
approach it is important to note that in this regard the use of interviews is more than merely data 
triangulation in the sense it is often used in mixed methods research (see for example 
Hammersley, 2008). Any divergent results for example would not be treated as a problem to be 
reconciled but rather are, given the inherent subjectivity, entirely anticipated and a potentially 
important source of insight (Modell, 2009). 
The interviews also provided an opportunity to directly engage with the overarching research 
question: To what extent is mediation appropriate for dealing with workplace bullying and 
harassment?  
Participants and Procedure 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty external workplace mediators. As noted 
previously, much of the research conducted on the use of mediation in the UK has focused on 
organisational perspectives and experiences or more recently on participant experience. What is 
lacking, certainly in the academic arena, is the voice of workplace mediators, especially external 
mediators.  
The relative lack of exposure to mediation of most organisations means that the inclusion of the 
mediator explanation and understanding of mediation is vital. Mediators are almost uniquely placed 
in the mediation context since they are arguably both the creators of the rhetoric surrounding 
mediation and potentially responsible for that rhetoric failing to translate into reality. A possible 
consequence of this is that mediators have a vested interest in presenting mediation in a positive 
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 For coding frame see Appendix 6. 
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light and this may be reflected in their interview responses (Collins, Shatell and Thomas, 2005). 
However, the nature of the semi-structured interview provided the flexibility to probe answers in an 
attempt to go beyond the rhetoric (for example, by asking for examples where a promised benefit 
had been realised in practice). In this regard, mediators are an important source for helping to 
develop conceptual understanding of mediation by providing an insight into the practice of 
mediation, something that is arguably the key to explaining how some apparently manage 
reconcile the nature of bullying and harassment with that of mediation.  
Mediators are also ideally placed to reflect on their experiences of both organisational and 
participant experiences of mediation, as well as their own. Granted this will be filtered through 
their own perceptions, understanding and experience but it nevertheless potentially provides 
access to a wealth of information about the existence of and relative importance and interaction of 
the various factors in practice. This characteristic was a key driver for interviewing external 
mediators rather than internal mediators as it was anticipated that external mediators would have 
a greater number and breadth of experiences. The participant mediators came from a range of 
backgrounds, including teaching, policing, publishing, TU representation, HR and law.  
Potential participants were recruited in a number of different ways. Four mediators who had been 
speculatively contacted at the questionnaire stage and who had subsequently emailed expressing 
their interest in the research were contacted and asked if they would be willing to be interviewed. 
The remaining participants were recruited either through the use of a speculative letter of 
invitation46 or were recommended by other interviewees in a snowball manner. It is interesting to 
note that on the whole recruiting participants was relatively easy as the majority of the mediators 
contacted were enthusiastic and eager for more research to be conducted on mediation. Many saw 
the generation and dissemination of information about mediation as a vital step in increasing 
understanding of what it is and when it is and is not appropriate. It is again important to 
acknowledge the possibility that this attitude towards the research may have biased participant’s 
responses.  
It is not easily possible to identify the total number of external mediators currently practising in the 
UK but again, the purpose of the interviews was not to provide an account that is representative of 
all mediators. The twenty interviews were arguably sufficient to provide saturation on the key 
themes covered by the framework (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006).  
Interviews were conducted either face-to-face (N=6), via Skype (N=8) or over the telephone 
(N=6). This mixed approach served to open the geographical reach of potential participants and 
also helped to keep the costs of this stage of data collection to a minimum. Interviews ranged from 
30 minutes to 75 minutes (average time of 55 minutes). Whilst the telephone interviews certainly 
posed problems which were not present in the face-to-face or Skype interviews, primarily in 
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respect of not being able to read non-verbal cues or judge pauses in response as easily, there was 
no notable difference in the length of the interviews (across all mediums this was often determined 
by the participant’s availability above all), or in the quality of the responses (Irvine, Drew and 
Sainsbury, 2012; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004).  
All interviews were recorded using a digital recorder. Additional notes were also taken during the 
interviews and key points or themes were recorded after each interview.  
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as they provide both the structure to ensure that the 
relevant themes identified from existing theory and the previous data collection stage are 
addressed whilst also allowing for other to emerge. This flexibility plays an important role in terms 
of allowing the participants’ own meanings and explanations to be explored (King, 2004a). From a 
critical realist perspective it is through such flexibility and in-depth enquiry that one can begin to 
understand and explain the phenomenon in question (Sayer, 1992).  
Interview Schedule 
An interview schedule was prepared47 and was used as a guide in each of the interviews. The 
schedule took the form of full questions as this helped to ensure a degree of consistency across the 
interviews and also made sure that the questions were clear and well structured, for example not 
asking multiple or overly complicated questions (Horrocks and King, 2010:39, 51). As the aim was 
to access the participant’s own understanding and experience it was also necessary to try and 
avoid closed or leading questions, for example, asking “How relevant is determining up-front 
whether there is a power imbalance between the parties to the decision as to whether mediation is 
suitable?” rather than “The existence of a power imbalance is often said to be the reason 
mediation is not appropriate for mediation, do you agree?”.  
Opening questions about their interest in mediation and how they became a mediator were used to 
try and relax the participant. This also provided a conversational segue into the questions about 
what mediation is and to the role of the mediator. These questions provided access to the 
language the mediator’s use to describe mediation and their role within that process. Again, 
understanding the meaning behind the words used is important and therefore clarification of 
meaning was often sought through follow up questions, for example: “You said mediation provides 
a safe environment, could you please say more about what you mean by that?” This was also a 
vital checkpoint for trustworthiness to try and ensure that participant’s meaning was accurately 
represented and interpreted in analysis and framework construction (Bryman, 2008:377) and was 
done throughout each interview.  
Participants were then directly asked about the extent to which they thought mediation was an 
appropriate way of dealing with bullying and harassment. They were also asked to give specific 
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examples to illustrate their answers which helped to provide context to their responses. This 
overarching question allowed for the emergence of relevant themes without prompt from the 
questions. Where this was the case, the order or the questions was changed to provide for a 
greater flow to the interview. A number of specific follow-up questions were included on the 
schedule to ensure key points that did not arise unprompted were covered. These concerned the 
ease and use of distinguishing between bullying and harassment, the relevance of power 
imbalance and of intentions and perceptions, and the difference, if any, a racist, sexist or 
homophobic element would make. In each of the questions there was an intention to try and 
access information on both the nature of mediation and of its practical application. In respect of 
the latter, where mediators had identified potential problems associated with power imbalance they 
were asked for techniques they used to mitigate these problems.  
Questions then turned to the potential impact of mediation on the parties, on an organisation and 
on society more broadly. This, together with a question about the role of employment law (and the 
question on protected characteristics) were aimed at addressing the rhetoric of the 
transformational aspect of mediation and its relationship with the privatisation of justice concerns.  
Participants were then explicitly asked about mediation and fairness and mediation and justice. No 
definition of either fairness or justice was provided since again, it was important to understand 
what meaning the mediator assigned to those words and to understand how they are positioned 
within the mediation discourse.  
Finally, an additional set of questions was included that considered organisational and party 
attitudes towards, and apprehensions about, the use of mediation. In all but two cases the topics 
covered in these questions had been explored earlier in the interview.  
To close the interview, each participant was asked whether there was anything else they wanted to 
say about mediation that they felt they had not had the chance to say. In a number of cases 
(N=12) the mediators used this question as an opportunity to reflect on the content of the 
interview and on how it had made them address and think about certain issues they had either 
previously not really considered (particularly the justice aspect) or had not thought about in some 
time. This question therefore (somewhat unintentionally) turned into an interesting illustration of 
the ‘critical’ nature of research whereby participating in the research had altered, or at least 
impacted, the way in which the participant themselves thought about the topic in question (Sayer, 
1992).  
Analysis  
Transcripts were produced from the recordings of each interview. Each transcript was checked for 
accuracy by listening back through the original recording. The transcripts were then analysed using 
template analysis, a form of thematic analysis. This was considered to be the most appropriate 
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form of analysis as it provided a structure to focus the analysis which is consistent with the 
sequential mixed method design but it also provided sufficient flexibility to accommodate emergent 
or unanticipated themes (King, 2004b:426).  
An initial template was developed using a priori themes arising from the questionnaire and from 
notes made throughout the interviews. The template retained the distinction between behaviour 
and resolution present in the questionnaire.  
Each transcript was analysed in turn and coded in NVivo according to the template. Throughout 
this process the template evolved to reflect the addition, saturation or redundancy of various 
dimensions and the different themes (King, 2004b). The template was amended accordingly48.  
Many of the themes were integrative and where this was the case these connections were noted 
and are addressed in the findings and discussion. In addition to analysis between the interview 
data, the data were also analysed in respect of the questionnaire findings. Both convergent and 
divergent findings were identified, which, given the complexity and context-dependency, is both 
necessary and unsurprising.  
1.5.4 STAGE 4: Focus groups 
The final stage of data collection was focus groups. The purpose of the focus groups reflects that 
of the interviews, namely the pursuit of meaning and explanation. Here the focus shifts away from 
mediation specifically and more towards uncovering both individual and group understandings and 
perceptions of bullying and harassment and the general principles guiding how they should be 
dealt with. The focus groups provided an invaluable opportunity to explore the relevance of a 
number of the philosophical and/or abstract ideas such as dignity.  
Participants and Procedure 
The sample for the focus groups echoed that of the questionnaire, with the qualifying criteria 
(‘control characteristic’) being those who are eighteen years old or older with at least six months 
work experience in a UK workplace (Knodel, 1993:39). Again, the purpose behind this broad 
characteristic was to try and include a diverse, cross-sectional and potentially heterogeneous set of 
perspectives. It is important to make a distinction between heterogeneity of characteristics and 
heterogeneity of perspectives: a diversity of opinion is sought in focus groups (Krueger and Casey, 
2000) but accessing those opinions in a free and comfortable way is facilitated by homogeneously 
composed focus groups (Knodel, 1993:40; Krueger and Casey, 2000:70-72). Within the control 
characteristic it is possible to identify a greater level of homogeneity within groups by applying a 
‘break characteristic’ (Knodel, 1993:39). Such a decision should be informed by the substantive 
purpose of the study (Knodel, 1993). Here, a number of possible options were available. Arguably 
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the two most pertinent ones were those who had experienced bullying and those who had not, and 
those which singled out a demographic group (i.e. on the basis of a protected characteristic).  
The first option posed a number of practical and ethical problems, not least in respect of the 
question as to how obvious the homogeneous characteristic must be to other group members. 
Because of these difficulties the latter option was chosen. Given the time constraints and 
geographical restrictions involved in this stage of data collection, the characteristic chosen was 
gender. The homogenous nature of such groups would also be self-evident. This was also to reflect 
not only the emphasis on bullying and harassment which may involve a protected characteristic 
(including sexism) but also indications that bullying is a gendered phenomenon (Salin and Hoel, 
2013; Salin, 2011). Gendered groups may also help facilitate discussion on views which may 
otherwise be considered ‘taboo’ or socially undesirable in a mixed group (Kitzinger, 1994; Knodell, 
1993:41). 
Participants were again recruited via social media. The focus groups were also advertised via 
posters around the University campus and surrounding areas49. Initially the posters and 
advertisements were targeted at both male and female participants. There was a greater difficulty 
in recruiting male participants, so once a sufficient number of female participants had been found 
the advertising became more tailored (i.e. to make it clear that male participants were wanted). 
Participants were offered a £10 Amazon voucher for their participation.  
Four focus groups (two male and two female), each lasting an hour were conducted. Although 
there is no rule dictating a minimum number of focus groups, it is accepted that, depending on the 
purpose, three to four can be a sufficient number to allow for theoretical saturation (Krueger and 
Casey, 2000:26). Here therefore whilst conclusions to theory may be made on the basis of the 
overarching homogeneous quality (i.e. eighteen years old or over with at least six months in a UK 
workplace), caution should be exercised in respect of any conclusion attributed to gender 
differences (Knodel, 1993:42).  
The total number of sixteen participants attended the groups: eight males and eight females. The 
demographic details are shown in table 5. 
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AGE 18-25 2 INDUSTRY 
EXPERIENCE 
Agriculture, Animals 
and Environment 
1 
  26-34 10   Automotive, Driving 
and Transport 
1 
  35-46 3   Banking, Finance 
and Insurance 
2 
  47-54 1   Catering and 
Hospitality 
4 
SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION  
Heterosexual 14   Charity 4 
  Gay/Lesbian 1   Construction and 
Skilled Trades 
2 
  Undisclosed 1   Customer Service 
and Call Centre 
7 
ETHNICITY White-British 9   Distribution and 
Warehouse 
1 
  White-Irish 2   Education and 
Teaching 
10 
  Italian 1   Engineering, Freight 
and Logistics 
1 
  South African 1   Health, Nursing and 
Social Services 
1 
  White North African 1   HR 2 
  Mixed White European 
(British/German) 
1   IT 1 
  Asian/Asian British-
Bangladeshi 
1   Legal 3 
RELIGION OR 
BELIEF 
No religion 9   Management 4 
  Christian  5   Manufacturing 1 
  Buddhist 1   Media/New Media 1 
  Muslim 1   Recruitment 3 
MANAGERIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Yes 4   Retail and Sales 6 
  No 11   Scientific and 
Pharmaceutical 
2 
SECTOR Private sector 5   Secretarial, 
Administration and 
PA 
2 
  Public sector 10   Security and 
Defence 
1 
  Third sector 1   Travel and Leisure 1 
ET 
INVOLVEMENT 
Yes 3 EXPERIENCE 
OF 
BULLYING/    
HARASSMENT 
Yes 7 
  No 13   No 9 
EXPERIENCE 
AND/OR 
TRAINING OF 
MEDIATION  
Yes 4    
  No 12    
 Table 5. Focus group sample demographics 
 The number in each focus group varied from three to five participants. Although the size of the 
groups is smaller than is often recommended (Krueger and Casey, 2000:74), given the depth of 
discussion desired this was deemed necessary to allow sufficient time for each participant to share 
their opinion. In addition to this, whilst the focus groups are useful for uncovering individual views 
and attitudes, given the importance of the intersubjectivity of language assumed here, it was also 
important to provide sufficient time and opportunity for participants to interact with each other as 
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this can be important for developing their personal and collective voice (Smithson, 2000; Morgan 
and Krueger, 1993:16-17). It is this interactive and collaborative element that recommends focus 
groups for the present purpose above alternatives, for example individual interviews with qualifying 
individuals (Kitzinger, 1994; Albrecht, Johnson and Walther, 1993).  
Although attempts were made to try and arrange focus groups where participants did not have a 
prior relationship, this was not always possible. The argument against the use of pre-existing 
groups centres on the possibility it may hinder the extent to which they feel the need to explain 
their underlying reasoning (Krueger and Casey, 2000:11). Here, however, it was beneficial as 
where there was a pre-existing relationship those individuals were able to provide context for their 
opinions and jointly construct for them what is acceptable and what was not (Kitzinger, 1994).  
All focus groups were held at the University and at times to try and facilitate participation for those 
who worked “9am-5pm” in other parts of Manchester (for each category a lunchtime and an 
evening group were held). Biscuits and bottled water were also provided to help make the 
environment more comfortable.  
All focus groups were digitally recorded and key points and themes were noted throughout and 
following each group.  
Focus Group Guide 
The structure of the focus group broadly followed the structure of the questionnaire with the 
discussion being anchored in a scenario. Drawing on the themes having emerged from the analysis 
of the previous stages a focus group guide was constructed (Appendix 11).  
The scenario used was the sexism example from the questionnaire50. This was selected firstly 
because the sexism element resonated with the gendered composition of the focus groups and 
secondly because the detail and circumstances easily lent themselves to exploration and variation 
in a focus group environment. This ability to systematically vary the circumstances of the scenario 
provides an opportunity which was not offered with the questionnaire and allows for an 
identification of not only the underlying mechanisms but also the potential triggers and 
consequences (O’Dell, Crafter, de Abreu and Cline, 2012).  
The use of the vignette also provided a common point of reference for participants which is of use 
not only in analysis (Kitzinger, 1994) but through the depersonalisation also helps to encourage 
participants to share their views on the sensitive issues without having to make personal and/or 
potentially undesirable disclosures (Schoenberg and Ravdal, 2000).  
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Prior to the focus group 
Participants were provided with a copy of the scenario. Providing a copy of the scenario in advance 
not only served a practical purpose (i.e. freeing up time in the actual focus group) it also gave 
participants time to process their response and begin to consider their understanding and 
interpretation of the situation. As the focus group was concerned with accessing deeper 
understanding and meaning, giving participants this extra time was seen as beneficial (Zeller, 
1993:168).   
Participants were also asked to complete a short demographic questionnaire in Qualtrics.  
In the focus group 
A brief introduction to the purpose of the focus group was given and, as with the questionnaire, it 
was made clear that there was no right or wrong answer and that what was sought was their 
opinion. They were informed that differing views were anticipated and encouraged but should be 
respected. In order to promote the benefit of discussion participants were also encouraged to 
respond to each other and not just to the facilitator, for example, if they disagreed with or did not 
understand what another person had said. This was important not only for laying ground rules but 
also for providing an additional opportunity for clarification of meaning.  
Before commencing the discussion participants were asked to individually complete a brief set of 
questions about the scenario51. These questions were taken directly from the questionnaire. Asking 
for individual assessment prior to any discussion provided a means of tracking the extent to which 
an individual may (knowingly or otherwise) change their opinion throughout the focus group 
(Viscek, 2007).  
The discussion around the scenario was intended to be semi-structured. As with the interviews, 
this provided a direction and structure whilst allowing a considerable degree of flexibility. There 
were five main guiding questions, concerned with the meaning of bullying and harassment, the 
distinction between the two, the meaning and justifications for protected characteristics and what 
was necessary for a fair resolution. Within each of these questions key themes and variations in 
circumstances were identified (e.g. change in power relationship). It was hoped (and was often the 
case) that these points would arise in the participant’s own explanations, without the need for 
prompting. Again, however, where clarification on a particular statement or point was needed to 
help with accuracy in analysis and interpretation and which did not arise through discussion 
between participants, participants were probed to clarify or expand on a point (Krueger and Casey, 
2000:201-203). For example, in a response about the timing of the complaint a participant 
expressed a need to know when the complaint had been made and was asked what difference that 
would make to their answer.  
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It became apparent in the first focus group that it would be beneficial to explicitly ask participants 
where they drew the meaning for the concepts they were discussing from. After an 
acknowledgement in the first group that they did not know what the definitions of bullying or 
harassment were, yet they were able to make judgements as to whether or not they thought 
something was bullying/harassment, a further guiding question was added, asking participants to 
consider what they were basing their assessments on.  
Inspired by the comments of the mediators in the closing question of the interviews, the focus 
group finished by asking participants to reflect on whether or not they felt participating in the focus 
group had changed the way they thought about bullying and harassment. The purpose behind this 
was not only to explore the critical nature of the research but also to potentially begin to evaluate 
the value in providing individuals with a forum and structure to discuss these matters, which, of 
course, is what the resultant framework hopes to facilitate.  
Analysis 
The process of analysing the focus groups echoed that of the interviews. Transcripts were 
prepared and their accuracy checked. Template analysis was again used, with the a priori codes 
being drawn from the template for the interviews. This made it easier to compare and integrate 
the findings within the themes and across the methods. Again, this template was modified 
throughout the analytical process52. Comparisons were made both within and across groups 
(Knodel, 1993). Any possible relationships or connections within the focus group data, as well as 
between those arising from the previous data collection stages were noted to be drawn out in 
subsequent stages of interpretation and framework construction.  
An additional level of complexity was involved in coding the focus group data, namely whether to 
analyse the data at the individual or group level or both (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech and 
Zoran, 2009). Here both the individual and the group level were of interest. Given the importance 
assigned to the intersubjectivity of meaning and the emphasis on the interactive element in the 
focus group method, the group level was prioritised. Accordingly it was necessary to code sections 
of dialogue, rather than individual quotes. The individual level was also tracked to determine any 
changes in individual responses. The individual questionnaire was used as the benchmark for this 
process. This distinction is also important given the need identified in the previous chapters to 
identify points of departure between an individual’s own standards and those collectively valued.  
A further issue arises from the use of vignettes in the focus groups. In analysis, one must be aware 
of distinguishing between the various ways in which a participant may interpret the scenario. In 
addition to the individual and group dynamics, a participant may shift between interpreting the 
vignette from their perspective of the hypothetical parties, to making judgements and statements 
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based on their own experience and characteristics (O’Dell et al, 2012). Providing one is conscious 
of this possibility it is not necessarily problematic but rather can be an interesting source of insight 
into the way individuals position themselves in respect to others (Hermans, 2001). There were 
examples where the participants themselves would make this distinction which, together with 
directly asking participants what was driving their responses, arguably made it easier to track any 
changes in a position or interpretation.  
6.6 ETHICS 
Ethical approval for this project was obtained through the prescribed ethical procedure for the 
completion of PhD research within Manchester Business School.  
Potential participants were provided with information sheets which corresponded to the data 
collection stage53. An email address was provided for potential participants to contact the 
researcher for more information or to ask questions before they chose to participate. Consent was 
obtained from each participant before they took part in the research: for the questionnaire this 
took the form of qualifying consent questions online, for interviews this was either obtained in 
person or via email and for the focus groups participants were asked to sign a consent form at the 
beginning of the group.  
Those completing the questionnaire who did not wish to enter the prize draw could do so 
anonymously. The details of those who provided email addresses were kept confidential and not 
used in analysis. Details of participants in the qualitative stages were also kept confidential and 
every attempt has been made to minimise participants being identified from the descriptions given 
here. For example names of focus group participants have been changed.  
In addition to those related to conducting research in general (e.g. consent) the nature of the topic 
posed some potential ethical problems.  
Bullying and harassment is an inherently sensitive topic. The aim in this research however, to 
access understandings of bullying and harassment in general, rather than to uncover personal 
experiences of bullying and harassment, meant that many of the potential dangers involved in 
researching this area could (hopefully) be mitigated. It was made clear in information provided 
about the research to potential participants that, whilst they would be asked whether or not they 
had experienced bullying/harassment, they would not be asked to share details about it. It is 
accepted, however, that merely thinking or talking about the topic may be sufficient to trigger 
negative emotions and there were times in the focus groups where participants chose to share 
their experience. Where this was (or may have been the case) and it was apparent to the 
researcher, for example because a direct email had been received saying they had or were 
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experiencing bullying at work, participants (or potential participants) were referred to external 
groups should they need support and/or advice.  
The addition of a racist, sexist or homophobic element posed a further level of complexity. The 
nature of the scenarios used was made clear to participants by the use of a prominent disclaimer.  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined and discussed the methodological approach and research design adopted 
by this research. It sought to establish how critical realism provides a useful way of accessing and 
enhancing understanding and explanation of the concepts at the heart of this research. Adopting 
such an approach had important implications for the research design and the extent to which 
quantitative and qualitative methods could be utilised and combined. A mixed method approach 
was designed to help achieve the aim of developing a theoretical framework that reflects the 
complexity involved in understanding bullying and harassment and how it should be dealt with. It 
was argued that the robustness of the research should be determined by the integrated output, i.e. 
the quality of the resultant framework. This determination is driven by the findings and the way in 
which they are related back to existing theory, and in this instance, how that is then utilised to 
develop new theory: with this in mind, it is to the presentation of the findings which the thesis will 
now turn.  
Chapters 7 to 9 will present findings from the three main data collection stages. Although the 
findings for each stage will be presented separately, common themes and areas of convergence or 
divergence will be identified to help indicate how the different data may be related to each other. 
Themes such as the differences between bullying and harassment, indications of the 
personal/impersonal dynamic, the fairness and feasibility of mediation in bullying and harassment 
will be highlighted.  
Given the importance assigned in this chapter to the need to demonstrate clearly how the new 
theory is developed and justified through its relation back to existing knowledge, the discussion will 
indicate how the findings can be positioned within the literature presented in chapters 2 to 5 
before the new, empirically-informed framework is presented in chapter 10.  
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CHAPTER 7.  FINDINGS 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The presentation of the questionnaire findings will follow the structure of the questionnaire itself 
and, for the reasons given above, will focus on descriptive statistics and the patterns which emerge 
from them54. The chapter will also seek to indicate how the questionnaire findings can be related 
back to the thesis and literature presented above. However, given the importance of contextualised 
understandings, such references here will be brief with substantive discussion being offered in 
relation to the qualitative findings in chapters 8 and 9. The aim of the chapter is therefore to 
further (and empirically) identify the factors which influence whether a situation is perceived as 
bullying and/or harassment and those which may be perceived as influencing whether mediation is 
perceived as appropriate. 
The questionnaire findings indicate a foundational support for the arguments that individuals may 
see bullying and harassment as different things and that the difference may (but not necessarily) 
be determined by the presence of a protected characteristic. A consideration of the behaviour 
variables and qualitative definitions are used to identify possible defining features and the severity 
of the behaviour, target perception, perpetrator intent and violation of dignity are seen as being of 
particular importance to the first research question.  
Through a recognition that individuals indicate their judgement would differ to that of others and 
the positioning of decision making variables such ‘Behaviour was inherently wrong or offensive’ and 
the ranking of the nature of behaviour (e.g. involved race) over the personal characteristics of the 
parties involved, the findings also provide a basis in which the abstract argument over the 
operation of the personal/impersonal dynamic and the prioritisation of impersonally reasonable 
standards can be empirically grounded. 
The top ranking positions of resolution variables (related to research question 2) such as 
‘Opportunity for shared understanding’ and ‘Opportunity for alleged target/perpetrator to explain’ 
and the low ranking of ‘Need for outcome to be public’, together with appropriate response results 
and findings from the mediation statements, also provide a strong indication that mediation is seen 
as an appropriate way of dealing with workplace bullying and harassment.  
7.2 SCENARIO ASSESSMENTS 
Bullying 
The assessments for each of the scenarios in respect of bullying are shown in table 6.  
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Statement 
Scenario  
1 (SO) 
Scenario 2 
(Sex) 
Scenario 
3 (Race) 
It’s inappropriate and it’s definitely bullying 31.1 11.9 4.5 
It’s inappropriate and it might be bullying 26.7 36.6 24.2 
It’s inappropriate but it’s not bullying 38.5 46.3 47.7 
It’s appropriate and it’s definitely not bullying 3.7 5.2 23.5 
      (N=135) Table  6. Percentage Assessments: Bullying  
Although there is an apparent consensus that the best way to describe each scenario was 
statement 3, indicating the behaviour was inappropriate but not bullying, that there are responses 
for each statement means one can immediately identify potential support for the proposition of a 
spectrum of behaviour (chapter 4) and that different individuals assign different labels or 
interpretations to the behaviour.  
Harassment 
Table 7 sets out the responses in respect of harassment. Again, it is clear to see a difference in the 
assessments. Here however there is no single statement with the highest percentage for each 
scenario as there was with bullying. With the exception of scenario 3, a higher percentage of 
responses indicated the behaviour is either definitely harassment or might be harassment than 
thought it was definitely bullying or might be bullying.   
Statement 
Scenario  1 
(SO) 
Scenario 
2 (Sex) 
Scenario 
3 (Race) 
It’s inappropriate and it’s definitely harassment (1) 42.2 13.5 6.1 
It’s inappropriate and it might be harassment (2) 34.1 54.9 28.2 
It’s inappropriate but it’s not harassment (3) 22.2 27.8 44.3 
It’s appropriate and it’s definitely not harassment (4) 1.5 3.8 21.4 
  (N=135) Table 7. Percentage Assessments: Harassment  
Bullying and harassment 
When compared, there is a clear indication the participants make a distinction between bullying 
and harassment. The relative percentage responses for bullying and harassment for each scenario 
are shown in graphs 1-3 below.   
Given the preceding sections it is not surprising that where either statements 1 or 2 were selected, 
a higher percentage indicated the behaviour was either definitely or might be harassment rather 
than either definitely or might be bullying. With the exception of scenario 3, it is also clear that 
even though many thought the behaviour across the scenarios was not bullying or harassment, it 
was nevertheless inappropriate. Again this potentially provides support for the recognition of 
different standards of appropriateness/reasonableness and the argument that some distinction is 
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made between bullying and harassment, albeit with the acceptance there may be uncertainty as to 
how that distinction is made (thus echoing Branch, 2008).  
                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
                                  Graph 1. Scenario 1 (Sexual Orientation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Graph 2. Scenario 2 (Sex) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                      Graph 3. Scenario 3 (Race) 
Possible insight into the way in which a distinction between bullying and harassment was made 
may be found in a consideration of the results from the question relating to the potential 
sexist/racist/homophobic nature of the behaviour.  
Personal and Impersonal Assessments of Homophobia, Sexism and Racism 
Graphs 4 to 6 show how the responses to the ‘ism’ statements were rated for each scenario (%).  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4
123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Graph 4. Scenario 1  
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                           Graph 5. Scenario 2  
                                               
    Graph 6. Scenario 3  
The recognition that multiple characteristics may be involved (albeit it at low levels), may indicate a 
possible recognition of the existence of multiple, if not intersectional grounds (Holvino, 2010; 
Hudson, 2012). It is useful however to present the results for the single characteristic each 
scenario was designed to explore (see graphs 7-9 below). In so doing, one can see 63.2% strongly 
agreed they would describe scenario 1 as an example of homophobia; 22% strongly agreeing they 
would describe scenario 2 as an example of sexism and finally only 11.5% strongly agreeing they 
would describe scenario 3 as an example of racism.   
Again, in recognition that individual assessments would vary (using Nagel, 1991), the graphs also 
demonstrate that the respondents were aware others may have a different opinion to their own. 
These differences are particularly apparent in scenarios 2 and 3 with the percentages of those 
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agreeing other people would describe the scenarios as examples of sexism and racism 
(respectively) being higher than those who agreed that they themselves would describe the 
scenarios in that way. Here one may suggest an area for further (qualitative) enquiry as to the 
reasons for these differing views and the extent to which it may be seen as a reflection of the 
personal/impersonal dynamic.  
                               
                                         Graph 7. Scenario 1 (Homophobia) 
                                   
                                       Graph 8. Scenario 2 (Sexism) 
                                  
                               Graph 9. Scenario 3 (Racism) 
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Appropriate Responses to Scenarios 
Table 8 shows the ranking for the most appropriate responses for each of the scenarios. The 
ranking is determined by the percentages rating the response ‘very appropriate’.   
Given the use of vignettes (and therefore the necessarily limited detail), the high figures for the 
need for further investigation are not surprising. Whilst this may be seen as consistent with the 
requirements of formal procedural justice (Genn, 2010; Roberts and Palmer, 2005) and with the 
focus group results, the temptation to argue these results across the different stages therefore 
have the same meaning and importance must be tempered by the possible limitation of the 
method. 
Response Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Informal word 36.6 34.6 38.8 
Further investigation 34.6 35.9 38.5 
Grievance 18 8.4 7.7 
Disciplinary 23.5 5.3 7 
Mediation (Individual) 24.6 30 22.9 
Mediation (Joint) 22.6 33.6 31.3 
Equality & Diversity  51.1 30 30.2 
Resign (Target) 1.5 0 0 
Resign (Perpetrator) 4.5 1.5 1.5 
Legal Claim 1.5 1.5 2.3 
Do nothing 3 1.6 3.1 
Confrontation 4.5 12.6 8.7 
    (% Very Appropriate, (N=133))  
Table 8. Appropriate Response to Scenarios.  
Of greater surprise is perhaps the positioning of an informal word, especially as the majority of the 
responses saw the behaviour as bullying/harassment or at least as inappropriate. Of those who 
thought scenario 1 was inappropriate and definitely bullying, 40% indicated an informal word was 
very appropriate with only 7.5% thinking it was an inappropriate response. With the exception of 
scenario 1, formal responses such as grievance and disciplinary were seen as very appropriate by a 
relatively small percentage of responses. Against the argument of a reliance on or rush to law (BIS, 
2011a) the low ranking of the legal claim is to be noted. The highest percentage for any response 
(and across all scenarios) was in favour of equality and diversity training for scenario 1.  
Mediation 
Of course, for present purposes the positioning of mediation is important. In scenario 1 mediation 
(joint meetings) were seen as appropriate or very appropriate by 57.9%, by 68.7% in scenario 2 
and 62.6% in scenario 3.  
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   Table 9: It’s inappropriate and it’s definitely bullying (B)/harassment (H): Mediation  
Tables 9 and 10 show a breakdown of the appropriateness of mediation according to whether the 
behaviour was considered to either be definitely bullying/harassment or possibly 
bullying/harassment. 
   Table 10: It’s inappropriate and it might be bullying (B)/harassment (H): Mediation 
From the tables it is clear to see that even where the behaviour is seen as definitely 
bullying/harassment, mediation-individual and joint meetings-were seen as either appropriate or 
very appropriate by a majority. Particularly in respect of the joint meetings, it is interesting (and 
possibly not surprising) to note the percentages are higher where there is less certainty as to the 
nature of the behaviour. Mediation was also seen as either appropriate or very appropriate by 59% 
(individual) and 59% (joint) of those who strongly agreed they would describe scenario 1 as an 
example of homophobia; 75.8% (individual) and 72.4% (joint) for those who strongly agreed 
scenario 2 could be described as an example of sexism; and 57.1% (for both individual and joint) 
of those who strongly agreed they would describe scenario 3 as an example of racism.  
7.3 DECISION MAKING VARIABLES 
Tables 11 and 12 present the rankings of the given decision making variables (relating to the first 
two research questions: factors influencing bullying/harassment and the appropriateness of 
mediation respectively). The table is ranked according to a combined percentage for those who 
thought the variable was extremely or very important. 
                        S1   S2   S3   
 
Individual  Joint Individual  Joint Individual  Joint 
B H B H B H B H B H B H 
Appropriate or 
very 
appropriate 
(%) 
56.
4 62.9 51.2 57.1 66.7 64.7 53.4 64.7 83.3 62.5 66.7 50.0 
Inappropriate 
or very 
inappropriate 
(%) 
15.
4 11.2 17.1 12.5 13.3 11.8 20.0 11.8 16.7 25.0 33.4 37.5 
 
S1   S2   S3   
 
Individual  Joint Individual  Joint Individual  Joint 
B H B H B H B H B H B H 
Appropriate or 
very appropriate 
(%)  57.1 57.8 61.1 67.4 83.6 67.1  79.6 68.5  58.1 69.4 58.1  72.2 
Inappropriate or 
very 
inappropriate 
(%) 0.0 4.4  5.6 2.2  2 4.1  4 8.2  9.7 0.0  9.7 0.0 
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7.3.1  Behaviour 
Table 11. Decision making variables for assessing behaviour 
The top five characteristics offer an interesting mix of what may be considered as impersonal 
factors (for example ‘Behaviour was inherently wrong or offensive’) and personal factors (e.g. ‘The 
alleged target’s perception’).  
Given the importance assigned to dignity in this research, it is useful to note the positioning of 
dignity both overall and of the relative positioning of the importance of dignity for the target and 
for the perpetrator. This is perhaps indicative of the prioritisation of the alleged target in bullying 
and harassment and in this respect it is also important to note the positioning of perception and of 
intention.  
Behaviour Variable 
Extremely/ Very 
Important (%) 
Not at all 
Important (%) 
How severe the behaviour was 81.3 1.9 
Violation of the alleged target's dignity 75.3 1.8 
The alleged target's perception 73.9 1.9 
Behaviour was inherently wrong or offensive 72.9 3.7 
The alleged perpetrator's intention 68.2 1.9 
Involved sexual orientation 59.3 4.6 
Impact of the behaviour on the alleged target's health, 
career and life 
59.2 0.9 
Reasonableness of the alleged target's perception 57 1.9 
Involved race and/or ethnicity 57 4.7 
Involved gender and/or sexual behaviour 55.5 4.6 
How often the behaviour happened 53.3 3.7 
How many times the behaviour happened 52.3 3.7 
Impact on colleagues 44.8 5.6 
Impact on organisation 44.8 9.3 
Acas or employer definition(s) 43 4.7 
Legal definition(s) 41.6 4.6 
Violation of the alleged perpetrator's dignity 41.1 4.7 
Personal characteristics of the alleged target 37.7 15.1 
Impact of the behaviour on the alleged perpetrator's 
health, career and life 
36.1 8.3 
Level of power imbalance between the parties 36.1 15.7 
Culture of the workplace 32.4 15.7 
Personal characteristics of the alleged perpetrator 24.1 17.6 
Seniority/level in organisation of the alleged 
perpetrator 
22.3 25.9 
Seniority/level in organisation of the alleged target 18.6 31.5 
Size of the organisation 4.6 49.5 
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The ranking of the target’s perception above the perpetrator’s intention is consistent with the 
arguments of Einarsen et al, 201155. However, the high ranking of intention and the relatively small 
percentage difference between it and perception (5.7%) is potentially interesting from a 
definitional perspective. Intention here of course does not allow for the distinction to be made 
between intention to do the act and intention to cause the effect (Einarsen et al, 2003). This was, 
however, explored in the qualitative stages56. 
Consistent with arguments of the personal/impersonal, the positioning of ‘Behaviour was inherently 
wrong or offensive’ is helpful for arguing in favour of the recognition of an impersonal standpoint, 
especially when viewed in light of the (target’s) dignity ranking. The relative importance assigned 
to the reasonableness of the perception is also interesting (perception 3rd, reasonableness of 
perception 8th) since this may potentially support the need for an objective check and would seem 
to be consistent with the emphasis on the importance of investigation in the focus groups57.  
Further support may be found if one looks at the relative positions of those factors related to the 
behaviour involving a protected characteristic compared with that related to the protected 
characteristics of the individuals involved. The former are assigned greater importance than the 
latter: sexual orientation 59.3%, gender and/or sexual behaviour 55.5% and race and/or ethnicity 
57% compared with personal characteristics of the target (37.7%) and of the perpetrator (24.1%). 
One may relate this distinction to the implications drawn from Fredman’s (2011) conception of 
dignity in chapter 4, namely that an individual does not need to possess a particular characteristic 
for behaviour to be seen as offensive or objectionable. This is consistent with the conclusions of 
the focus group participants, although, as is seen in chapter 9, their treatment of protected 
characteristics is not always coherent with this.  
The relatively low importance of legal (41.6%) and Acas/employer (43%) definitions should be 
noted, although perhaps here one should be aware that the responses may be related to 
knowledge and awareness of such definitions, rather than importance per se. Again, the later 
stages allow for a clarification of this and indeed the focus groups indicate knowledge of such 
definitions may be low.  
A consideration of the five factors deemed to be least important (Not at all important) raises some 
interesting points for further consideration. The positioning of organisational size and culture might 
reflect the argument that it is the behaviour not the organisation that is important in assessing the 
behaviour. Caution needs to be exercised, however, in making this connection as it may be a 
consequence of the vignette design, especially where there is, regrettably, little explicit description 
of size.  Although size is not considered, organisational culture was given a great deal of attention 
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in the focus groups but reflecting these results, it was seen as being of little relevance when 
defining the behaviour58.  
Given the arguments over the importance of recognising the hierarchical positions in relationships 
and the prevalence of vertical bullying in the UK (Beale and Hoel, 2010), the presence of the 
seniority factors in the bottom five is potentially problematic. It may, however, perhaps be because 
a hierarchical relationship (as opposed to power imbalance) is not seen as important in assessing 
behaviour. The importance assigned to the explicit power imbalance factor, however, does not 
really rectify this suspicion with only 36.1% indicating it was extremely or very important.  
Fortunately the mixed method design helps to counter these concerns and potential deficiencies by 
providing opportunities for later clarification. The relevance of power and of power imbalances, 
related to formal and informal forms of power (Einarsen et al, 2003; Einarsen et al, 2009; Holvino, 
2010) were considered in detail in the mediator interviews in relation to the appropriateness of 
mediation59 and in the focus groups in relation to changes in vertical relationships between the 
parties involved60.  
Additional Variables 
In addition to the options provided, a number of additional variables were offered (N=29). These 
fell into two themes related to the unwanted nature of the behaviour. The first theme was the past 
relationship between the parties e.g. ‘whether or not the target had themselves participated’ and 
the second theme concerned whether the perpetrator was aware the behaviour was unwanted by 
the target, e.g. ‘whether the alleged target had already told the perpetrator to stop’.  
7.3.2  Resolution 
 Resolution Variables 
Extremely/ Very Impt 
(%) 
Not at all Impt 
(%) 
Opportunity for alleged perpetrator to explain 89.8 0 
Opportunity for the alleged target to explain 89.8 0.9 
Opportunity for shared understanding 88.9 0 
Opportunity for flexible outcome 80.5 0.9 
 How severe the behaviour was 77.5 0.9 
What was fair to the alleged target 75.7 1.9 
Behaviour was inherently wrong or offensive 73.2 2.8 
Opportunity for the parties to take control 73.1 2.8 
Opportunity for private resolution 70.4 1.9 
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Impact of the behaviour on the alleged target's health, career 
and life 
68.5 1.9 
What was fair to the alleged perpetrator 66.6 1.9 
The alleged target's perception 65.4 0.9 
The alleged perpetrator's intention 65.4 0.9 
 Speed of resolution 63.3 5.5 
Whether the parties still had to work together 62 1.9 
Reasonableness of the alleged target's perception 61.7 0.9 
Zero tolerance for that type of behaviour 57.8 4.6 
Involved sexual orientation 57 5.6 
Involved race and/or ethnicity 56.5 5.6 
Involved gender and/or sexual behaviour 56 5.6 
How often the behaviour happened 49.6 1.9 
Impact on colleagues 48.1 4.6 
Legal obligation 46.3 8.3 
Level of power imbalance between the parties 43.5 11.1 
How many times the behaviour happened 43 4.7 
Impact of the behaviour on the alleged perpetrator's health, 
career and life 
40.7 3.7 
 Impact on organisation 39.2 11.2 
Personal characteristics of the alleged target 34.5 9.3 
Seniority/level in organisation of the alleged perpetrator 32.7 17.8 
Culture of the workplace 31.8 6.5 
Seniority/level in organisation of the alleged target 24.3 20.6 
Personal characteristics of the alleged perpetrator 23.4 10.3 
Cost of resolution to the parties 21.3 12 
Cost of resolution to the organisation 19.7 15 
Need for a right or wrong answer 18.5 15.7 
The alleged perpetrator deserved to be punished 16.6 10.2 
The alleged target deserves compensation 12 13.9 
Opportunity for public vindication 10.2 16.7 
Need for outcome to be public 7.5 16.7 
Size of the organisation 6.6 27.4 
Table 12. Resolution variables 
The results at each end of the rankings for what was considered important when deciding on the 
appropriateness of the resolution options are extremely interesting. The top four clearly correspond 
with the characteristics and opportunities purportedly offered by facilitative mediation (Ridley-Duff 
and Bennett, 2011; Riskin, 2003) whilst the factors deemed to be the least important (aside from 
size) are those argued to be associated with adversarial methods. The positioning of ‘Need for a 
public outcome’ as second to last is somewhat problematic as it perhaps makes arguing against the 
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privatisation of justice in line with Fiss (1984) and Mulcahy’s (2013) objections more difficult. This 
position is compounded by the high importance of an opportunity for a private resolution (70.4%). 
In this regard it is also interesting to note the low importance attached to punishment (16.6%) and 
public vindication (10.2%). Indeed ideas of blame, punishment and vindication (as may be 
anticipated by Fairness Theory (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001) and restorative justice (Menkell-
Meadow, 2007)) are given little consideration throughout qualitative stages. 
Severity is again ranked highly, although lower than when assessments about the behaviour were 
being made: 77.5% and 81.3% respectively. This arguably indicates that one must consider the 
relationship between the behaviour and the appropriate response (Edwards, 1986). This is also 
potentially supported by the positioning of the nature of the behaviour (i.e. involving a protected 
characteristic) and the importance assigned to a sense of inherent wrongness (72.3%), 
reasonableness (61.7%) and to a recognition of zero tolerance (57.8%). Again, the importance 
attached to these may indicate support for the valuing of an impersonal set of standards and the 
need to pursue a sense of social justice (Edwards, 1986; Rawls, 2001). The role of law in this, 
however, is unclear given the relatively low importance attached to legal obligation (46.3%).  
The variables explicitly asking about fairness are perhaps not ranked as highly as the argument 
presented in this research would suggest: What was fair to the target (75.7%) and to the 
perpetrator (66.6%).  But this is arguably not detrimental to the argument over the importance of 
fairness since, as was seen in the literature review chapters, many of the other variables (for 
example opportunity to explain or to take control) may be assigned to and understood as 
important contributors to understanding fairness (Genn, 2010; Nabatchi et al, 2007). The limiting 
of the analysis to descriptive statistics does not allow this conclusion to be drawn on the basis of 
the questionnaire; however, such arguments can (and will) be continued through the interview and 
focus group data61.  
Again, in respect of fairness one can see an apparent prioritisation of the target over the 
perpetrator. When one compares fairness with dignity, the figures for the target are similar (0.4% 
difference) but in respect of fairness for the perpetrator the difference is greater: 41.1% for 
dignity, 66.6% for fairness. Of course the argument presented here (chapter 4) assumes dignity as 
a requirement of fairness, so it is useful to try and understand these differences.  
Intention and perception appear to be seen as equally important in resolution (65.4%) but less 
important than when determining what an appropriate response is than when assessing the 
behaviour. When compared with the mediator responses this is particularly interesting since for 
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them, intention and perception in relation to dealing with the dispute were seen as being of greater 
relevance than perception/intention in relation to the behaviour62.   
The power imbalance between the parties was seen by a greater percentage as being extremely or 
very important in determining the appropriate response than in assessing the behaviour: 43.5% 
and 36.1% respectively. The position of the parties within the organisation was also seen as being 
more important for resolution, particularly that of the perpetrator (32.7% resolution and 22.3% 
behaviour). Relatively, however, power and seniority are not assigned a great deal of importance. 
This is perhaps surprising since they were assigned a great deal of significance in the later data 
stages. However, here one may need to make a distinction between their relevance for choosing 
an appropriate response (questionnaire) and the influence they exert over the extent to which a 
target may be able to pursue that appropriate response, which was the focus in the qualitative 
stages. Here again one finds the need to have a contextualised understanding of the findings in 
order to answer the remaining research questions (why influential and relationships between the 
factors).  
The importance attached to the variables reflecting the twin pillars of cost/efficiency and 
empowerment do not necessarily reflect the balance evident in the rhetoric around mediation (i.e. 
emphasis on the former) (BIS, 2011a; CIPD, 2011). Those presented above as associated with 
empowerment, 73.1% and 88.9% (for example, respectively control and understanding) are 
ranked as highly important whilst considerations of cost are assigned far less importance: cost to 
parties (21.3%) and to organisation (19.7%). Speed (efficiency) was however deemed to be of 
greater importance than cost (63.3%). These are consistent with the results from the mediation 
statements63 and indeed also with the interview findings.  
Additional variables 
Although contributions were offered for additional response considerations, these took the form of 
qualitative expansion on choices given or comments related to the vignette approach, rather than 
additions.  
7.4 INFLUENCES 
Table 13 shows the results from the hypothetical question where participants were asked to 
imagine what would influence their response decision if they were the victim in a situation of 
bullying/harassment.  
 
                                                          
62
 pp152-153 
63
 p140 
133 
 
Influence Variable A Lot Some Little None 
How quickly the situation could be resolved 49.1 33.3 13 4.6 
Your job security 44.9 36.4 11.2 7.5 
Your mental health 47.7 32.7 12.1 7.5 
How much you like your job 42.1 37.4 15.9 4.7 
The culture of your organisation 41.5 35.8 13.2 9.4 
Your chances of getting another job 39.3 36.4 13.1 11.2 
Your line manager 29.0 41.1 18.7 11.2 
Your physical health 41.1 28.0 15.9 15 
Your family members 22.4 46.7 16.8 14 
 Your colleagues 19.6 46.7 29 4.7 
How much it would cost you to achieve a resolution 32.7 32.7 25.2 9.3 
Whether you had to face the other party yourself 28.0 33.6 23.4 15 
Your financial position 23.4 28.0 25.2 23.4 
Your gender 12.1 23.4 26.2 38.3 
Your age 14.2 19.8 31.1 34.9 
Your trade union representative 10.2 19.4 12 58.3 
Your sexual orientation 8.4 17.8 27.1 46.7 
Your religion or belief 11.2 14.0 16.8 57.9 
Your ethnic origin 6.5 14.0 31.8 47.7 
               Table 13. Influence variables 
It is immediately apparent that speed of resolution seems to be the greatest potential influence. 
This does, of course, resonate with the mediation arguments and the ordering of speed above cost 
is consistent with their relative importance in choice of resolution for the scenarios. Against the 
importance assigned above to the opportunity to explain and understand, the positioning of 
‘Whether you had to face the other party yourself’ is interesting. Although not tested for 
significance, a gender difference is apparent in respect of this influence with 65.3% of women 
indicating it would have some or a lot of influence, compared with 45.8% of men. It is important 
(as it is admittedly with all the influences) to understand the extent to which this characteristic 
would encourage them to try a certain resolution or whether it would dissuade them from doing so. 
If it is a hesitance to face the party themselves it would be interesting to explore the degree this 
could be related to stereotypical assumptions about appropriate responses (as may be anticipated 
by Salin and Hoel, 2013 and Salin, 2011).  
It is interesting to note the ranking of those influences relating to the organisation and the 
individual’s position and attitude towards their job, for example, job security. Given the arguments 
about the role and influence of the organisation apparent in the literature, the positioning of line 
manager (70.1%) and of organisational culture (77.3%) is unsurprising. These are also consistent 
with the focus group findings where a great deal of emphasis was placed on the relational and 
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contextual factors within organisation culture in relation to resolution options64. Given the nature 
and individual impact of bullying (Einarsen et al, 2003), the relatively high influence of mental 
health (80.4%) could have been anticipated. 
Again it is possible to identify an apparent difference in the importance attached to an individual’s 
own characteristics and to the involvement of race/sex/orientation. When asked whether their 
responses would change if the behaviour was racist/sexist/homophobic, only 31.5% said it would 
(N=34). Of that 31.5%, 68.6% said their own personal characteristics would be more important in 
such a case. The relationship between the possession of protected characteristics and the nature of 
the behaviour is considered in greater detail in chapter 9.  
7.5 DEFINITIONS 
Characteristic Bullying Harassment Examples 
Persistency  21 20 
ongoing; continued; relentless; 
constantly; persistent; sustained 
Power 20 3 
power trip; abuse of power; power 
imbalance; exploitation of 
weakness 
Impact on target 41 27 
belittle or denigrate the recipient; 
make another person 
uncomfortable; reduce [a person's] 
skills and ability; deterioration of 
the victim's physical or mental 
health 
Intention (deliberate act 
and consequence) 42 19 
saying or doing something to hurt 
a particular person; targeted; 
singling out; goading of one 
person…in a malicious manner 
Intended or unintended 3 7 
perpetrator may not be aware of 
the effect of his/her actions but 
which cause distress nevertheless; 
unwelcome behaviour intended to 
or demean another person or 
having that effect 
Target perception 12 17 
when you feel someone is 
behaving in a way that 
undermines, insults, or frightens 
you; where one or more persons 
act in a way another person sees 
as a threat; a subjective 
perception; anything you 
personally find humiliating is 
bullying 
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Protected characteristics 6 27 
treating someone differently 
because of one of their 
characteristics; any of the isms 
Dignity 16 17 
making people feel small and 
worthless; undermines an 
individual's dignity; 
violates an individual's dignity; 
when I am targeted for who I am 
             Table 14. Content analysis: Bullying and Harassment Definitions 
Table 14 highlights a number of features in the definitions of bullying and of harassment provided 
(N=100). Although some (N=15) used bullying and harassment interchangeably or stated they did 
not see a difference, the table indicates different features were highlighted in bullying than in 
harassment. 
 
Given the statutory definition of harassment, that persistency was seen as a feature of both 
bullying and harassment is interesting. Only two definitions of harassment (and none of bullying) 
made a reference to a single act or ‘just a couple of times’.  
Intention, and particularly a sense the act and the consequence need be intended, was apparent in 
a relatively high number of definitions whilst reference to target perception was relatively lacking. 
In light of the problematic inclusion of intention in definitions of bullying and the importance of 
perception considered above, this is perhaps surprising and may indicate intention is given a 
greater precedence in lay understandings of bullying (this is supported by the focus group 
findings). Whilst perceptions may not have been evident, a sense that bullying and harassment has 
some kind of negative impact on the target was quite prevalent. A sense of how this impact was to 
be determined was, however, absent.  
There was nevertheless an indication of a role for impersonal standards and an acceptance that 
bullying of itself objectionable (Hoel and Beale, 2006) as words/phrases such as ‘reasonable’, 
‘unreasonable’, ‘inappropriate’ and ‘[behaviour] that disrespects acceptable boundaries’.  
The relative mentions of power for bullying and harassment seemingly reflect the understanding 
and positioning of power in the definitions considered above but not necessarily its positioning in 
the decision making responses. A number of different forms of power were identified and included 
hierarchical, social and experiential (Einarsen et al, 2003; Einarsen et al, 2009; Holvino, 2010). The 
greater number of references to protected characteristics in harassment definitions also arguably 
conforms to the distinction made in chapters 4, if not with the ambiguous situation arising from the 
scenario section results. It is interesting to note that a broader range of characteristics was 
identified in a number of definitions: ‘gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, appearance, health 
issues or ability’ and ‘because of not only a protected characteristic but any personal feature, e.g. a 
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big nose, being fat, walking funny…’. This resonates with the lookism arguments (Davis, 2008; 
Desir, 2010) and is something that receives varying degrees of support in the focus groups65.  
There were also a small number (N=5) of references to bullying/harassment being ‘unfair’. In the 
context of the argument being presented here over its use as a unifying concept, the number of 
references to dignity-for both bullying and harassment-is noteworthy.   
7.6 BULLYING AND HARASSMENT STATEMENTS 
  Table 15. Bullying and harassment statements 
The results of the statements in table 15 reflect a number of those presented above.  
The level of agreement with the statement relating to the possibility of distinguishing bullying from 
harassment (S3) is consistent with the responses presented above demonstrating that a distinction 
is made between bullying and harassment. There is also agreement with the proposition that 
bullying and harassment should be treated differently from other workplace disputes (S5), perhaps 
again indicating broad support for the recognition of different levels of reasonableness. There is 
also a clear indication that bullying and harassment could be harmful to equality (S2). Whilst it 
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Racism, sexism and homophobia should be 
treated as equally serious (S1). 
0 1 1 2.9 33.3 61.8 
Bullying and harassment are bad for equality 
(S2). 
2.9 2 0 19.6 33.3 42.2 
Bullying and harassment are different things 
(S3). 
6.9 6.9 15.8 31.7 24.8 13.9 
Bullying and harassment is more complicated 
when it involves racism, sexism or 
homophobia (S4). 
9.8 12.7 10.8 19.6 26.5 20.6 
Bullying and harassment should be treated 
differently from other workplace disputes 
(S5). 
8.8 15.7 12.7 22.5 20.6 19.6 
Bullying and harassment is worse when it 
involves racism, sexism or homophobia (S6). 
15.8 17.8 13.9 26.7 12.9 12.9 
A situation must be labelled (for example as 
bullying or not) before the decision how to 
deal with it can be made (S7). 
16.8 26.7 18.8 22.8 9.9 5 
Racism and sexism are more serious than 
homophobia (S8). 
63.4 28.7 5.9 2 0 0 
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seems apparent racism, sexism and homophobia should be treated as equally serious (S1/S8) 
(therefore potentially contradicting Colgan and Wright’s (2011) hierarchy) and that their presence 
may make a situation more complicated (S4), the mixed responses for S6 make it difficult to 
strongly support a conclusion that ‘Bullying and harassment is worse when it involves racism, 
sexism or homophobia’. Again, the relevance of and the relationship between the protected 
characteristics is considered in greater detail in the focus groups.  
As the chapter now moves on to consider mediation, it is useful to note the responses that seem to 
disagree with the need to label a dispute in order to determine how it should be dealt with (S7). 
7.7 MEDIATION 
7.7.1 Definition 
Characteristic Count 
Informal 6 
Joint meeting 12 
Legal 8 
Mutual outcome 17 
Neutral third party 33 
Parties control outcome 6 
Opportunity for shared understanding 24 
Repair relationship 10 
Resolution 22 
Training 5 
Voluntary 5 
                                    (N=100)                     
                                    Table 16. Content Analysis: Mediation Definitions  
The definitions provided overwhelmingly reflected the features of facilitative mediation above other 
forms (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011; Riskin, 2003). By contrast, however, the relatively low 
number mentioning the voluntary nature is surprising given the emphasis placed on this feature by 
the mediators66. Although relatively few in number, those referring to a trained individual is 
interesting as sufficient training was seen as important by both the mediators and the focus group 
participants67. 
Although there were no definitions explicitly using the term ‘empowerment’, the numbers referring 
to a characteristic which was associated with it in chapter 5 were relatively high. The figures for 
shared understanding and mutual outcome are particularly noteworthy.  
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How these various features are related to each other and to the potential 
advantages/disadvantages of mediation will become apparent in the findings offered in the 
remainder of this chapter and those in the next chapter.  
7.7.2 Mediation Tables 
The responses for all the mediation statements are given in tables 17-20. It is useful to recall that 
only those with mediation training and/or experience completed this section.  
Policy, culture change and transformation 
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The use of mediation will only increase if both 
employers and employee knowledge and awareness 
are improved. 
0 1.8 5.5 16.4 38.2 38.2 
Mediation is an effective way of reducing the number 
of disputes being formalised in an organisation. 
0 5.5 3.6 21.8 38.2 30.9 
Mediation is an effective way of reducing the number 
of Employment Tribunal Claims. 
1.8 5.5 1.8 25.5 36.4 29.1 
The use of mediation will have a significant impact on 
the way workplace disputes are resolved in the UK. 
0 1.8 10.9 29.1 30.9 27.3 
Mediation is an effective way of reducing legal costs 
associated with workplace disputes. 
0 1.8 3.6 30.9 30.9 32.7 
Mediation should be compulsory for all workplace 
disputes. 
23.6 10.9 21.8 25.5 10.9 7.3 
        
The use of mediation has a negative impact on the 
development of employment law. 
23.6 38.2 25.5 5.5 3.6 3.6 
Mediation can be a useful tool for promoting diversity 
and cultural understanding in an organisation. 
0 9.1 9.1 21.8 34.5 25.5 
The use of mediation can have a positive impact on 
tackling inequality. 
0 5.5 14.5 20 45.5 14.5 
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Table 17: Mediation Statements 1: Policy, culture change and transformation 
The statements in table 17 seem to support the arguments of the ‘docket-clearing’ function 
(Goldberg and Shaw, 2010) and the cost rhetoric surrounding mediation and therefore also 
arguably offer support for the proposition (doubted in this research) that mediation can have a 
macro transformative effect on the way in which disputes are resolved in the workplace (Bush and 
Folger, 2012).  
They also seem to counter the arguments associated with the privatisation of justice that the use 
of mediation may be harmful to the development of law (Dolder, 2004; Mulcahy, 2013) or to 
equality (for example, through disaggregation of claims, Nader, 1979). It is clear there is 
agreement that mediation could actually be a useful mechanism for increasing understanding and 
even in tackling inequality. It is interesting to note, however, that agreement over the potential of 
mediation in this respect is not unanimous with 10.9% agreeing or strongly agreeing it could be 
harmful to equality and 5.5% disagreeing the use of mediation could have a positive impact on 
tackling inequality. The reasons why this may be the case are perhaps related to the way in which 
organisations may use mediation to personalise more systemic problems68. It is also interesting to 
note the difference in the figures for the potential of mediation to promote understanding in an 
organisation (60%) and in society (53.7%). When compared with the interview data, these are at 
least consistent or even perhaps a little high which has implications for the transformation claims 
(BIS, 2011a; Saundry et al, 2014).  
The figures for the last statement in the table (sweeping problems under the carpet) are also 
noteworthy, especially when it is recalled that responses in this section are informed by experience 
of and/or training in mediation. When considered in light of the later data collection stages, one 
may argue these figures reflect the role assigned to (or adopted by) the organisation in the 
mediation process.  
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Mediation can be a useful tool for promoting diversity 
and cultural understanding in society. 
0 9.3 13 24.1 29.6 24.1 
The use of mediation can be harmful to equality. 21.8 47.3 12.7 7.3 9.1 1.8 
Mediation can be an effective tool for changing 
workplace culture. 
0 3.6 12.7 20 38.2 25.5 
Mediation allows employers to avoid dealing with 
problems by sweeping problems under the carpet. 
18.2 32.7 9.1 16.4 12.7 10.9 
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Cost and efficiency 
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The confidential nature of mediation can encourage the 
disclosure of sensitive information in a way that formal 
procedures cannot. 
0 1.8 3.6 25.5 41.8 27.3 
The speed with which disputes can be settled using 
mediation is what makes mediation attractive to employers. 
0 3.6 3.6 32.7 45.5 14.5 
The speed with which disputes can be settled using 
mediation is what makes mediation attractive to employees 
in a dispute. 
0 3.6 9.1 36.4 36.4 14.5 
The opportunity to take control of a situation and reach 
their own outcome in a dispute is what makes mediation 
attractive to employees in a dispute. 
0 1.8 7.3 40 41.8 9.1 
The opportunity for employees to take control of a situation 
and reach their own outcome in a dispute is what makes 
mediation attractive to employers. 
0 7.3 9.1 40 34.5 9.1 
The financial savings associated with mediation are what 
make mediation attractive to employers. 
0 11.1 9.3 38.9 25.9 14.8 
The financial savings associated with mediation are what 
make mediation attractive to employees in a dispute. 
3.6 9.1 32.7 25.5 18.2 10.9 
    Table 18: Mediation Statements 2: Cost, efficiency and the nature of mediation 
The statements in table 18 relate to cost and efficiency arguments and to the nature of mediation. 
Here it is clear to see a relatively high percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with the argument 
that the confidential nature of mediation offers something to the parties formal procedures do not 
(thus reflecting Gazeley (1997) and Latreille (2011)).  
Consistent with the apparent importance of speed of resolution over cost evident in the decision 
making factors, a higher percentage agreed or strongly agreed with the attraction of speed of 
resolution to employers (60%) than the cost (financial savings, 40.7%). A comparison of the 
responses relating to the attractiveness of features mediation for employers and employees 
potentially offers tentative support for the argument mediation is attractive for different reasons 
which again fall along the cost/efficiency (employer) and empowerment (employee) lines: for 
example financial savings (40.7%/29.1%) and opportunity to take control (43.6%/50.9%). 
Although not as high as the figure for employers, the feature with the greatest percentage 
indicating attractiveness for employees is speed (50.9%) which is arguably consistent with the 
ranking of speed of resolution in the influence question above. 
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Mediation timing and process. 
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There is a greater potential for mediation to be 
successful where the parties are co-workers. 
5.5 12.7 29.1 30.9 12.7 9.1 
There is a greater potential for mediation to be 
successful where the parties are a line manager and a 
subordinate. 
18.2 25.5 38.2 10.9 3.6 3.6 
Mediation is most appropriate when the parties still need 
to work together. 
0 0 5.5 34.5 43.6 16.4 
        
Employers should be able to use the fact that mediation 
was attempted in their defence in a later tribunal claim. 
9.1 10.9 12.7 14.5 38.2 14.5 
The discussions and outcome of a mediation should 
never be used in a later formal procedure. 
7.3 5.5 21.8 12.7 25.5 27.3 
Mediation is most effective if it is used early in a dispute. 1.8 3.6 5.5 29.1 29.1 30.9 
If one or both parties have doubts about mediation they 
should be encouraged to have individual meetings. 
0 0 7.3 27.3 38.2 27.3 
Mediation must include both individual and joint 
meetings to have a positive impact on the parties. 
1.8 3.6 30.9 25.5 25.5 12.7 
Mediation can have a positive impact on the parties if 
they have individual meetings with a mediator but not a 
joint meeting. 
3.6 5.5 27.3 34.5 23.6 5.5 
 Table 19: Mediation Statements 3: Mediation Timing and Process 
The statements in table 19 relate to the relative positions of the parties in a mediation, the stages 
of the process and the relationship between mediation and other procedures. Interestingly, there is 
no polarised opinion on the first statement with a relatively low percentage strongly agreeing or 
agreeing (21.8%) or strongly disagreeing/disagreeing (18.2%) that there is greater potential for 
mediation to be successful where the parties are co-workers. A difference is more apparent in 
respect of the second statement, however, with 43.7% strongly agreeing or disagreeing with 
regard to a hierarchical relationship. Possible explanations for these positions have been hinted at 
above and can be found in the mediator responses in the next chapter. 
While it is not surprising that there is relatively high agreement with the statement ‘Mediation is 
most appropriate when the parties still need to work together’ the emphasis in the rhetoric placed 
on mediation’s ability to preserve relationships would perhaps suggest that one would expect this 
figure to be higher (Gibbons, 2007; BIS, 2011a). Similarly, given its promotion as an early 
intervention technique, one might expect the figure for the early use of mediation to be higher 
than 60%.  
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The figures for the relationship between mediation and other procedures is interesting, not least 
because there appear to be relatively high percentages for both the disagree and the agree 
options. For example, 52.7% strongly agreeing or agreeing ‘[e]mployers should be able to use the 
fact mediation was attempted in their defence in a later tribunal claim’ and 20% disagreeing or 
strongly disagreeing. A similar number agreed or strongly agreed, however, with the statement 
‘[t]he discussions and outcome of a mediation should never be used in a later formal procedure’ 
(52.8%), here a smaller percentage disagreed/strongly disagreed (12.8%). Albeit not in the 
context of later formal procedures, discussion in the focus groups on a need to distinguish between 
the specific detail of and the general principles involved in a specific dispute may offer an insight 
into these two potentially conflicting statements69. The relationship of mediation to other 
procedures was explored in the mediator interviews and the findings seem to agree with the 
positions that distinguish between the fact mediation has been conducted and the specific details 
and/or outcome.  
Although only 18.2% agreed or strongly agreed mediation should be compulsory for all workplace 
disputes (table 16), 65.5% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: ‘If one or both of the 
parties have doubts about mediation they should be encouraged to have individual meetings’. As 
will be seen in chapter 8, this distinction was also echoed in the interview responses. Given the 
emphasis placed on the transformative effect arising from shared understanding and mutual 
agreement70, the figures for the individual/joint meetings are perhaps not surprising; although 
again, one may have expected a higher figure agreeing or strongly agreeing that a positive impact 
flows from attending both individual and joint meetings. Again, the mediator interviews potentially 
provide an explanation for this lower figure.  
Mediation, bullying and harassment and mediator role 
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Mediation is appropriate in bullying and harassment if 
there is an allegation of racism, sexism and/or 
homophobia. 
0 0 14.5 20 45.5 20 
The nature of bullying and harassment make the use of 
mediation particularly appropriate. 
3.6 7.3 9.1 14.5 40 25.5 
Mediation is appropriate where there is an imbalance of 
power between the parties. 
7.4 1.9 7.4 24.1 37 22.2 
A mediator must only take a facilitative role. 1.9 3.7 22.2 11.1 44.4 16.7 
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Table 20: Mediation Statements 4: Mediation, bullying and harassment and mediator role 
The final table (table 20) concerns the use of mediation for bullying and harassment and the 
mediator role. It is interesting to note that 0% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the first 
statement, whilst 65.5% agreed or strongly agreed. From the interview responses, the key to 
understanding these figures may be the presence of the word ‘allegation’71. Whilst the figure is 
high relative to that of other statements, one may arguably have anticipated the strongly/agree 
percentage for the statement ‘The nature of bullying and harassment make the use of mediation 
particularly appropriate’ to be higher. It is also important to note 10.9% either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with that statement since this indicates there is no unanimity on the 
appropriateness of mediation for bullying and harassment.  
It is also clear the presence of a power imbalance would not render mediation inappropriate (9.3% 
disagreeing/strongly disagreeing it would be appropriate), a figure that may worry Keashly and 
Nowell (2003). The figures in the table indicate that the mediator role favoured is the dominant 
facilitative one (Latreille, 2011) and that a higher percentage either agreed or strongly agreed that 
the presence of an impartial mediator is sufficient to mitigate power imbalance than agree or 
strongly agree a directive mediator is sufficient. Again, potential reasons for this are offered in the 
qualitative interviews.  
7.8 CONCLUSION 
From the questionnaire results one finds support for the argument there is no uniform assessment 
of the behaviour and that, whilst there may be a difference between bullying and harassment, 
there is no indication where the line is to be drawn, or how far understandings of harassment are 
equated with sexism/racism/homophobia or by association with protected characteristics.  
Through all the various sections there are also grounds for the need to explore the 
personal/impersonal dynamic with possible tensions between private, personal judgements and 
public outcomes and standards of reasonableness being identified throughout.  
Finally there is also an indication that mediation is seen as appropriate for dealing with bullying and 
harassment.  
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The presence of a directive mediator is sufficient to 
mitigate an imbalance of power between the parties. 
14.5 21.8 25.5 18.2 16.4 3.6 
The presence of an impartial mediator is sufficient to 
mitigate an imbalance of power between the parties in 
bullying and harassment. 
9.1 5.5 18.2 36.4 20 10.9 
A mediator should be able to make suggestions and take a 
more directive role. 
7.4 14.8 22.2 31.5 18.5 5.6 
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Areas of ambiguity and possible conflict were identified and the role of the qualitative stages in 
helping to explain these was also highlighted. It is to the detail of the qualitative stages that the 
discussion will now turn.  
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  CHAPTER 8.  FINDINGS 2: MEDIATOR INTERVIEWS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter outlined the findings from the questionnaire which potentially help to answer 
the first two research questions (i.e. what factors influence whether a situation is perceived as 
bullying/harassment/whether mediation is perceived as appropriate). It also identified a number of 
potential characteristics and perceived benefits of mediation. This chapter seeks to use responses 
from the twenty mediator interviews to explore these characteristics further. It will do this by 
contextualising the questionnaire results and seeking to understand the meaning behind them. It is 
through this qualitative data that the third, fourth and fifth research questions can also be 
addressed: why are those factors considered to have an influence and how do they relate to each 
other. Again, as part of the theory-building process, this chapter positions the findings within the 
existing literature. 
It will be seen that the findings arguably offer credible support for a number of the factors and 
potential relationships and justifications previously identified and that there is evidence of the 
anticipated tension between the representative argument favoured here and that of direct 
democracy and participation offered by Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011). At the outset it is also 
interesting to note that of the “twin pillars” identified in chapter 5, there was a dominance of 
empowerment arguments, with issues of cost and efficiency arising only tangentially in relation to 
organisational attitudes towards mediation.  
This chapter will begin by outlining the responses of the interviewees to the direct question: To 
what extent do you think mediation is appropriate for dealing with workplace bullying? It will then 
move to explore the reasons for these responses, for example through understanding what 
mediation is, what bullying and harassment are, the relevance of intention and perception and the 
role of power. As chapter 5 suggested, theoretical and conceptual understanding can (and must) 
be informed by an understanding of how mediation operates in practice. Insights offered by the 
responses which help to bridge the gaps between potential conceptual tensions in mediation and 
bullying/harassment are highlighted to demonstrate that for the participant mediators the use of 
mediation is often (though not always) both feasible and fair. 
8.2 MEDIATION: APPROPRIATE AND SUCCESSFUL? 
In line with the questionnaire findings, all twenty mediators were in agreement that mediation was 
an appropriate way of addressing bullying (and harassment) in the workplace. Given the policy and 
practitioner literature outlined previously this is not surprising. There were differences, however, in 
the extent to which mediation was seen as being appropriate.  
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One mediator took what may be considered as a relatively radical approach, stating that: 
 I think it’s the only true way of addressing issues of workplace bullying. (Mediator 15) 
The other responses, however, indicated that whilst they thought mediation was often the 
appropriate option for dealing with bullying and harassment, it was nevertheless just one option:  
I think it’s incredibly significant, my experience tells me that, well nearly probably 80, 90%, 80 
85% of accusations of bullying can be worked out in mediation, and of course, there are going 
to be situations where the formal procedures are absolutely necessary…but I would say it’s 
absolutely integral to deal with workplace bullying. (Mediator 14) 
Appreciating that mediation should be seen as one possible option is consistent with the findings of 
Bennett (2013). It is also important for understanding how mediation should be positioned with 
other procedures and approaches72.  
Though support was unanimous, it did come with two key caveats. The first is that above: it is only 
an option. The second relates to the skill and motives of the mediator and was stated passionately 
by Mediator 7:  
I do think now…whether it’s [bullying and harassment] or whether it’s something else, 
mediation sounds lovely, and obviously it’s intention is benign and really quite transformative 
but it’s like any tool in the wrong hands or unskilled hands…it does worry me that the world is 
trotting out lots of mediators…I…absolutely do worry that things could get worse in the room, 
because after all, the mediator is being paid by the organisation and you know you have to 
manage and self-manage your own sense of bullying and harassment…and if the senior 
person is close to who is paying you your money, you know, you could get caught up in all of 
that. The mediator is not a Teflon human.  
These concerns notwithstanding, all the mediators were able to provide examples of situations 
where they had felt mediation had not only been appropriate but also successful. These included 
misinterpretations of or complaints over management style, incompatible communication styles and 
complaints of racial and sexual harassment. 
There was some discussion over the way in which success can be, and is, defined. There was 
strong agreement that the parties deciding they could (or could not) work together in the future 
and the terms for that future was an essential marker (albeit one difficult to track in the long 
term).  
A difference of opinion was apparent over whether producing a written settlement or any 
settlement was the benchmark for success. Those who thought it was did so on the basis it 
provides the parties with a point of reference in the future and there was an indication that a 
settlement was expected by organisations. Others however felt that a written settlement is not 
always what the parties’ desire and that insisting on one may undermine the empowering benefits 
of mediation:  
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...if I go in thinking what I’ve got to get to is a piece of paper, I’m not really listening to the 
parties involved. I’m not doing what they want. I’m kind of following my own agenda…It’s 
resolution in the eyes of the parties that’s the holy grail because that means that they’ve 
created it and it works for them. (Mediator 18) 
In this one may begin to see how organisational and mediator agendas could be influential (Coben,  
2001, 2004; Dolder, 2004; Van Gramberg, 2006) and informs the argument for the need to expand 
the classification of parties to mediation beyond the parties and the mediator (which Nabatchi et al, 
2007 fail to do).  
A number of the participants also reflected the concerns of parties in Saundry et al’s (2013) study 
about the extent to which an initially successful outcome may be sustainable in the longer term. 
Some of the mediators offered follow up contact after the initial 1-2 day process but consistent 
with Saundry et al’s (2013) this was not necessarily the norm.  
The short timeframe and lack of follow up is one of a number of concerns raised by the mediators 
over the appropriateness of mediation that are not necessarily related to the structure or nature of 
mediation itself but rather to the way it is, and may be, used in practice. There was a strong sense 
that much of the current practice was driven by the high levels of competition between mediators 
and organisational attitudes towards mediation:  
I don’t think the market product serves the process very well…mediation still isn’t very well 
known...[organisations] are still not very wise buyers. So where do they get their information 
from to become more discerning? So if they’re getting their information from mediators who 
are selling the mediation product, then having a more time consuming product in the 
marketplace is probably not going to be very attractive when they’ve got multiple other 
providers who just do a one day model. (Mediator 5) 
Without further information, however, the confirmation that the mediators thought (and had 
found) mediation to be appropriate does not advance understanding as to why this is the case. It is 
to the detail behind these opinions that the findings will now turn.  
8.3 UNDERSTANDING WHY MEDIATION IS SEEN AS APPROPRIATE 
Favouring facilitative mediation 
The first step in understanding why mediation is seen as appropriate returns the discussion to the 
question of what mediation is. All interviewees were asked what mediation means to them and in 
their responses it is possible to identify the features offered in Ridley-Duff and Bennett’s (2011) 
definition of facilitative mediation adopted above73. The responses also reflected those in the 
content analysis of the definitions provided in the questionnaire:  
Attempting to resolve a dispute between one or more parties…in a way that they can, in a 
format that they can deal with. (Mediator 9) 
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[The mediator role is] to facilitate the conversation and communication. So to be there to 
facilitate them having the conversation that hopefully brings about greater understanding in 
how they’ve got to where they are and helps them think through creatively, and honestly, how 
they can move forwards. So very much the impartial facilitator. I’m not an evaluative mediator. 
I’m not directive at all so I feel very strongly, well my style is very much about empowering the 
parties to make their own decisions. (Mediator 10) 
The last quote typified the responses to the question of how they saw their role as a mediator. 
There was a favouring of the facilitative model (thus reflecting Latreille (2011) that it is the most 
commonly used form). There was an emphasis on the need for mediator impartiality and their 
responsibility for creating an environment which was safe and encouraged trust. This environment 
plays an important role in positioning mediation as appropriate74.  
From a definitional perspective, concerns reflecting those of Dickens (2012) and Dolder (2004), 
and the findings of Saundry and Wibberley (2012), were expressed over the misuse or loose 
application of the term mediation. There was recognition that awareness of mediation is generally 
low but growing:  
You know there are a lot of political…initiatives pulling in favour of mediation, I think for good, 
economic reasons, and I think also you know the senior judiciary is promoting it which puts a 
lot of welly there. I think it is a bit like watching the coins go off the thing at the fairground, you 
know. You wait for the pennies to fall off the belt and they are taking a long time to get to the 
edge (Mediator 11) 
It was felt however that a lack of clarity over what mediation is, together with a lack of quality 
control in training standards, had the potential to confuse organisations and/or parties and that it 
may dissuade them from trying a structured mediation process in the future. 
Mediation: Something different 
Part of this potential confusion also lay in the presentation of mediation as something “different”: a 
theme evident in the interviews:  
I’ve always been interested in understanding why people get engaged in conflict and 
understanding why people specifically are unable to get out of conflict in an adult way, and 
mediation offers a very powerful tool to cut through conflict and part of it that interests me the 
most is the journey that the individual makes to emerge from that conflict. So that’s really 
what for me mediation is. It’s more than just the process. It’s the journey for the individual on 
both sides really to mature and to gain a better understanding and therefore more control over 
their lives. (Mediator 3) 
[I]t may just be for them [the accused] to hear it for the first time. Maybe hear it from the 
person themselves, not second hand through HR, not second hand through a grievance 
which is written down but directly from the person themselves…part of what we do is we 
encourage people to actually come together, and actually sit together, and actually talk 
together, and that’s the whole person talking. So when they can hear the tone and the 
emotion and the impact and actually see reactions in people, all of that, we think contributes 
to potentially helping to solve the problem. (Mediator 6) 
                                                          
74
 For example see pp164-165 
149 
 
Here one can see how the empowerment pillar is dominant.  The opportunity offered by mediation 
to provide a way for the parties to better understand themselves and each other is presented as 
the characteristic which sets mediation apart from other options and underpins the sense 
mediation can result in individual transformation.  
Although a discourse analysis was not undertaken, it is interesting to note the kind of language 
used to describe and differentiate mediation. Positioning mediation in the context of dignity as this 
research seeks to do, the use of words such as ‘whole person’ is interesting. On the basis of the 
responses, however, one may argue that dignity here is related to a sense of empowerment and is 
therefore used in a more individualistic sense than was argued in chapter 4. This stance seems to 
accord more strongly with the participatory one favoured by Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011), rather 
than the representative one based on impersonal recognition favoured here. Indeed, social 
conventions and structures were seen as inhibiting or at least dissuading parties from having the 
type of conversations necessary to deliver empowerment:  
[W]e’re so isolated in our own thoughts and feelings and we’re so prohibited from being 
genuine with people. There’s so many kind of social constructions that formalise how we talk 
to each other and I find those exhausting and I find them limiting and and meaningless, and 
when you’re mediating you’re actually in a space where people are really working hard to not 
collude with those social constructions. So if you have a manager and a member of staff in a 
mediation and you’re doing the right thing as a mediator, you’ve got a reasonable chance that 
they will have a meaningful conversation where they are being human and real (Mediator 6) 
Within these views that mediation is something different, there was a strong theme that the 
opportunity for the parties to take control was seen as an important element of empowerment. The 
significance of control, however, is not noticeably assigned greater importance for one party above 
the other i.e. for the alleged target as Harkavy, 1999 argued. This may not necessarily serve to 
counter or undermine Harkavy’s position but may instead be seen as reflecting the hesitance of the 
mediators to assign clear and defined labels to the behaviour and to the parties75. Control over the 
outcome for both parties was seen as important to secure commitment to the otherwise non-
binding agreement reached. 
This non-binding nature of mediation is again something which sets mediation apart as different 
from other dispute resolution processes. The strength in an agreement in mediation comes from 
the involvement of the parties in reaching that agreement and therefore feeling a sense of 
ownership over it. There was an acknowledgement that though mediation affords the parties a 
great deal of flexibility in the agreement reached, the options are not unlimited and must be 
workable outside of the mediation process:  
A mediator has got to be very good at doing the return to work stuff: “ok that’s what you’re 
saying here, what do you mean by that tomorrow when you’re back at your desks or back out 
in your industry working?”. (Mediator 12) 
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As this section demonstrates there was a clear agreement across all participants that mediation can 
be empowering for the parties and provide them with a sense of control over the reaching of and 
the continued adherence to an agreement through a potentially transformed approach to 
understanding. This potential for empowerment however does not necessarily automatically flow 
from simple attendance to and participation in mediation, a number of conditions must be met.  
The first for consideration is the extent to which participation in mediation needs to be voluntary 
and, if yes, how voluntary is to be understood and determined (and by whom) (Bennett, 2013; 
Saundry, Bennett and Wibberley, 2013).  
The importance of voluntary participation  
There was a strong (although not unanimous) sense of support among the mediators that 
mediation should be a voluntary process.  
…the model we deliver…is something which relies very much on peoples’ commitment to 
it…we never force someone to go down to mediation. So people wanting to do it is our 
foundation level. (Mediator 1) 
As will be seen below the reasons for insisting on voluntariness are explicitly related to the 
empowering potential of mediation and to a sense of fairness in the process of mediation76. 
There was a majority opinion that a move to make mediation mandatory may serve to undermine 
its potential and lead to it being seen as simply another stage in a formal process. However, whilst 
mandatory participation in mediation was seen as undesirable, two of the mediators felt that 
meeting with a mediator should be mandatory. The opinion that parties should be encouraged to 
meet with a mediator is consistent with the support (65.5% agreement) for the similar statement 
in the questionnaire77: 
I would make it compulsory that they need to consider mediation and get some advice of what 
mediation is and talk to the mediator basically. After they know what it is, I think that they then 
have the choice. (Mediator 20) 
Influences 
Where one is talking about encouragement to meet with a mediator, even where it is not 
mandatory, it is important to return to a need to acknowledge the possible influences that may 
lead a party to feel compelled to try mediation, rather than be genuinely willingly to attend. In 
addressing this there is a need to look at what happens when the parties meet with the mediator 
individually and how the decision to proceed to mediation is taken. In the interviews it was 
acknowledged that a number of factors may serve to influence this decision including the nature of 
the dispute, organisational pressure and attitude, mediator motives and skill and the personal 
capabilities of the parties.  
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Nature of the dispute: a secondary concern? 
The relevance of the nature of the dispute to the question of appropriateness will be considered in 
greater detail below but in the context of influence and the voluntary characteristic of mediation it 
appeared to have little relevance. From a mediator perspective, the nature of the issues involved 
were not necessarily of great significance. What mattered was that the parties are willing to try 
mediation. This was the case even where there were allegations of sexism, racism or homophobia:  
I think it’s on a case by case basis. If that’s just the very fact that there’s allegations of this 
type, [it] doesn’t mean that mediation isn’t suitable, because again, they’re allegations and 
they’re labels of behaviour that just need to be understood and talked about, so again, it 
comes back to the willingness of people to have that conversation (Mediator 10). 
There was an awareness, however, that the perspectives of a mediator and of an employer may 
differ. In line with Saundry et al (2013) there was an evident recognition that employer 
responsibilities and duties of care may mean that certain types of behaviour should not be seen as 
appropriate for mediation and therefore the question of party voluntariness may never arise. For 
example: 
Well an employer has got a duty under the Equality Act, under all of the protected 
characteristics to ensure that it’s compliant with that legislation. If someone’s acted in a racist 
or sexist way or a homophobic way and so on…the employer has got to deal with that, just full 
stop. The employer has got to deal with it. (Mediator 8) 
That certain types of behaviour may also effectively (though not necessarily) be removed from the 
possible reach of mediation also potentially triggers references back to the recognition of different 
standards of reasonableness in behaviour and of levels of responsibility for upholding them78.  
It flows from this recognition that the positioning of mediation with other procedures is important. 
If an organisation is to decide, it might not become a question of the nature of the behaviour per 
se but rather of managerial attitude toward that behaviour. This may lead a party to feel that 
mediation is their only option and indeed the mediators had encountered situations where this had 
been the case:  
…I speak to people on the phone and I say “well you do know this is voluntary?” and they say 
“well I’ve been told I’ve got to”. We’ll take a step back and I’ll tell you a bit about it…so you 
can then make that choice as to whether you do actually want to go through it. (Mediator 1) 
However, even where it became apparent there was organisational pressure to mediate this would 
not automatically bar the mediation from proceeding further. As the above quote illustrates, a 
mediator may seek to explore this sense of pressure and in doing so seek to determine whether it 
was possible to nevertheless secure voluntary attendance.  
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Voluntary: More than just turning up 
Whilst the willingness to attend mediation voluntarily (any possible influence notwithstanding) was 
seen as necessary, it is by itself not sufficient. For the benefits of empowerment to be realised 
willingness to actively participate and “engage properly” (Mediator 3) in the mediation process is 
vital. This proper engagement includes willingness by both parties to listen to each other and to be 
open to hearing about the impact of their behaviour and to the possibility of change:  
I think a key aspect of whether mediation is suitable is peoples’… ability to come to the table 
with a degree of openness to hearing what the other person has to say and thinking that I 
might need to change as a result of this process…I might need to do something different. 
(Mediator 17) 
It may be this characteristic that led the participants in Saundry et al’s (2013) research to feel that 
they had to accept a degree of blame. This was not expressly considered or raised in the mediator 
responses but may potentially be inferred from the repetition of statements such as ‘take 
responsibility for their actions’. However, as the responses in relation to labelling situations and the 
rejection of the relevance of blame for mediation set out below will show, the mediators may 
refute this inference.  
Resolution and the importance of intention toward and perception of mediation 
When participants were asked about the relevance of intention and perception when determining 
whether mediation is appropriate, the question was concerned with intention and perception in 
respect of the behaviour complained of. However, the responses to the question in the first 
interviews indicated the need to ask an additional question. The responses had related not to the 
behaviour but to the parties’ intentions towards and perception of the mediation process, the 
mediator and the other party. 
There was an indication that where certain party motives and expectations could not be met by 
mediation it would be seen as inappropriate. Interestingly, against the context of restorative justice 
and organisational justice an intention to allocate blame or pursue punishment were seen as 
inappropriate within mediation79. 
This again leads to the recurring theme that whilst mediation is (and offers) something different, 
and should be encouraged as an option, it will not always be appropriate. All the mediators were of 
the opinion, however, that the existence of potentially inappropriate intentions or perceptions of 
mediation at the outset would not automatically bring the possibility of mediation to an end. These 
can be explored in the initial meetings: 
I’d have to understand if somebody didn’t want to mediate, what it was that they’re frightened 
of or what was it that they wanted to achieve that wasn’t going to be served by mediation, and 
often it’s retribution, and mediation does not provide retribution. It’s restorative and maybe 
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they don’t want to restore, maybe they want to stick the knife in…so it’s not what the 
presenting symptoms are that determine whether mediation is [appropriate], it’s actually…the 
desired outcome. (Mediator 5) 
The majority felt that given a sufficiently skilled mediator and an appropriate amount of time, 
willing individuals could be “prepared” for mediation. However, one mediator was less certain that 
anyone could be prepared for mediation, instead viewing personal traits as an important 
precondition:  
…only the people who are minded to engage in mediation will contemplate it. So you’re 
already working with a subset of people who believe that talking can be useful…so you know, 
you’re calling from a fairly narrow range of people, and that’s a big secret most people won’t 
tell you (Mediator 5) 
Whilst personality was not explicitly acknowledged by the other mediators, an appreciation of the 
health and the potential vulnerability of the parties was seen as important. In the context of the 
health implications of bullying/harassment and the potential erosion of a party’s coping resources, 
(Einarsen et al, 2009) vulnerability is an important consideration. 
In making such assessments (willingness/capability) one again encounters the gatekeeping role of 
a mediator and the potential influence a mediator may exert over the parties’ decisions. In 
understanding the significance of mediator influence it is necessary to consider the skill and 
integrity of the mediator. As indicated in the quote above that mediators are not ‘Teflon’, there 
were a number of indications that though the organisation may influence and exert pressure on the 
parties, the mediators themselves may also be subject to organisational pressure to proceed to 
mediation (which may then influence the mediator-party relationship).  
Thus, in respect of the question of who makes the decision to mediate, it was clear that whilst the 
mediator (and also to a certain extent the organisation) acted as gatekeepers, the decision to 
mediate must be led by voluntarily willing parties. This is well supported by the existing research 
(for example Bennett, 2013).  Voluntariness may be subject to a number of influences but, in the 
view of the mediators, provided those influences are made explicit and explored (between each 
party and the mediator through the initial contact and individual meetings) they do not necessarily 
make mediation inappropriate. In the absence of such explicit exploration, however, there was 
acceptance of the risks and dangers for exploitation raised by Coben (2004) and Van Gramberg 
(2006) may arise.  
8.4 TIMING AND RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PROCEDURES 
There was support for the use of mediation as an early intervention technique. The comments of 
the mediators reflected those of Gibbons (2007), with recurrent themes of the chance to avoid 
escalation or entrenchment by ‘nipping [them] in the bud’ (Mediator 15). 
Contrary to the promotion of mediation as an early intervention technique however, in the 
experience of the sample it was not often used as one. The mediators were brought in at various 
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points within a resolution process. One may argue that the later involvement of the mediators is 
down to their external position but this experience is consistent with the operation of internal 
mediation (Latreille, 2011).  
Given the importance in this research assigned to balancing the personal/impersonal standpoints, it 
is interesting to note the relationship between mediation and investigation processes. Here it was 
apparent from the mediator responses there was disconnect between organisational practice and 
the mediator perspective on the worth of investigations in mediation. 
Mediation and Investigation  
It was common for organisations to have conducted investigations prior to contacting a mediator. 
For the mediators, however, conducting investigations prior to mediation was unhelpful. There was 
again a positioning of mediation as something different to adversarial procedures. There was an 
exclusion of the relevance of facts and evidence-gathering in mediation. The emphasis instead was 
on the non-judgemental nature of mediation (Purcell, 2010) and the subjective experiences and 
expectations of the parties involved: 
[W]e’re not really interested in facts. Facts are for investigators. We’re just interested in what 
people have got to say for themselves [and] how they do it in relation to the party they are in 
dispute with. (Mediator 4) 
I would strongly recommend that people try when it’s appropriate, even when it does include 
something like sexism and racism. The important thing though is that you do not, in 
[mediation], need evidence whether someone is racist or not. You do need to reframe the 
conversation towards “Ok. What do you want to do about this in the future?”. (Mediator 12) 
The rejection of the need to gather evidence and make judgements sits uncomfortably with the 
view advanced here that behaviour should be determined by reference to an objective standard of 
reasonableness. However, it does seem to avoid the problems associated with the need to develop 
a credible case (Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin, 2011) or, as Harrington et al (2012) found, the 
need to rely on biased organisational decision makers to determine an outcome. That 
investigations are seen as inappropriate prior to mediation by the mediators contrasts with the 
findings from the focus groups where the need for some initial fact-finding process in addressing 
bullying/harassment was a strong theme.  
A focus on investigation provides a slightly different lens through which to view the relationship 
between mediation and other formal procedures such as grievance and disciplinary (i.e. beyond 
entrenchment). Timing and entrenchment are, however, relevant and are necessarily closely 
related to any discussion on the role of investigation, especially where the outcome of the 
investigation (and resultant grievance/disciplinary decision) are not seen as the end of the matter 
i.e. continued animosity regardless of the investigation outcome where the parties still work 
together. In the mediator responses there was a clear positioning of mediation as a way, or indeed 
the only way, of rebuilding relationships and/or facilitating a continued relationship.  
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The ability of mediation to repair relationships is another of its argued benefits (Gibbons, 2007). 
What is noteworthy was recognition not only that it will not always be possible to repair a 
relationship but also that the post-mediated relationship need only be civil and nothing more. 
Against the language of empowerment and transformation such results may seem a little lacklustre 
and indeed one mediator did comment that such outcomes, particularly the former (no repair) do 
not necessarily conform to employer expectations.  
Here again one finds the need to understand the relationship between an employer and a mediator 
and the need for a mediator to potentially manage employer expectations.  
Distinguishing workplace and employment mediation 
It was in the need to appreciate whether the employment relationship (rather than the relationship 
between the parties involved) would continue that one of a number of distinctions between 
workplace and employment mediation was drawn: 
[W]orkplace very much you’re envisioning people working together afterwards…whereas with 
employment…it’s already gone a bit more serious. There’s already tribunal proceedings, so 
you may be talking about actual figures and money (Mediator 2) 
The other distinctions relate to the relevance of employment law. In employment mediation the 
parties are more directly engaging with employment law and the need to appreciate their legal 
positions prior to mediation. Here the objections on the grounds of privatisation of justice 
advanced by Fiss (1984) and Mulcahy (2013) are of particular concern since the outcome of 
employment mediation can be binding in the form of private settlements. However, the relationship 
between workplace mediation and employment law is not clear.  
Law 
When asked what the role of employment law was in mediation the responses fell into one of two 
themes. The first related to procedural considerations and the second to the substance of 
employment law.  
Procedure 
The responses in the first category were consistent with the findings of Harris et al (2012) and 
Saundry and Wibberley (2014) that employers were wary of litigation. The mediators saw this as a 
potential barrier to increasing the use of mediation: 
I talk to lawyers, I talk to mediators and it’s still really unclear…I think some real clarity around 
the relationship between mediation, its contents and its outputs and any subsequent legal 
action that might take place some kind of clarity around that and reassurance…would be very 
helpful for people (Mediator 10) 
When considering the relationship between law and workplace mediation, timing again becomes 
important. Timing here, however, is given a different relevance than that considered in the 
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previous sub-section. Timing is not of concern in respect of the ability of mediation to rebuild 
relationships and counter-entrenchment but is rather seen in relation to the satisfaction of 
employer duties and the operation of limitation periods.  
Substance 
Those in the second theme serve to illuminate the arguments preferred in this thesis further since 
they relate to the limited relevance of the standards of reasonableness contained in legal (and 
organisational) instruments. They also firmly steer the discussion to the crux of understanding why 
mediation is considered as appropriate for bullying and harassment.  
The responses here again sought to position mediation as something different. Although 
employment law provided the context in which mediation operates, the mediators saw it as having 
little direct relevance within the workplace mediation process: 
Well I suppose it’s useful…in framing the world in which relationships at work now have to 
happen, but on the whole, I think it needs to be in the background not the foreground…I think 
as for the detailed law, my experience tells me this, more of a problem than a help because 
harassment and bullying are not things where you want to get into black letter law. It doesn’t 
matter if it was my little finger rather than my whole hand. I only brushed against her once or 
something, and you know it’s not that kind of minute analysis of the evidence. It’s much more 
important to come out and see what’s going on overall (Mediator 12) 
Here there are echoes of Hippensteele’s (2006-2007) comment that facilitative mediation is not 
about rights: indeed many of the mediators disclosed that they had little knowledge of employment 
law. They did not see this as problematic, however, as provision of legal advice was not part of 
their role as a non-judgemental facilitative mediator. If parties require legal advice before 
proceeding to mediation they should seek it elsewhere. A clear division of responsibility for advising 
about rights was thus drawn: seemingly conflicting with Jenkin’s (2011) suggestion a mediator 
should advise of rights. The voluntary and non-binding nature of workplace mediation was stressed 
and there was again recognition that whilst mediation offered something different, it should only 
be seen as a possible option:  
[I]t’s an option. It doesn’t diminish anybody’s rights to be able to turn around later on and say 
this hasn’t worked but I still don’t like what you are doing and grieve through formal 
processes. (Mediator 1) 
When one moves to consider the reasons why the mediators viewed mediation as appropriate for 
bullying and harassment the reason for the exclusion of legal rights from mediation is illuminated. 
At the risk of oversimplifying the responses the position may be crudely summed up thusly: 
mediation is appropriate for bullying but not actual bullying. 
8.5 THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING BULLYING AND HARASSMENT 
With the exception of one mediator who saw current disciplinary/grievance processes as being 
fundamentally flawed, it was apparent from the responses that there was and should be a place for 
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formal policies and processes. This was reflected in the view that mediation should not be used to 
allow someone to ‘escape the consequences of bullying’ (Mediator 12).  
Consistent with the arguments of Foster and Harris (2005) in the managing diversity literature, 
however, the arguments in favour of such policies were dominated by references to employer 
obligations and concerns of cost, rather than recognition of any inherent value in prohibiting 
bullying/harassment. This notwithstanding, although they do not explicitly engage with the 
arguments of dignity and the relevance of disadvantage, an inference could be made from a 
minority of the comments that the reasons for the policies are grounded in impersonal standards 
and that this influenced the way prejudice could be challenged:   
…in most workplaces there’s a set of isms. It’s a difficulty that comes to the attention of 
particularly senior managers or HR, people are just kept apart…[there’s] this fear of 
addressing it, because it might pick up this label of prejudice in some way, and then 
everything gets kind of very polarised in the way it gets discussed (Mediator18) 
It is interesting to note that the few comments relating to societal values arose in relation to the 
appropriateness of mediation for potentially racist/sexist/homophobic behaviour, rather than 
bullying.  
Definitions: bullying but not actual bullying 
Reflecting the results of the other data collection stages and definitional issues in the bullying 
literature considered in chapter 4, when asked whether mediation was appropriate for dealing with 
workplace bullying the responses frequently noted that bullying and harassment are difficult to 
define: 
I think probably most mediations that I do, there will be an element of one person, if not both 
people, sometimes saying that they are being bullied by the other and it’s the old cliché isn’t 
it? One person’s bullying behaviour is someone else’s assertive management and bullying 
means many things to many people (Mediator 10) 
The responses thus favoured a subjective understanding of bullying. Echoing the findings of 
organisational approaches to labelling (Ferris, 2004; Latreille, 2011), they also seek to distinguish 
miscommunication, misunderstandings or interpersonal problems from ‘actual’, ‘genuine’ or ‘high-
level’ bullying or harassment. Mediation is seen is appropriate for the former descriptions but not 
the latter, or rather if “actual”, mediation should not be used as the only response:  
…my view in terms of addressing the issues of racism and discrimination in our society is 
through education and through greater understanding and empathy, and you cannot get that 
through a law court, through adjudication process. You can only get that by coming face to 
face and bringing the perpetrators and victim face to face. So, even in the most serious cases 
of bullying and harassment, where the organisation has taken a very clear line they may or 
may not dismiss, they should always consider the opportunity for learning and growth through 
dialogue. (Mediator 15) 
How the behaviour involved should be allocated to actual or not is difficult to discern, although 
there seemed to be an agreement there is a role for policies in determining this benchmark. This 
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arguably relates to the comments above in the context of the voluntary nature relating to the 
responsibility of employers to act as gatekeepers. There was a strong theme, however, that 
behaviour, though labelled as bullying and/or harassment was rarely actually found to be (through 
investigation) or be considered as such once the behaviour was unpicked. 
A rejection of labels 
There was a rejection of the value of labels for mediation. Consistent with Irvine’s (2014) 
reflections it was felt that labels were closely associated with adversarialism and operated to 
constrain understanding and empowerment. There was also an important acknowledgment of the 
role labels play in influencing power dynamics80.  
Rather than seeking to label the behaviours, the mediators are concerned with understanding what 
has led the parties to apply that label. Here the emphasis is not therefore on fitting the experience 
into predetermined categories or evaluating them against objectively reasonable standards but 
rather on exploring the subjective experience of the parties: 
[B]ullying is very often about people’s perceptions of who is strong and who is weak, and 
again, they’re very often misconceptions and I think also, the very exploration of what’s 
happened in front of or with a third party can really create change…I think it’s probably much 
more effective than the ordinary disciplinary process which puts people into a defensive 
position to start from. (Mediator 13) 
We talk a lot about words like bullying being used as labels, and what you need to do is to 
peel that label back and to understand what it is underneath that label are lots of real 
examples of what people have said, done or perceived to have said or done. I think those 
things can be talked about. (Mediator 1) 
The rejection of labels was consistent with the view shared by the sample that, for the purposes of 
mediation, there was little, if any, value in seeking to distinguish bullying from harassment.  
The concern is instead with the perception, intention and the impact on the parties. This serves to 
illustrate Ridley-Duff and Bennett’s (2011) argument for direct democracy (see also Bennett, 2013) 
and shift the emphasis in decision making firmly to a prioritisation of the personal standpoint: 
Mediation is a short hand for sitting down and having a managed, constructive, adult 
conversation, where I can describe the impact of your behaviour on me and you can tell me 
what you intended your behaviour to be. You can then make choices about how you behave 
tomorrow because you’ve looked me in the eye and you’ve seen the distress and the harm 
that you’ve caused me, and it’s about giving people choices. (Mediator 15) 
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8.6 MEDIATION AND THE LESSER RELEVANCE OF INTENTION AND PERCEPTION 
Intention: a difference of opinion 
When asked about the relevance of a distinction between an intention on the part of the accused 
bully/harasser to do the act and an intention to cause the harm/impact in determining the 
appropriateness of mediation, there was a reiteration of the point made above that intentions  
toward mediation were of greater importance than the intention behind the behaviour. Even if the 
behaviour had been intentional, mediation would not necessarily be seen as inappropriate: what 
would be important was the willingness to change. Again, however, there was an indication of 
circumstances where mediator and employer views may differ.  
I think if people are genuinely bullying then they have no intention to change and their 
behaviour is diminishing the other person, I don’t think that mediation is the appropriate way 
to deal with it…certainly those cases exist and I suppose it’s a bit hard for me to know 
because my work as an external mediator…I think what that means is that probably the 
serious cases of bullying and harassment don’t ever come my way. (Mediator 17) 
 
[T]here are many allegations of bullying where the bullying per se has been completely 
unintentional and I think the accused has been both shocked and mortified to hear that that’s 
how their behaviour has been interpreted. So I think mediation can offer a really helpful space 
for behaviours to be discussed and understood in the context of what is the intention sitting 
behind those behaviours. (Mediator 10) 
Here again there is the apparent tendency to classify disputes as misunderstandings, rather than 
as being motivated by malice or ill-intent. Thus whilst intention to cause harm may be of some 
relevance to the appropriateness question, intention to do the act has little relevance. Intention in 
both forms, however, is arguably significant within the mediation process in understanding, if not 
defining, the behaviour.  
The emphasis on perception and intention support their positions in the ranking importance of the 
behaviour variables in the questionnaire81.  
Recognising a role for both intention and perception necessitates a return to a consideration of the 
balancing of objective/subjective determinations of reasonableness.  
The contextual role of impersonal standards of reasonableness 
Despite the limited role assigned to objective standards within the mediation process, in some of 
the examples given by the mediators there was an indication that individuals drew on impersonal 
standards and shared labels to contextualise their experiences. Bullying was viewed as a ‘very 
inflammatory’ label (Mediator 10) meaning: 
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…as soon as somebody is given any clue that they might be being bullied, it changes the 
landscape for them…they will feel that they now have permission to access a load of 
commentary about their situation that they wouldn’t have otherwise accessed (Mediator 6) 
This appeared to be strongest where a protected characteristic was involved since this allowed 
parties to draw on a societally shared sense of injustice:  
I think they [bullying and bullying with an allegation of racism etc.] probably are different in a 
mediation because it’s hard. It’s hugely more complicated. It is. It is because you’re now not 
talking about people, you’re talking about norms and people’s perception of other…the stakes 
feel very, very high to people because the person who is on the receiving end will feel like 
they’re not just defending themselves or speaking on their own account, but on behalf of all 
women or all lesbians. (Mediator 6)  
In light of the argument made in this research of the importance of understanding and 
appreciating the historical and social development and consensus over values and standards, this 
recognition of the social context by the parties is interesting. Given the differences drawn between 
the possible underlying rationales and distinguishing elements between behaviour involving a 
protected characteristic and that without (Fredman, 2011; Solanke, 2011), it is noteworthy that 
either label (bullying or an ism) was seen as allowing individuals to access a sense of a breach of 
collective unreasonableness but that these discourses are not necessarily the same.  
Here the mediators are reporting/reflecting on the experiences of the parties, rather than 
expressing their own views so one must be careful about placing too much weight on this alone. 
However, the recognition is consistent with the positioning of the impersonal variables such as 
‘Behaviour was inherently wrong or offensive’ and the importance assigned to the involvement of 
protected characteristics in the questionnaire findings82. As will be seen shortly, reference to 
socially-held and, from a Rawlsian perspective, publically knowable standards played an important 
role in constructing the understanding of bullying and harassment by (and between) the focus 
group participants83.  
It is important to recall here, however, that whilst individual parties may draw on these impersonal 
standards to understand or explain their behaviour and experiences, there is no objective “check” 
to ensure that their personal perception of the application of the impersonal standard is of itself 
reasonable. This was rationalised by the mediators by reference to the voluntary nature of 
mediation and the choice of the parties, even where, for example, they (the alleged target) felt the 
behaviour was racist/homophobic/sexist: 
…as long as the people in the room are not feeling they’ve been told they’ve got to come, 
because that would be completely inappropriate…and the person says “well yeah, you know if 
it gives me the chance to say what I feel is happening and to address this, yes I am [willing]” 
and the other person is also willing, then sure, mediation is entirely appropriate because both, 
rather than looking to some outside authority to enforce it, when it may be very difficult to 
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prove, it’s actually allowing the person who’s experienced it to explain why they’re seeing it 
that way (Mediator 18) 
There was agreement in the responses that what may be labelled as racist/sexist/homophobic is 
often the result of a misunderstanding or lack of cultural understanding, rather than overt and 
deliberate prejudice. Where this was the case, mediation was seen as very useful and the 
responses therefore reflected the level of agreement with the statements in the questionnaire 
about the ability of mediation to improve tolerance and cultural understanding84. 
Although there was strong agreement mediation could benefit the education and understanding of 
equality and diversity issues between the parties, a number of reservations were raised about its 
limitations in this regard. Again, these relate less to any inherent flaw or problem with the 
mediation process itself but rather to the way it may be used or conducted.  
The first relates to mediator training and knowledge in equality and diversity issues and 
understandings of bias. It was suggested that though this may (and should) be considered as 
crucial knowledge for mediators, it was not always a part of mediator training. Although caution is 
exercised in making the link on the information available, it is potentially possible to see how this 
lack of knowledge may lead to the treatment of racist/sexist/homophobic behaviour as an 
interpersonal dispute.  
Support for this may be found in the second reservation that has significant resonance for this 
thesis and relates to the shifting of responsibility onto the parties to explain and educate each 
other. This objection was, however, only explicitly stated by one mediator. The objection arose out 
of a reflection where the mediator had misjudged a situation and had the more articulate (black) 
woman educate a less articulate (white) woman:  
[W]hy should a black woman not only have to tolerate racist behaviour…85systemically from 
the employer…and then sit for two hours and try and educate her about racism? (Mediator 6) 
This may illustrate the individualisation of broader organisational and/or societal problems.  
In respect of reasonableness, the interviews provided a further variable that had not necessarily 
been contemplated previously. In addition to the previous relationship between the parties 
(identified in the questionnaire and given weight in the focus groups), a number of examples given 
exposed the impact previous experience of the parties with others (both in and outside of the 
workplace) could have on the way the behaviour was perceived by the alleged target. Examples 
were given by two mediators independently where the past experience of sexual harassment or 
sexual abuse of alleged female targets had led them to perceive behaviour by male colleagues in a 
way others may not have done.  
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In both cases, the mediators felt the parties had thought that mediation had resolved the situation 
and had even helped the women involved to confront their feelings about the past experiences. 
These situations may be seen as providing support for the proposition the confidential nature of 
mediation encourages/allows individuals to disclose information they would not disclose in another 
setting (Latreille, 2011).  
The rejection of labels and the positioning of objectively reasonable standards as informing but not 
constraining the discussions in mediation has important implications for the question of the 
balancing of personal and impersonal standards, and as anticipated, at the request of the parties, 
subordinates the latter to the former. In doing so, however, one begins to potentially encounter 
the objections related to the privatisation of justice. Before moving on to consider confidentiality, it 
is useful to address how balances of power are understood and how the treatment of power in 
mediation may facilitate or frustrate the findings outlined thus far.  
8.7 MEDIATION AND POWER DYNAMICS 
It was evident that perceptions of power were closely tied with perceptions of bullying and of 
harassment. There was an appreciation that power may arise from a number of different sources 
and manifest in many different ways (formal/informal) (Einarsen et al, 2003; Holvino, 2010). 
Examples such as race (black/white), gender, levels of experience, value (financial) to the company 
and managerial hierarchy were provided.  
Whilst there was an apparent consensus on the centrality of power in discourses of mediation, 
there was a difference of opinion as to the extent to which perceptions of where the balance lay 
were relevant or helpful when determining how appropriate mediation was. The recognition of the 
relevance of power but not necessarily of power imbalance may help to explain the positioning of 
power imbalance in the questionnaire. The differences in the mediator responses ranged from the 
view that recognition of a power imbalance is of little relevance on the one hand, to seeing power 
imbalances as being of the upmost importance on the other.  
Despite the differences, all sought to accommodate their position on power within the facilitative 
role, allowing the mediator to seek to retain their neutrality and to treat both parties equally. The 
techniques used to do this will be considered shortly but first it is important to understand how 
each stance was justified.  
The limited relevance of power in mediation 
This is the approach most closely aligned with Keashly and Nowell’s (2011) concern over the 
assumption of equality between the parties in a bullying situation within mediation. At first glance 
their objection in relation to power may be seen as well-founded. The rejection of the relevance of 
power imbalance in mediation is however more nuanced. A distinction was drawn between the 
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relevance of perceptions of power imbalances to the parties in understanding their experiences and 
the relevance of perceptions of power imbalances to the mediator in their neutral, facilitative role: 
I would want to understand what that person means by power imbalance. Of course 
structurally  we have, unfortunately, hierarchal  organisations that mean that it makes it very 
easy for some people in positions, in higher positions, to use that power in harmful ways, and 
in those instances, what we would want in the mediation is for that person to become 
conscious that that’s how they’re using their power…so I would want to empower the person 
that felt like there was a power imbalance to communicate that and find a way to receive more 
power themselves in relation to the person they feel has more power. (Mediator 14) 
I’m not particularly concerned with [power] because I’m providing two people with the space 
to have a discussion. I’m not looking at who’s more powerful than who. I’m not taking steps in 
trying to address that because that would mean me taking sides…I’m only concerned with are 
they both treated equally within the mediation. (Mediator 18)  
With further explanation of this position one returns to the mediator objections to the power that 
attaches to the labels of target and perpetrator when the label of bullying is applied. There was 
also support for Jenkins et al’s (2012) claims that power dynamics are not static and that there 
may be no clearly defined target and perpetrator.  
Who’s to say what the relevant power imbalance is? Someone can see things, the victim in 
the situation but also the victim has a lot of the attention and the drama and actually creates 
the power in the dispute whereas the alleged aggressor [who may have] more power in the 
organisation may be feeling vulnerable because of the situation…so who’s the victim? Who’s 
the aggressor and who’s got the power? (Mediator 16) 
The importance of power in mediation 
In contrast to this approach, a (smaller) number of mediators were of the opinion that an 
understanding of power was paramount. This approach potentially counters Keashly and Nowell’s 
objection since it seeks to directly uncover and address the impact a power imbalance may have 
on the individuals if they participate in mediation. In the following quote the relevance of 
understanding mediation as a process is highlighted: 
Oh I think that’s really important because I mean, some mediators don’t think about it, and 
yet, if you’ve got people in the room and there’s a power imbalance of any kind, you have to 
be incredibly sensitive to that because, particularly joint sessions, is somebody going to be 
able to talk honestly about their anger with their boss if their job is on the line? So I think it’s 
something that has to be addressed in the private sessions and be very clear how you’re 
going to handle that…I do think mediators have to be very sensitive to power dynamics, and 
also be careful not to make assumptions about where the power lies because it may not be 
where you expect it to be. (Mediator 13) 
Again, however, it is important to be aware of the nuances in this position and in the latter 
sentence there is clear overlap with the alternative view on power. It is necessary to note that 
whilst power imbalance may be seen as relevant for the appropriateness question, this relevance 
refers to its importance in choosing a response and not in defining whether the behaviour is 
bullying/harassment (i.e. of relevance to research question 2 rather than 1). 
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Managing power and neutrality: the importance of understanding mediation as a 
process 
In both positions there was a recognition that whilst perceptions of power imbalance in relation to 
the behaviour/events in question may be problematic, where the parties involved are in a 
hierarchical relationship there are certain actual, rather than perceived, power imbalances which 
flow from this:  
I think a lot of openness and honesty goes a long way. Mediation does not take away the fact 
you are going to have to tell the chief executive that they said something you didn’t like and 
that is hard. It’s difficult, and what we might do is talk honestly about what are your options? 
Well, you can put up with it. What are your options? Well, you can grieve against it. Well, you 
know, and ask people to reflect on what is going to happen about that and I think we have to 
live in the real world (Mediator 1) 
This acknowledges one of the realities of the employment relationship and in doing so reflects calls 
of both Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011) and Beale and Hoel (2010) to recognise the operation of 
managerial prerogative. This also seems to confirm Sherman’s (2003) position that a mediator is 
unable to ‘change the fundamental power relationship that exists between parties’ (:43). It is 
therefore important to understand how the line between balance in mediation and imbalance - 
both in and outside of mediation - is navigated. Although the stances differ, there seemed to be 
little difference in the way mediators conducted the mediation and as the above quote indicated, 
being open and honest and acknowledging its existence is fundamental. The mediators provided 
examples of techniques they use to try and retain their neutrality. 
Different techniques were used in the individual meetings than in the joint meetings and thus it is 
necessary to return to the idea that discussions of mediation should distinguish between the 
different stages in the process.  
The importance of preparing the parties for mediation in the individual meetings was considered 
above where it was noted they may play an important role in filtering appropriate behaviour and 
determining whether a party is willing and able to proceed to the joint meetings. The individual 
meetings were also where the initial exploration of perceptions of the behaviour were explored. 
Although the individual meetings must be seen as an important part of the process, one mediator 
saw their purpose in functional terms: 
The individual meetings can have a variety of roles but it boils down to…no, it can be carried 
out in a variety of ways, but the purpose of them boils down to one thing, which is to ready the 
party for the joint meeting. (Mediator 6) 
What is required to ready the parties may vary from the simple provision of information about the 
mediation process to prepping them mentally (potentially through something akin to coaching) to 
be able to meet the other party face to face.  
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This preparation process was also strongly related to the need for mediators to seek to establish 
their neutrality and set out how that may operate throughout the mediation. This was seen as 
crucial for building trust and rapport with the parties. Here a number of the features Nabatchi et al 
(2007) assigned to procedural justice are evident, as are those suggested by Jenkins (2011): for 
example setting ground rules and how the mediator may act to monitor them and listening to each 
party (and for an equal amount of time).  
There was also an explicit recognition of the need for a mediator to be aware of the ways in which 
parties may try and influence them (therefore agreeing with Klein and Martin, (2011) in the HRM 
context) and for mediators to ensure that mediation is not used as an opportunity to further 
bully/harass someone (as Keashly and Nowell (2003), fear): 
…as mediators you can stop the mediation at any point, and I think in circumstances where it 
seemed like there was bullying going on in the mediation, for example, you would call it to an 
end as that would not be appropriate (Mediator 2)  
There was an acknowledgement of the potential validity in the type of criticism raised by Sherman 
(2003) and Dolder (2004) over the ability of a facilitative mediator to remain neutral in the 
presence of a power imbalance. This could be mitigated, however, by the mediator exercising self-
awareness not only in their actions but also in their perceptions. An example of this may be the 
mediator ensuring they do not always address the party with managerial status or greater 
communication skills first. A number of mediators stated an awareness of the fact they were only 
human and that therefore it was necessary for them to constantly check their own behaviour.  
Given the acceptance power can be dynamic throughout the process and an acceptance that 
mediation can be a difficult process a number of techniques for managing parties who were 
struggling were identified. Whilst these may conform to the aim of equal treatment, they were not 
used for the equal benefit of the parties:  
We may identify that one person needs a break, but we won’t turn around and say “oh you 
need a break”. We’d say “we need a break”. But then we might go and have a quiet word with 
that person and say “how are you?”. Because what we’re doing there is, we want them to 
continue, but then we’d also go and see the other person and say “how are you?”, even 
though we know that person doesn’t need that reassurance. We’re still trying to create that 
sense of our impartiality (Mediator 1) 
Whilst the interviews provide little insight into the extent to which power imbalance can be seen as 
a defining characteristic of bullying or harassment, they helped to facilitate understanding of how 
power, if not power imbalances, can be seen as important when determining the appropriate 
response. The examples of the techniques used by the mediators provide possible responses to a 
number of the critics of mediation in both bullying and legal literature and demonstrate how 
knowledge of mediation in practice can inform theoretical understanding. This insight from practice 
was also invaluable in understanding how to address the criticisms associated with confidentiality. 
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8.8 MEDIATION, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVATISATION 
In light of the potential benefits there was a consensus that the confidential nature of mediation is 
something which should be preserved. Ensuring the parties understood what confidentiality meant 
and ensuring it was preserved in accordance with this understanding was seen as a key mediator 
role and was closely aligned with securing the willingness of the parties not only to attend 
mediation but to fully participate in the way outlined above:  
I think confidentiality is probably one of the most fundamental things...I think one of the 
problems why things don’t get resolved in a HR context is because it always has an impact. If 
HR knows, they’re going to have a judgement about you, it’s going to impact other things, so 
to be able to be completely open and honest, I think it has to be someone who is 
confidentially not going to tell someone else. (Mediator 2) 
The mediators gave examples where what may be considered as very sensitive information was 
disclosed (e.g. previous experience of sexual harassment/abuse). There was, however, a limit to 
what could be disclosed and remain between the parties and the mediator. The insight into the 
boundaries of confidentiality in practice was illuminating and, as anticipated, provides the key to 
potentially reconciling privatisation concerns and the use of workplace mediation.  
The scope of confidentiality 
In understanding the scope of confidentiality it is necessary to return to the relationship between 
mediation and substantive legal provisions and to the role and responsibilities of the employer in 
the mediation process. In this respect the first thing to note is that confidentiality is something that 
is explicitly discussed between the mediator and the organisation before any steps to mediate are 
taken. Here mediators and employers begin to define the nature and the extent of their 
relationship and it is an important step in managing the expectations of the employer and the way 
they should position mediation with other procedures, for example investigation:  
Mediation and investigation are two parts of a continuum of a system if you like…they’re both 
options. So you need to be very clear about first of all, when can you do mediation? Where an 
investigation is either scheduled, or it’s happened, and you can’t combine the two, so people 
need to sign up if they’re going to do mediation to a confidentiality agreement in which 
allegations aren’t going to be, information isn’t going to be passed from mediation to the 
investigation, unless of course, it’s the type of information that you can’t keep secret. So 
there’s a [corporately agreed] confidentiality clause. (Mediator 12) 
Examples of reasons where confidentiality could be broken included those relating to acts of illegal 
or unlawful behaviour and concerns over party vulnerability and health.  
A number of the mediators stated they explicitly viewed the organisation as a party to the 
mediation and that therefore mediation could be used as a learning opportunity:  
I think when I started as a mediator, I went in thinking right, thank you very much HR director, 
manager whoever, I’ll go in and work with these two people and it very quickly became clear 
to me that there’s a third party in the room which is the organisational style and culture…I do 
feed back as part of the closing process, specific messages that the people have agreed that 
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I feed back. Maybe we’ll do it directly. We may all do it in a room together, whatever. But I 
definitely, as I’m going through the process, and I’m liaising with the organisation, certainly at 
the end feeding back to them about things they may want to consider doing differently and 
sometimes...changes can happen. (Mediator 7) 
There was an acknowledgment, however, that this was not necessarily consistent with 
organisational motivations for using mediation and does perhaps rely on the assumption 
questioned in chapter 5 that organisations are sufficiently engaged:  
The problem, I guess, is where you have organisations who aren’t really conflict savvy. They 
just use mediation as a, “oh blimey we can’t deal with this one, let’s just send it off to the 
mediators and they can sort it out”. But they’re not a very conflict aware organisation, and it’s 
much more of a tick box thing, and maybe making sure they’re doing what they need to do in 
case it goes further and they have to show they’ve been a good employer. So yeah, 
mediation has massive potential to influence organisations culturally but those organisations, I 
suppose, need to be open to the influence. (Mediator 10) 
Leaving aside these qualifications (temporarily), the involvement of the organisation is, of course, 
an element which is strongly supported in this research and this encouragement for the 
organisation to learn and develop is an important insight that is largely missing from the rhetoric 
on mediation. There seems to be a logical disconnect between arguments that mediation is a 
confidential process yet it can lead to cultural change which could not easily be remedied on the 
information currently available. That this transformative effect may be realised through the use of 
external mediators was particularly puzzling, especially as evidence that such change has occurred 
with internal schemes is limited (Saundry and Wibberley, 2014).  
In terms of understanding the relationship dynamics (mediator-parties-organisations) it is 
important to note that though the organisation may ask the mediator for feedback from the parties 
on specific issues, the decision as to what is disclosed to anyone (including the organisation) 
outside the mediation lies with the parties. Thus whilst there is the potential for mediation to allow 
for a flow of conversation between the parties and the organisation, any desired learning hinges on 
the parties’ willingness to disclose information: 
Sometimes when I’m mediating for organisations, in the sense that they have called me in to 
mediate, I have a contract, an agreement with the parties in mediation that everything that 
they’re telling me is confidential but that if there is anything that I feel is about an 
organisational issue, which there often is, can I have their permission to feed that back up to 
the organisation, so they can change that practice?...generally they have been very pleased 
do to that, in fact, I’ve never known them not be. But in the end, I’m very clear what it is that 
I’ve got permission to take back to the organisation. (Mediator 13) 
Well, say it’s two colleagues, it may be they decide that the manager needs to do something 
to make the environment more conducive…in fact there was one mediation I did where they, 
both the parties, wanted to have a chat with the chairman, and they also wanted to have 
some policy change, and they also wanted to have notices to go out to put up on the work 
boards. So they are just examples of how the parties together worked to create an 
environment within which they could work together better but also, kind of, accelerate a 
cultural shift. (Mediator 5) 
The last quote may perhaps be seen as an example of what Ridley-Duff and Bennett (and Bennett, 
2013) saw as the radical possibility of mediation, i.e. to challenge the standards/set the standards 
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which constrain them. In respect of the thesis advanced here the chance for this flow of 
information is pivotal for understanding how individual parties to mediation may challenge 
organisational standards.  
Before moving to privatisation, it is also important to address the possible incompatibility in the 
acknowledgement of spill-over effect of conflict and the confidential/interpersonal nature of 
mediation questioned by Honeyman and McAdoo (2001). Again this is rectified by a greater 
understanding of how confidentiality operates. Just as the parties may choose to share information 
with their employer, part of the agreement reached in mediation may include what they want to 
say to their colleagues when they return to work:  
I will help them consider when they go back, how can they make sure they don’t breach 
confidentiality but have something to say to their colleagues that they both agree…what 
words shall we use to say “oh are you still not getting on with Louise”. Help them rehearse 
some phrases and some scenarios that they might need some, you know, prepared scripts 
for. (Mediator 5) 
Scope of impact: Individual transformation but little more? 
So if there is a possibility to share information, is privatisation no longer a concern? If it could be 
said with any confidence that relevant information would always be shared and the employer 
would respond accordingly then perhaps. On the evidence currently available, however, confidence 
levels that this is the case are low. Although there was overwhelming support for the proposition 
that mediation can deliver transformative effects for individuals who participate in it, for the 
reasons relating to organisational role considered above, there was less support it could result in 
transformation beyond the parties. 
This hesitation to extend the chances of increasing understanding and tolerance to the 
organisation stands in contrast to the support for this feature in the results of the questionnaire86 
and with the way in which mediation is frequently promoted (BIS, 2011a). The responses when 
asked about the extent to which mediation had the possibility to increase tolerance and 
understanding in society more broadly were mixed.  
Some saw it as occurring on an incremental basis:  
…what I believe, is that the world changes one person at a time, and that we never change, 
can’t change, other people…the only person we can change is ourselves, and the more 
people who take responsibility for their behaviour, the more opportunities that the change that 
it will have on the world…I think that, culturally, can have reverberations all over the place. 
(Mediator 16) 
Others however were more cynical: 
That’s very altruistic. The optimist side of me says yes, they have learnt something by going 
through the process. The pessimist says no, most people just want it to stop hurting and that’s 
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it. It depends which side of, whether you[r]…glass is half full or half empty as far as human 
nature is concerned. Probably somewhere in the middle is the reality. It would be nice to be 
altruistic but I think mediation just gets people over a difficult hurdle, and what they do after 
that is entirely up to them. (Mediator 9) 
Though many felt that simply using mediation was unlikely to deliver benefits beyond the parties 
immediately involved, in support of Saundry and Wibberley’s findings (2014), there was a greater 
confidence that those who had undertaken mediator training would benefit in the long term.  
 
Mediation: Challenging culture and norms 
The problems of challenging social norms and standards within mediation was considered above in 
the context of reasonableness. It was concluded that the decision as to what is appropriate and 
important was up to the parties. Whilst this is objectionable from a stance which favours collective 
standards, it supports Bush and Folger’s (2012) assertion that change may occur on a micro level, 
challenging attitudes and stereotypes on an individual basis. For those who favour a more 
individualistic approach (for example the government) this is potentially attractive. The sufficiency 
of this micro change may however be questioned, especially where organisational attitude or 
culture is not conducive to it:  
I’ve seen bullying and [sexual] harassment at work [in a HR role] where a complicating issue 
is, I mean it’s not only the power imbalance in the situation, it’s also the power imbalance in 
terms of the position that the alleged perpetrator feels they have to protect, or indeed the 
increased value the organisation perceives they have against a victim who is less 
important…it means that there can be all the policies in the world, and all the procedures in 
the world, and everybody can try very hard to make those work and make a mediation work, 
but in the end, you’ve got someone who’s vital to the next deal and someone who isn’t, and in 
the end, however…unsophisticated it is, it’s very hard for the organisation to let the 
commercially valuable person go. (Mediator 11) 
Mediation and the danger of privatisation through personalisation 
The latter quote embodies the reasoning for the amended privatisation arguments. The responses 
provided evidence to warrant the argument that concerns over the privatisation of justice can be 
extended to the pre-legal organisational context. This was true in respect of the potential for 
workplace mediation to challenge and provoke broader organisational debate on/influence standard 
setting and allow employees to model behaviour in accordance with publically known standards 
(Rawls, 2001). Justifying the concerns of Keashly and Nowell (2011), there is doubt over the ability 
of mediation to enable individuals to hold organisations to account for persistent or systemic 
problems which were embedded in or which characterised the culture of the organisation. In a 
rather frank quote about the limited power of mediation to drive cultural change without 
organisational support, one mediator summed the situation up:  
…where mediation is being used to personalise something that is corporate. So people will, 
yeah, rather than looking at the structural sexism in their organisation, they’ll say, “oh Janet 
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and John can’t work together”…I’ll tell you now, there’s something really crap about putting in 
a load of support and investing in your employee base, whilst still allowing your senior 
management to behave like shits, because what you’re doing is, you’re saying, you’re going 
to create an organisation that’s fundamentally naff but we’re going to support you in putting up 
with it, and that’s horrible. That’s horrible. There’s got to be integrity in an organisation 
(Mediator 6) 
Another reflected this, noting the use of mediation in such a case may be beneficial for a mediator 
but not for employees:  
Well that’s just an income stream for mediators if the culture is, I call them toxic workplaces, if 
they’re reinforcing intolerant behaviours, then obviously, you’re just going to get a revolving 
door. One will go and another one will come in. (Mediator 5) 
Here one can see how the categorisation of disputes as interpersonal problems such as 
misunderstandings risks personalising issues rather than recognising them as problems of bullying 
and/or harassment. This runs the risk of legitimating and perpetuating breaches of what may be 
considered as impersonally unreasonable standards (Acker, 2006) and leaves individuals with 
limited scope for challenging this behaviour or for changing the culture (Leskinen et al, 2011; 
Samuels, 2004). In agreement with Latreille (2011) and Saundry and Wibberley (2012), the need 
for organisational commitment and trust is therefore crucial.  
Thus, whilst an understanding that confidentiality in mediation does provide some scope for 
addressing the privatisation concerns, without organisational and party willingness to use 
mediation as a learning process, it has limited potential to challenge and/or change prevailing 
standards and practices. This may be particularly worrying if organisations use mediation to 
personalise disputes which are indicative of organisational (or societal) problems.  
8.9 FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE 
There was an interesting distinction made between the relevance of the objective recognition of 
fairness in respect to the procedural aspects and process of mediation and a near absolute 
prioritisation of personal perceptions in relation to the outcome.  
The importance of procedure and the impersonal 
There was a unanimous agreement that - provided mediation was conducted properly - it could be 
seen as an extremely fair process:  
I think it’s very fair. I think it’s set up to be that. It depends, I think, how good the mediator is... 
(Mediator 11) 
I would say that the whole premise of mediation is based on equality, and addressing each 
parties’ needs and feelings as equally important as the other, and one of the key factors that 
the mediator displays is multi partiality, where you embrace both people equally, and what 
you think and feel their needs are equally valid. So I would say that without fairness, 
mediation wouldn’t be able to exist. (Mediator 14) 
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These quotes reflect many of the characteristics seen as relevant to procedural justice across the 
various literatures. The opportunity for both parties to be heard was a strong theme. However, the 
opportunity here was for the parties to be heard by each other and the mediator (Nabatchi et al, 
2007) and not a decision making third party (Genn, 2010). The rejection of the relevance of 
evidence seems, however, inconsistent with legal conceptualisations (Genn, 2010); although the 
experience that investigations are often conducted prior to mediation does not necessarily render 
evidence entirely irrelevant. 
Given the emphasis on empowerment in the responses, it is perhaps not surprising that there was 
a corresponding emphasis on those characteristics which the organisational justice literature might 
assign to interactional (Reb et al, 2006) or interpersonal (Nabatchi et al, 2007) justice, for 
example, treating the parties with respect and sensitivity. In light of the importance attached to 
mediator neutrality in respect of both those characteristics relating to information/process aspects 
and also to the interpersonal aspects, the qualitative explanations of the mediator views on 
fairness still arguably make the distinctions drawn by organisational justice difficult to separate 
both conceptually and practically. So, whilst it seems it is not possible to fully apply legal (formal) 
understandings of procedural justice to mediation, it is also difficult to accurately apply 
psychological understandings. What may be needed therefore is an adapted understanding of 
procedural considerations which draws on features of both (see chapter 10).  
Substantive outcome: the prioritisation of the personal 
The sense that there is a need for others to also see the process as fair did not seem to apply to 
perceptions over the fairness of the outcome. Here, reflecting Green (2005), the balance lay firmly 
with the personal views of the parties as to what is acceptable in the circumstances. No questions 
of substantive fairness arise: 
…if I’m doing my job as a mediator, and not losing my impartiality, then it has to be their 
judgement about what’s fair and just in their situation…So yeah, on the basis that the parties 
involved are determining the outcomes, and they are deciding what works for them, I don’t 
see myself as having the authority to say that is or isn’t just. (Mediator 17) 
The reasoning behind this seems to follow a similar logic to Rawls’s idea of procedural background 
justice i.e. the idea that provided the decision has been reached using a procedure which had been 
collectively deemed to be just in a fair society the outcome would be fair. Thus, provided parties 
had voluntarily agreed to participate in mediation and the mediator had acted in a neutral and fair 
way, any agreement deemed acceptable to the parties should not be challenged on the basis it is 
not what others may see as fair:  
I mean, I guess, you could look at fair within the process, but also fair from outside, and I think 
for me, the only way it might be possible mediation is unfair from outside would be if someone 
felt they were forced to have it, or that they had to have it in order to then allow a further thing 
to happen…rather than because they actually want to try to resolve things (Mediator 18)  
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This characteristic of course stands at odds with the view favoured here that there should be an 
objective evaluation and the extent to which the two may be reconciled (through the potential 
tailoring of confidentiality) will be considered in chapter 10.  
Justice 
Although some used the terms interchangeably, many of the mediators found it easier to answer 
the questions about fairness than about justice. The responses in relation to justice potentially 
provide support for the argument that it is not only possible but also important to make a 
distinction between justice and fairness when addressing the question of the appropriateness of 
mediation.  
Questions on justice provided a mixed response and indeed it was in respect of the relevance of 
justice that a number of the mediators revealed it was something they felt they had not really 
thought about before. There were nevertheless a number of different opinions expressed over the 
relevance of justice to mediation. These focused around two themes: that mediation was not about 
justice, or that it was about justice but a different kind of justice than that delivered by adversarial 
approaches. These positions resonate with the argument that mediation is something different.  
Mediation: Not about justice 
This view can be related to the parties’ motives for participating in mediation and what their 
desired outcome is and reflects the idea that mediation should only be seen as one possible option:  
I don’t think it’s a word that fits. I don’t think justice, it’s the wrong kind of language, and it’s 
not a word I would use to describe mediation. (Mediator 10) 
Justice. What a massive word. No, I don’t think so. They deal with retribution or punishment. 
Mediation is concerned with the way forward, not to allot blame or punishment on anyone 
really. (Mediator 4) 
Mediation: A different kind of justice 
This alternative stance is aligned with many of the features of restorative justice and also perhaps 
fits most easily with the emphasis on personal empowerment. Here, through collaboration, 
mediation provides the parties with the opportunity to jointly address and determine what is for 
them, a just outcome. Here the point of reference is not adversarial ideas of justice but personal 
judgement:  
For me, mediation provides one of the most radical opportunities to redefine our notions of 
justice that we’ve ever seen…it is a revolution that we’re experiencing, is the notion of sitting 
down communicating with each other, with the assistance of a skilled third party, giving the 
parties a chance to feel that they have a say, a stake in the outcome, and the outcome 
achieves that need to fulfil a sense of justice and fairness that they have. It delivers justice in 
a way that a court, in my view, never can. (Mediator 15) 
I don’t think mediation should be lined up with justice in its sort of definition within the legal 
umbrella, because the solution is determined by the parties, so it’s not determined by whether 
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it’s right according to law or whether it’s right according to how all organisations should work 
or right in terms of being in the advertising industry you know. It’s so bespoke it can’t be 
benchmarked against that kind of wall. (Mediator 5) 
How these differing approaches to justice may be reconciled with each other and/or with fairness 
as an overriding concern will be set out in chapter 10.    
8.10 CONCLUSION 
The interviews provided valuable insights into the way mediation operates in practice and which 
can be used to expand on and explain a number of the conceptual and theoretical questions 
identified in chapters 2-5.   
In respect of the appropriateness question, the use of mediation in bullying and harassment was 
seen as both feasible and fair, but not in every, and all situations. The distinction drawn between 
“actual” and other types of behaviour potentially perceived as bullying/harassment lends support to 
the need to recognise how the appropriateness of mediation varies according to the severity of the 
behaviour and where it falls on the spectrum offered in chapter 4 (and developed in chapter 10).  
Objections to the use of mediation in bullying/harassment were addressed. Although many were 
not entirely dismissed on the basis of the evidence presented, possible ways of reconciling 
concerns over power imbalances were considered. Understanding mediation as a process and that 
confidentiality is not absolute are key to this. 
In their responses the mediators arguably demonstrated an awareness of their power and 
influence (an awareness questioned by Herrman et al, 2003) and also indicated that whilst they 
classified themselves as facilitative, their role was not as passive as Dolder (2004) concluded.  
The argument that understanding the appropriateness of mediation necessitates the inclusion of 
the organisation as a party was again presented and evidence to substantiate this argument was 
offered.  
Finally, whilst there was a role for impersonal standards, these were largely positioned outside of 
the mediation process in favour of an embracing of the personally determined and perceived 
standards of reasonableness, fairness and justice.  
The next chapter will consider how far these are reflected in the focus group findings. 
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CHAPTER 9.  FINDINGS 3: FOCUS GROUPS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will present the findings from the four focus groups. As stated in chapter 6, the focus 
groups used one of the vignettes from the questionnaire to explore understandings of bullying and 
harassment and how it should be dealt with. The use of the vignette also acted as a stimulus for 
exploring some of the more abstract ideas surrounding dignity and the relevance of protected 
characteristics that was not possible in the previous stages.  
The discussion in the focus group concentrated on a number of themes and this is reflected in the 
way the findings are reported in this chapter. It will begin by reporting discrepancies between 
individual quantitative and qualitative responses before moving on to explore how these were 
justified in their qualitative responses. It will then explore whether the presence of a protected 
characteristic changes the situation and the extent to which the singling out of certain 
characteristics for protection can be justified and/or sustained. Finally, it will address the question 
of what a fair response to the situation in the scenario would be.  
In contrast to the concluding position in the previous chapter of the prioritisation of the personal, 
the focus group findings suggest the need for a much greater weight to be attached to impersonal 
standards and objective ways of determining these i.e. investigation. There was a great emphasis 
on the importance of contextual and relational factors. There was a strong sense that whilst 
mediation may have benefits for the parties involved, employers should play a central role in 
publically determining and upholding standards of appropriateness in the workplace.  
Scenario reminder 
Before proceeding it is useful to provide a reminder of the scenario used:  
Katrina and Philip are both probation officers. They work together in an environment where there is 
a lot of banter which sometimes includes sexual innuendo. Both frequently participate in this. They 
were initially the same grade but Philip has since been promoted and is now Katrina’s line 
manager. Neither of them say this has affected the level of banter between them. Katrina gives 
examples of Philip tying her scarf around her face when she is typing, making comments about her 
appearance and, on at least three occasions having made remarks about her “being on the game”. 
Until recently Katrina had never complained about the behaviour to Philip or to anyone else. She is 
now off work with stress and is saying she wants the behaviour to stop. Philip is shocked to hear 
that she has said she feels harassed and bullied as he thought she had happily participated. He 
doesn’t deny any of it but said the comments about her being a prostitute were in response to 
Katrina’s statement to her colleagues that “in an ideal world she would like to be the madam of a 
high class brothel”. Their colleagues are also surprised as they say Katrina is “no shrinking violet”. 
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9.2 SCENARIO ASSESSMENTS 
As the purpose of the focus groups was to try and provide qualitative and contextualised potential 
explanations for the questionnaire results, rather than to provide quantitative confirmation of the 
assessments, little attention will be given to the individual quantitative responses to the scenario87. 
As the reasons behind them will be set out below, it is sufficient to note that assessments varied 
within groups and also slightly between groups (and between genders).  
When the quantitative responses were compared with the qualitative responses given by each 
individual participant, for a number of participants there was a discrepancy between the two. 
These discrepancies were often explicitly acknowledged by the participants but were otherwise 
evident only in comparative analysis.  
In both cases the shift occurred after hearing the views and justifications of at least one other 
participant. One must be aware of the influence of the group dynamics and pressure in focus 
groups in assigning meaning to these changes (particularly where the change was not explicitly 
acknowledged) (O’Dell et al, 2012), but where those who explicitly acknowledged they had 
changed their view it was not necessarily to bring it into agreement with other participants. For 
example a shift from inappropriate but not harassment to inappropriate and might be harassment 
where the majority of the group thought it was definitely harassment. In all but one instance 
(where the male participant who strongly agreed it was an example of sexism began to question 
that assessment), changes were made to revise the decision up in terms of severity.  
The reasons given for these changes throughout the discussion and in the closing reflections 
arguably demonstrate the value in providing a forum and structure for discussing bullying and 
harassment and exploring individual and collective understandings. This aspect will be returned to 
at the end of this chapter.  
9.3 UNDERSTANDING AND CONSTRUCTING BULLYING AND HARASSMENT 
The focus group responses indicated the importance of contextual and relational features in 
identifying and understanding the relevant decision making characteristics and the conditions or 
factors that may influence their weight in a situation. Together with the previous chapter, this 
arguably justifies not only the need for all five research questions but also demonstrates the 
importance of the qualitative contextualisation of quantitative results argued for88.  
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Assessing the behaviour 
It should be recalled89 that the focus group participants were not given a list of possible decision 
making factors prior to the focus groups. They were instead asked open questions with the aim of 
exploring, in an unprompted way, the elements in the scenario they viewed as important. The 
thematic analysis of the focus group transcripts did however result in the identification of the 
majority of the factors previously identified in the questionnaire90: although the discussion was 
concentrated only on a limited number of factors. These included: target perception, perpetrator 
intention, the nature of the behaviour (severity and whether it was inappropriate) and impact on 
the target. These reflect those ranked as being the top five most important in the questionnaire 
results, as well as those given explicit attention in the mediator interviews.  
These five were however not the only dominant themes. As could perhaps be anticipated by the 
prevalence of definitions referring to the continuous nature or pattern of behaviour in the 
questionnaire, the persistency of the behaviour was seen to be important.  
Against the consideration of how the factors may relate to each other it is important to note that 
these, and other factors considered were not seen as discrete or easily divorced from the context 
in which they are being applied.  
In the behavioural assessments, context and relationships are relevant on a number of levels: the 
individual level (i.e. the interpersonal relationship between the parties), the organisational 
relationship (i.e. hierarchical or vertical relationship between the parties and the relationship of 
each with their colleagues and others in the organisation) and finally societal relationship (i.e. 
organisational reputation; group membership/non-membership; collectively determined and known 
standards). These may be seen as broadly reflecting the relationships identified in chapter 3 as 
characterising Rawls’s fair society: individuals in their associational capacity, individual associations 
within the institutions and individuals acting as a collective body socially co-operating in accordance 
with public rules and reason. How these can be understood and applied should become apparent 
as the discussion progresses.  
Bullying and harassment: different things? 
Usefulness of a distinction 
Whilst all participants were able to make an assessment in accordance with one of the options 
provided, responses were frequently qualified by statements indicating they were unaware of the 
definitions of bullying or harassment and therefore of what the difference between them was. 
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There was a difference of opinion between the participants both within and across groups over the 
worth or need to be able to distinguish between bullying and harassment. This difference was 
polarised. At one end there was support for the need to make a distinction between the two, both 
for ensuring the behaviour is appropriately addressed and for the purposes of clarity of discussion: 
Vicky (G1): …I think it’s really important because, in this case, it’s probably bullying. I don’t 
know if it is, but it’s probably bullying, but actually, from my own, sort of my own perspective, 
it’s harassment and it probably is bullying. But to have a definition is really important to 
distinguish between the two. If you were a manager, you would need to know the distinction 
to move on from that, I think, to show what he’s done. 
Betty (G1): I agree. It’s absolutely essential in my opinion to have a definition, because if you 
don’t have a definition, no one knows what you’re talking about. So how are you supposed to 
talk about it? 
This position reflects that adopted in chapter 4.  
The alternative position favoured the view that making a distinction was unnecessary. Indeed, 
some felt that it would be difficult to define one without reference to the other: 
Oliver (G4): I think for me, if I looked up in a thesaurus they’d come side by side in definitions. 
I do take your point, but my own personal view of bullied has a level of persistence to it as 
well. 
Michael (G4): Exactly. We’re almost in a circular definition.  
Oliver: Yeah. 
Michael: I mean you can’t really define harassment…without using the word bully. 
Oliver: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
Instead, for one of these participants, attention should be paid to whether or not the behaviour 
was inappropriate. Once it had been established that a threshold had been breached, 
concentrating efforts on whether it was then bullying or harassment was unnecessary: 
I’m not sure it does any good to define necessarily. I’m not a lawyer, but it’s inappropriate. 
That’s what’s important: it shouldn’t happen. Whether they define it as harassment or bullying, 
either way it doesn’t make a difference… (Oliver (G4)) 
Though on the face of it this latter view may be seen as consistent with the views of the mediators’ 
over the lack of the need to assign labels, this is not the case. The mediator stance is more radical, 
calling for a rejection of labels to focus on the meanings behind the behaviour. The focus group 
comments, however, do not necessarily support a rejection of labels altogether but rather see little 
value in diverting energy assigning a further label once that of inappropriate had been satisfied.  
Their view about the worth of distinguishing between bullying and harassment notwithstanding, 
when an analysis of their individual responses was considered, a number of these participants were 
nevertheless able to suggest possible, if not certain, differences between bullying and harassment. 
This lack of certainty however was by no means restricted to this group of participants.  
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Making distinctions 
A number of suggested distinctions will be briefly outlined in this section but will be explored in 
greater detail below in the context they arose. 
Protected characteristic 
Whilst many of the dominant factors outlined above were seen as common to both bullying and 
harassment, the presence of a protected characteristic was limited to discussions of the latter. 
Thus, when asked whether they thought the behaviour was harassment, a number of the 
responses reflected the distinction made in this research i.e. the involvement of a protected 
characteristic (EA 2010, chapter 4):  
I thought so, yeah. I thought it was much more clearly harassment and that’s to do with it’s 
sexual harassment, she’s a women, he’s a man, and that seems to make it, almost by 
definition. There’s obviously much more to it, but that’s why I said it seemed to be 
harassment. (Maria (G2)) 
Returning to arguments about the relevance of personal characteristics for interpreting behaviour, 
it is interesting to note that the gender of the parties in the scenario and the sexual/gendered 
nature of the behaviour were referenced in the responses of a number of women participants in 
the evaluation of whether the behaviour was harassment. For the majority of the male participants, 
however, the gender of the parties and implications this had for the behaviour was brought up only 
after they were asked whether they thought Philip was treating Katrina in a sexist way. Although 
her concern was with bullying alone, that women emphasised target characteristics more than men 
differs from Salin’s (2011) findings.   
Other responses however also reflected what Branch (2008) referred to as ‘general harassment’ 
(see below, e.g. in relation to intent). These findings reflect those of the questionnaire that 
participants do draw a distinction between bullying and harassment but that this is not necessarily 
associated with the presence of a protected characteristic.  
Deliberate (Intent to harm) 
The view that bullying is understood as being something deliberate and intentional whilst this is not 
necessarily the case with harassment was evident in the responses of a number of participants, for 
example:  
I’d say harassment can be a lot more than bullying. Basically, you get lots of different types 
and levels of harassment, and I would say that harassment, like can be intentional, 
unintentional. It could be sexual harassment. It could be verbal. It could be psychological. A 
whole range of things, where I think bullying is basically, you’re intentionally trying to make 
someone feel bad. Possibly ganging up with others to do it, but if it’s harassment, it’s 
harassment because she feels harassed. (Anthony (G3)) 
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It is interesting to note however that whilst intention is seen as a defining characteristic of bullying 
by some (reflecting a number of the definitions in the questionnaire), others saw it as a relevant 
factor, though not necessarily defining one91. 
Persistency 
There was a limited indication that persistency may be seen as important for bullying but not 
harassment. The dominant view however was that harassment also involved a certain degree of 
persistency:  
Matt (G3): Harassment is like a wasp isn’t it. Buzzing round. You just can’t get away. Actually 
that’s a terrible analogy isn’t it? 
John (G3): Yeah I think…the continuous focus from him on her, making her feel 
uncomfortable. I think if it was continuous, if it was every hour, or every day, I think that’s 
harassment but if he is intentionally trying to make her upset or drive her out, I think that 
would be bullying. 
Ian (G3): I think bullying is like a sustained persistent like series of things, whereas 
harassment can just be you feel harassed by something. There might just be a one off that 
isn’t part of anything else and that person isn’t doing it deliberately, you just feel harassed. 
The importance assigned to persistency in both bullying and harassment is consistent with the 
definitions in the questionnaire findings, if not with its ranking in the decision making factors. That 
persistency is seen as a defining characteristic for bullying seemingly reflects Branch’s (2008) 
arguments. However, the meaning assigned to persistency does not necessarily conform to that in 
the quantitative bullying measures (i.e. a prescribed frequency over a specified period, Einarsen et 
al, 2009):  
Oliver (G4): I think we certainly need to know about timeframe…but I think time frame in 
terms of my understanding of bullying means something more persistent, over a period of 
time and a need to know how long it lasted for.  
… 
Michael (G4): It might not necessarily be a time-led thing. It should be a change in behaviour-
led thing. So, if this could have been going on for a week between the promotion and her 
going off, it could have been going on for three weeks. I don’t think time is necessarily the 
important thing here. It’s her participation within that time frame. 
The fact the acts may be considered as persistent, however, was not enough to lead to a 
conclusion they amounted to bullying or harassment. As the last quote indicated, the importance 
allocated to persistency was tempered by a consideration of the extent to which that behaviour 
could be seen as unwanted. 
The unwanted character of the behaviour was determined by reference to the degree to which 
participation in the behaviour was mutual. The mutuality of the behaviour was related to the 
intention and the perceptions of the parties involved; the parties’ relationship 
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(personal/associational and organisational) and the target’s reaction to the behaviour. This returns 
the discussion to the importance of understanding context when identifying what factors are 
important, and why and how they are related.  
The contextualisation will begin by considering the role of perception and intent.  
The relative importance of perception and intention  
The positioning of target perception and perpetrator intention as important factors in assessing 
behaviour is supported across all three data collection stages. Whilst perpetrator intention was 
given a relatively large amount of attention in the discussion in all the groups, when asked whether 
perception or intention was of greater importance in determining whether the behaviour was 
bullying/harassment, it was agreed by all participants that target perception should be given 
priority:  
Maria (G2): …it’s interesting. If somebody is being bullied, it’s up to them to say that isn’t it…I 
think it’s to do with the individual defining it, isn’t it? Because what else have you got to go on 
really, it has to be that how that person is made to feel by somebody else’s behaviour or 
comments. 
… 
Carol (G2): I think it’s probably more important than any other one factor, but it’s not the only 
thing that you would take into account…but how she feels about it is very significant I think.  
 
Samantha (G1): I think it’s, it’s hard to say, because when you think of someone harassing 
and bullying, you do think of them doing it deliberately, intending to put somebody down, 
intending to hurt them, and the fact that he’s shocked, and the fact that he thought she’s 
always happily participating but then, at the same time, you would say someone was 
harassing someone in the office if they were making inappropriate comments “ooh 
yeah…you’re quite fit” but they might not mean that, they might not mean to hurt someone by 
doing that, but it is going to make someone feel uncomfortable. 
Betty (G1): Although I would say, in my opinion, whether it really matters that much whether 
he knew…because I also know people that if I say to them, for instance, “I think that was 
bullying behaviour you just exhibited” that they would be really shocked but that doesn’t mean 
that they didn’t mean to do it, and they may not have meant it, but for example, in one 
instance, their social skills are so low, they wouldn’t be able to realise that’s what they were 
doing or intend to, but they’re still doing it. 
[agreement] 
Gemma (G1): I think, could you sort of, almost the opposite, that he might think that I’m telling 
her she’s an attractive woman or but if it’s just perceived by her as something inappropriate 
and that makes her feel uncomfortable, I would still think it’s ok to say it’s harassment.  
These latter comments provide an insight into why intention should not be considered as a defining 
feature of bullying but is nevertheless not irrelevant. This is explored in greater detail below. This 
ordering and the reasoning behind it is consistent with the view of Einarsen et al (2011) and, as 
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will be seen, is also important for leading the decision as to what was seen as a fair way of dealing 
with the situation92.  
Target perceptions, relationships and organisational influences 
Though perception was given priority, it was clear from the discussion that interpreting target 
perception was not easy. The integrity of Katrina’s perception was questioned. In order to 
determine whether the behaviour could be considered as unwanted (and therefore correctly 
perceived as bullying/harassment) the participants felt they needed more information about the 
way Katrina had responded to the behaviour throughout the relationship and about the way and 
extent to which she had participated:  
Matt (G3): The statement says they both frequently participate in this but we don’t get any 
examples of what she said, of what Katrina has said to Philip. What [she’s] done, because 
without that, you can’t really put it into context. He’s wrapped a scarf around her face, which I 
don’t think is appropriate, but at the same time, what’s she done? What banter and what has 
she said to him in the past. Where do you draw the line with that? (Matt (G3)) 
John (G3): What’s her reaction been to that? We’re not getting her reaction. We’re getting her 
reaction down the line, but not her instant reaction, so that when he does say that she’s on 
the game or she’s a prostitute, we don’t see what her response is.  
It is interesting that the target response, and the timing of that response, were considered 
important, as this is consistent with Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin’s (2011) findings in relation to 
the treatment of sexual harassment cases. In line with the emphasis Keashly and Nowell (2003; 
2011) placed on the ability to retaliate or defend in a conflict (but not bullying), there was an 
assumption Katrina should have spoken up sooner: ‘It’s interesting…because it says she’s no 
shrinking violet because I imagine that somebody [who] is being bullied might shrink’ (Maria (G2)). 
Indeed Katrina’s motives for not responding in a way that make her objection clear prior to her 
going off with stress were viewed by some in a cynical light:  
Marco (G4): But I…think it’s important to understand whether she called sick before telling 
him. 
Michael (G4): Yeah. 
… 
Oliver (G4): Potentially, if you want to be really pessimistic about it, she may have done it on 
purpose that way, so it made him look worse. Possibly, if she went off on stress, that would 
make him look even worse, potentially. If it’s gone that sour… 
This cynicism was however balanced by the recognition that the assumption while she should have 
been able to respond in a way that made the unwanted nature clearer at an earlier point, there 
may have been reasons preventing her from doing so. These reasons reflect a number of those 
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anticipated in chapter 493 and included organisation culture, continuous exposure and the change 
in relationship. 
Organisational culture:  
Anthony (G3): I think it’s probably an organisational problem then, because it clearly isn’t a 
culture where she’s comfortable complaining to anyone else that it’s inappropriate in her 
opinion, and obviously, they have a culture where that kind of banter is, at least assumed to 
be, normal by Philip, which, in the end, did make people feel uncomfortable. So, I mean 
there’s clearly something wrong generally with the attitude people have, and there is 
obviously no way for her to express that she was uncomfortable with that until she got to the 
point where she is off work with stress.   
Ian (G3): But I suppose it says until recently she’s never complained, but you don’t know 
whether she had a problem with it beforehand, before he was promoted and even then, that 
she didn’t feel comfortable, because it might just because she’s never complained before, 
doesn’t mean that she’s, just because she’s engaged with it, might be that she feels under 
pressure to kind of fit in with colleagues, so she gets engaged in banter with colleagues she’s 
not comfortable with, maybe. 
The influence of organisational culture was seen as relevant in relation to a number and factors 
and will be explored throughout this chapter. But it is important to note that, as will be seen, 
organisational culture is seen as influencing the extent to which an individual may challenge the 
behaviour and set the benchmark for what is acceptable in a particular workplace but this does not 
determine what may be seen as objectively reasonable at the societal level.  
Continuous exposure: 
Vicky (G1): I think it’s hard, because I think no matter what, you know, if she at some point, 
obviously, you can change over time. Sometimes you might think something is acceptable 
and sometimes you might change as a person and think actually, I don’t really like that. So 
obviously, things can change. Whether or not the power dynamic, but I think that probably 
was the cause that changed rather than anything else. 
Samantha (G1): Yeah. 
… 
Betty (G1): But I think at this stage, on the same level, like you were saying, it could have a 
cumulative effect; to say it once or twice is one thing but if you know…if it becomes so 
persistent it could be a cumulative effect.  
[agreement] 
Betty (G1): I think you could consider it bullying after some time. 
Here it is interesting to note that there is recognition that the behaviour does not need to have 
been perceived as unwanted from the outset but may become unwanted over time. This may not 
have resulted from an escalation in the nature or persistency of the behaviour (Einarsen et al, 
2003) but rather from sustained exposure the same type of behaviour.  
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Although the change in relationship was seen as significant, participants indicated that, as the last 
quote suggested, the absence of a hierarchical relationship would not prevent the behaviour from 
ever being considered as bullying. The change in relationship did, however, trigger the need to 
apply a stricter level of reasonableness to the behaviour and had implications for the significance of 
perceptions of power (im)balances.  
Change in relationship 
The change in relationship and resultant shift in power was seen as potentially having an influence 
over the degree to which Katrina felt she could challenge the behaviour:  
…now maybe that he’s been promoted, he’s sort of his team leader, she thinks “who do I go 
to if I have a problem?” So she feels even more vulnerable. (Rose (G2)) 
Well it’s a power relationship then, because it’s harder for the employee to go, to say to her 
manager, “actually, I disapprove of the way you behave” and in that situation, you almost cut 
off your employee voice. (Michael (G4)) 
These problems could also be compounded by the possible influence of a poor organisational 
culture. Nevertheless, there was an acknowledgement that the onus for challenging the behaviour 
should not solely lie with Katrina to overtly object, there was an indication that her objections could 
have been subtle and should have been recognised by others, for example managers. The need to 
acknowledge organisational responsibility for allowing the existence and persistence of 
inappropriate behaviour in the workplace is important. The discussion will return to this point again 
shortly but first it is important to briefly further consider intent.  
Perpetrator intention and motives 
The initial cynicism around Katrina’s perception was not matched with a similar degree of doubting 
of Philip’s intention. There was little questioning that he had genuinely perceived the behaviour to 
be mutual and therefore, whilst he had intended to say what he had said and do what he did, it 
had not been his intention to offend Katrina or cause her distress.  
Indeed there was a certain sense of sympathy felt for Philip apparent across all the groups: 
I think I’m trying to work as a manager between the two people as well, because obviously, 
you feel sympathy for her because she obviously feels stress, and obviously felt bad about it, 
but at the same time I feel bad for him because they did have this history, and when did it 
change? Did he misread her signals? (Vicky (G1)) 
Philip’s response to Katrina’s complaint however was not entirely uncriticised, and the extent to 
which he was genuinely unaware of the impact it was having on her was questioned:  
Because it does say that Philip is shocked to hear that she feels harassed and bullied, so for 
him, it sounds superficially like this is the first time he has heard of this and I have heard 
managers…plead ignorance but actually they have been [aware] so it…there’s two ways of 
her notifying him. She can do it verbally, or by her lack of participation or withdrawal. (Michael 
(G4)) 
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There was also agreement within and across the groups that if at any point Philip was made or 
became aware that Katrina found the behaviour inappropriate but chose to continue his behaviour 
that would impact the participants’ perception of the situation. Continuance in the knowledge that 
the behaviour was having a negative impact on the target crossed a line between unintentional 
and misunderstanding to intentional and deliberate and would therefore certainly be considered as 
bullying. 
This has interesting consequences for the argument about the possibility of distinguishing between 
the intent to engage in the behaviour and the intent to cause the harm arising from that behaviour. 
From the focus group responses there is an indication that the former is of less significance when 
determining whether something should be considered as bullying than where intent in both forms 
is evident.  
A number of responses suggested that demonstration of this intent was not to come from Philip 
alone but is to be inferred from an investigation which included the views of colleagues as to 
whether or not Philip had been or should have been aware that the behaviour was unwanted 
(Einarsen et al, 2011). This view (the need for objective determination of intent) stands in contrast 
to those of the participant mediators discussed in chapter 8. Though there was no explicit use of 
terms like blame and punishment as one may have anticipated (particularly from an organisational 
justice/fairness theory perspective (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001)94, there was nevertheless 
agreement that a shift from misunderstanding to knowing act was important when determining 
what a fair response to the situation was95.  
Thus, as with the previous findings chapters, perception and intent are seen as important - though 
not necessarily equally important - factors in relation to both the determination of behaviour and 
what may be seen as an appropriate response. Contextual factors such as the relationship between 
the parties and the organisational culture were suggested as possible factors which may influence 
the weight to be attached to claims of perception and intent and the extent to which an 
appropriate response may be pursued in practice. There was a strong endorsement of the idea that 
these claims should be subject to some third party scrutiny.  
9.4 REASONABLENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN IMPERSONAL CONCERN 
Organisational Responsibility 
Even where participants were willing to accept Philip’s statement he thought Katrina was a willing 
participant, the change in the relationship was again seen as a relevant factor in assessing the 
appropriateness of the behaviour. This change reflects the shift from the individual (associational)  
                                                          
94
 Albeit this may be due to the conclusion that it was likely Philip’s actions toward Katrina were not deliberate.  
95
 9.6, p196 
185 
 
relationship to the organisational and societal levels and it is here where the organisational 
responsibility again becomes relevant.  
There was agreement that when Philip became Katrina’s manager he should have been aware that 
his behaviour was inappropriate. There was agreement this would be the case regardless of 
whether the behaviour was genuinely well-intentioned and perceived by Katrina as appropriate:  
Vicky (G1): I still think a manager should know better though. You can kind of get away with a 
bit of sexual innuendo in the workplace but I think as soon as you become a manager, if it 
was me, you’d start to think “I need to become a bit more professional”.  
[agreement] 
Vicky (G1): You know that really isn’t appropriate, even if it was happening. Even if she liked it 
or not, I still don’t think as a manager. You’ve just got to be more. 
Gemma (G1): I think, as you said he had no bad intentions but he should be savvy of when 
he’s suddenly the manager that they may have been doing this before but it’s a completely 
different thing now he’s the manager. 
This potentially serves to support the argument presented above96 that there is a spectrum of 
reasonableness, determined by context, relationships and by levels of responsibility for setting and 
upholding standards. It also reflects the perspective of Hoel et al (2003) that the expectations for 
manager’s behaviour are stricter than for those without managerial responsibility. The importance 
of context and responsibility were recurring themes throughout the groups. There was agreement 
across all groups that a certain level of banter was inevitable and necessary in a workplace to 
facilitate good relationships between colleagues and a number of participants gave examples of 
their own personal experiences.  
In the examples provided there was an indication of participants exercising a personal 
responsibility to make judgements as to what others may find appropriate or inappropriate. For 
example:  
I work with a lot of women and I wouldn’t call them prostitutes, even in a jokey way because 
that, in my opinion, [is] probably a little bit strong for a joke. (Anthony (G3)) 
There was an indication that no matter how strong personal relationships were certain behaviour 
which may be permissible outside of the workplace (e.g. in personal associational relationships) 
could never be seen as appropriate in a workplace context: 
Ian (G3): …certain characteristics being protected doesn’t change the way I am with people. 
It’s just when you get to know people it changes. My best friend, I say massively offensive 
things to her and she says massively offensive things to me and it’s really funny because it’s 
so inappropriate and that’s what makes it funny, but I wouldn’t in a million years, like the way I 
greet my friend, I would never greet somebody that way in work, ever.   
This quote is interesting as it demonstrates that whilst context may determine appropriateness to a 
certain extent, some behaviour/language by its nature will be offensive. There was an 
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acknowledgement, however, that such behaviour and language would clearly always be 
inappropriate in the workplace, there were plenty of ‘grey areas’ (Michael (G4)) and determining 
what may be reasonable behaviour in the opinion of another person was very difficult:  
…if you know, it’s just a zero tolerance type of thing, and no one sort of gets into this banter. 
Everyone knows where the line is, but as soon as you sort of start moving what is acceptable, 
it’s quite easy for somebody to not know where someone else’s boundaries are. (Carol (G2)) 
This was seen as particularly problematic where the boundaries of reasonableness may be skewed 
in environments where the gender or racial composition of the workforce is highly unbalanced. For 
example:  
…my ex-boyfriend is a police officer and obviously he works in a very male environment…and 
he said, you know he’s found sometimes female officers, he’s found incredibly vulgar…but 
he’s said his perception has been that, actually they’re being like that because they’re with 
males and they want to fit in. (Rose (G2)) 
Accordingly, whilst personal evaluations can be made, it was felt the responsibility for clarifying 
what falls on either side of the line of reasonableness lies with the employer (therefore supporting 
the arguments favoured by those such as Acker (2006) and the argument advanced here 
concerning the role of the organisation as a social institution). 
These comments return the discussion to the need to acknowledge both personal and impersonal 
standards of reasonableness and the argument that viewing complaints solely as a matter of 
individual perception and determination (as the (mis)use of mediation may do) is inadequate.  
The importance of an objective investigation 
In contrast to the approach favoured by the mediators (but consistent with the questionnaire 
findings), there was unanimity across the four groups and all participants of the need for an 
investigation to determine what had happened. An investigation was seen as a key precondition for 
enabling a fair response to be determined:  
Vicky (G1): You need objective facts. You'd have to have an investigation to see the facts 
from both sides, and obviously to map onto whether it’s bullying and harassment the 
definitions, I think.  
Samantha (G1): Yeah, I agree definitely. 
… 
Vicky (G1): There’s also the fairness as well, on both sides, if you did a full investigation with 
someone objective. You know, whether it was Katrina or Philip, they might not feel it was 
dealt with fairly and you’re likely to go all the way to court…I just think you probably need that 
to prevent it going all the way because, if it was me, and I was Katrina, and there wasn’t that 
and then I was told sort it out with him, you might just think “well no”. 
The problems associated with investigations notwithstanding, in these quotes the language of 
‘facts’ and ‘objectivity’ associated with formal procedures that were lacking in the claims for legal  
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procedural justice (Genn, 2010) in the previous chapter is clearly evident. In this fact-finding 
process, isolating the inquiry to the parties involved was seen as insufficient and colleagues were 
seen as an important source of information for determining what had happened (and therefore the 
reasonableness of the target perception):  
…if this was me at work and someone phoned up, if Katrina phoned up and said “I’d like to 
raise a grievance” because until she [does that], we can’t look into it; and so, if she puts it in 
writing to us, and raises it as a grievance, then we can investigate it. See what’s happened, 
speak to them, speak to witnesses try and get to the bottom of it really, get her side of the 
story and get Philip’s side of the story, and try and try and sort it out for her.97 (Samantha 
(G1)) 
I think yeah, definitely the colleagues should be asked to provide their perceptions of what 
has been going on. (Marco (G4)) 
However, there was a recognition that relying on the involvement of others was not without its 
problems. This was viewed as especially problematic where the culture is one where the behaviour 
complained of is rife, or where the target is in a weak position of power:  
Lauren (G2): Well, I would probably go for a thorough investigation as I would want to get a 
picture of the workplace environment that they work in, who else they work with, any kind of 
witnesses to exchanges, not just between them but maybe just gathering a picture of the 
environment itself… 
Carol (G2): It might be something where there’s like a training need really, because it doesn’t 
seem, on the face of it, like it’s been a malicious thing on Philip’s part. So it’s kind of like, well 
does he need a bit of training in terms of what’s acceptable, and actually so does everyone 
who is in that environment, because if everyone has been at it, you know, is it something 
where they kind of need to be told what’s acceptable in the workplace and what isn’t? 
… 
Lauren (G2):…I also think the difficulty with that is, if Philip is this horrible bully, you know, 
and there’s this-he’s got a group of mates, that they could also all say that, they could have 
the same story…so it’s just kind of, it would have to be very thorough wouldn’t it? 
This returns the discussion to the importance of organisational culture and support. The last 
comment potentially engages with the findings of Harrington et al (2012) that organisations may 
favour managers and downplay the significance of the complaint.  
The possible response options available will be considered below98, but for present purposes it is 
sufficient to acknowledge that regardless of the potential problems, there was strong support for 
the need for some objective, third party intervention to deal with the situation. This favouring of an 
investigation provides support for the argument favoured here.99  
Participants were asked about the possibility of parties being able to define the boundaries of 
reasonableness and resolve it between themselves, and though some saw an appeal in this, there 
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was a consensus that this should only occur after an investigation. There was a strong feeling that 
where behaviour was alleged to be unreasonable there was a need to treat this not as an 
interpersonal issue but rather as an organisational one100.  
An exploration of why this objective element is seen as necessary again returns the discussion to 
the need to appreciate the reasons why bullying and harassment are considered as objectionable 
and how this may have influenced the participants’ decisions. 
9.5 REASONABLE STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR: PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS  
Attempts to explore the underlying reasons and understandings of why bullying and harassment 
should not be tolerated were made in two ways. The first was to ask participants what they were 
basing their judgements on and the second was to address the matter of protected characteristics 
(through a focus on sexism) and the distinction between protected and other characteristics.  
Influences and values: Public values and the personal/impersonal evaluation 
As stated above, the majority of the participants said they were unaware of the definitions of 
bullying or harassment but were nevertheless able to make assessments. Participants were 
therefore asked how they were making these. Some responses were related to experience and 
knowledge gained through social interaction and collectively available information such as that 
presented in the media or discourses on bullying in schools:  
Vicky (G1): I think bullying, you just see it in the media bullying…just from the media. I don’t 
know. I need to think about that one. 
Gemma (G1): Maybe also trying to be empathetic. I’ve never had anything like this, but trying 
to think would I feel bullied. This, so it’s quite an intangible sort of attaching it to emotional 
experience, would I feel like, is this something I would feel harassed, or would I sort of 
attaching to, sort of putting myself in the situation and attaching whatever I would feel if this 
happened to me, and from that deriving what my hypothetical emotions would be…  
[laughter] 
Gemma (G1): This is a really weird question to verbalise but also yeah, from thinking what 
has been in the media, what has been classed as bullying, or what sort of cases have been 
discussed as harassment and comparing it to features of cases that have been in, yeah, 
stories. 
        Others were related to their upbringing and prior experience in the workplace:  
I guess people get their values and their attitudes from their experiences, basically the way 
they’ve been brought up. The location of where they’ve been brought up, places they’ve 
worked. (Oliver (G4)) 
What am I basing it on? What a good question. I’d like to think training and years of dealing 
with Acas and things that come up at work, so I think that has an influence in my mind 
somewhere when I’m looking at situations. Whether that judgement is absolutely correct in 
the legal definition, that’s my personal view I guess. (Lauren (G2)) 
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From these responses, one may tentatively derive support for the argument of the value of 
publically known and debated standards, grounded in Rawls’s (2001) concern with rules for social 
co-operation. Given the argument of the need to extend privatisation of justice arguments to the 
organisational setting in a context of workplace mediation, the inclusion of organisational 
influences is important.  
As illustrated by Gemma (G1)‘s response above, there were also references to the participants 
trying to place themselves in the position of the parties and determine how they would feel and 
what would be appropriate. Such an evaluation is not only characteristic of the use of vignettes 
(O’Dell et al, 2012) but also perhaps broadly begins to demonstrate the balancing process Nagel 
(1991) places at the centre of the personal/impersonal evaluation i.e. individuals putting 
themselves in the shoes of other people to determine what is important.  
A discussion of whether or not Philip was treating Katrina in a sexist way led to the identification of 
a number of other factors participants saw as important in assessing the reasonableness of the 
behaviour. It is through a consideration of whether the behaviour amounted to sexism that 
understandings about protected characteristics and their relevance were accessed.  
Sexism and protected characteristics: the behaviour or the parties?  
It is in the identification of the behaviour in the scenario as sexism (or not) that the differences 
between the responses of the women and the men were most evident. As indicated above, when 
asked about harassment, the female participants were quicker to refer to the importance of the 
gender of the parties than the male participants.  
The explanations of these assessments provide some interesting, although not entirely coherent, 
insights into the relevance of the parties’ characteristics and the nature of the behaviour: 
Vicky (G1): Definitely [sexist] because prostitute, by putting the scarf around her, there’s lots 
of examples. It’s all of a sexual nature, and the fact that she’s a women, it definitely is sexual 
harassment which is probably why I thought it was sexual harassment rather than bullying. 
Now you mention that, yeah, I think it’s degrading, and that’s why it makes it worse, because 
the power difference already, because he’s the manager. If it was two men and there’s that 
banter, it might have been different but because she’s a woman, it’s almost like pushing her 
down even more. 
Samantha (G1): Yeah. Now I would agree it is, because all of the banter and the jokes that 
he’s making are related to her sex basically and to her gender, yeah. (emphasis added) 
 
 
Marco (G4): I would say it is [sexism], yeah. I mean I’m pretty sure this is not the type of 
banter and behaviour that he could have done to a man, but I think there’s definitely an 
element of sexism. 
Oliver (G4):  I try and flip everybody’s sort of situation over, and if Philip turned out to be 
homosexual, he could then, therefore make the comments to another man, and it would be 
appropriate in the workplace.  
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Michael (G4): Could be.  
Oliver: So, I don’t think it is sexist, because you can flip all the roles of, whether they’re 
homosexual, heterosexual, I don’t think it’s directed. Although it might be common for a man 
to say these things, I mean, I don’t know the statistics, but I assume there are probably more 
female prostitutes than there are male prostitutes. I don’t know, but maybe there are, so it 
might be more common for a man to say these things to a woman, but it could just as easily, 
well maybe not just as easily, but it could happen. 
Marco: But it is, I think, the power relationships. There’s a lot more, there’s a subtle 
domination involved that is male towards female oriented. I mean, even in a homosexual 
relationship I think that this wouldn’t have happened, the scarf and stuff like that, there’s the 
subtle dominance. 
From the above quotes there is an evident application of something akin to the comparator test 
applied in discrimination cases with the conclusion determined by reference to whether or not 
Philip would have also said and done the same things to a man. Where it was concluded that he 
would, there was an apparent excusing of the behaviour and therefore a potential endorsement of 
Clarke’s (2006) idea of an ‘equal opportunity harasser’. The attention given to the parties as well as 
the behaviour lends (indirect) support for the arguments that members of different protected 
groups may experience a different kind of treatment (Fielden et al, 2010; Healy et al, 2011a) and 
that they may interpret it in different ways (Salin, 2011).  
In light of the relevance of protected characteristics there seems to be a potential contradiction 
with the questionnaire findings which saw the characteristics of the parties involved as being of 
lesser importance than whether the behaviour involved a protected characteristic. This was also 
reflected in the hypothetical personal influence results101.  
This contradiction is not easily remedied when one compares the above responses with those 
where participants were directly asked whether it is the nature of the behaviour or the 
characteristics of the parties (i.e. whether one or both have a particular protected characteristic) 
involved that drives the assessment. The responses in this case were strongly in favour of the 
importance of the nature of the behaviour over the party characteristics.  
Rose (G2): It doesn’t make any difference whether it’s a man or a woman.  
[agreement] 
Lauren (G2): I think when you’re reading it, as face value, you do make a number of 
assumptions because you’re looking at, and that’s the danger isn’t it? You’ve got to really try 
and avoid that, if you’ve got into the detail of it, and you were investigating. That’s why you’ve 
got to just focus on ok, what’s the facts, what’s the behaviours?  
Rose (G2): Yes, it should be…if they were called A and B you wouldn’t know what they were, 
would you? 
[agreement] 
Rose (G2): So.  
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Maria (G2): Very interesting. 
Rose (G2): So no, I don’t think it makes any difference. 
The potential resolution to this contradiction may lie firstly in the recognition that there was not 
unanimity in the view that the words, even said to a man, would not amount to sexism (‘I would 
say it’s sexist no matter what’ (Betty (G1)). And secondly in an appreciation that whilst those who 
thought the behaviour was not sexism: they did nevertheless think the behaviour was 
inappropriate. 
Thus, one may possibly argue that though the characteristics of the parties may be seen by some 
(the majority) as important in determining whether the behaviour was sexism, the characteristics 
of the parties was of less importance when the behaviour was seen as falling lower down the scale 
of reasonableness. As the responses demonstrate, it was the sexualised nature of the comments 
that was considered inappropriate102.  
Accessing power through the prioritisation of group membership 
Following from the relevance of personal characteristics, there were comments echoing those of 
the mediators as to the consequences which may flow from the labelling of behaviour as racism 
(for example). Such a label potentially allows an individual to access discourse and power related 
to group membership: 
…if it’s to do with say, your race or your gender, you’ve got from that history and you might 
have more of a supportive group…it’s more power behind you, almost. Whereas, if it’s you, as 
an individual, to do with the way you look or your personality, it’s much more just you on your 
own, fighting this. (Maria (G2)) 
In relation to the positioning of sexism/racism/homophobia as a societal problem, rather than an 
individual one this is an important observation. However, in one of the groups, caution was 
expressed over the danger in rushing to label behaviour as racist/sexist/homophobic simply 
because of the parties or even because of the nature of the language involved:  
Marco (G4): …there’s a distinction here, I think. I suppose if these kinds of situations can be 
made worse if certain conditions are present, like sex or race. At the same time, it can be 
mistaken, a situation like this can be mistaken to be [labelled] sexist or racist just because 
there’s a woman or a person of another race involved, where it can be led back to the person 
who is committing the harassment or bullying being just inappropriate, regardless of race and 
sex. So I think sometimes, it’s you know, using sex and race can be the easy way out. Yeah, 
he did it because he’s racist, or he did it because he’s sexist, but I think sometimes, it’s just 
wrong behaviour, regardless of these conditions… 
Oliver (G4): It can be certainly used as an excuse, as a way of labelling it, and putting it in a 
box. “That’s what he did. It was sexist.” When actually, that might have been an element of it, 
but it wasn’t overtly that clear. 
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Marco (G4): But I think also, from the other way from the other way, it can be used as a 
reinforcement for that accusation. He harassed me because I’m a woman, or he bullied me 
because I’m black, or he bullied me because I’m not white or whatever. So I think it can be 
used as a tool, also as a defensive tool by the person who suffers from this. So it can be, I 
don’t know, used as a weapon. 
Again there was agreement that an investigation was necessary to determine whether it was 
sexism or not. In so doing one participant suggested the priority should be to explore the reasons 
why that specific language was used:  
…you have to get into Philip’s mind about why, in particular, he used those terms to denigrate 
Katrina. What was your thinking behind those things, as well, and perhaps he either has a 
very benign approach or he could have something which is much more deeply engrained in 
his psychology about the treatment of women. (Michael (G4)) 
Such a view potentially risks elevating the importance of intention but also seems to resonate with 
the observations in the previous chapter that situations may often be the result of a 
misunderstanding or a lack of cultural awareness, rather than a knowingly offensive or prejudiced 
comment.  
Protected characteristics: worthy of protection?  
Each group was asked whether they felt a situation was more serious if a protected characteristic 
was involved. The responses generated some interesting insights into understandings of why 
certain characteristics were protected and others were not, and into the propriety of this.  
A number of participants were quick to respond that the situation was legally worse as certain 
characteristics were protected by law. Further probing was required however to access responses 
as to why this was the case (i.e. why only specific characteristics had legal protection). Two 
possible reasons were identified, with one being far more dominant within and across the groups 
than the other.  
The first, less dominant argument related to the difficulties and ambiguities involved in defining 
and delineating characteristics for protection:  
I suppose it’s partly about what you can actually police, but obviously, things like weight and 
stuff like that, there’s such a broad spectrum on everything; whereas something like sex or 
race, it’s kind of a very identifiable characteristic, so it’s much easier to kind of legalise that. 
(Carol (G2)) 
The second, dominant reasons centred round the theme of historical oppression and resultant 
imbalances of power in society: 
Maria (G2): …and there’s more history too isn’t it, beyond bullying. There’s a lot of history to 
those two groups [black and woman] specifically.  
Rose (G2): Yes, that’s right. “We’re not giving you a job because you’re a Catholic in Northern 
Ireland” or “we’re not giving you a job because it’s the 1970s and you’ve got a black face”. 
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Gemma (G1): But also, into all the attachments, if someone gets harassed for their bad sense 
of fashion at work for just wearing hideous jumpers or something like that, there’s not all this 
background on, I don’t know, background of homophobia and racially motivated harassment. 
So it’s not as, it doesn’t fall into this bigger… 
Betty (G1): Like debates. 
Gemma (G1): Yeah, or bigger prejudice that is really within each of, yeah, I don’t know. It’s 
hard to actually describe it. 
Samantha (G1): It’s with, I suppose, with women having been “oppressed” for, you know, 
obviously, for years and years and like you say, it’s that history to it. If you’re making fun of 
someone for yeah, wearing a bad jumper, people with bad jumpers haven’t been oppressed 
for years and years. Yeah I think it’s about that. 
These clearly reflect the rationales identified in the equality literature, for example by Fredman 
(2011) and Collins (2003)103. Given the arguments favoured in the present research, this 
recognition by the participants arguably supports the need to position questions as to why certain 
groups are protected more explicitly when considering the appropriateness question.  
Mixed support for a hierarchy of protected characteristics 
Interestingly, there was doubt among a number of the participants that the arguments surrounding 
the oppression and disadvantaged treatment of women were as relevant now than they had been 
in the past since women’s position in society had improved: 
I think it’s in the past. I mean, if you’d have set this scenario twenty, thirty years ago, it would 
have been straight away probably highly sexist but I think now, because more women have 
been coming, getting higher up in positions than ever before though, so I think [now we’re] 
much more liberal minded… (Oliver (G4)) 
This is interesting since it highlights the fact that standards of reasonableness may change over 
time (Archer, 1998). Indeed, this shifting in socially-defined standards (not solely related to 
gender) was identified as a possible reason why misunderstandings may occur and was (arguably 
in line with the view of the participant mediators) seen as a situation where re-education was seen 
as the appropriate response:  
Lauren (G2): I work in a male dominated industry and I would say, it’s going to sound ageist 
and it’s not meant to, but certainly people who have worked in the industry for a longer time, 
that are used to, what we would call the old days, pre as much employment legislation as 
we’ve got now, that used to have conversations that would now be deemed highly 
inappropriate. Sometimes, if they’ve carried on in that little bubble and worked their way up 
the ladder, and they really don’t realise and I think you’re absolutely right, I think maybe it has 
got to the point where this is the switch for him. That it’s got to the point where “oh, I never 
thought of it like that”. It could be as innocent as that couldn’t it? 
[agreement] 
Lauren (G2): It could just be somebody being naïve to things. 
                                                          
103
 4.4, p48 
194 
 
Rose (G2): and life was very different 30 years ago. Certainly the eighties, it was very 
different. I remember, I used to be chased around meeting rooms. It used to be seen as a 
laugh. 
A number of those who had expressed the view that sexual harassment was no longer as 
serious a problem as it had been went on to describe what may be viewed as a hierarchy of 
characteristics. Here, however, there was contrast with Colgan and Wright (2011) since 
sexual orientation (along with race and disability) was placed higher in the hierarchy:  
Vicky (G1): I almost think race is worse than the gender thing. I don’t know why. I just, gender 
I think it might have changed. I think the race thing, disability is another one as well, 
homophobia are all really sensitive subjects with one person’s, I just think that’s worse. A 
white man with a black man, I just think that would be worse.  
[Samantha (G1) and Gemma (G1): agreement] 
Betty (G1): I don’t agree. I don’t think it’s worse. I think it’s just as bad. I think they’re all bad, 
as bad as each other…that’s also because, probably the gender issue is the only that affects 
me, like racism I suppose, usually if anything, I would probably from a more positive end, and 
also obviously like disability doesn’t either, so maybe it’s just that gender issues are the only 
ones that affect me but I don’t think it’s any better. I think they’re as bad as each other.  
Whilst these rankings are interesting, they were not unanimously supported within or across the 
focus groups, or indeed by the questionnaire findings (where 95.1% agreed or strongly agreed 
that racism, sexism and homophobia were equally serious). That the distinctions were made, 
however, is of potential relevance and interest in respect of the acknowledgement that different 
people prioritise different characteristics in different ways. It is also important to note that this 
indicates that personal interpretations of impersonal standards will differ. This is, of course, one of 
the reasons why those, such as the mediators interviewed, prefer responses that allow the 
individuals involved to determine this balance for themselves.  
Protected or non-protected: the importance of dignity 
The identification of a possible hierarchy by some participants aside, there was no objection raised 
to the inclusion of race, sex or sexual orientation as protected characteristics. To return to the 
question of whether the presence of these made a situation more serious, the responses fell along 
a spectrum where these were seen as worse than non-protected characteristics at the one end and 
those who felt that they were not worse at the other. Though the conclusions differed, the 
reasoning behind these positions was similar and focused on whether it could ever be fair to treat 
someone differently on the basis of an aspect of their person.  
Here, although the word dignity was not often used, the ideas and understandings being expressed 
resonate with the notion of dignity set out in chapter 4, i.e. ‘the value attached to individuals 
simply by virtue of their humanity’ meaning ‘that all are entitled to equal concern and respect’ 
(Fredman, 2011:20). Some of the language used in the following quotes, for example ‘denigrates’ 
also reflects those given in the qualitative definitions of bullying and harassment and coded as 
dignity in chapter 7: 
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Michael (G4): Absolutely. If something is overtly an ism and specifically denigrates somebody 
on a nature of their own character and their being, then that becomes very serious for me. 
That’s either racism or sexism or a phobia based around a characteristic of a person, be that 
race or ethnicity or religious belief that becomes a very, very serious issue. 
Oliver (G4): Yeah, attacking somebody on the basis of who they are, of what they are, is 
fundamentally wrong. 
 
Rose (G2): …even if it’s not legally, it does [make it more serious] because it’s something 
very personal to you. So somebody is saying, oh you know, somebody is saying something 
you know, something and it’s yes 
Maria (G2): part of your identity 
… 
Maria (G2): Yeah. It’s an interesting question isn’t it? Is it more serious sort of, to say 
something to somebody who is overweight, and obviously that would really hurt somebody. Is 
that more hurtful or more serious than saying something is really kind of like racially offensive, 
as you, say legally it is. 
Characteristics potentially seen as serious included weight, hair colour and height and reflected the 
‘lookism’ arguments for an expansion of protected characteristics (Desir, 2010; Davis, 2008). The 
positioning of characteristics that attract stigma also seemingly supports Solanke’s (2011) 
argument, although the link she draws with disadvantage is not drawn here. From the participant 
responses it seems that the impact to the individual’s character is sufficient.  
Care should be exercised however in the temptation to relate treating non-protected characteristics 
as equally important to protected characteristics with the position offered by managing diversity. 
The rationale in their responses differs from that adopted in the latter because the rationale 
because here the concerns are ethical and moral, and not for the business case (Dickens, 1999; 
Noon, 2007).  
Those who found it more difficult to conclude all characteristics should be treated equally accepted 
the relevance of dignity but drew their conclusion on the basis of the inalienability of the protected 
characteristics. The recognition of the inalienability of a characteristic is closely related to the 
understandings of dignity accepted in this thesis and also underpins many of the structural and 
disadvantage arguments (Desir, 2010; Fredman, 2011): 
I wonder also, if from what you’ve said, is what makes it even worse is because they are 
demographic things and not things you can change…because you can wear a better jumper, 
obviously, but you can’t change these demographic things. (Betty (G1)) 
The findings presented in this portion of the chapter provide some interesting insights and 
empirical evidence for a number of the parts of the argument set out above that are largely based 
on abstract, non-empirical work. That there was confusion and a lack of consensus on many points 
is interesting and entirely expected since the issues involved are complex. In particular, the 
questions about the reasons for distinguishing between protected and non-protected characteristics 
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seemed to challenge the participants. The ways in which the various positions in respect of the 
relationship between the nature of the behaviour and the protected characteristics of the parties 
involved and of the differing views relating to the singling out of specific characteristics may be 
incorporated into the framework will be considered in the next chapter. The key, it will be argued, 
lies in the acknowledgement that the standards of reasonableness to be applied vary with the level 
of responsibility and the nature of the relationship (i.e. associational/organisational/societal).  
9.6 FINDING A FAIR RESOLUTION 
Despite the different views on whether or not the behaviour amounted to bullying, harassment or 
sexism, there was agreement that the behaviour was nevertheless inappropriate. There was also 
agreement that the choice as to how the situation should be dealt with lay with Katrina and what 
she wanted or needed from the response: 
I think you’d have to talk to Katrina and speak to her to see how she sees it moving on. Does 
she see that she can ever go back to the workplace with him? Obviously speak to him to get 
his side, but I don’t think that matters so much as her, seeing where she can go from here. 
(Vicky (G1)) 
Possible choices identified included both formal and informal options and included the potential use 
of mediation. It should be noted, however, that even where informal options were favoured it was 
felt that these must involve a third party who was sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled:  
[M]y understanding is that mediation may work in that process but maybe a professional 
mediator, because if I am not that much skilled as a mediator, in that case I should not be 
handling that process. I should be hiring a professional mediator to come in. (Robert (G3)) 
I do think there needs to be another person who sits in the middle and I do think that person 
needs to be appropriately qualified and trained as well…in this kind of thing, how people are 
feeling. (Betty (G1)) 
The concern with skill reflects the views of the mediators set out in the previous chapter and, as 
was seen there, has potential implications for whether the chosen resolution option may be 
considered as fair. Although the comments about skills made in the focus group were not explored 
to confirm agreement with this, agreement may tentatively be inferred from the context in which 
the comments arose i.e. what would be a fair way to deal with the situation.  
Reflecting the high rankings of the corresponding variables in the questionnaire results, there was 
a strong agreement that the option chosen should provide the parties involved with the opportunity 
to explain:  
Rose (G2): Yes. Yes. I do, some sort of mediation where there’s somebody there…she can 
say how she feels, he can say how he feels and they can help understand each other. 
Lauren (G2): I’m not sure where I’d put that [mediation]. I might want to investigate the initial 
facts first, because there could be some real, there seems to be an inference that there is a 
breakdown in communication here somewhere, and to put them in a room…if she’s going 
through something that’s not obvious here, you wouldn’t know that until you’ve asked the 
questions so… 
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… 
Carol (G2): Yeah, I agree with that. I think the ideal outcome really, would be if you got to that 
stage. Spoke to them both, did the investigation and realised that it was just kind of a 
miscommunication or a lack of understanding, and then you could do the mediation and 
they’re both like, “yeah, now I understand your point of view and I won’t do it anymore”. That 
is the best outcome you could hope for. 
The focus group responses in this respect, however, offer an apparent difference to those provided 
by the mediators and that difference relates to the process through which these opportunities 
should be afforded. The mediators saw mediation as the appropriate mechanism to facilitate this 
but for the focus groups the initial opportunity to explain should arise in the context of an 
investigation. Here the explanation is being delivered to the third party investigator and not to the 
other party. As previously outlined, there was clear agreement amongst the focus group 
participants that explanations should be used to allow a third party to ascertain the ‘facts’ and the 
outcome of the investigation would determine what the next step should be. Therefore, even 
where an informal option was suggested, such a choice should be preceded by an investigation. 
This opinion was shared by all participants, including those who stated they had training and 
experience of workplace mediation. This is interesting since it seems to reflect the experience of 
the mediators reported in the interviews but does not reflect the opinion of the mediators 
themselves over the timing of investigations.  
The support for the need for an investigation seems grounded in a sense that the scenario cannot 
just be characterised as an interpersonal dispute but that it should be seen as a potential 
organisational problem. As indicated above104, there was a great deal of discussion about the role 
the culture of the organisation may have played in facilitating and/or failing to curtail the 
behaviour: 
They did highlight [it] was a characteristic of the environment. That there was a lot of banter 
and sexual innuendo…I think organisationally they have to highlight…there has to be a way of 
allowing people to complain earlier in a safer way. If she felt like she couldn’t complain or 
something, that would be an issue and you could, you’d have to ask her to find out if she felt 
she couldn’t say anything, whether there was no process for her to complain about 
harassment before the situation got that bad. (Anthony (G3)) 
This stance provides support for the proposition that an organisation should be seen as a party to 
the dispute. This is not entirely inconsistent with the findings from the mediator interviews but 
seemingly casts the organisation in a far more proactive and directive role than envisioned in the 
previous chapter where the degree of organisational involvement was to be driven by the parties. 
This position has important implications for the privatisation arguments and will be considered 
shortly.  
Although initial explanations should be given to a third party investigator, the focus group 
participants saw a value in providing the opportunity for the parties to explain their positions to 
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each other directly and to seek the shared understanding which ranked so highly in the 
questionnaire (and was considered as central to the arguments of empowerment and the value of 
mediation). The focus group responses did not necessarily directly invoke the themes associated 
with empowerment (for example, there was no mention of control) but the chance to use the 
situation as a learning opportunity was evident. Reflecting the mediator stance, providing Katrina 
was willing, mediation was seen to be relevant regardless of whether or not the investigation had 
shown the situation to be a misunderstanding. 
In relation to resolution, intent seemed to be of greater relevance than in the assessment of the 
behaviour. From the responses, an inference could be made that where it was found to be 
bullying/harassment and that it had been deliberate, mediation alone would not be seen as a fair 
response. Although the terms blame and punishment were not used, if the behaviour was seen as 
deliberate, fairness seemed to necessitate a stronger response. A potential role for learning and 
understanding in such a case was not automatically excluded but there seemed to be a view that 
here the responsibility should not necessarily fall on the parties involved but on the organisation:  
Oliver (G4): …from the company’s point of view, more holistically some sort of memo needs 
to be sent around about appropriate behaviour and reminding people of policies that are in 
place. 
Michael (G4): They also need to be re-inducted into the organisation as well. Whatever equal 
opportunities training is given to people as new recruits, they need to be taken back through 
as well. 
Though the focus group comments offered in this section and the next may be used to support the 
theoretical arguments, they also demonstrate an acknowledgement that a public statement is also 
required by an appreciation of a practical reality of managing in an organisation. This again returns 
the discussion to the extent to which an organisation should be involved in dealing with the 
situation in a fair way. As has, and will be seen, one may derive an apparent support from the 
focus group findings against the personalisation and privatisation of disputes.   
9.7 AN IMPERSONAL ISSUE: ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTING 
STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS 
That an organisation should be responsible for setting and enforcing standards of reasonable 
behaviour was a strong theme throughout all the focus groups. There was a persistent questioning 
of the extent to which a problem between two individuals could ever be seen as just that. The 
influence and impact of the organisational attitude towards the behaviour and the parties was seen 
as an unavoidable contextual factor when assessing the behaviour and what would be seen as a 
fair way of dealing with it. Just as the involvement of colleagues in establishing what had 
happened was seen as necessary, that they were aware of the steps taken to deal with the 
situation was also seen as necessary: 
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I think the office should know. That they should be given a message how the problem has 
been solved so that they can see that it doesn’t happen in the office again. Because, if I’m the 
boss, and I have to deal with these things quite often, I definitely too would be pissed off 
because rather than focusing on my job, I have to deal with this kind of behaviour all the time. 
(Robert (G3)) 
I think you have to give the example, and if a line manager doesn’t give the example, I don’t 
know. [You] could have fifteen, twenty employees, you might as well, if you don’t stop it there, 
you may as well have the CEO doing things like that, and then the whole organisation might 
think “Well, it’s acceptable. Everything is acceptable here.” I’m just saying the higher up, the 
more you’re under the spot light. The more you’re exposed to certain public criticism and 
public investigation as well. (Marco (G4)) 
Thus, failure to be seen to address the problem may result in the ‘revolving door’ situation 
considered in the previous chapter. 
Again, however, ensuring this information was relayed was not seen as the responsibility of the 
parties involved (as may be the case in mediation) but the responsibility of the organisation.  
There was some debate however over what information it was necessary to disclose in order to 
satisfy this responsibility, especially where the parties involved wanted to keep information private:  
Ian (G3): I think it’s up to her. Up to Katrina if she wants it to be shared then, but if she wants 
it to be private, that’s her decision…if there is a message that needs to be discussed with the 
office, then you can do it generally, without specifically mentioning like this case because she 
might not want people to know.  
Anthony (G3): I think in an office situation, where there’s a large problem and then silence, 
and then high management comes down and passes a new policy, without details it just 
makes rumours and speculation and [would] probably be a harder working environment after 
that. 
… 
John (G3): I don’t think it should be kept private. I think the details should be kept private, but 
I think the outcome should be communicated to the wider team. So if it was, say there was, 
because we work with students, and in the past, we’ve had issues where a member of staff 
has said something inappropriate in front of a student and that member of staff has been 
taken in and spoken to about the inappropriateness of it, and then afterwards, an email goes 
out to say “just be aware that comments relating to this, this, this and this are inappropriate, 
especially in front of students or directed to students. So please be aware of the nature of 
your environment”…and I think that’s reasonable. Obviously, when the email goes out 
everyone knew what it was about but not everyone knew the details of what actually 
happened, about what was said. 
Anthony (G3): So you don’t rewrite the insult twice basically.  
The consensus within and across groups was, however, that there was no need to widely disclose 
the precise details of how the situation arose, the specific words and/or the actions leading to the 
complaint. Rather, it was felt that what was necessary was a strong reminder of organisational 
policies and intolerance of certain types of behaviour. 
This reflects the importance of the need argued for here for organisations to provide publically 
knowable standards which conform to both organisational and societal impersonally determined 
standards of reasonableness. If standards are needed to aid people in knowing what the rules of 
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co-operation with others are, it follows these should be public (Rawls, 2001). Also possibly 
supporting the proposition that standards should be subject to a process of public deliberation 
through discussion in accordance with public reasons (Rawls, 2001), sending a strong message 
was also seen as an important part of creating a culture which encouraged individuals to challenge 
behaviour they see as unreasonable. This may also serve to encourage a discussion on appropriate 
language and conduct that may otherwise be constrained or discouraged by a lack of 
communication following a complaint: 
Betty (G1): I think there needs to be some sort of demonstrable outcome…from a business 
point of view. It’s impossible to sell something if people don’t understand what comes out of it. 
If you say put money, time, whatever, and yourselves into a process, and no one ever sees 
anything come out of it, in the end you’re never going to get that sold, and for future people 
that may want to use the process, if they then always see “oh look, those people. We don’t 
know the details but it was resolved so…”  
… 
Vicky (G1): People feel able to talk about it more openly, and maybe she could have said 
earlier, I don’t know. 
Betty (G1): I agree. If you want to have a culture of a company that supports, or would not 
support, this kind of behaviour, you need to make it clear that this kind of behaviour occurred 
and was not put up with because it’s not appropriate. 
The organisational reinforcement may also include training, not only of the parties involved but 
also of colleagues, and importantly managers. In agreement with the mediators, as seen above, 
there was also a feeling the organisation could take the situation as an organisational learning 
opportunity105.  
That the possibility an organisation may use the opportunity to change its practices may be seen 
as a way of an organisation holding itself to account through the disciplining of wrongdoing or the 
retraining of those who may have allowed standards to slip.  
The focus group ideas of what is necessary to deal with the situation in a fair way seem to provide 
a much greater degree of overt support for the arguments advanced in chapters 2-5 than the 
mediator responses. In particular, the insistence on an investigation and on organisational 
involvement at every step seems to prioritise notions of impersonally reasonable standards and 
responsibility over personal ones and thus arguably favours the representative (rather than direct) 
structures argued for here. The two sets of findings are, however, not necessarily incompatible 
and, as will be seen in the next chapter, may be integrated into the theoretical framework without 
too much trouble. And whilst fairness was considered, it is interesting to note that ideas of justice 
were far less apparent.  
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9.8 THE RELEVANCE OF JUSTICE: IMPLIED BUT NOT EXPLICIT 
As has been stated, there was also strong agreement both within groups and overall that a fair 
way of dealing with the situation required an investigation. The reasons why an investigation was 
seen as necessary seem to engage with concerns of both substance and procedure. It is important 
to note at the outset that whilst responses do refer to factors which may thematically be related to 
one or more of the forms of justice identified in chapter 3 (and most clearly procedural justice), 
there was only one explicit use of the word justice, which was a reference to restorative justice. 
The lack of direct comment on justice may perhaps counter the argument advanced that there is a 
need to distinguish between fairness and justice since it seems no such distinction is made here. 
Alternatively, however, the presence of factors potentially related to ideas of procedural justice 
may be seen to support the argument that whilst justice and fairness may be seen as different 
things, particularly in respect of procedure, it is likely both fairness and justice factors will be 
present.  
The prioritising of impersonally reasonable standards and the need for organisations to take 
responsibility for enforcing those standards also perhaps reflects some of the characteristics of 
more substantive forms of justice and of social justice in particular i.e. the need to reinforce the 
idea that individuals should not be exposed to certain types of behaviour (those engaging with 
protected characteristics and/or dignity). That the parties involved perceive the outcome as fair 
was seen as necessary but not sufficient:  
Yeah, find a way of managing the communications. So you’ve reached the decisions you’ve 
reached…you may not necessarily agree, but if the people involved are satisfied, and the 
actions taken are agreed by the organisation that they’re the right actions, then I think that’s 
just a matter of managing that communication piece to everybody else. (Lauren (G2)) 
Therefore, it was not necessary that every person would also think that the response was fair 
provided the basis on which the decision had been made was evident. 
Again, this has echoes of ideas of procedural justice (e.g. transparency in process, Roberts and 
Palmer, 2005) and its importance for determining the extent to which an outcome may be 
considered as fair (or possibly just).  
Therefore, though it may be argued that the participants did not expressly label their comments as 
relating to justice, many of the factors and conditions considered could thematically be related to 
notions of justice. However, participants were not expressly asked about justice (for time reasons) 
and the failure to qualify their statements as relating to justice make it difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions here in support of the distinction between fairness and justice.  
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9.9 REFLECTIONS 
Finally, by way of seeking to demonstrate the worth in having theoretically informed discussions 
and in exposing people to other views and providing them with the opportunity to explore them to 
increase understanding, it is worth briefly noting the reflections of the participants on whether 
taking part had changed the way they thought about bullying and harassment. Responses largely 
fell into one of two categories. The first category stated it had made them reflect more on their 
own experiences. Responses in the second category related to understandings of bullying and 
harassment itself and referred to ways it had made them realise how complex it could be or how it 
had made them broaden their perspective and, for example, to think more about the victim or to 
view it as an organisational problem. 
9.10 CONCLUSION 
Although it is possible to identify a number of areas of agreement between the focus group 
findings and those of the mediator interviews, there is an evident difference in the importance 
attached to personal and impersonal standards in evaluating behaviour and also what a fair 
response would be. From the focus groups, personal perceptions and evaluations are to be 
tempered by impersonal and objectively determined standards through investigation and 
organisational involvement at every stage. On the face of it this may potentially lead one to 
conclude from the focus group findings that mediation is inappropriate for dealing with bullying and 
harassment. However, this is not a necessary consequence and in the recognition that mediation 
should be considered as one possible option, one may find a solution to reconciling the findings 
within the framework proposed here. This will be set out in the next chapter.  
The emphasis placed on the organisational responsibility in ensuring disputes are dealt with in a 
fair way arguably favours of avoidance of the personalisation and inappropriate privatisation of 
problems. Again, however, as with the mediator responses, the faith placed in the extent to which 
an organisation may be sufficiently willing and able to accept and uphold its responsibility is not 
necessarily matched when the counter-productive or even prohibitive nature of the culture of many 
organisations is accepted.  
Having now set out the findings from each data collection stage and sought to relate them back to 
the existing literature and to the arguments advanced in order to try and demonstrate how the 
quality of the research (as defined in chapter 6) may be determined, the next chapter will now 
explicitly address the research questions and present the final framework for consideration.  
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CHAPTER 10. DISCUSSION, KEY CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the extent of the discussion in the context of the existing literature in the preceding 
chapters, this chapter will focus on the theoretical contribution derived from the previous 
discussion in chapters 2-5 and chapters 7-9. As it has been argued that the aim is to offer a 
greater theoretical grounding for understanding workplace mediation in bullying and harassment 
cases through responding to the over-arching “appropriateness question”, it is further argued that 
this necessitates a greater focus on the combined contributions of each research question within 
the theoretical framework offered, rather than on each question taken individually. It follows from 
this argument that the structure and content of this chapter may therefore differ from that which 
may otherwise be anticipated and thus, only brief attention will be given to the individual research 
questions (questions 1-5). The theoretical framework will therefore be offered as a response to the 
research questions in itself.  
The framework is presented in two parts. The first is a theoretical model representing the guiding 
context of fairness and the balancing of the personal and impersonal standards of reasonableness 
to illustrate how different disputes may be positioned along a spectrum of standards of behaviour. 
The second takes the form of a flow diagram illustrating how the various factors and contextual 
features may influence the route a particular dispute may take. It is anticipated that the second 
component will have greater practical utility and speak more directly to matters of feasibility than 
the model. However, by incorporating elements of the theoretical model into the second part the 
connection between the often abstract concepts and arguments and the practical policy and 
organisational context is evident. The two parts seek to demonstrate the value in offering 
theoretically structured discussions on “the appropriateness question”.  
Thus, to return to the map analogy, the model represents the hypothetical park of fairness and the 
schematic represents the various paths and directions that may be followed to determine how 
feasible a certain path is and where in the park a dispute (and the parties involved) may end up.  
The chapter will also identify a number of limitations of the research and offer suggestions for 
future research.  
Finally, it will identify the key contributions of the research and offer a brief overall conclusion 
arguing that workplace mediation may be seen as appropriate for dealing with bullying and 
harassment but that this appropriateness is highly contingent. 
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10.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overarching question has been to what extent is workplace mediation appropriate for dealing 
with workplace bullying and harassment? This has been referred to throughout as “the 
appropriateness question”. In order to answer this, further questions were considered:  
1. What factors influence whether a situation is perceived as bullying and/or harassment?  
2. What factors influence whether mediation is perceived as appropriate? 
3. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining perceptions of bullying 
and/or harassment? 
4. Why are certain factors considered to be influential in determining whether mediation is 
perceived as appropriate? 
5. How do the factors associated with perceptions of bullying and/or harassment and those 
associated with the appropriateness of mediation relate to each other? 
 
The responses to the research questions are offered from within the methodological and 
theoretical assumptions adopted here and thus it is important to qualify that the conclusions drawn 
are not intended to be prescriptive and universal. They are offered as representing what may be 
seen as an overlapping consensus (Rawls, 2001) on the factors and influences which could, on the 
basis of the evidence presented (through the literature review and findings), answer the research 
questions.  
Although a distinction will be made between factors seen as necessary and those seen as 
influential, this is not to be equated with a presentation of a single ordering of the factors. Rather, 
the conclusions drawn for the first two (“what”) research questions are qualified by the responses 
to the “why” and the “how” questions. The contextual and relational factors will therefore dictate 
the weight to be assigned to a particular factor on a case-by-case basis. This contextual and 
relational nature further necessitates the offering of the framework in combined response to the 
research questions. 
 
10.3 IDENTIFYING THE ‘WHAT’ FACTORS 
The discussion will begin by outlining the conclusions to the first two questions. The potential 
reasons for the importance of these factors have been identified throughout the preceding 
chapters and so in the interests of avoiding repetition and allowing for the focus on theoretical 
contribution outlined in the introduction, initial consideration of the first and second questions will 
largely take the form a list. However, further discussion of a number of the factors is offered below 
in relation to their potential operation within the proposed framework (see 10.5, p212).  
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10.3.1 Question 1. Behaviour: Bullying and harassment 
In order to consider the factors arising from this research it is useful to return to the definitions of 
bullying and harassment adopted above (p47). Bullying was taken as ‘persistently insulting, 
malicious, intimidating, exclusionary or violent behaviour which adopts a particular pattern and 
dynamic with escalation of the problem over a time period’ (Beale and Hoel, 2010:101). 
Harassment was defined as it is in s26 (1) of the EA 2010: ‘A person (A) harasses another (B) if- 
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the 
conduct has the purpose or effect of- (i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B’. Chapter 4 further identified a 
number of additional considerations including negative behaviour, perception, intention, 
persistency, power imbalance and escalation. All of these elements arose at some or multiple 
points throughout the data collection stages. 
On the basis of the arguments presented in chapters 2-5 and the findings explored in chapters 7-9, 
the factors which may arguably be seen as necessary and/or influential in understanding what may 
lead to a situation being perceived as bullying and/or harassment can be identified. Although target 
perception was seen as the paramount factor, no single factor is sufficient. Multiple factors are 
required and include:  
1. Perpetrator intention to do the act complained of (but not necessarily to cause harm-although 
this may be influential);  
2. The behaviour is negative and unwanted; 
3. Target perception that the behaviour is bullying/harassment is necessary and sufficient to 
trigger a presumption of bullying/harassment but it is not sufficient for a conclusion of 
bullying/harassment to be made. The presumption must be validated through an assessment 
of the reasonableness of the target perception, for example, through an objective 
investigation; 
4. A degree of persistency (likely but not always necessary for harassment). 
It was suggested that other factors may not be seen as necessary but may nevertheless influence 
the perception: 
1. An escalation in the frequency or form of the behaviour; 
2. Power imbalance(s) between the parties; 
3. The parties’ personal (protected) characteristics. 
The classification of some factors as influential, rather than necessary, and the attention given to 
intention to cause harm (i.e. a malicious element) do not necessarily differ from Beale and Hoel’s 
definition adopted above but do depart from Einarsen et al’s (2003:22) characteristics of bullying. 
In addressing Keashly and Nowell’s (2003; 2011) objections relating to a failure to adequately 
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account for power imbalances in bullying situations in mediation, the positioning of power should 
be noted. On the findings it is difficult to conclude a power imbalance was seen as a necessary 
factor. However, it is possible to argue evidence of a power imbalance may strengthen the 
conclusion that something is or is not bullying/harassment but it is not necessary for reaching that 
conclusion in the first place. On the basis that there was an acceptance in the qualitative stages 
that power is complicated and dynamic (Jenkins et al, 2012) and that the presence of certain 
imbalances, for example, a hierarchical relationship or male/female does not necessarily lead to 
bullying/harassment it is less problematic to argue on the data collected here that the existence of 
power imbalances may lead to or be the result of bullying/harassment. Understood in this way 
power (im)balances may be seen as more of a contextual factor, creating conditions that may allow 
bullying and/or harassment to arise and may therefore be of greater importance in determining 
how to deal with the situation and perhaps also in explaining why certain behaviour should not be 
tolerated106.   
Bullying and harassment: the same but different?  
There was recognition across all three stages that bullying and harassment were different things 
but this was accompanied by a sense of confusion as to what the difference was. 
Possible distinctions were drawn in relation to the involvement of a protected characteristic. This 
was often however not drawn on the basis of knowledge of employment law but rather through 
exposure to publically available information such as media reporting on cases of sexual or racial 
harassment. This had led to the association of the word harassment with a protected characteristic. 
Given the argument made in chapters 2-5 about the importance of a public forum to help facilitate 
collective understanding (as required in Rawls’s fair society) this is interesting. It is particularly so 
in light of the comments about the media potentially being the primary way many will receive 
information about how the standards of reasonableness enacted in law are applied in practice107. 
Although there were some apparent inconsistencies between the relative importance of the parties 
possessing certain characteristics and the nature of the behaviour, overall one may argue the 
balance fell in line with the legal position i.e. the latter108.  
Other possible distinctions were drawn over the relevance of a malicious intent or the requirement 
the behaviour was repeated. In both cases the questionnaire definitions and the focus groups saw 
these as more relevant to bullying than to harassment. They were not seen as entirely irrelevant to 
harassment (and therefore only partially support Branch’s (2008) view).  
Although they could not themselves necessarily make the distinction, when explicitly asked 
whether it was important to distinguish between bullying and harassment a minority (of both 
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mediators and focus group participants) felt it was important to make a distinction between the 
two for the purposes of formal procedures. The majority of participants in the qualitative stages, 
however, supported the view that they are synonyms or subsets of each other and for many of the 
focus group participants it was sufficient to establish that the behaviour had breached some 
threshold of (impersonally) reasonable behaviour. This view is potentially inconsistent with their 
support of investigation and objective determinations of the situation. One may perhaps infer 
therefore that whilst they personally see it as unnecessary for their own understanding, 
distinguishing the two serves an organisational purpose.  
The interview participants were, however, more explicit in their rejection of the need to distinguish 
between the two. For them what mattered was the perception of the parties and what had led 
them to apply those labels. This is, of course, consistent with the rejection of labels in mediation 
(Irvine, 2014) but has implications for the (public) shared understandings of reasonable behaviour 
favoured here109.  
Thus it is argued that whilst it is possible to make distinctions between bullying and harassment, 
for the majority of participants (in the last two stages) this did not appear to influence their 
personal assessment as to what they understood as bullying/harassment. The need to distinguish 
the two was however seen as important by the focus group participants (but not the mediators) in 
order to deal with a situation in a fair way.  
10.3.2 Question 2. Resolution: The appropriateness of mediation 
Before continuing it is important to reiterate the favouring of a facilitative model of mediation 
(confirmed through the interviews) and thus the conclusions drawn here are to be seen as 
reflecting assessments as to the appropriateness of facilitative mediation.  
As with the previous section, factors for the second research question can be considered as either 
necessary and/or influential in understanding whether mediation may be considered as 
appropriate. Again, although voluntary full participation was seen as the paramount factor, no 
single factor is sufficient. Multiple factors are required and include:  
1. Voluntary participation and intention to fully participate in the mediation process; 
2. A consideration of the nature and severity of the behaviour (although possibly of greater 
importance to an employer than a mediator); 
3. Party capability (health and possibly personality); 
4. Organisational involvement in the mediation process (Organisation as a party); 
5. Strong mediator skills and impartiality; 
6. Confidentiality: negotiated and tailored, not absolute; 
7. Opportunity to explain and seek shared understanding. 
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Other factors may arguably not be seen as necessary but may nevertheless influence the response: 
1. Power relationship; 
2. Organisational attitude and culture; 
3. Party (protected) characteristics. 
It was seen above that the responses of the parties, a mediator and the employer may vary. The 
strong dominance of the empowerment factors, rather than the cost and efficiency ones should be 
noted. Beyond the questionnaire there was little consideration of the latter. This may, however, 
largely be a consequence of the sample composition as there was evidence through the mediator 
responses that organisations’ concerns remain dominated by the latter.  
The greatest contribution to understanding the appropriateness of mediation in relation to this 
question (and indeed overall) may be found in the expansion of the mediation relationship beyond 
that adopted by Nabatchi et al (2007) and indeed by Ridley-Duff and Bennett (2011) to include the 
organisation. That this is necessary was noted by Bennett (2013) in his application of Ridley-Duff 
and Bennett’s framework to his interview findings but their framework is yet to be developed to 
reflect this. This contribution is strengthened by a greater insight into the way in which 
confidentiality operates in practice. Confidentiality as a barrier to the transformative effect of 
mediation has been noted (e.g. Latreille, 2011; Saam, 2010) but has not explored in the UK, either 
conceptually or empirically.  
The factors and influences identified above which may lead to a fair and feasible use of mediation 
to address workplace bullying are highly contingent on context and relationships and thus the mere 
identification of the factors is not sufficient. 
10.4 ADDRESSING THE ‘WHY’ AND ‘HOW’ QUESTIONS 
In order to answer the remaining research questions it is necessary to finally move to the 
construction of the new framework since it is through this process that the conclusions as to the 
reasons why those factors are considered important and how they relate to each other are best 
demonstrated. In relation to the why question, the understandings of fairness, justice and dignity 
as explored in chapters 2-5 and related to the findings in chapters 7-9 are offered in response to 
research questions 3 and 4 and are used as key justifications for determining a fair response to the 
appropriateness question. These “why” factors will be structured according to the need to 
recognise the varying standards of reasonableness to be applied across the spectrum previously 
teased out110. In explaining these “why” factors it is also important to acknowledge the differing 
levels of responsibility that attach to different parties in their relationships with each other 
(associational, organisational, societal) (question 5).  
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The two parts of the framework (the theoretical model and schematic) can be seen in their 
complete forms on pages 213 and 223 respectively. The schematic will be dealt with briefly as its 
elements are more self-evident (on the basis of answers to the first two research questions and the 
discussion of the model). The theoretical model however requires more detailed explanation and 
most explicitly relates back to the abstract arguments and necessitates a return to Rawls’s thought 
experiment for determining the terms of social co-operation in a fair society111. The discussion of 
the model will take a step-by-step approach to its construction and seeks to demonstrate how 
fairness provides the grounding for the discussion and is presented with the purpose of indicating 
where disputes may “plotted” within the analogised “park of fairness”.  
10.4.1 Questions 3 and 4. Why: A respect for fairness, justice and dignity 
The “why” questions were treated as thematically similar and therefore in response to both 
questions 3 and 4 one may tentatively offer empirical support for the theoretical argument that 
many of the factors identified in question 1 and 2 are seen as influential for reasons of fairness, 
justice and dignity, although the extent to which these were to be seen as personally or 
impersonally determined varied. Reasons of cost and efficiency were also evident but, on the data 
collected were arguably subordinate112. This section will explore why fairness, justice and dignity 
are seen as important.  
Fairness 
Firstly, it is important to recall the understanding of Rawls’s fairness favoured above: ‘central [to 
the idea of fairness] must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the 
interests and concerns of others as well, in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our 
respective vested interests, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices’ (Sen, 
2009:54). It is argued that there is sufficient evidence in an exploration of the literature and in the 
findings to establish fairness as a possible guiding concern in mediation or at the very least for 
providing a context within which the appropriateness question can be discussed. Indeed the factors 
identified above and the constant battle between the balancing of subjective and objective 
determinations highlight the relevance of this to the understanding presented here.  
Support can be found both in relation to the questions explicitly asked about fairness in the 
mediator interviews and the faith placed that mediation, properly used and conducted, is 
necessarily fair. Support may also be found in other findings which explore how organisational, 
societal and/or individual priorities and pursuits may influence or bias evaluations of behaviour and 
the choice and operation of dealing with bullying and harassment in a fair way. These arguably 
serve to demonstrate the relevance of fairness and also help to illustrate how an abstract notion 
such as fairness may be applied in practice.  
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Justice 
Similarly it is argued there are grounds to conclude that whilst justice will often be a relevant 
concern that may determine the way the above factors are weighted, this will not necessarily 
always be the case. Across the data collection stages there seemed to be a stronger consensus 
over the importance or relevance of objective standards for complying with procedural justice: 
although the form procedural justice may take arguably differed according to the resolution 
chosen113. There was a greater level of disagreement over the importance of objective judgements 
of the substantive outcome of the situation114. The interviews indicated that this had little or no 
role in mediation115. It is more difficult to offer a definite conclusion on the basis of the very limited 
direct comments about justice in the focus groups but given the themes of the theoretical 
argument offered here one may arguably infer tentative support for a collective form of substantive 
justice from the importance placed on organisational involvement and the need for a public 
demonstration of a commitment to shared standards of reasonableness116.   
The positions are, however, not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the mediator interviews there 
was a clear positioning of mediation as something different and as something that potentially 
requires a different language and a different form of justice, that is, if justice is to be seen as 
relevant at all. Reconciliation in the different views may be found in an argument that not every 
element of procedural and/or substantive forms of justice must be satisfied in each and every case. 
What matters is that those factors that correspond with the resolution choice are met e.g. that a 
mediator is impartial and that parties participate voluntarily. Additionally, it will be seen shortly that 
the greater organisational involvement in mediation championed here provides the possibility of 
convergence between the differing focus group and mediator views since it potentially allows for 
personal and impersonal considerations of justice to be (at least partially) satisfied. At the very 
least the scope for difference in opinion highlights the need to have discussions over the relevance 
of justice to workplace mediation that are lacking in a UK context.  
Dignity 
Though the position in relation to justice is a little precarious at present, the support for dignity as 
a reason why the various factors considered above are seen as influential and why bullying and 
harassment are objectionable was stronger117. This was particularly evident in the discussions over 
the singling out of particular characteristics for protection. Here dignity was either explicitly or 
thematically demonstrated through an appreciation of an inherent need to respect an individual’s 
intrinsic identity and worth (Fredman, 2011; p194-196). Whilst there was a difference of opinion 
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over the propriety of selecting only certain characteristics, there was an acknowledgement of the 
historical and social reasons why this was the case (Fredman, 2011; Hepple, 2008; pp192-194). As 
will be seen below, this is reflected in the model through recognition of a spectrum of 
reasonableness118.  
Dignity was also seen as relevant in the mediator interviews in relation not only to the behaviour 
but also to the possibility offered by mediation to help the parties take control of a situation and 
become personally empowered to determine what happens to them119. As was seen, this view 
seems to offer strong support for Ridley-Duff and Bennett’s (2011) favouring of direct democracy 
and the radical potential of mediation (Bennett, 2013). It is, however, arguably insufficient to 
account for many of the complicating contextual factors which may hamper the appropriate use of 
mediation in practice, e.g. organisational culture or the sense of collective power and historical 
weight which potentially flows from allegations of racism, sexism and/or homophobia.  
Balancing personal and impersonal standards of reasonableness 
It is in relation to this aspect that the interview and focus group findings most notably differ. The 
assessments and justifications provided in the focus groups lend support to the extension of the 
use of public standards of reasonableness to individuals in their associational capacities, i.e. in their 
day to day dealings with each other and therefore support the need to adapt Rawls’s thought 
experiment beyond a political society (p31; Nagel, 1991). Though there was recognition that 
impersonal standards of reasonableness may inform an individual’s personal position, for the 
mediators, these had limited relevance to mediation where the subjective perception of the parties 
is paramount120. However, in the focus groups there was a favouring of the impersonal. This was 
evidenced through the importance attached to investigation and also in the apparent (albeit 
inconsistently presented) conclusion that it is the fact behaviour may be racist or sexist and 
therefore offensive to those groups, rather than whether or not the parties involved possessed one 
or more of the relevant characteristics121.  Understanding how mediation can be related to other 
procedures and adapted in practice helps to reconcile tensions between the balancing of the 
personal and impersonal in a way which supports the development and stability of the fair society 
argued for in chapters 2-5.   
Therefore it is argued that fairness can be seen as the overarching construct and can be treated as 
separate, though necessarily related to notions of justice and of dignity. The central thesis offered 
is that fairness is something that a society (through institutions) and individuals do, or at least 
should always strive to achieve and/or uphold, and in the context of bullying and harassment the 
means by which fairness can be achieved is through respecting dignity and, where appropriate 
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pursuing justice.  
10.4.2 Question 5. How: The importance of relationships and responsibility 
The nature of the behaviour and of the relationship between the parties (i.e. associational, 
organisational and/or societal) and the relative levels of responsibility attached to the parties in 
those relationships were seen as determinative of the ways in which the various factors may be 
weighted in a given situation. An exploration of the dimensions of this question is best considered 
in the context of the construction of the framework and it is thus to this which the chapter will now 
turn.  
10.5 APPROPRIATELY “PLOTTING” FOR FAIRNESS: BUILDING THE NEW FRAMEWORK 
10.5.1 The Theoretical Model 
The completed model is given in Figure 3 below. 
Overview 
Figures 3-7 and the accompanying explanations are intended to demonstrate how the conceptual 
model has been developed and how it operates against the arguments and data presented in the 
preceding chapters. The figures are thus presented as an incremental development of the 
components of the full conceptual model presented in figure 3. However, before presenting the 
explanation of the model in that way, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the elements of 
figure 3.  
The black outline of the figure represents fairness and is intended to reflect the boundaries within 
which decisions about the fairness of a particular situation can be plotted. The shapes within this 
outline should be viewed as interrelated layers, relevant to the determination of fairness. The 
dimensions of justice are represented by the horizontal black boxes labelled 'Procedural' and 
'Substantive'. The vertical blue boxes represent the personal and impersonal dimensions and are 
labelled respectively as 'Subjective' and 'Objective'. There are areas of overlap both within the 
dimensions of justice and the personal/impersonal dimensions, as well as areas of overlap between 
justice and the personal/impersonal levels. These reflect the arguments in chapter 3 and are 
presented in figure 4.  
The lines on the left-hand side of the figure should be considered as a scale and represent the 
'Spectrum of reasonableness' (see figure 5 and chapters 4 and 5). The levels towards the top of 
the figure correspond with assessments of behaviour requiring determination by reference an 
objective, impersonal standard, and engage with concerns of both procedural and substantive 
justice. Those towards the bottom of the figure are less concerned with objective determinations of 
reasonableness, and may, therefore, be more appropriately determined by reference to subjective 
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Figure 3. Theoretical Model  
standards and notions of justice. The lines on the right-hand side correspond with the levels of 
responsibility assigned to the different institutions, i.e. courts and organisations and to individuals. 
The positioning of courts at the top of the figure represents their responsibility in relation to 
objective standards, and concerns of both procedural and substantive justice as defined in law. 
Their role in setting and enforcing standards is also represented by the arrows labelled ‘Top down’ 
at the very top of the diagram.  
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The scope of legal protection is represented by the red shape (see figure 6). Responsibility for 
upholding legal standards does not, however, fall solely to courts and this is represented by the 
extension of the lines for 'Organisations' and 'Individuals'. There is a high degree of overlap 
between the responsibilities of individuals and organisations, but it is important to note that, in 
relation to standards falling at the bottom end of the spectrum of reasonableness, there may be 
certain behaviour which is exclusively of individual, subjective concern (see figures 6 and 7). 
Where subjective, personal assessments dominate, this may be viewed as standard setting from 
the ‘Bottom up’, rather than the ‘Top down’. This is represented by the arrows at the very bottom 
of the figure. 
Finally, the green trapezium (labelled 'Privatisation') represents the boundaries of privatisation. The 
space within the shape indicates the high degree of instances where no public deliberation or 
outcome may occur (see chapter 5 and figure 7). Within these boundaries a further separation of 
cases is made to illustrate the personalisation of disputes considered in chapters 5, 8 and 9. This is 
represented by the green rectangle labelled 'Personalisation'. Particularly where this rectangle 
begins to overlap with legal protection and objective standards, personalisation through the use of 
mediation is considered to be particularly unfair (see figure 7).  
Having outlined the various components, the discussion will now turn to consider these in greater 
detail.  
Fairness and Justice 
As seen in figure 3 fairness (represented by the outer, rounded black box) is divided into different 
sections: objective (impersonal) and subjective (personal) and procedural and substantive. These 
represent the key tensions in the debates on fairness (and in justice) i.e. whether it is a personal or 
impersonal judgement of reasonableness that is more important and whether a particular action or 
choice pursues and/or achieves a procedural or a substantive aim (e.g. procedural or distributive). 
As has been seen throughout the preceding chapters there is overlap between the various 
elements as it is not necessarily a case of either/or but is rather a case of how a balance should be 
struck between the various factors. 
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    Figure 4. Model: Fairness                     Figure 5. Model: Reasonableness and  Responsibility 
Spectrum of Reasonable Behaviour 
One of the key determinants of where the balance should fall is the nature and the severity of the 
behaviour in question. It has been argued that there is a spectrum of standards of reasonableness 
(determined by the nature of behaviour) the seriousness of which (in this context) is derived from 
notions of dignity and translated into the concepts of bullying and harassment (i.e. bullying and 
harassment are ways of ensuring dignity is respected) (chapter 4; 4.5, p54). Certain types of 
bullying and harassment, namely “actual” bullying or that related to protected characteristics are 
seen to be more objectively severe since they possibly violate societally determined standards of 
reasonableness, standards that may have legislative protection. Where this is the case what is 
appropriate should not be determined solely by the personal judgement of the parties involved122. 
These situations would be plotted in the top half of the model (e.g. the circle in Fig. 5) since they 
are both substantively and objectively valued in society. Other types of behaviour are considered to 
be less severe (in the sense there is less of an impact on dignity and a lesser threat to societally 
held values) and therefore may be more suitably solely subjectively determined (e.g. the triangle in 
Fig. 5).  
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Relationships and levels of responsibility 
As demonstrated through the focus groups, one can find support for the idea advanced by both 
Nagel (1991) and Rawls (2001) that individuals may uphold the objective standards in principle but 
judge their levels of acceptable behaviour differently in their day to day interactions123. It is in this 
recognition of a potential disconnect between personal and impersonal standards that it becomes 
important to recognise the relational aspects and how these influence how the various factors can 
be related to each other. In any given situation there will be competing priorities and perspectives 
and for present purposes the key actors are individuals, organisations and the courts. Each of 
these has differing levels of responsibility. These are represented on the right hand side of the 
model. The freedom to make judgements on a subjective basis is greatest for individuals in their 
associational capacity and lowest for the courts who are to ensure decisions are taken in line with 
societal held standards of reasonableness (Genn, 1999; Mulcahy, 2013). It has been argued that 
an organisation in their position as a societal institution is charged with a greater responsibility 
than individuals but lesser than the courts since they do not have the same constitutional 
responsibility in a fair society (Rawls, 2001; p34; 9.4, p184). 
It is necessary to reiterate however that the role of the courts is limited to a relatively small 
number of cases, both in respect of the percentage of workplace disputes which will make it to an 
Employment Tribunal (or beyond) and in respect of its jurisdiction (Latreille, 2011:15; p75).  Whilst 
it is important to recognise the reasons why certain rights and standards have been enshrined in 
law (particularly in respect of discrimination law), it is also important to recognise that there are 
certain types of behaviour that may objectively be considered to be unacceptable by the majority 
but which is not protected by law (as indicated by the lighter shaded areas in Fig 5124). This is 
particularly important given the legal position (or lack of) in respect of workplace bullying in the UK 
and the limiting of characteristics afforded protected status. 
                                                          
123
 For example see p185 
124
 Shaded triangle areas 
217 
 
                                               
                                                          Figure 6. Model: Levels of institutional protection  
Recognising these differing levels of responsibility and levels of protection allows for the 
consideration of the context of the workplace as there will be behaviour that may fall short of 
breaching legal levels of acceptability or, indeed, even of broader societal standards but which will 
nevertheless be considered as unacceptable or inappropriate in a workplace, for example fat jokes 
that may be personally acceptable but which arguably should not be a part of an organisation’s 
culture.  
Here it is important to acknowledge the relationship between personal, subjective assessments of 
what is appropriate and the standards permitted or perpetuated by organisational culture. Although 
not unanimously supported in all data collection stages, the need to conduct an investigation which 
prioritises a more objective assessment by the organisation over the subjective personal view of 
the parties was favoured. There is an important assumption here, however, that the view of the 
organisation will conform to those standards and laws protected and valued towards the more 
objective end of the spectrum. But where this is not the case this has important implications for 
how the situation may be resolved in a way which is deemed fair (certainly in any objective 
sense)125.  
Recognising the level of standards within this objective (impersonal)-subjective (personal) 
spectrum and further within the context of the workplace is important and accommodates those 
instances within an organisation which individuals label as bullying or harassment but which may 
be determined (either through investigation or more informal means) to fall short of the adopted 
definitions (indicated by darker shaded box in Fig. 6).  Particularly where arguments of workplace 
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mediation are concerned these seem to be an important group of cases126. 
Organisational Responsibility and Privatisation  
The level of the standard involved is (or arguably should be) the determining factor as to what 
would be a fair way to deal with the situation (i.e. certain resolution paths should be disregarded in 
certain cases). This is where arguments of justice (in whichever form) come to the fore. It is 
important to position the discussion as to the appropriate resolution mechanism within the 
objective/subjective standard and as such it has been argued the reasons for the elevation and 
protection of certain types and classes of behaviour cannot be ignored127. However, it is not the 
only consideration and the impact of the behaviour on the individuals involved, on the organisation 
and on society more broadly should also be considered: since all three are responsible for 
perpetuating and upholding social standards of reasonableness (albeit at differing levels).  
Considering the impact of the behaviour on the individuals involved in bullying and harassment 
cases (particularly the impact on the alleged target) is important since objective assessments as to 
whether or not it was bullying and/or harassment notwithstanding, the impact on the individual’s 
physical and mental health may be quite severe (see for example Hoel, Faragher and Cooper, 
2004). This needs to be accounted for when determining what may be a fair way of dealing with 
the situation and the role the party will play in reaching the resolution. Given the high degree of 
personal involvement required by the process, this is particularly important when mediation is 
being considered as an option128.    
The impact on an organisation can be considered in a number of ways and was closely related to 
the organisational culture, in terms of the standards of behaviour it permits and its attitude to 
dispute resolution and conflict129. Within the broader debate of maintaining a standard of behaviour 
which respects dignity (i.e. not permitting bullying and/harassment to take place), one must also 
consider the extent to which an organisation can and should be considered as a party to any 
dispute as has been championed here. This is important both in the sense the organisational 
culture may have been a source or a contributing factor (e.g. by permitting sexist banter, or 
aggressive management styles) and as a key player in resolving the dispute, and further, in their 
role as a social institution, in respect of upholding and enforcing acceptable standards more 
broadly. There is a potential mismatch between the former and the latter roles where an individual 
complaint is indicative of a broader organisational problem. It is on this point that the use of 
mediation arguably becomes particularly controversial. 
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As the extension of the privatisation of justice arguments to an organisational context sought to 
demonstrate (in chapter 5 and through the findings), the confidential and private nature of 
mediation may provide an opportunity for organisations to personalise disputes that are actually 
indicators or the symptoms of wider organisational problems. Where this is the case, provided 
mediation is entered into willingly and conducted properly, it may provide an opportunity for 
individual empowerment and transformation and allow the parties to receive what they may 
consider a fair outcome130. It will, however, likely have limited impact on changing, setting or 
enforcing standards within the organisation131. The only potential for change in this personalised 
scenario is that individual perspectives and understandings may have changed and the parties may 
carry this forward in the way they interact with others in the future, who in turn may also change 
the way they think and respond. In this way an incremental change may occur (Bush and Folger, 
2012; p89; p168). The use of mediation in this way alone is unlikely to result in the culture change 
championed in the mediation rhetoric (BIS, 2011a; p70; p168).  
A recognition of the need for a greater organisational awareness and involvement in mediation 
leads to the need to distinguish the potential for the personalisation of disputes from the 
privatisation of disputes. In answer to the privatisation objections, the findings confirmed it is 
important to understand how confidentiality in mediation operates in practice.  
Tailored Privatisation   
Confidentiality is not necessarily an absolute notion and as such is a potential key to reconciling 
many arguments of privatisation of justice objections. The use of mediation where the organisation 
is also considered to be a party potentially broadens the scope of the impact mediation may have 
not only on the individuals but also on organisational culture and practice. Here, whilst it is still 
only the individual parties in the mediation meetings, the organisation (via HR or a manager) is 
involved and willing to acknowledge and act on any contribution its culture may have played in 
causing or perpetuating the dispute132. The mediator plays an important intermediary role between 
the individual parties and the organisation. The information which is fed back to the organisation 
by the mediator (or in some cases directly by the parties) is determined by the parties in the 
mediation session.  
Appreciating this capacity arguably necessitates a more nuanced approach to understanding what 
is meant by privatisation. Rather than viewing it as an absolute in all circumstances, it is helpful to 
think of this approach to confidentiality as offering “tailored privatisation” since it allows some 
relevant information to be shared, whilst keeping other details private. Aside from the cultural 
impact aspect, this also answers the practical question as to what information will be shared with 
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colleagues (given the assumption that it is extremely rare only the parties directly involved will be 
aware of the dispute) (as per Sherman, 2003; p87; p164). Again, however, this approach requires 
a certain type of organisational attitude towards the behaviour involved and towards dispute 
resolution and this may stand in contrast to many organisations’ understanding of and approach to 
the use of mediation (e.g. avoidance of litigation: Saundry and Wibberley, 2014; p155). Without 
this organisational engagement mediation provides no mechanism to address the accountability 
concerns of Mulcahy (2013) and Fiss (1984). 
The Personalisation Threat  
An unengaged organisation is likely to be more realistic133 (and is more aligned with the 
personalisation approach). This personalised approach, if coupled with absolute confidentiality (and 
therefore absolute privatisation) is potentially where threats to fairness are most acute. It may be 
that there are some cases that may be correctly characterised solely as interpersonal disputes and 
in such instances the personalised approach may not be problematic. However, especially where 
bullying and harassment are concerned, even where cases are considered as misunderstandings 
(i.e. falling short of bullying and harassment as objectively defined) as, according to the mediators, 
it seems is commonly the case, personalisation is still a risky and arguably inappropriate approach. 
This is almost certainly the case where mediation is being used or conducted inappropriately.  
The area of greatest concern however is where the boundaries between legal standards and 
organisational standards are unclear (circled on Fig. 7). Personalisation and absolute privatisation   
here sit uncomfortably with many (certainly objective) notions of fairness (and justice).                       
                                      Figure 7. Model: Personalisation  
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Legal rights and Privatisation 
The use of mediation where legal rights are involved is controversial in itself (p73; Fiss, 1984) and 
leads back to the question as to whose responsibility it is to make decisions as to the assessment 
and enforcement of standards (considered above in relation to the balance between personal and 
impersonal judgements and in relation to the institutions in society134). It is also important 
generally, but particularly in respect of these cases, to understand the relationship between 
mediation, organisational policies and legal processes. In the context of workplace mediation, 
much weight is placed on the fact that choosing to try mediation does not bar future formal or 
legal action since the outcomes are not legally binding: although, as indicated in the interviews, the 
boundaries between workplace mediation and the law are not yet firmly defined135. It is important 
to recall however that where a legal agreement is to be reached through mediation, it probably 
falls under employment mediation and under the rules for settlement agreements parties must 
have independent legal advice (for example see s111A Employment Rights Act 1996).  
Societal Impact and Public Reason 
Whilst considering the question as to who should determine whether standards have been 
breached, two further issues arise. Beyond impact on the individual and on the organisation, if 
what is being dealt with breaches (or potentially breaches) what society may deem to be 
reasonable, the extent to which the chosen resolution must have an impact on society (i.e. in 
sending a message that these are the standards (e.g. racism is unacceptable) and breaching them 
has consequences) needs to be considered. The public nature of such an approach is important for 
the development and stability of a fair society (Rawls, 2001; p34). In considering this, attention 
should be given to the extent to which it is necessary for standards to be set and defined by the 
courts (as a social institutional charged with that purpose (Genn, 1999; 5.2, p66)) and then 
communicated down to individuals and employers (i.e. ‘Top Down’ on the model).  Or alternatively, 
whether there is value in the more incremental, individual approach described above (through 
micro-transformation) (i.e. ‘Bottom Up’ on the model).  
Privatisation is again of both practical and conceptual relevance here. Given the complications of 
proving a legal claim for harassment (and the undefined status of bullying in law), together with 
other barriers to justice and the prevalence of private settlements136, a relatively small number of 
cases will ever make it to a public forum or public knowledge in order for the ‘Top Down’ standard 
setting to occur (before even considering the lack of understanding and awareness of employment 
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law by many individuals and employers)137. However, coupled with tailored privatisation, there is 
arguably greater scope for the ‘Bottom Up’ approach through mediation to make an impact, albeit 
over a much longer period of time (i.e. individuals change their outlook and approach towards 
others and that spreads); although this is perhaps an optimistic notion and contingent on a number 
of contextual factors.  
Conclusion 
Therefore, whilst the importance of ‘Top Down’ approaches for the production and enforcement of 
publically knowable and broadly supported (through an overlapping consensus) standards of 
reasonableness driven and facilitated by societal institutions (courts and organisations) have been 
strongly argued for here, it is accepted that the feasibility and fairness of this process is far from 
perfect. However, through recognition of the ability of mediation to be adapted and tailored, it 
potentially provides the opportunity for offering a complementary process which speaks to both 
personal standards and priorities and to impersonal ones.  
Having set out the theoretical model the discussion will turn to a description of the second part of 
the framework which facilitates considerations of feasibility.  
10.5.2 Theoretical Schematic: Combining theory and practice 
The schematic is shown in Fig 7 and seeks to illustrate different options available in a situation and 
how they may be related to each other. As previously stated it is not intended to be prescriptive 
but rather a tool for facilitating discussion on the different options which may be available and 
what may influence the extent to which mediation may be appropriate. In order to demonstrate 
how the two parts of the framework may be seen as mutually reinforcing, aspects of the model 
have been mapped on to the schematic, e.g. the possible outcomes and corresponding level of 
privatisation and danger of personalisation.  
Since the findings, responses to the first two research questions and the theoretical model have 
been presented at length, it is sufficient to consider the schematic only briefly as its contents 
should be relatively self-evident. Therefore the key stages and example corresponding factors are 
presented in table 21.  
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Figure 8. Theoretical framework: Schematic 
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Table 21. Theoretical framework: Schematic Notes 
Stage Description  Example possible 
considerations 
Behaviour The act or acts that trigger a response.  Nature of the behaviour  
Severity of the behaviour 
Target Reaction  The individual (alleged target) chooses 
to complain or not.  
Relative positions of 
power between the parties 
(formal/informal) 
 
Target perception 
 
Target characteristics (e.g. 
gender) 
 
Target health 
Organisational 
Response 
Where a complaint is made, a formal or 
informal route is adopted.   
Priority of target 
perception  
 
Alleged nature and 
severity of the behaviour 
 
Organisational culture  
 
Organisational attitude 
towards the parties 
involved 
Investigation Where an investigation is favoured (and 
seen as necessary by the organisation) 
the nature and severity of the behaviour 
will be explored.  
Objective determination of the validity 
of the labels applied is undertaken and 
parties involved extends beyond the 
immediate parties involved (i.e. alleged 
target and alleged perpetrator).   
Definitional characteristics 
of bullying and/or 
harassment.  
 
The discovery and 
weighing of facts and 
evidence  
 
Involvement of colleagues 
 
Reasonableness of the 
target perception 
 
Perpetrator intent: to do 
the act and/or to cause 
harm 
 
Relative positions of the 
parties in the organisation 
Investigation 
Outcome 
Should be determined by the conclusion 
of the investigation and process by the 
severity of the behaviour involved. 
Although not necessary for 
demonstrating that the behaviour 
amounts to bullying and/or harassment, 
the further identification of a malicious 
intent should influence what step is 
taken next and the nature of potential 
sanctions.  
 
The potential outcomes can be plotted 
along the spectrum of behaviour from 
the left-hand side of the theoretical 
model.  
Organisational The conclusion of an investigation Legal obligation and 
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Response should dictate the next response and 
should be determined by where on the 
spectrum the behaviour has been found 
to fall, for example whether the 
behaviour was potentially unlawful. 
 
An organisation may have a 
responsibility and/or duty to pursue to a 
particular path which removes the 
decision from the parties involved.  
higher level of 
responsibility  
 
Cost and efficiency 
concerns 
 
Organisational culture 
Individual 
Response 
The conclusion of an investigation will 
potentially limit the options available to 
the alleged target.  
Health 
 
Desired outcome e.g. to 
stay at the organisation 
 
Personal characteristics 
 
Nature of the behaviour  
 
Speed of resolution 
 
Organisational culture 
 
Mediation  Mediation may be used either following 
an investigation (and potentially in the 
event of any of the above outcomes) or 
prior to an investigation. The latter is 
the approach likely favoured by 
mediators.  
 
The use of mediation does not 
necessarily bar a return to or the 
instigation of formal methods. 
Party willingness to try 
and fully participate in 
mediation 
 
Level of organisational 
involvement 
 
Timing of mediation  
 
(Ir)relevance of labels 
 
Empowerment 
 
Subjective assessments 
 
Power imbalances 
 
Confidentiality  
 
Understanding mediation 
as a process 
 
Mediator Role Skill 
and Impartiality  
This refers to the relationship between 
the mediator and the organisation, the 
mediator and the parties and the ability 
of the mediator to define and manage 
the process and the various 
relationships. These include not only 
mediator-organisation and mediator-
parties but also party-party and parties-
organisation. 
Level of organisational 
involvement 
 
Mediator motives  
 
Mediator self-awareness 
 
Organisational attitude 
toward mediation 
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Outcome and 
Impact 
These relate to the concerns of 
privatisation, personalisation and the 
ability of mediation to influence and 
impact change. Impact here is 
concerned with three levels: the 
individual parties involved, 
organisational and societal.  
 
Four different options are suggested 
and are presented against two 
spectrums. The first relates to the level 
for potential personalisation of disputes 
and the second to the degree of the 
operation of the tailored privatisation 
identified above.  
 
The extent to which each of the options 
may be seen as impacting on each of 
the three levels is indicated. Only those 
allowing for some element of shared 
information are shown as having 
potential for a strong influence beyond 
the parties. These options are also 
positioned against the ‘top-down’ or 
‘bottom-up’ standard-setting approach 
outlined in the theoretical model.  
Public outcome needed 
 
Details or key message 
 
Individual choice 
 
Level of organisational 
involvement  
 
Transformation and 
culture change 
 
Individual empowerment 
 
Perpetuation of prejudicial 
or stereotypical behaviour 
 
Visibility of organisational 
practice and levels of 
accountability 
 
10.6 FRAMEWORK SUMMARY 
Through a consideration of the various research questions, a framework which helps to 
theoretically and practically structure discussions of the extremely complex question of the 
appropriateness of mediation for dealing with workplace bullying and harassment has been 
developed. It intended to illustrate that workplace mediation may be considered as both a fair and 
feasible choice but this feasibility and fairness is subject to a number of contextual constraints and 
dangers and therefore what is needed is a far greater degree of qualification in discussions of the 
use of workplace mediation in this context.  
10.7 LIMITATIONS 
The methodological and research design choices were set out and justified in chapter 6. Making 
those choices, however, involved trade-offs and therefore inevitably resulted in a number of 
potential limitations. 
The first relates to the level at which the findings may be considered as generalisable or 
transferable. As stated above, the aim of the research was never to produce a framework which 
could be generalised or transferred to a specific or general population. The qualifying criteria for 
the questionnaire and focus group stages was anyone from the general population over 18 years 
old and with at least six months work experience but it was never the purpose of the research to 
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claim that the findings could be applied to all people who fit that criteria. This position also holds 
for the external mediators.  
The use of vignettes may also be seen to limit transferability but this is not necessarily the case. 
Transferability here relates to the extent to which the abstracted factors and influences can be 
applied to existing understandings and how, in future, as the new theory matures, they are 
reinforced through further research (Modell, 2009). In the interests of transparency, attention has 
been paid to assessing existing understandings and evaluating how these may be developed and 
informed through the data collected here and how these have been abstracted and integrated into 
the framework offered above.  
The second is connected to the first and relates to the size and composition of the sample. Again, 
as the concern was not with generalisability, the question of representative sample sizes did not 
arise. Rather the concern was to try and seek saturation on the analytical themes. A larger sample 
would undoubtedly have produced more insight into potential combinations and examples of how 
the themes may operate in practice but the themes themselves were sufficiently saturated with the 
sample size of this research (across the three stages). It is anticipated that a similar situation 
would result if the research was replicated, i.e. the same themes but different combinations.  
A limitation arises from the disappointing lack of diversity in the sample in respect of the protected 
characteristics considered other than gender, i.e. race and sexual orientation. This meant that 
whilst tentative conclusions may be drawn from the focus group comments that characteristics or 
combinations of characteristics may influence the type of behaviour experienced and the way it is 
interpreted, it was not possible to explore sufficiently the intersectional dimension or to allow 
strong conclusions to be drawn about the intersection and influence of specific characteristics.   
A potential limitation may also arise from the use of self-selecting participants. Again, however, 
because of the aim of the research and the goal of identifying and explaining possible themes and 
understandings, the fact participants chose to take part may perhaps indicate they are engaged 
with the issues and thus applied the cognitive effort to give honest and considered answers. Whilst 
it would be pure speculation that this was the case for the questionnaire and for the focus groups, 
the high levels of enthusiasm and engagement with the research displayed by the mediators 
interviewed indicate it is a reasonable conclusion to draw for that stage.  
A further limitation in relation to the use of vignettes may lie with the level of emotional 
detachment relative to the actual experience of bullying/harassment (Collett and Childs, 2010). If 
the research was concerned with predicting possible responses in situations this would be a big 
limitation. However, as this is not the aim here, it is arguably sufficient that the participants 
(qualitative) identified that the emotions of the situation may operate as a contextual factor.  
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An additional limitation related to the choice of vignettes is the absence of an example with no 
protected characteristic. Not providing such a point of comparison prohibits clear conclusions to be 
made as to how distinctions between bullying and harassment are made and the role the presence 
of a protected characteristic plays in this. A related limitation refers to the structure of the 
questionnaire and asking participants to select the importance of the factors in making their 
decisions, without distinguishing between their relative importance for bullying and for harassment. 
This therefore did not allow for an analysis of whether different factors were rated differently in 
relation to assessments of bullying than harassment. There was, however, sufficient flexibility in 
the focus group discussions to address these limitations and explore the relative importance of 
multiple factors.  
The final limitation is a reflexive one and relates to the researcher’s relationship with the research 
and researcher prominence to the participants in the qualitative stages. Attempts have been made 
to offer justifications for any assumptions and how they have been informed explicit and where 
others disagree with those assumptions and the approach adopted, limitations will necessarily 
arise. The second aspect relates to the extent to which the researcher’s presence and indeed 
identity may have influenced the responses of the participants in the interviews and the focus 
groups. For example, the presence of a female researcher in the male focus groups may have 
increased the degree to which they felt they had to provide socially desirable responses (O’Dell et 
al, 2012). There was, however, no evident reason to suspect this was the case. 
10.8 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although it has been argued that, at this point, the framework is sufficiently developed to present a 
new theory, the need to see how the framework may be deployed to assist in its further 
development into a mature theory has been noted. This section will therefore briefly outline 
possible directions that development may take.  
The first speaks directly to the demographic diversity limitation stated above. It would be helpful to 
conduct further focus groups that allowed for a greater exploration of the influence of the 
participants’ own protected characteristics on the assessments made. The use of scenarios which 
engage with multiple characteristics would also help in this regard. Possible distinctions between 
the female and male assessments were identified above and it would be interesting to hold more 
gendered groups, as well as groups divided by race and sexual orientation. Due to the problems 
associated with recruiting members with certain characteristics (for example BME and LGB) 
recruiting sufficient numbers for such groups was, unfortunately, not possible for the current 
research.  
Although they were included in the pilot and potentially in the questionnaire (and their views are 
indirectly represented through the qualitative stages), it would be useful to conduct focus groups 
with others who may influence the decision as to whether mediation is appropriate such as 
229 
 
organisations and trade unions to see whether the assessments and the weighting of the factors 
differ.  
Finally, the focus in this research has been on mediation between two individuals. It became 
apparent through the interviews however that group mediations are not uncommon. Given the 
conclusion here that certain types of dispute should never be personalised and may be indicative of 
wider conditions, it would interesting to see how the framework can be developed and/or adapted 
in a group mediation context. For example, it would be interesting to see how power dynamics and 
the individual empowerment arguments translate and what impact the group nature has on party 
willingness and capabilities to fully participate. Interviews with mediators specifically focusing on 
group mediation would be needed.   
10.9 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS  
10.9.1 Methodology and Research Design 
The strong theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of this research and the critical realist 
approach adopted offer a different way of exploring bullying and harassment and mediation. The 
bullying work is traditionally grounded in a more positivistic approach and that into mediation is 
arguably epistemologically ambiguous. In either case, however, the work is strongly empirically-
orientated and grounded which is not the case here. In the case of workplace mediation especially 
this has led to an under-theorisation of the concept itself which the strong theoretical slant here 
has sought to address. Conversely, that there is an empirical element helps to ground the legal and 
philosophical work relied on which is almost exclusively based in ideal theory and/or analytical 
opinion (as is the tradition for those fields). Thus the approach adopted here and the mixed 
method design provided the opportunity to offer a framework informed by both abstract theory 
and by primary data. Though the data collected cannot speak to positivistic standards, this 
research does nevertheless potentially contribute to literature (including the bullying field) which 
values subjective contributions over the meaning of bullying and harassment and the potential of 
workplace mediation. 
The use of vignettes to access understandings of bullying and harassment is not unprecedented 
but is relatively rare (Salin, 2011) and vignettes have not been used in any UK mediation studies. 
Their use here provided an invaluable way of accessing understandings about bullying, harassment 
and resolution which are necessarily context-bound. The use of vignettes for future/other research 
in this area would certainly be recommended.   
10.9.2 Theoretical Discussion and Framework: Contributing to knowledge and practice 
The theoretical discussion and resultant framework set out above is offered as the main 
contribution of this research. It provides a structure that differs in scope and perspective to the 
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sole theoretical ADR framework in a UK context (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011). It extends Rawls 
(2001) and Nagel (1991) further into a workplace context, to harassment and (uniquely) to bullying 
and workplace mediation to offer a representative, rather than participatory perspective.  
The positioning of concerns of fairness and dignity (including equality) as central to the question of 
the appropriateness of the use of mediation in workplace bullying and harassment and especially 
where this may involve or engage with protected characteristics seeks to facilitate debate that 
retains historical and social determinations of reasonableness. Such a positioning challenges the 
individualisation of workplace disputes which is arguably characteristic of mediation discourse both 
at the policy and academic level.  
In such an unpopulated field (workplace mediation in the UK), offering an alternative perspective 
helps to broaden debate and thus hopefully strengthen understanding.   
Offering a framework that also allows for the recognition of different understandings of bullying 
and harassment and corresponding different levels of responsibility (for individuals, organisations 
and society) discourages a blanket grouping of behaviours together under the same label. Asking 
for more refined references to what is meant by bullying and harassment in relation to mediation 
arguably contributes not only to the mediation and the bullying and harassment literatures (a 
consideration of different levels of bullying/harassment is lacking in both) but also potentially to 
organisational understanding of both bullying/harassment and the appropriate use of mediation in 
practice. 
That the framework is empirically-informed further helps distinguish it from other ADR or mediation 
frameworks which are not (Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 2011; Riskin, 2003). The insights into the 
operation of mediation in practice provided by the interviews with the external mediators helped to 
identify a number of crucial findings which served to reconcile the apparent disconnect between a 
number of features of mediation and of bullying and harassment. These include understanding 
mediation as a process which has important implications for addressing the concerns over power 
imbalance expressed by Keashly and Nowell (2011) in the bullying literature. Understanding the 
way confidentiality operates in practice and the need to recognise organisational involvement and 
retention as a party helps to address the privatisation concerns expressed by Keashly and Nowell 
(2011) and also in the legal ADR literature (e.g. Fiss, 1984) and challenges the conceptualisation of 
mediation in organisational justice (Nabatchi et al, 2007). By giving the private nature of mediation 
greater attention than is otherwise afforded in the existing literature may also help to further 
explain why the transformation of cultures has not flowed from the use of mediation.  
Finally, as indicated in the previous contributions, the framework also has the potential to inform 
policy and practice: although the contributions here do not necessarily sit comfortably with the 
current presentation and operation of mediation. This is particularly true in respect of the increased 
organisational role recommended. Through a combination of the use of vignettes and the 
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framework, focus groups and/or workshops could be developed to help structure discussions within 
organisations which challenge their understandings of bullying and harassment, why it is not to be 
tolerated and what an appropriate way of dealing with it is. In this way knowledge of mediation 
could be shared in a way which is not dominated by arguments of cost/efficiency and individual 
empowerment. Thus, a further contribution is the basis on which training and educational material 
could be developed.  
In light of these contributions, it is possible to identify three key findings which help to inform and 
broaden the debate on the appropriateness of the use of mediation to address workplace bullying 
and harassment in the UK. These findings are set out as qualifications in the conclusion and may 
be offered in circumstances where it is not possible to present the full framework, for example in a 
research briefing.  
10.10 THESIS CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to present an interdisciplinary, empirically informed theoretical framework 
for facilitating understanding of and discussion on the extent to which workplace mediation is an 
appropriate way of dealing with bullying and harassment in UK workplaces. Through an exploration 
of often highly abstract concepts, it has aimed to explore understandings of bullying and 
harassment and to demonstrate how theoretical ideas and arguments can inform not only 
academic understanding but also potentially influence practical understanding and therefore the 
practice of workplace mediation.  
 
It has found that the use of mediation may be both feasible and fair but that these are contingent 
on the operation of numerous contextual factors. These include the nature of the behaviour, the 
level of organisational involvement and the skill of the mediator and should be considered in 
against the key findings: 
An appreciation of what bullying and harassment means and why they should not be tolerated is 
needed. Different levels of bullying and harassment require different responses and, depending on 
the severity, the responsibility for dealing with the situation varies and mediation is not always 
appropriate.   
Organisations must be considered as a party in mediation. A threat to fairness is posed through 
the personalisation of disputes, rather than through the privatisation of disputes per se. Through a 
tailoring of privatisation (“Tailored privatisation”) to suit the needs of the parties, amendments 
may be made to confidentiality which permits a negotiated flow of information allowing individuals 
to challenge the wider organisational culture. This however relies on both the willingness of the 
parties to share the information and on the organisation being willing to listen which may not 
always be the case.  
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Mediation needs to be understood as a non-linear process. When talking about the 
appropriateness of mediation for workplace bullying and harassment it is important to distinguish 
between the different stages and the role they play in assessing the situation, preparing the 
parties, facilitating the shared understanding and mitigating power imbalances or potential 
exploitation in the mediation process. Procedural safeguards exist in the structure of mediation 
and in mediator techniques but depend on the skill and integrity of the mediator.  
It is hoped that encouraging a more nuanced understanding of mediation and when it is 
appropriate and when it is not will help to facilitate a maximisation of its benefits and the 
mitigation of its dangers. In so doing, it is further hoped this research can help to inform the 
question of the extent to which the desired organisational and policy shifts may be realised.  
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APPENDIX 1 EXPLORATORY PILOT REPORT 
EXPLORATORY PILOT REPORT  
The research is seeking to offer a new framework to help facilitate discussion about the use of 
mediation in the UK workplace context, an area which is arguably still in its infancy conceptually 
and certainly empirically. Given this infancy, the novel element of equality and diversity, and the 
potential breadth of focus for the research, a pilot study was conducted between July and 
September 2012.  
AIMS  
The pilot was exploratory in nature and provided the opportunity to begin to consider and discuss 
the various conceptual elements identified from the extant literature in a practical arena. The 
overarching aim was to begin to build a greater degree of clarity and focus to the research topic 
and aid with the development of research questions. Enabling the research questions and the 
project to be informed by empirical data at this early stage was also important to help strengthen 
the desire for the resultant framework to be both conceptually and practically sound. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Accordingly the research questions were:  
1. Why was mediation introduced at the University of Manchester (expectations of mediation)? 
2. How has experience matched those expectations?  
3. How is the appropriateness of mediation determined?  
METHODOLOGY 
Given the exploratory aims, the pilot adopted a case study methodology (Lee, 1999:41). It was 
accepted that even a single case can help achieve the desired aim of focusing the research and 
generating research questions for the subsequent study (Yin, 2003:5). Accordingly the 
expectations and experience of mediation within one organisation provided the context for the 
pilot.   
The case.  
The University of Manchester (UoM) introduced a university-wide internal mediation scheme in 
2009 as part of its Dignity at Work and Study Policy; this was later broadened to a more general 
mediation service offered as an option more generally. The service is overseen by a mediation co-
ordinator who is responsible for allocating mediators to disputes where appropriate and for the 
training and development of the mediators. Mediators were recruited from across the university 
and trained externally. The UoM currently has a pool of 13 trained mediators. Despite attempts to 
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publicise the service, take up has been low with only a relatively small number of cases having 
been mediated since 2009.  
Sample 
A purposive approach was used and accordingly those who had been involved in the decision to 
implement mediation and/or with the design of the service and/or those who were involved in its 
operation were targeted. These broad categories allowed for the inclusion of a number of different 
interested parties and included HR professionals, equality and diversity staff, the mediation co-
ordinator, TU representatives from UCU and Unite and mediators. Trying to include these various 
and potentially varied voices was crucial to explore the contention that the framework needs to 
reflect the perspectives of multiple groups. In total seven interviews were conducted. 
The interview 
An interview guide was constructed using the ‘primitive framework’ (Hartley, 2004:324) developed 
through a review of the existing literature. Given the exploratory aims the questions were designed 
to be open in order to explore the issues already identified through the literature but also to allow 
for any others to arise. This was facilitated by adopting a semi-structured approach to the 
interviews. The questions allowed for the discussion of both the expectations of mediation in 
general and of the extent to which these were (or were not) reflected in experience at the UoM. 
Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour and was recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
Analysis 
Template analysis was used. A priori codes were developed using the interview guide as a basis. 
Each transcript was analysed individually with revisions being made to the template where 
necessary as new themes or lower themes were identified. The flexibility in this approach suited 
the exploratory needs; allowing for analysis within the previously proposed structure whilst 
providing a means of expanding or exploring the various themes (King & Horrocks, 2010). Allowing 
for parallel coding was also important for demonstrating how the various themes were 
interconnected (King, 2003) which is crucial for achieving the multi-perspective yet integrated aim 
of this research.  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The exploratory nature of the pilot meant that data were collected on a broad range of issues and 
given the small number of interviews a relatively large amount of rich data were collected. The 
data on the whole were invaluable in helping to increase understanding of mediation and of 
decision making factors in general. It was also useful to begin building a picture of the experience 
and barriers at the UoM. The discussion on the remainder of this chapter will focus on how the 
findings shaped the framework, which in turn, had implications for the design of the main research.  
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Understanding mediation 
As a headline, the pilot confirmed that there was a desire-at least among those involved in 
mediation-for more information on how mediation is, and can be, used in the workplace.  
It indicated that a lack of understanding of mediation may be the main barrier to the use of 
mediation, at least within the university.  
This lack of understanding may be characterised in different ways. The first may arise where an 
individual has had no contact with mediation and doesn’t know anything about it. Alternatively, it 
may take the form of a misunderstanding. This may be the result of confusion over what is meant 
by the term mediation:  
“managers people will talk about mediating and they’ll talk about people in dispute and say like oh 
yeah I’m going to mediate this and this and they don’t mean mediation they mean arbitration or 
they mean basically they’re going to tell people what to do to sort it out…so the term is bandied 
around quite loosely which is probably a detriment to the other pure mediation we do through the 
service”  (Development and mediator 1) 
Or perhaps from perceptions about what mediation is or what it can do:  
“I mean it has a bit of a sort of stigma attached to it which I think is unfair it’s just like oh we’ll just 
have a tea and biscuit and just chat and everything will be nice again but it isn’t it’s a bit more 
robust than that” (TU, Unite) 
 “one of the reasons the unions didn’t trust [mediation] was if the university is providing the 
resource to provide a mediator they thought that the mediator would feel duty bound to side with 
the management so that’s what makes me think that they don’t understand mediation at all 
because they thought that the mediator had that power of decision making” (Development and 
mediator 1) 
There was an indication that the lack of understanding was not unique to any particular group. 
Although levels of understanding were, unsurprisingly (and reassuringly) higher in those 
participants who were trained mediators, it was felt that there was always more that could be done 
to help improve their knowledge. There were suggestions that in order to increase understanding 
(and potentially therefore use) of mediation, a number of groups needed to be targeted. For the 
UoM these were TU representatives (particularly at branch level), line managers, employees and 
human resource personnel.  
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The sources of and reasons for the lack of understanding/misunderstanding may lead to conflicting 
views which potentially inhibits the progress of mediation. These conflicts may arise between 
groups, for example, one participant outlined what had, in her experience, been the differences 
between management and TU perspectives on mediation. They may also arise within groups, as 
was the case in differing attitudes between the two unions included.  
The recognition that multiple groups are involved in the operation and progression of mediation in 
the workplace, coupled with the acceptance that these groups may have different opinions and 
perspectives, provides an important grounding justification for the need to adopt the multiparty 
approach embraced by this research.  
The lack of understanding aspect however, particularly the misunderstanding element had further 
implications. It may perhaps be a little disingenuous to label all confusion of the term “mediation” 
as a misunderstanding. The UoM currently adopts a facilitative model of mediation (which was the 
one assumed in this research). However, fortuitously, at the time of the interviews, the UoM was 
exploring affirmative mediation. In discussing the implications of a change, it was clear that, for 
one participant in particular, moving to an affirmative model would erode the power of mediation: 
“you’ve lost the mediation principles of it’s all about them…it’s blurring the boundaries between 
what HR do and what mediation is all about…we need to keep mediation quite safe and tight and 
different because it is different it is very different” (Development and mediator 1) 
Whilst for that participant it would not be welcome, some of the others saw potential in a more 
directive mediator role and indeed there was an indication that this may be important for helping 
to redress an imbalance of power. The timing of this was useful because it highlighted the 
multitude of models offered by private firms and to illuminate how assuming the facilitative model 
may not be as easy as initially thought.  
This posed a dilemma for the research as, although it does not seek to challenge the definition of 
mediation, it obviously needed to adopt a definition of mediation to present to the participants in 
the main research and to ground the framework. If there is a plethora of models out there, with 
broadly the same characteristics (save for the degree of direction by the mediator) which are 
evidently used in practice, could the research abandon the facilitative label and just go for a more 
generic one of ‘mediation’?  
The research aims to explore and understand the relationship between characteristics of mediation 
and decision making. Seeking to build a framework on generic foundations introduces a greater 
degree of ambiguity and may arguably undermine any claims ultimately made that what is needed 
is a nuanced understanding and appreciation of mediation.  
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The responses in the pilot were extremely illustrative and compelling in demonstrating why and 
how facilitative mediation should be utilised as the basis for the research. It is to that aspect which 
the discussion will now turn.  
 
Characteristics of mediation 
All participants in their discussion of mediation outlined the characteristics associated with 
facilitative mediation (and those given in the UoM mediation documentation): voluntary, 
confidential, informal, impartial and facilitated process.  
From the responses, one may arguably begin to identify the way in which the various 
characteristics are interrelated; how they may be related to other decision making factors and/or 
indeed may be important decision making factors in themselves. This was invaluable in helping to 
structure the way mediation is characterised and utilised in the development of the framework.  
An important consideration arose in respect of the characteristics of mediation, namely that 
mediation needs to be understood as a process. The participants seemed to draw a distinction 
about what was possible at each stage of the mediation process and indicated that decision making 
factors may vary and have a different level of importance, depending on the stage of the mediation 
process. This had a number of implications. Firstly it exposed the assumption and tendency, 
certainly in this research, when thinking about mediation, to jump straight to the implications of 
the joint meeting and to conflate them with the initial decision to mediate and with any influence 
the individual meetings may have on the decision to proceed further.  This in turn means that the 
decision to mediate is not a one shot “now or never” decision. There are a number of opportunities 
for the various parties to make a decision. This clearly has important implications for the approach 
taken by this research and poses a methodological challenge, namely, how can this be reflected in 
data collection. Beyond simply perhaps offering options such as “try individual meetings”, “try joint 
meetings” it may be difficult to represent this in the quantitative stage. However, the later focus 
groups may provide the opportunity to explore this characteristic and the ways in which the 
decision making process should not, or cannot be seen as static.   
A related question is to ask is who is making the decision(s). The participants were unanimous in 
the belief that mediation is only appropriate where both parties voluntarily agree to it. There was 
some indication however that this voluntary decision may be the result of persuasion. Further, 
whilst party agreement may be necessary, it was clear that it was not sufficient. In the UoM access 
to mediation is controlled by a gatekeeper who may, notwithstanding the parties’ apparent 
consent, decide that mediation is not appropriate. Beyond the gatekeeper, the ultimate decision as 
to whether or not mediation is appropriate lies with the mediator. Behind this, there may also be 
other individuals seeking to influence the decision, for example a TU representative, colleagues or 
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family members. Again, it demonstrates the need for all the various individuals to agree on the 
issue of appropriateness in a given situation.  
 A discussion of the characteristics was also vital for understanding how the benefits and 
disadvantages of mediation were perceived and realised. When asked what they thought the 
benefits of mediation were, the responses fell along the empowerment/cost and efficiency lines 
assumed in this research. 
What was particularly interesting was that there seemed to be more discussion about the powers 
and pitfalls of the empowerment arguments. Indeed concerns about the potential for exploitation 
or misuse of mediation arguably overwhelming fell on this side. They appeared to be focused on 
the danger of an individual being exploited or manipulated through mediation. The participants 
were not aware of a situation where this had happened but accepted that it in some circumstances 
it may be real concern and would therefore impact the appropriateness question.  
“I wouldn’t like it to be done in a way particularly where a junior member of staff was put in a 
position where they felt that they were having to somehow understand or accept the bullying 
behaviour as a way of resolving it” (Development and TU, UCU) 
Whilst it is important to include characteristics and benefits/disadvantages of mediation in the 
discussion, unsurprisingly, they do not represent the only decision making factors. There was a 
great deal of consideration in the interviews about the important role played by the behaviour at 
the heart of the dispute and how it is assessed.  
Types of case 
The participants were unanimous in the opinion that mediation should not and cannot be used as a 
blanket dispute resolution method. There was however a degree of difference as to the types of 
situation which may be appropriate for mediation and where the line should be drawn in making 
any such assessment.  
Bullying and harassment?  
An important issue in understanding how assessments are made is that of labelling. In this regard, 
one needs to consider not only how behaviour is labelled but also who does the labelling.  
“I think really the complications are in terms of third parties whether they’re union reps or 
managers or whatever they’re really trying to get to grips with the problem” (TU, UCU)  
In the pilot there was an acceptance about the subjectivity of the labelling behaviour and of the 
difficulties these present. However, one may reflect a view from the participants that formal 
definitions may be a hindrance where mediation is concerned.  
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For the UoM specifically it was suggested that originally annexing mediation to bullying and 
harassment and therefore requiring something to be labelled as bullying/ harassment in order to 
trigger mediation may have been a barrier:  
“…we [the UoM] initially tried to monitor the type of case…but it became unmanageable because it 
was all about identifying what it was rather than them actually solving the issue…we felt it was 
more important to solve the issues between the staff” (Coordinator) 
There was arguably therefore a sense that if possible, labelling the behaviour should be avoided. 
Or, in the alternative, where mediation was concerned, working towards a resolution may be 
facilitated through a willingness to allow for a more everyday self-labelling understanding of 
bullying and harassment. 
 “if we stick a label on it we term it something that makes it more or less serious depending on 
what it is and peoples’ perceptions of bullying and it’s for me to decide whether or not I think I’m 
being bullied because it’s in the eye of the perceiver” (Development and mediator 1) 
“...my head of department, I don’t mean my head of department this is fictitious my head of 
department came in and told me my work was fucking crap and used those words I can see how a 
lot of people will say I’ve been bullied this morning well yeah they have and that’s the reality of 
how you’ve got to deal with it” (TU, UCU 2)  
These issues had a number of implications for the research. Given the practical as well as 
conceptual aspirations of the research, this notion that what is important in deciding whether 
mediation may be appropriate or not may is whether the various parties may label something as 
bullying or harassment according to some definition, then it is important to explore how these 
conclusions are reached. Presenting participants of the main research with examples of behaviour 
in a given situation is intended to help with understanding this.  
It is, however, important to acknowledge that the use of mediation happens alongside the prospect 
for the use of formal procedures and potentially even a legal claim, and there was an indication, 
unsurprisingly, that with such procedures the formal definitions would have to apply. Further, 
obviously the research does seek to position itself within existing bullying and harassment work 
and the characteristics of the traditional academic definitions will be included in the questionnaire 
as descriptors alongside other options. The approach taken in the research of utilising existing 
definitions but not being constrained by the them helps to straddle the practical and academic 
divide and the qualitative stages provide a greater opportunity to explore this issue of how and 
who decides where something is bullying and harassment for the purposes of deciding on a 
resolution path and what implication this has for the use of mediation and/or how bullying and 
harassment are understood more broadly.  
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It is clear that the issue of labelling is a tricky one. Whilst it is interesting to understand what may 
be labelled as bullying/harassment, there is an argument that in the determination of the question 
of appropriateness, it is the aspects of the behaviour and the situation which is crucial. 
Determining quite where the line of appropriateness falls in a situation however is a very complex 
endeavour.   
Drawing the line 
Bullying and harassment 
All participants were explicitly asked whether they thought mediation was appropriate for bullying 
and harassment cases. The responses were varied:  
“yeah I do yeah…because bullying and harassment is something that is very subjective in a 
way…it’s quite difficult to be clear whether someone is or is not bullying or harassing somebody 
and so sort of trying to resolve those sorts of things by just trying to understand where each other 
is coming from is I think a good thing” (Development and mediator 2) 
“[Sigh] Yes yes and no because it depends we’ve talked about shades of grey and I think a lot of 
this is shades of grey people get cross purposes” (Development and mediator 1) 
“I think there are limits to its potential in the context of an anti-bullying or anti-harassment policy 
I’m not saying there’s no place for it but I think it’s limited in terms of its potential” (TU, UCU) 
In these one begins to see a spectrum of attitudes towards the use of mediation in bullying and 
harassment: an embracing approach, a more cautionary one, through to a strong scepticism. One 
can see in these how what may be seen as bullying/harassment by some may is characterised as a 
‘misunderstanding’ by others.  
Equality 
The responses were similarly fractured when protected characteristics were added to the equation. 
Some participants were of the opinion that an equality aspect could add an extra layer of 
complexity:  
“I’m on unsafe ground here with this but I think even if somebody has said something that’s gone 
to the root of somebody’s gender sexuality race I wonder if there’s still grounds to unpick that with 
them and for an explanation to be given…it’s all very subtle but as employers we shouldn’t go 
there and use anything like subtlety or motivation or meaning as an excuse because we have zero 
tolerance of that sort of thing because it’s almost like a risk management” (Development and 
mediator 1)  
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“I don’t know I guess is a mediator the correct route to go through…I don’t know if there’s a direct 
allegation something falls under that equality area it may have to be dealt with formally at some 
point anyway partly because there is a wider duty to all of its employees it wouldn’t be enough to 
say we went to mediation and sorted it out” (Development and TU, UCU) 
“if you accuse somebody of racism and then say sit down and talk to them it’s very difficult 
because quite rightly it’s a very serious thing” (TU, Unite) 
The reasons identified reflect the concern for legal compliance and perhaps beyond that, reasons 
why there should be zero tolerance in such cases. In these, one finds tentative justification of the 
need to include equality and social justice considerations into the mix of decision making factors.  
There were however also different responses to the question of whether protected characteristics 
would make a difference:  
“No unless what they’ve done is a serious disciplinary matter”  (Development and mediator 2).  
“if it’s a problem with language particularly in the university environment where you’ve got a range 
of different cultures with a range of different languages it’s possible for people to say things which 
may be taken incorrectly or people might misunderstand facial expressions or emotions so it’s 
possible in that case but I think they would still have to understand that what they said was not 
acceptable…I think some other cultures have differences in respect and some that might be 
perceived as intimidating and be entirely unintentional so you do have to be aware of those 
matters and it may just be a matter of sorting it out” (Development and TU, UCU) 
Especially in the latter quote, one begins to get the impression that mediation could perhaps be 
utilised to promote and facilitate understanding of diversity. The characteristics which seemed to 
come up most frequently as examples were race, sex and sexual orientation.   
What is particularly interesting in these varied responses is that they arguably echo the lines of 
distinction offered in equality versus managing diversity discourses.  
On the issue of equality, it was possible to begin to argue that not only is there a case for equality 
to be expressly considered but that protected characteristics may be relevant for decision making 
in two ways: the first concerns the behaviour in question and the second the identity and 
characteristics of the parties. With this, the issue of not only why equality should be included but 
also how was moulded in to the framework.  
With this, one begins to see the relationship between the behaviour in question, the 
appropriateness decision and the types of distinctions and rationale for those that might be 
relevant. Again, however, these arguably need to be reconciled with a number of further 
considerations which appear to have an influence on where the line should be drawn.   
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Common ground? 
Even though there was a difference of opinion regarding the suitability of mediation for bullying 
and harassment cases and in the extent to which a protected characteristic changed the situation, 
there were arguably similarities in factors which would inform the decision.  
   Severity 
The first and the one perhaps most explicitly reflective of the link between the behaviour and the 
appropriateness question can be described as severity. It was clear that some cases were 
considered more appropriate than others: 
“mediation is not always an option so if one member of staff punched another and the member of 
staff who had been punched said I want to take out a grievance I don’t think it would be 
appropriate for us to say “oh have you considered mediation “because I think there is a degree of 
management responsibility whereby certain kinds of events and certain kinds of issues require a 
formal response” (Mediator) 
Gross misconduct and criminal conduct were examples given where mediation would definitely not 
be appropriate.  
In severity one may also consider the impact that the behaviour had an on individual and the 
resultant state of mind: 
“I think there are some extremes where you say look that person has been psychologically 
damaged by this, this isn’t a simple dispute psychological damage has happened here and 
therefore we wouldn’t mediate” (Development and mediator 1) 
However, as the discussion above indicated, the more problematic issues arise in the potentially 
borderline cases and so the answer to the severity question is not always straightforward and/or 
sufficient. In such cases, one may again look to other factors.  
Control over the outcome 
One factor which is particularly aligned with the characteristics of mediation is whether or not the 
parties have control over the outcome of a dispute.  
“I think it’s got to be situations that have the potential for them to be able to sort it out between 
themselves…you’ve really got to identify what the problem is and whether it is something that they 
can just talk about and agree to change their behaviour or whether it’s not really that sort of 
situation” (Development and mediator 2) 
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It may be that a formal option is the sole one available. However, a number of participants 
suggested that mediation may be used but that the outcome may draw on or be used in 
conjunction with formal mechanisms.  
 “you might get cases that are bullying but you’ve still got a relationship to repair but at the end of 
the day the manager has acted inappropriately and that shouldn’t be left unchallenged in some 
way so I think you can still have mediation as part of a repair process but it doesn’t necessarily 
mean that the story stops there” (Development and mediator 1) 
In this the need to not consider mediation in isolation from other options becomes clear and 
accordingly, in data collection, after selecting what they consider to be the important factors 
respondents will be asked what they consider the appropriate path to be.  
A further issue which may be considered here is that of the timing of mediation and the extent to 
which the parties’ positions are entrenched: 
 “I think by the time it has come to me it has gone past the point where they’re actually going to 
be able to sit down and sort it out amicably and it’s got to the point where it needs to be resolved 
by other parties coming in and taking decisions…saying this is right or this is wrong” (Development 
and TU, UCU) 
Perception and Intent 
A further factor which arguably may be seen as central to the assessment of behaviour and even 
as a precursor to many of the other factors considered thus far is that of perception and intent. 
Addressing perception and intent is vital in a situation in order to decide whether or not mediation 
is appropriate.  
“the target has really got to have some sense that it might not have been intended I can’t really 
see how this [mediation] would work if the target wasn’t convinced in any way that it wasn’t 
intended”  (TU, UCU 2) 
“sometimes people just think they’re being funny and it’s not and they sometimes run roughshod 
over peoples’ sensitivities and are probably a bit shocked when they find out what they have done 
has offended the other person…I think that’s the most important thing,  getting somebody to say 
sorry I’ve done wrong” (TU, Unite) 
There was an acknowledgement of the complexities introduced by the inherent subjectivity of 
making these assessments. In the context of mediation however, some participants felt that 
perhaps the forum of mediation was a particularly good place to enable each party to 
explore/share their perceptions and intent and to allow the parties and/or the mediator to choose 
how to proceed from there.   
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This issue of perception and intent has again been important in shaping the framework and the 
way the various factors may be considered as interrelated, and data will be collected on whether 
the participants thought the behaviour in a given situation was intended or not; whether the 
perception was reasonable and whether intent is relevant if the behaviour where one of the 
equality factors is involved.  
Parties and Power 
The final factor involves a consideration of who the parties in a dispute are. Here there was a clear 
distinction made between behaviour which occurred between co-workers and that which arose out 
of an employer-employee relationship. The linchpin for this distinction appeared to be the level and 
potential source(s) of power in the situation.  
Where co-workers were involved, there was an indication that power issues were less problematic 
and therefore mediation may have a greater potential for success. This potential was reduced 
when the parties involved were in a vertical relationship and the behaviour was top-down.  
For one participant in particular there was a concern that the UoM and employers in general in 
their pursuit to use mediation, failed to properly understand the power imbalance in the employer-
employee relationship and the problems this posed: 
“I couldn’t make my mind up that they weren’t aware of that research [saying that majority of 
bullying in Britain is top-down] or they were aware of it but weren’t really prepared to take on 
board the implications of it like a lot of employers” (TU, UCU 2)  
And indeed a minority of the participants either did not mention power imbalance or didn’t see it as 
a significant issue. However, the majority saw the power imbalance in such circumstances as 
potentially problematic:  
“if you’ve got a situation where let's say a senior white member of staff has apparently said 
something abusive to a junior black member of staff, I think the power imbalance there might 
mean that mediation might appear to work on the surface but might not really be working because 
the junior party felt too kind of powerless relative to the other person so they might agree to 
things through mediation that are still oppressive and not in their best interest” (Mediator) 
There was an indication that other sources of power may also be present in both scenarios and 
that this would make the situation more complicated. These other sources may be levels of job 
security, for example, or they may take the form of equality considerations, such as the sex or race 
of the parties.  
The severity, control, perception/intent and party factors therefore have important implications 
both conceptually and practically. They also act as a useful foundation for beginning to understand 
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how behaviour may be assessed within the framework. Further, they provide the template for the 
characteristics the cases chosen to anchor the data collection need to display. 
Before moving on to offer a summary and final overview of the pilot, it is important to briefly 
address the implications of using a case study approach, arguably the most important of which is 
the matter of the significance of workplace culture.  
Workplace culture 
All the participants made reference to the culture of the UoM specifically (particularly academic 
staff) and to that of higher education more generally. It was largely seen as a potential hindrance 
to the use of mediation because of the nature of the work, opinions of colleagues and attitudes 
towards workplace conflict, although there was a general feeling that the culture was changing in a 
way which may aid an increased understanding and use of mediation. It was clear from the pilot 
that, although the precise characteristics of the UoM will not apply in all situations, workplace 
culture certainly seems to have an influence on the way in which a decision to try mediation (or 
not) may be made. The question for the research therefore is how this can be reflected in the 
framework as it is not practically feasible to look into the nuanced characteristics of the workplace 
of each participant. However, one may argue that the structure of the research design, for 
example the choice of cases, may seek to describe aspects of the workplace culture which may 
then be represented in the decision making options and again the extent of the significance may 
be explored in the qualitative stages.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The pilot played an important role reaffirming the need for the research and for the mixed method 
design and was therefore pivotal in shaping the research and helping to formulate research 
questions:  
1. What factors influence whether a situation is perceived as bullying and/or harassment? 
2. What factors influence whether mediation is perceived as appropriate? 
3. Why are those factors considered to have an influence? 
4. How do the influencing factors relate to each other? 
From the discussion above one may argue that there is a distinction between who makes decisions 
and who and what influences the decision on the appropriateness of mediation.   
The who in the first instance is the parties to the dispute, the gatekeeper (if there is one) and the 
mediator. These are the people who have the power to instigate, make the decision to attend and 
to potentially terminate the mediation process. Since all need to agree that mediation is the 
appropriate path, it is vital to try and incorporate individuals, gatekeepers and mediators in the 
research.  
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The question in the latter instance is, however, arguably the big one and is essentially what the 
research is concerned with. It is difficult to separate the who and the what in the influence 
element, as one may argue that in many instances the what is manifested through the who, for 
example workplace culture through colleagues or religion or culture through family members. It is 
therefore necessary to explore how both the who and what manifest and how they are related.    
Although the various factors are interrelated in complex ways, in order to try and understand and 
operationalise the ideas and arguments in this research it is helpful to perhaps approach the 
question of appropriateness in an almost sequential way: 
1. Assess the behaviour 
2. Assess how this may (or may not) fit with the characteristics of mediation 
3. Assess who is influencing the individuals in the dispute  
4. Assess the individuals in the dispute 
TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK 
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APPENDIX  3  QUESTIONNAIRE EMAIL INVITATION 
Good morning/afternoon,  
 I'm a PhD student at Manchester Business School. My research is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) and aims to explore perceptions of workplace bullying and 
harassment and how it should be dealt with. I am particularly interested in the role of mediation.  
 I was wondering whether you would be willing to support my research by completing an online 
questionnaire? Anyone who is over 18 and has at least six months work experience in a UK 
workplace can take part. Participants will have the chance to enter a prize draw to win a £100 
Amazon voucher.  
 You can find more information and complete the questionnaire at: http://tinyurl.com/wpbullying  
 If at all possible, I would be very grateful if you could please share this email with others you 
think may be interested in participating. The questionnaire will remain open for the next few 
weeks.  
 Any help you could provide would be very much appreciated.  
 Many thanks,  
 Ria  
Ria Deakin, LLB (Hons), MSc, Assoc CIPD | Doctoral Researcher 
People Management and Organisations (PMO) Division   
Manchester Business School | The University of Manchester | Booth Street West, Manchester, M15 
6PB, UK |      
Original Thinking Applied    
MBS Doctoral Programmes ranked No 1 in the world 2012, 2011, 2009 and 2008 
(Financial Times) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
APPENDIX 4  QUESTIONNAIRE 
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    APPENDIX 5  ALTERNATIVE VIGNETTES 
Priya is of Indian ethnic origin but is British and has always lived in England.  She works as a 
Project Manager in a company which conducts clinical trials. She has worked there for five years 
and has always had a good relationship with her managers and with Dr Smith, a co-founder of the 
company. She recently announced she was thinking of getting another job. When she told Dr 
Smith, he accepted her decision and said “We will probably bump into each other in future, unless 
you are married off in India”. Priya is very upset and offended by the remark. Dr Smith says that 
he said “unless you are married or in India” and not “unless you are married off in India”. They 
had previously had conversations about how her parents wanted to see her married and about the 
possibility of her giving up work if she got married. Priya had also told Dr Smith that she would 
soon be going to India. 
Hannah is a teacher at a large further education college.  The principal of the college is a woman. 
The college has some management problems and there is often a bad atmosphere in the staff 
room. One day, in a meeting, Hannah was asked by a fellow teacher, Stuart, to stop talking as he 
couldn’t hear what was being said by the principal. Hannah was outraged and said “how dare you”.  
In a subsequent argument Stuart told her “not to be a drama queen”. Hannah is now complaining 
that Stuart had previously made a number of sexist comments whilst she had been in the staff 
room but that he had not made them to her. She says he had made reference to “girlie chat” as 
well as making comments about female directors who “did nothing but look nice” and about 
“power dressed women”.  Stuart does not deny making the comments but says that they were 
single comments made over a few months and Hannah did not object at the time. He says she has 
only complained because she is annoyed after their argument.  
James is the owner of a playground building company employing 20 to 25 people.  Employees have 
received no diversity awareness training. In April 2012, the office manager, Lisa, spoke to James 
after she had received a complaint that some employees had shouted racist abuse at a man in the 
street. In response he said “I know I have dealt with it. The man is a fucking immigrant”. In June 
2012, Lisa was upset and offended by James. Although the comment wasn’t directed at her, she 
overheard him asking the office “why is it that white girls like black men?” and laughing. Then, in 
July 2012, in a meeting between James, Lisa and another female employee, Stacey, Lisa says that 
James admitted that in the office “they often joked about why black men have big cocks”. James 
does not deny making the immigrant comment or the comment in June but says he didn’t say 
anything like that in the meeting. Stacey says she couldn’t remember James mentioning “big 
cocks”.  Lisa was born in the UK but both her parents are from Jamaica and she describes herself 
as Afro Caribbean. She feels that James doesn’t like people of different racial groups.  
Hand and Cuffs LLP is a solicitors practice. In total it employs seven people including Kevin, a 
solicitor and Ian, a partner. Kevin is out at work and on work social occasions will wilfully discuss 
his sex life. Kevin and Ian had a coffee meeting to discuss business performance. During the 
meeting Ian joked to Kevin that “even if your strategy was to hang outside lavatories, if it develops 
work I would say it was the best strategy in the world”. They both laughed. Ian said no offence 
had been intended and Kevin said none had been taken. A few weeks later, Kevin was searching 
through some archived files and found a note written by Ian. The note questioned Kevin’s job 
performance and abilities and suggested that he only gave work to his “batty boy mate”. Kevin was 
very shocked and was signed off work with stress and insomnia. Ian says it was a personal note 
that was never meant to be kept or to be seen by anyone, let alone Kevin. He says it was an 
isolated incident and that he doesn’t have homophobic views. He is willing to apologise for any 
offence caused.  
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Jessica has been working as a teaching assistant at a special school for seven years. She says that 
the assistant head teacher Dominic has sexually abused her over a period of six years. She alleges 
he demanded sexual favours, sometimes up to three times a week for a number of months and 
that there were occasions where she felt compelled to participate in oral sex. She says he also 
made inappropriate remarks and requests about her sex life and frequently made comments about 
wanting to have sex with her. Dominic has denied it all, saying that he would not risk his career 
and relationships by behaving in that way. He says that she didn’t complain about him once in six 
years and that she has only complained now because he had criticised her in a staff meeting. 
Jessica says that she didn’t complain because she felt bullied and powerless to stop his advances. 
She feels that the way he spoke to her in the staff meeting was degrading and demeaning. 
Following the meeting, Jessica is now off work with work-related stress. (This was initially used in 
the questionnaire but removed after the pilot) 
Nigel is a nurse at a care home for vulnerable elderly people. He has been working there for two 
years but has been having problems with his colleagues for most of that time. These problems 
include them making multiple complaints about his work. There were occasions where they didn’t 
pass information on to him, including one instance where they didn’t tell him that they were going 
to give a birthday cake to one of the residents whilst he was giving out medicines. To present the 
cake they turned the lights off without warning him, causing him to react angrily. He says that the 
behaviour is led by a fellow nurse Amanda and began seven months earlier when she called him a 
“chimp” and said “he was the most obnoxious being on the planet”.  Nigel says this behaviour 
displays a disregard of him as a human being and as a professional nurse. He is currently off work. 
Amanda can’t remember whether she made the original comments because it was too long ago but 
says if she did make them it wasn’t because Nigel is black.  
Dennis owns a company which repairs household appliances. Amir works for Dennis as an engineer 
and has done for nine years. Both customers and other members of staff have complained that 
Amir was unprofessional and that he was often abusive and insulting. Despite all these complaints 
and a number of formal warnings, Dennis has ensured that Amir kept his job as he felt they were 
friends. When talking to him about yet another complaint, Dennis says that Amir lost his temper 
and shouted at him, saying “you fucking black bastard I am going to fuck your mother and your 
family up”. Amir denies saying that and instead says that Dennis was going to dismiss him and said 
“you fucking Muslims are nothing but trouble fuck off back home”. Dennis strongly denies having 
said this, saying “I abhor racism of all kinds, as a black person I understand what racism is”.  
Bennett’s Signs Ltd is a family run business employing eight members of staff. All but one of the 
employees is male. There was a great deal of joking among some of the employees including 
references to “bums” and “anal sex”.  Leslie works at Bennett’s Signs Ltd. When these comments 
were made, no one at work knew Leslie was gay. Leslie complained to the Director, Frank that the 
comments were getting on his nerves. He said it was on behalf of another colleague who was the 
target of the jokes. A notice that such jokes were not acceptable went out to all staff with their 
wage slip but the jokes didn’t stop. Leslie then chose to come out to a colleague, Paul. Paul then 
told another colleague Carl that Leslie was gay. Last week, Carl shouted across the workshop to 
Paul saying “I can’t believe you had a drink with a gay boy he was probably after your arse”. Leslie 
heard this and is upset by it. In response Carl says “I’m not really bothered if botty bashers work 
here as long as the work gets done”.  
Adam works for a sheet metal business. At a work event he decided to come out to his colleagues. 
Two years later he is complaining of recent behaviour by one of his colleagues, Alex. He is 
complaining that on more than one occasion Alex has simulated oral sex on a banana in front of 
him. He also claims that Alex has pinched his bottom and asked him for a kiss on the lips as he got 
into a taxi after the firm’s Christmas party. Adam thinks that the behaviour is inappropriate and 
discriminatory and wants to leave. Alex denies everything but some colleagues are willing to 
support Adam in his claims.  
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APPENDIX 7  QUESTIONNAIRE CODING FRAME 
        
(Extract from NVivo 10) 
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APPENDIX 7  INTERVIEW INVITATION LETTER 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Invitation to participate in PhD research about workplace mediation 
I'm a PhD student at Manchester Business School. My research is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) and aims to explore perceptions of workplace bullying and 
harassment and how it should be dealt with. I am particularly interested in the role of mediation and 
how appropriate it is for dealing with workplace bullying and harassment. 
I am looking to interview mediators about their views on and experience of the use of mediation in 
the workplace, particularly in respect of its suitability for bullying and harassment. I was wondering 
whether anyone in your organisation would be interested in taking part? The interview would last 
about an hour and would be conducted either face-to-face, via Skype or over the telephone, 
depending on the circumstances (e.g. location, availability). 
If you (or any of your colleagues) are willing to be interviewed and/or would like more information, 
please just let me know: ria.deakin@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk / 07832923888. 
Please accept my apologies for this unsolicited contact. 
I hope to hear from you soon.  
Kind regards,  
 
Ria Deakin, LLB (Hons), MSc, Assoc CIPD | Doctoral Researcher 
People Management and Organisations (PMO) Division  
C1 MBS East | Manchester Business School | The University of Manchester | Booth Street West, 
Manchester, M15 6PB, UK | 
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APPENDIX 8 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
1. How did you become interested in mediation?  
2. What made you decide to become a mediator? 
3. What does mediation mean to you? 
4. How do you see your role as a mediator in the mediation process?  
5. To what extent to you think mediation is appropriate for dealing with workplace bullying?  
6. In your experience, how successful have mediations been in bullying situations? Can you provide 
any examples?  
7. To what extent do you think mediation is an appropriate way of dealing with workplace 
harassment? 
8. How far do you think it’s possible to make a distinction between bullying and harassment?  
9. How far do you think it is necessary to make a distinction between bullying and harassment? 
10. How important is it for a situation to be labelled or given a name, for example as bullying, before 
mediation can take place?   
11.  How relevant is determining up-front whether there is a power imbalance between the parties to 
the decision as to whether mediation is suitable?  
-Relevant: Why, what difference does it make 
-Not relevant: Why not 
12.  How suitable do you think mediation is where there is an allegation of sexism, racism and/or 
homophobia?  
-Why? 
13.  How relevant are the intentions and perceptions of the involved parties in determining whether 
mediation is suitable? 
-Relevant: Why, what difference does it make? 
-Not relevant: Why not  
14.  In what way do you think mediation has the potential to increase tolerance and understanding 
between parties/in an organisation/in society?  
15. What is the role of employment law in mediation?  
16.  To what extent do you think mediation is fair? 
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-what ways (process, outcome, who for) 
17.  In your experience do you think the parties feel that mediation is fair?  
-What makes you reach that conclusion?  
18.  Is fairness something that the parties are concerned with?  
19.  Do you think that mediation provides justice for the parties?  
- If yes, how 
- If no, why not 
20.  Is justice something the parties are concerned with?  
21.  In your experience what is it that the parties are most interested in when you meet them? 
-What are their biggest concerns about trying mediation?  
-What persuades them to try mediation? 
22.  In your experience what is that organisations are most interested in when they contact you? 
-Do they have any reservations about trying mediation?  
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APPENDIX 9 INTERVIEW CODING TEMPLATE (FINAL) 
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(Extract from NVivo 10) 
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APPENDIX 10  EXAMPLE FOCUS GROUP POSTER 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
295 
 
APPENDIX 11  FOCUS GROUP GUIDE  
Outline:  
Four (1 hour) focus groups with 4-5 participants who have at least six months work experience in 
a UK workplace: two groups with male participants and two groups with female participants.  
Purpose:  
Explore what people perceive as and understand to be bullying and/or harassment. 
Explore what is considered as fair way of dealing with bullying and harassment. 
Explore what these perceptions and determinations are based on (public/private standards) and 
how their relative importance is weighed.  
Pre-group:  
Complete confidential demographic information and question about experience of workplace 
bullying.  
Provided with a copy of the scenario to be discussed: 
 
Focus group plan:  
Introduction 
Outline project and how data will be used (confidentiality etc; consent forms) 
Encourage difference of opinion and conversation between participants and not just with 
facilitator. 
Ground rules: 
Be respectful of other opinions, if want to challenge/follow up a comment made by another 
partiĐipaŶt wait for theŵ to fiŶish/doŶ’t shout  
Want to hear from everyone so if someone is talking a lot may ask them to finish, not because 
what theǇ’re saǇiŶg isŶ’t worth heariŶg ďut because time is time and want to give everyone the 
chance to speak.  
Will not be asked to disclose whether you have experience of bullying and harassment but if you 
do aŶd Đhoose to draw oŶ that eǆperieŶĐe theŶ that’s fiŶe, although will Ŷot ďe asked for details.  
Ice breaker/introductions 
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Task 
Each participant to be given a copy of the pre-disclosed scenario together with the corresponding 
questions from the questionnaire and asked to complete them. The responses will be collected in 
(to help in analysis re: individual/group influences).  
Discussion 
1. Would you describe the situation in the scenario as an example of bullying?  
-  What makes you say that?  
2. Would you describe the situation in the scenario as an example of harassment?  
- What makes you say that?  
Things to explore:  
-power relationship 
-intention  
-perception 
3. Do you think that Philip was acting in a sexist way towards Katrina?  
- What makes you say that?  
4. Do you think a situation becomes more serious if sexism is involved?  
- What makes you say that? 
Things to explore:  
-characteristics of the parties involved 
-zero tolerance/inherently wrong or objectionable behaviour 
5. What do you think needs to be done to deal with this situation in a fair way?  
Things to explore:  
-parties have chance to explain themselves 
-importance of public process and outcome 
-employer role and accountability 
-waiving legal right  
-speed and cost 
-importance of justice 
Closing 
 Do you think that taking part in this focus group has changed the way you think about bullying 
and harassment?  
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APPENDIX 12 FOCUS GROUP INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX 13 FOCUS GROUP CODING TEMPLATE (FINAL)  
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(Extract from NVivo 10) 
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APPENDIX 14 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEETS (INTERVIEW AND FOCUS 
GROUP) 
 
Mediator Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
301 
 
 
 
 
Focus Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
